Biography
Vyacheslav Pavlovich Artemyev[i] spent his entire adult life as an officer in Soviet army and NKVD troop units. He wrote prolifically after the war, covering three main topics: Soviet forced labor camps, Soviet military science and training, and Vlasov’s army. His writings were a combination of autobiographical accounts and informational material about the Soviet army, which he wrote for a U.S. Army audience. A sense of bitterness toward the Soviet Union permeated all of his writings, especially in relation to the imprisonment of millions of Soviet citizens.
Artemyev was born in August 1903. His birthplace is unclear because he may have concealed it to hide his family connections. Artemyev stated in a Harvard interview that he was born and went to a military cadet school in Moscow. However, he had previously claimed to have come from another part of Russia and that his mother had moved to Moscow.[ii] Other sources indicate that he was born in the town of Berezan east of Kiev, Ukraine, but that may have been a fictitious birthplace to hide the fact that he was the son of a tsarist military officer who fled Russia during the revolution, but later returned and was arrested along with his mother.[iii] His mother was freed not long after Artemyev joined the army, but his father was in prison until 1923 and died soon after being released.
Artemyev joined the Soviet Army in November 1918, as a 15 year old, with the help of his older brother. Artemyev stated that he was too young when he joined the army to fully understand the Bolshevik ideology or the differences between the Soviet and tsarist armies, so joining the army was not a political move but simply a continuation of his family’s military tradition and to support his younger siblings after his parents’ arrests.[iv]
Artemyev began his military career in a transportation unit, achieving the rank of noncommissioned officer by 1920. His brother again helped him to transfer to a cavalry regiment, and he began officer training there. Although he was in a cavalry regiment during the civil war, he did not see combat action because he attended officer training from September 1921 to June 1923, first in the Unified Military School of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in Moscow, and then as a cadet in the First Moscow Cavalry School. In October 1925, he entered the Kiev Combined Military School, graduating in 1927 with the rank of squadron commander, the equivalent of a captain.[v]
His military training formed the core of some of his later writings. He wrote a monograph in about 1950 about the structure, institutions, and training emphases of the Soviet military training system. He indicated that frequent purges and chitski confused many Soviet military trainees, leaving them unsure about what to believe among the topics they were studying. Some trainees thought, ”Why should I master this? In a little while something new will surely come along, making what I am studying now in the best case obsolete, and maybe even subversive.”[vi] He also quoted a General Lieutenant Rakholskiy, whom he described as the chief of a military academy, who reportedly said in 1942, after the Soviet Army was forced to retreat in the face of advancing German troops: “After tenacious studying in the walls of our academy, you will proceed to your practical training in active Army units, where you should forget everything that we taught you and act as prompted by the circumstances of combat.”[vii]
From his graduation in 1927 until 1933, he served in the “Stalin” Separate Cavalry Brigade, first as a platoon commander in the 63rd Cavalry Regiment from December 1928 to December 1932; then as a platoon commander in the regimental school, adding to his experience with Soviet military training; and then as a squadron commander in the 62nd Cavalry Regiment. He served for a short time in 1933 as the assistant chief of staff of the 61st Cavalry Regiment.[viii]
Artemyev wrote about a Japanese cavalry officer named Major Doi who visited the 62nd Cavalry Regiment for several months during the summer of 1933 as an exchange officer, while Artemyev was serving as a squadron commander. The exchange was part of a Soviet-Japanese agreement by which each country would send five visiting officers from different branches of the military to the other for familiarization. Artemyev was likely referring to Doi Akio, who served and the Japanese military attaché in Moscow in 1939 and eventually rose to the rank of lieutenant general in the Japanese army. Doi became known as an expert on Soviet affairs and served as the head of a Japanese intelligence office, the Continental Affairs Research Institute, responsible for Soviet issues. Artemyev gives what is likely an account of the beginning of Doi’s career as a Soviet specialist.
Although the Soviet Union agreed to the officer exchanges, it did not welcome foreign officers. Artemyev’s regiment prepared for Doi’s visit by warning the officer staff to avoid him as much as possible, to evade conversations, to walk the other direction when they saw him coming, and to report any interchanges to the Party leadership. The politruk and OO chief described Doi as a representative of a capitalist military who only wanted to conduct espionage. The regiment prepared for all foreseeable contingencies to avoid contaminating the Soviet officers. However, Doi presented a problem that they had not foreseen. Doi initially arrived in the Soviet Union as a captain, but received notification of his promotion to major while he was visiting the regiment. He arranged an elaborate promotion party to which he invited the entire brigade command staff. The brigade commander, politruk, and OO chief conferenced to determine how to respond. They hoped to persuade Doi to postpone the party until after the unit completed field exercises in the fall. If Doi persisted in keeping the date of the party, the brigade would send a small contingent of senior officers, particularly political officers, to make an appearance. But Doi had invited the Japanese military attaché in Moscow to the event, so he cold not reschedule it. Consequently, the event occurred, but to the great anxiety of the brigade leadership.
Doi had come to observe military training. However, rather than showing him real Soviet military tactics, the regiment staged military maneuvers to impress Doi, while hiding real, substantive exercises. This led to some uncomfortable situations, such as when the unit was scheduled to be part of a combined arms exercise, which was considered a military secret, and was forced to revise the training plan to prevent Doi from seeing anything real.[ix]
In late 1933 or early 1934, Artemyev was transferred to the NKVD forces, where he served as an inspector of border guards in Central Asia and the Far East. This was probably a meritorious assignment as a reward for loyalty and distinction in his regular army assignments. He also began correspondence courses at the Frunze Military Academy in 1934.[x]
During this period Artemyev traveled to NKVD labor camps conducting inspections, and during one of these trips he encountered a major NKVD figure. In late 1934, Fillip Demyanovich Medved served as the chief of the Leningrad Region NKVD Department when the Leningrad Party Chief, Sergey Mironovich Kirov, was assassinated. Stalin publically accused Medved and his close associates of failing to prevent the murder, and they were given symbolic sentences of three years in the Kolyma forced labor camp in the Soviet Far East.[xi] However, while Medved officially arrived as a prisoner in Magadan in early 1935, in reality he retained his high position in the NKVD. He was assigned to supervise the use of prison labor to build a road from Magadan through the taiga to Yakutia.
Artemyev had an opportunity to speak with Medved one-on-one, and he claims that it was during this conversation that Artemyev’s doubts about the Soviet system took root. He had had doubts as early as 1929 regarding collectivization, but he had suppressed them.[xii] However, Medved described in passionate terms the need to develop communism in the Soviet Union as quickly as possible, at whatever cost, even at the cost of hundreds of thousands of prisoners dying in the process. The only sorrow Medved showed for the deaths of prisoners was the resulting decrement in human labor capacity. Artemyev wrote, “In my naiveté and inexperience I thought, is he out of his mind?...It could not be that our Soviet government, the party, and Comrade Stalin think the same as this disgraced influential chekist and former member of the government.” But he came to realize that Medved’s views about the value of human life were not unique among Soviet leaders, planting seeds of doubt in Artemyev’s mind that never left him.[xiii]
Then, in 1937, Artemyev himself fell victim to the purge and was arrested for allegedly planning terrorist acts against government officials and for participating in a military conspiracy to overthrow the government. After six months in prison, these charges were dropped because a lack of evidence. A new charge of espionage for Japan was raised; it was also dropped. In total, he was held in a corrective labor camp for nine months in 1937 and 1938 “cutting trees.” His brother was arrested the same night as he was but was not so fortunate; he was executed.[xiv]
Artemyev was released in 1938; however, he was still not fully trusted, because he was then sent to the 79th Reserve Regiment of the NKVD, where he served as the chief of staff of the military security force at the NKVD Karaganda Camp System up to fall of 1941. The Karaganda Camp (known as Karlag) was part of the GULAG system. It was a huge collective farm complex on the Kazakh steppe where prisoners performed forced labor, secured by a guard force of 3,500 guards. Artemyev viewed this assignment as an insult to his dignity, below the status of a professional army officer with a military education. However, it was well paid, which allowed him to care for a family, which by this time included a wife, son, and parents-in-law.[xv]
Artemyev wrote of a special operation that occurred in the fall of 1938, not long after he arrive at Karlag. He received an order from the camp NKVD Operational Section to identify a group of the most reliable, disciplined soldiers from among those who were Komsomol members or Party candidates or members for a special assignment. The soldiers were placed in a special unit isolated from the rest of the guard force, and camp staff could only guess their mission through whispered rumors. After a few weeks, one of the soldiers approached Artemyev, the unit’s chief of staff, pleading for a transfer from the special detachment. He described the unit’s secret mission of hauling hundreds of prisoners from the camp to special interrogation facilities, and then to places of execution. The soldier complained that he could no longer bear the terrible assignment, and threatened to commit suicide if he was not transferred. Artemyev reacted with fear himself, ordering the soldier to return to his unit and never speak again about his secret mission. When the operation ended after several months, the special detachment itself disappeared, and no one, including either the unit leadership or the soldiers’ families, ever heard form them again. Artemyev later learned that the operation was conducted at camps all over the country and resulted in the “cleansing” of eight to ten percent of all prisoners in a two-month period.[xvi]
Consequently, Artemyev had personal experience with Soviet corrective labor camps administered by the GULAG both as an inmate and as a guard force officer. When asked during a Harvard Interview Program to estimate how many prisoners were held in Soviet labor camps, he responded angrily and asked, “Why do you people only ask about the number of people in prison camps? Why don’t you also ask about the number deprived of liberty?” He estimated that approximately 13,500,000 people were held as prisoners in NKVD camps, local prison facilities, and isolation facilities for political prisoners.[xvii] He complimented Dallin and Nikolaevskiy for doing the best they could in their book Forced Labor in Soviet Russia in estimating the number of prison camps in the Soviet Union; however, he claimed they estimated too high a number, and he disagreed with their thesis the forced labor was cost effective.[xviii] Although thousands of labor inmates were forced to work for the Soviet state, they represented only a portion of the total prisoner population, which demanded significant resources from the Soviet government to feed and house. Consequently, Artemyev assessed that the prison population cost more than the benefit it provided in free labor.[xix]
Artemyev distinguishes between an NKVD forces commander, which he was, and a “chekist,” which he claims he was not. In Artemyev’s estimation, a chekist was an NKVD operational officer from the Main Administration of State Security (Главное Управление Государственной Безопасности; GUGB), which in 1941 was separated from the NKVD and made a separate Народный Комиссариат Внешних Дел (People’s Commissariat of State Security; NKGB). Artemyev never worked in the GUGB/NKGB, and thus he did not claim the title “chekist.”[xx]
Artermyev’s status as a full Soviet citizen was eventually renewed. In 1940 he became a candidate for Party membership, and in 1941, after he had arrived at Karlag, he became a full Party member.[xxi] He claimed that he joined the party only to end the badgering from the party bosses and to prove that he had nothing to hide.[xxii] Nevertheless, he was highly critical of party control of military decision making through political commissars. He expressed frustration about commissars’ interference in the military command structure. He endured many arguments between unit commanders and commissars, and, as chief of staff, he was often held responsible for the delays that those arguments caused.[xxiii]
Artemyev discussed the organization of corrective-labor camps and the roles of different NVKD sections and Party cells in the camps during his Harvard Program interviews in late 1950. His comments were based on a two-part essay he was writing at about the same time under the auspices of the Research Program on the USSR.[xxiv] Artemyev’s essay, Исправительно-Трудовые Лагеря МВД СССР (Corrective Labor Camps of the USSR MVD), provides an extensive description of the structure and functions of Soviet corrective-labor camps, how they related to the GULAG in Moscow, prisoners’ living conditions, Soviet use of forced labor, and the security systems in the camps.
He introduced the book, saying, “This book is not designed for a wide circle of readers; it would have interest only for those who desire to study the Soviet camp system and its purpose.”[xxv] A group that did have that interest was the International Commission Against Concentration Regimes, which was founded in Brussels by David Rousset, a survivor of a Nazi concentration camp during World War II. The Commission endorsed Artemyev’s essay, and Artemyev appeared before the commission in May 1951 as an expert on Soviet concentration camps, basing his remarks on his essay.
Artemyev wrote that only a small portion of the millions of prisoners in Soviet corrective labor camps had committed what other regimes would consider crimes. Prisoners were held for telling an anti-Soviet joke or openly expressing disagreement with the Party’s or government’s policies; for having come from a privileged family during tsarist times or for holding a church position; for showing up to work more than 20 minutes late or refusing a work assignment; for having snuck into a kolkhoz field and picked wheat to make a few cakes for his starving family; for returning to the Soviet Union after having been a POW under the Nazis, even if they had been wounded in battle; or those whom the Nazis transported for forced labor. He contrasted the Soviet mindset with what he viewed as a typical Christian philosophy, which says that it is better to let 10 guilty people go free than to condemn one innocent person. In the Soviet Union, the philosophy was that if 10 people are “repressed” and one was actually guilty, then the repression was justified.[xxvi]
As of 1950, when Artemyev was writing his essay, he asserted that the chief of the GULAG in Moscow was the fourth deputy of the MVD, after the chief of the GUGB, Chief of the Главное Управление Пограничной и Внутренней Охраны (Main Administration of Border and Internal Security; GUPVO), and the chief of the Главное Управление Советской Милиции (Main Administration of Soviet Militia; GUM).[xxvii] The GUGB was represented in each prison camp by an Operational Section that was directly subordinate to the GUGB in Moscow, not to the camp director. It was a microcosm of the GUGB in general: it recruited agents among the staff of the camp, including in the guard force, to monitor signs of economic or political counterrevolution, and had the same powers to arrest as it did in other settings. It also developed extensive informant networks among the prisoner population to gauge the prisoners’ attitudes, political views, and reliability. Prisoners who were found to be politically reliable could be employed as a civilian employee at the camp after they completed their sentence. Artemyev had personal experience with this section, because the chief of the Operational Section had operational control over the guard force, where Artemyev worked.[xxviii] The second part of Artemyev’s essay was entirely devoted to the minute details of the organization, training, deployment of the camp guard force.
Artemyev wrote that while he was working at Karlag, a group of 250 soldiers arrived in August 1941 from the front to supplement the guard force. They came with horror stories about their experiences during the chaotic first months of the war. They had been assigned to guard a prison camp in Belarus, and they recounted instances where the camp administration was afraid of riots and mass disorder among prisoners, and, feeling the weakening of Soviet power, offered concessions to prisoners to prevent such occurrences.[xxix] However, the prisoners did not rise up against their captors because their personal will had atrophied to the point that they did not take advantage of the situation. Incidentally, it was in this environment that defector Ivan Georgiyevich Bessonov’s “Airdrop on the GULAG” operation dropped Soviet POWs trained to raise prisoner-armies at forced labor camps in the Soviet rear. Bessonov’s operation met with little success; no mass uprisings occurred among prisoners.
The frontline soldiers recounted that during this time an order came from Moscow to evacuate prisoners to the rear where possible, and where not possible, to destroy them.[xxx] The soldiers described the panic that ensued as the front advanced toward Minsk and prison camps hastily organized evacuations. The mass evacuations led to instances of mass escapes; it was during one of these breakouts that Anokhin (aka Nikolay Potapov) fled his Soviet captors in September 1941.[xxxi]
At the same time, the NKVD was ordered to arrest anyone who could be considered politically unreliable, adding huge numbers of new people to the prisons. Individuals of foreign origins were especially rounded up, even if they were Soviet citizens who had never traveled outside the Soviet Union. Consequently, the front was moving too quickly to evacuate the increasing number of prisoners, and the NKVD troops commenced to slaughter them. They opened fire and threw grenades into the prison, and lit it on fire, killing nearly 10,000 prisoners. Then NKVD forces departed the scene, leaving the Army soldiers who had been guarding the prison. Upon seeing the slaughter, the local population attacked the remaining guards, who fled eastward into Soviet-held territory, and eventually arrived in Moscow, where they were formed into a unit and assigned to the Karaganda Camps as a guard force.[xxxii]
The soldiers arrived in Karaganda with trunks full of money and valuables and large amounts of vodka that they had looted along the way. They caused havoc in the city, running around armed and drunk and ignoring the police. The Karaganda Camp guard force rounded up the unruly soldiers, packed them into trucks and took them to the camp, where they underwent political training and military disciplinary training. However, the horrendous scenes they had witnessed on the front left them cynical and disenchanted. The stories also had an impact on Artemyev, who had spent time in a Soviet forced labor camp himself several years earlier.
Artemyev worked in the Karlag for about a year. He then reenrolled at the Frunze Military Academy in 1942 and graduated in February 1943. Aleksandrov indicates that he was promoted to lieutenant colonel at the end of 1942 or beginning of 1943[xxxiii]; Artemyev himself, however, states that he was only a major in the Soviet Army.[xxxiv] He was originally slated to go to a staff position in the Far East after graduating from the academy; however, an assignment in the Far East meant leaving his family for a year and a half and working in a staff job instead of a command position. He appealed to the academy director, who refused to change the assignment. He resorted to flunking the course on staff work intentionally to remove himself from consideration for a staff job.[xxxv] The ploy worked; he was assigned as a commander of the 46th Guards Cavalry Regiment, serving on the front until September 1943, when he was captured as a POW.
Artemyev noted that when German troops captured him, they treated him respectfully and cared for wounds that he had received in battle.[xxxvi] Artemyev was held in the Lötzen Officers’ Camp (near modern-day Giżycko, Poland), where he was interrogated and performed unspecified work for the Germans.[xxxvii] He looked back at this time with a degree of relief, both because of the respectful treatment offered by the Germans, and because while he was POW he had the luxury of time to think. He reevaluated his thoughts about his career and prior assignments, leading him become increasingly disillusioned about the Soviet system. He asked himself, “Why did I not become critical before,” and he realized that he had been so busy during his career he had never had time to critically analyze what was happening around him. He claimed that these realizations were not the product of German propaganda, which was “so stupid, so idiotic, so base that it could not have influenced anyone,”[xxxviii] but rather the result of unoccupied time he had to think.
In June 1944, he joined the ROA and was assigned as commander of the Second Grenadier Regiment, First Infantry Division of the KONR military forces. Artemyev indicated that there was conflict between Vlasov and the Germans about plans for using the ROA, and that Vlasov had even instituted a signal to his commanders about whether to obey a German order or sabotage it; if Vlasov disagreed with the order, he would sign his name on it with the last line going down; if he agreed with it, the last line of the signature would go up.[xxxix]
In April and May 1945, Artemyev commanded his unit in military actions around Prague, in some of the only combat that the KONR saw during the war. He encountered Soviet forces during these operations and entered into discussions about the handover of his KONR unit to Soviet forces, with promises from the Soviet commander guaranteeing life and freedom. He claims, however, that his parlaying was only a delaying tactic to allow time for the First KONR Infantry Division to escape Soviet control into U.S.-held territory.[xl]
After the war, Artemyev offered his services to U.S. forces in Germany as a research analyst on Soviet issues. From 1947 to 1950 he worked in a U.S. Army intelligence school in Regensburg, Germany, and from 1948 to 1951 he was an associate of Columbia University’s Research Program on the USSR. He wrote a number of monographs for those institutions during this time, focusing on Soviet intelligence structure, military doctrine, and Vlasov’s Army. He was also interviewed for the Harvard University Project on the Soviet Social System in November 1950.
In the mid-1950s, the Research Program on the USSR published a number of Artemyev’s papers, particularly those that dealt with Soviet state security services. In 1954, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who had recently completed his Ph.D. at Harvard, published a collection of essays by former Soviet military officers under the auspices of the Research Program on the USSR on the topic of political control of the Soviet military. The book included an essay by Artemyev titled Special Sections in the Soviet Army,[xli] which describes the duties of special sections (OOs), beginning with combatting foreign espionage, but going far beyond that to monitor the training, readiness, security, and above all, political reliability of Soviet military forces. It summarizes the approach that OOs take toward the military:
For the organs of state security, and for special sections in particular, ranks, social and service positions, and party membership do not exist. For them only people and their behavior exist. The special section views every military member, regardless of his position, above all as capable of committing a crime against the state, and the higher the position that a person occupies, the more dangerous it could be for the state.[xlii]
A later article by Artemyev on Soviet military law stated similarly, “The Soviet military law system makes no distinctions of rank. High and low alike share its weight and fear its impact. Indeed, the more senior the officer, the more apprehensive he may be, for in many instances even a minor transgression may mean the end of a career, regardless of prior distinctions and merits.”[xliii] He wrote separately, “Dictatorships tolerate no outstanding personalities except the personality of the dictator himself.”[xliv]
An updated treatment of OOs, which under the KGB became the Отдел контрразведки (Counterintelligence Department), appears in the U.S. Army journal Military Review in 1963. Artemyev cites new regulations that had had been promulgated in the 1950s and early 1960s, based on the same foundation of political control for which OOs were responsible.[xlv]
In 1957, Simon Wolin, a Soviet émigré to the United States,[xlvi] and Robert Slusser, an associate director of the Research Program on the USSR, co-edited another volume titled The Soviet Secret Police, which included several of Artemyev’s papers.[xlvii] Wolin and Slusser’s book included four essays co-authored by Artemyev and another more recent intelligence officer defector, Grigoriy Stepanovich Burlutskiy, who defected in June 1953. Like Artemyev, Burlutskiy had been assigned to Central Asia, and their essays touched on the organization, training, and activities of Soviet state security organizations, with Burlutskiy supplementing Artemyev’s knowledge with information about changes that occurred after World War II. The essays were titled
· Structure and Condition of the Soviet Organs of State Security After World War II[xlviii]
· Personnel, Conditions of Service and Training in the Border Troops[xlix]
· Internal Activities of the Soviet Organs of State Security After World War II[l]
· Postwar Activities of the Soviet Organs of State Security in Western Europe[li]
The majority of Artemyev’s writings focus on Soviet internal security and prison camp operations, as with the first three of these articles. However, he and Burlutskiy collaborated on an essay about Soviet foreign espionage in Western Europe that describes the advantages that Soviet intelligence activities enjoyed abroad and the disadvantages that impeded them. They identify the following as Soviet intelligence advantages:
· The wartime alliance with the Soviet Union gave Soviet intelligence opportunities to study Western military industry, communications, economics, and transportation
· Victory over Germany gave the Soviet Union access to the people and archives of the defeated countries
· The Soviet Union can dispatch agents among the flow of refugees being repatriated from Eastern to Western Europe
· The Soviet Union established various governmental representation offices and pro-Soviet/pro-communist organizations in Western Europe during the war, which, in addition to diplomatic representations, can serve as cover for intelligence activities
· The ease of travel in Western Europe, and the absence of restricted zones that exist in the Soviet Union, simplifies the movement of agents
· Western laws are lenient toward espionage
· Freedom of speech and the lack of censorship in the West makes it easier to learn about military and economic topics that in the Soviet Union are considered state secrets, and allows for the spread of pro-Soviet/pro-communist ideas and opinions[lii]
Soviet intelligence disadvantages are:
· Soviet intelligence lost credibility before the war because it failed to ascertain German preparations for attacking the Soviet Union; Nazi intelligence and counterintelligence blunted pre-war Soviet intelligence
· The war further destabilized Soviet intelligence; the banning and suppression of pro-communist organizations in European countries during the war impeded Soviet clandestine activity
· After the war, many Soviet individuals who possessed valuable information remained in the West, providing the West with knowledge of “many things which are kept strictly secret in the Soviet Union, among them many aspects of Soviet government activity, including state security organs, intelligence, and subversion” (Artemyev probably included himself in this group)
· Western counterintelligence has gradually gained a greater understanding of Soviet espionage and subversion techniques, allowing the West to develop increasingly effective countermeasures
· Soviet aggressive actions since the end of the war have undermined Soviet and communist prestige in the eyes of world public opinion, creating discontent even within communist parties[liii]
A review of Wolin and Slusser’s book by John Rondeau, published in Studies in Intelligence in 1958, disdainfully critiques Artemyev’s and Burlutskiy’s essays, asserting that they occupy a disproportionate amount of space in the volume. Rondeau questions Artemyev’s and Burlutskiy’s competence to discuss the topics they address, especially espionage in Western Europe.[liv] Rondeau disparages the authors for their “short and inadequate essay on espionage in Western Europe,” especially pointing to a statement that he claims denies “the elementary fact that Moscow closely supervises all foreign residencies and networks.”[lv] Rondeau is reacting to a comment in the essay that states, “It would be impossible for all this [the KGB’s] many-sided espionage in every country of the world to be directly organized and led from Moscow.”[lvi] While this and other unclear statements in the essay do detract from its credibility, the description of Soviet advantages and disadvantages are of some value.
Artemyev also wrote an essay for the Research Program on the USSR that touched on overseas trade and intelligence activities, with a particular emphasis on the Soviet trade representation in Iran. He begins this essay with a statement that the information contained in it originated with an individual who had been employee in the Soviet trade mission in Iran before World War II. Thus, Artemyev’s information in this area was second hand. Nevertheless, his essay describes the elaborate and strict screening of potential employees for Soviet trade missions abroad, political indoctrination, and even provocations directed at the candidate to determine how he or she would respond.
Once abroad, Soviet trade mission employees were expected to conclude trade deals in the Union’s favor and to collect whatever intelligence they could. While Soviet fur traders traveled throughout Iran, for example, they collected information about the condition of roads and bridges, military border zones, military and industrial installations, etc. They collected intelligence about market conditions and prices for commodities that the Soviet Union wanted to buy or sell. The Soviet trade officials took advantage of Iranian employees who were willing to take bribes to falsify trade arrangements or provide inside information. The NKVD office in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan, ran the intelligence activities of the Soviet Trade Mission in Iran and . Artemyev identified the chief of Soviet intelligence in Iran as Boris Yartsev.[lvii] Artemyev and his source may not have been aware that Yartsev was the cover name of Boris Arkadyevich Rybkin, a long-time Soviet intelligence officer.[lviii]
Artemyev identified several Soviet intelligence recruited agents in Iran:
· A Persian man nicknamed “Arvad” who worked as courier for the British consulate in Meshed. He provided information about British diplomatic correspondence. Collected material was photographed in a photography lab located in a safe house.
· An Armenian national nicknamed “Seid” who worked in the Meshed post office. He provided correspondence from large commercial firms.
· An Armenian named Aganov who worked in a bank and provided information about prominent bank clientele.[lix]
Iran’s road and rail infrastructure was a particularly prominent collection target for Soviet intelligence. An intelligence officer named Bazikov, who was covered as an economist at the Soviet Trade Mission in Tehran, ran sources in Iranian government institutions, including a senior official in the Ministry of Railroads, who provided plans for the construction along the Trans-Persian Railroad. Chauffeurs provided information about the construction of bridges and the status of rivers and reservoirs. The Soviet trade mission staff also sponsored excursions into the countryside for picnics and hunting, during which topography specialists collected cartographic information. Artemyev claims that this collection greatly assisted the Soviet army when it entered Iran in 1941, because Soviet maps were more accurate than the Iranians’ own maps.[lx]
Soviet intelligence services in Iran also maintained contact with Iranian communist organizations and supervised their activities. Soviet advisors created underground cells of eight to ten Iranians who met in teashops and brothels to plan intelligence and subversion activities. Covert support to Iranian communists included provision of propaganda materials and weapons for rebel tribes.[lxi]
Between 1962 and 1969, Artemyev wrote ten articles for the U.S. Army journal Military Review on topics of military doctrine, military discipline, party control of the military, Soviet internal security matters, and the ROA. Artemyev is described as a “graduate of the Soviet War College (Frunze Military Academy) [who] has written extensively on the Soviet armed forces.” Much of the material in these articles analyzes Soviet military affairs in the decades after Artemyev’s defection in 1943. They are often based on topics he had covered in earlier writings, but cite new material and events that Artemyev uses to show continuity in Soviet military affairs.
Artemyev’s final publication was a volume on the ROA, Первая дивизия РОА. Материалы к истории освободительного движения народов России (1941-1945) (First Division of the ROA: Historical Materials of the Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Russia (1941-1945)), which was published in 1974. He writes in the preface that he had begun writing the book in 1946 when his recollections were still fresh.[lxii] He sent six excerpts from the book to Boris Nikolaevsky in September 1950 based on notes that he had made contemporary with the depicted events, which allowed him to “produce with precision the events, dates, places, and real names as they unfolded at the time.” He tells Nikolaevsky that he is probably the only person remaining who was involved in those events who could describe them in such detail.[lxiii] There is no indication that Nikolaevsky took any steps to publish the material at the time.
Artemyev had tried at least one other time to publish his book in 1965 through the Regnery Publishing Company. A reviewer of the draft criticized it for lack of documentation and for claiming to recall long conversations 20 years after the events, although Artemyev reminder Regnery that he had recorded the conversations soon after they had taken place. Artemyev’s return address at the time was Oberammergau, Germany, where he was apparently teaching at the U.S. Army foreign area officers’ school.[lxiv]
He covered some of the material in an article in Military Review in November 1967 titled ”Soviet Volunteers in the German Army.”[lxv] But he finally published the book in its entirety in 1974 through the auspices of the Союз Борьбы за Освобождение Народов России (Union for the Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia; SBONR), which published Russian émigré literature in the 1970s and 1980s. The book was not a great commercial success, but Kirill Aleksandrov, who has written several scholarly works on the ROA and General Vlasov, cites it extensively as an authoritative source.[lxvi]
Artemyev left a wife a child in the Soviet Union when he fell into Soviet captivity. He never heard from them again. He subsequently married a German woman, Dagni von Erdmann, after arriving in Germany, and lived the rest of his life there, working as an instructor in U.S. Army intelligence schools. No further information is available about Artemyev after the publication of his book in 1974, and his date of death is unknown.
Artemyev was born in August 1903. His birthplace is unclear because he may have concealed it to hide his family connections. Artemyev stated in a Harvard interview that he was born and went to a military cadet school in Moscow. However, he had previously claimed to have come from another part of Russia and that his mother had moved to Moscow.[ii] Other sources indicate that he was born in the town of Berezan east of Kiev, Ukraine, but that may have been a fictitious birthplace to hide the fact that he was the son of a tsarist military officer who fled Russia during the revolution, but later returned and was arrested along with his mother.[iii] His mother was freed not long after Artemyev joined the army, but his father was in prison until 1923 and died soon after being released.
Artemyev joined the Soviet Army in November 1918, as a 15 year old, with the help of his older brother. Artemyev stated that he was too young when he joined the army to fully understand the Bolshevik ideology or the differences between the Soviet and tsarist armies, so joining the army was not a political move but simply a continuation of his family’s military tradition and to support his younger siblings after his parents’ arrests.[iv]
Artemyev began his military career in a transportation unit, achieving the rank of noncommissioned officer by 1920. His brother again helped him to transfer to a cavalry regiment, and he began officer training there. Although he was in a cavalry regiment during the civil war, he did not see combat action because he attended officer training from September 1921 to June 1923, first in the Unified Military School of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in Moscow, and then as a cadet in the First Moscow Cavalry School. In October 1925, he entered the Kiev Combined Military School, graduating in 1927 with the rank of squadron commander, the equivalent of a captain.[v]
His military training formed the core of some of his later writings. He wrote a monograph in about 1950 about the structure, institutions, and training emphases of the Soviet military training system. He indicated that frequent purges and chitski confused many Soviet military trainees, leaving them unsure about what to believe among the topics they were studying. Some trainees thought, ”Why should I master this? In a little while something new will surely come along, making what I am studying now in the best case obsolete, and maybe even subversive.”[vi] He also quoted a General Lieutenant Rakholskiy, whom he described as the chief of a military academy, who reportedly said in 1942, after the Soviet Army was forced to retreat in the face of advancing German troops: “After tenacious studying in the walls of our academy, you will proceed to your practical training in active Army units, where you should forget everything that we taught you and act as prompted by the circumstances of combat.”[vii]
From his graduation in 1927 until 1933, he served in the “Stalin” Separate Cavalry Brigade, first as a platoon commander in the 63rd Cavalry Regiment from December 1928 to December 1932; then as a platoon commander in the regimental school, adding to his experience with Soviet military training; and then as a squadron commander in the 62nd Cavalry Regiment. He served for a short time in 1933 as the assistant chief of staff of the 61st Cavalry Regiment.[viii]
Artemyev wrote about a Japanese cavalry officer named Major Doi who visited the 62nd Cavalry Regiment for several months during the summer of 1933 as an exchange officer, while Artemyev was serving as a squadron commander. The exchange was part of a Soviet-Japanese agreement by which each country would send five visiting officers from different branches of the military to the other for familiarization. Artemyev was likely referring to Doi Akio, who served and the Japanese military attaché in Moscow in 1939 and eventually rose to the rank of lieutenant general in the Japanese army. Doi became known as an expert on Soviet affairs and served as the head of a Japanese intelligence office, the Continental Affairs Research Institute, responsible for Soviet issues. Artemyev gives what is likely an account of the beginning of Doi’s career as a Soviet specialist.
Although the Soviet Union agreed to the officer exchanges, it did not welcome foreign officers. Artemyev’s regiment prepared for Doi’s visit by warning the officer staff to avoid him as much as possible, to evade conversations, to walk the other direction when they saw him coming, and to report any interchanges to the Party leadership. The politruk and OO chief described Doi as a representative of a capitalist military who only wanted to conduct espionage. The regiment prepared for all foreseeable contingencies to avoid contaminating the Soviet officers. However, Doi presented a problem that they had not foreseen. Doi initially arrived in the Soviet Union as a captain, but received notification of his promotion to major while he was visiting the regiment. He arranged an elaborate promotion party to which he invited the entire brigade command staff. The brigade commander, politruk, and OO chief conferenced to determine how to respond. They hoped to persuade Doi to postpone the party until after the unit completed field exercises in the fall. If Doi persisted in keeping the date of the party, the brigade would send a small contingent of senior officers, particularly political officers, to make an appearance. But Doi had invited the Japanese military attaché in Moscow to the event, so he cold not reschedule it. Consequently, the event occurred, but to the great anxiety of the brigade leadership.
Doi had come to observe military training. However, rather than showing him real Soviet military tactics, the regiment staged military maneuvers to impress Doi, while hiding real, substantive exercises. This led to some uncomfortable situations, such as when the unit was scheduled to be part of a combined arms exercise, which was considered a military secret, and was forced to revise the training plan to prevent Doi from seeing anything real.[ix]
In late 1933 or early 1934, Artemyev was transferred to the NKVD forces, where he served as an inspector of border guards in Central Asia and the Far East. This was probably a meritorious assignment as a reward for loyalty and distinction in his regular army assignments. He also began correspondence courses at the Frunze Military Academy in 1934.[x]
During this period Artemyev traveled to NKVD labor camps conducting inspections, and during one of these trips he encountered a major NKVD figure. In late 1934, Fillip Demyanovich Medved served as the chief of the Leningrad Region NKVD Department when the Leningrad Party Chief, Sergey Mironovich Kirov, was assassinated. Stalin publically accused Medved and his close associates of failing to prevent the murder, and they were given symbolic sentences of three years in the Kolyma forced labor camp in the Soviet Far East.[xi] However, while Medved officially arrived as a prisoner in Magadan in early 1935, in reality he retained his high position in the NKVD. He was assigned to supervise the use of prison labor to build a road from Magadan through the taiga to Yakutia.
Artemyev had an opportunity to speak with Medved one-on-one, and he claims that it was during this conversation that Artemyev’s doubts about the Soviet system took root. He had had doubts as early as 1929 regarding collectivization, but he had suppressed them.[xii] However, Medved described in passionate terms the need to develop communism in the Soviet Union as quickly as possible, at whatever cost, even at the cost of hundreds of thousands of prisoners dying in the process. The only sorrow Medved showed for the deaths of prisoners was the resulting decrement in human labor capacity. Artemyev wrote, “In my naiveté and inexperience I thought, is he out of his mind?...It could not be that our Soviet government, the party, and Comrade Stalin think the same as this disgraced influential chekist and former member of the government.” But he came to realize that Medved’s views about the value of human life were not unique among Soviet leaders, planting seeds of doubt in Artemyev’s mind that never left him.[xiii]
Then, in 1937, Artemyev himself fell victim to the purge and was arrested for allegedly planning terrorist acts against government officials and for participating in a military conspiracy to overthrow the government. After six months in prison, these charges were dropped because a lack of evidence. A new charge of espionage for Japan was raised; it was also dropped. In total, he was held in a corrective labor camp for nine months in 1937 and 1938 “cutting trees.” His brother was arrested the same night as he was but was not so fortunate; he was executed.[xiv]
Artemyev was released in 1938; however, he was still not fully trusted, because he was then sent to the 79th Reserve Regiment of the NKVD, where he served as the chief of staff of the military security force at the NKVD Karaganda Camp System up to fall of 1941. The Karaganda Camp (known as Karlag) was part of the GULAG system. It was a huge collective farm complex on the Kazakh steppe where prisoners performed forced labor, secured by a guard force of 3,500 guards. Artemyev viewed this assignment as an insult to his dignity, below the status of a professional army officer with a military education. However, it was well paid, which allowed him to care for a family, which by this time included a wife, son, and parents-in-law.[xv]
Artemyev wrote of a special operation that occurred in the fall of 1938, not long after he arrive at Karlag. He received an order from the camp NKVD Operational Section to identify a group of the most reliable, disciplined soldiers from among those who were Komsomol members or Party candidates or members for a special assignment. The soldiers were placed in a special unit isolated from the rest of the guard force, and camp staff could only guess their mission through whispered rumors. After a few weeks, one of the soldiers approached Artemyev, the unit’s chief of staff, pleading for a transfer from the special detachment. He described the unit’s secret mission of hauling hundreds of prisoners from the camp to special interrogation facilities, and then to places of execution. The soldier complained that he could no longer bear the terrible assignment, and threatened to commit suicide if he was not transferred. Artemyev reacted with fear himself, ordering the soldier to return to his unit and never speak again about his secret mission. When the operation ended after several months, the special detachment itself disappeared, and no one, including either the unit leadership or the soldiers’ families, ever heard form them again. Artemyev later learned that the operation was conducted at camps all over the country and resulted in the “cleansing” of eight to ten percent of all prisoners in a two-month period.[xvi]
Consequently, Artemyev had personal experience with Soviet corrective labor camps administered by the GULAG both as an inmate and as a guard force officer. When asked during a Harvard Interview Program to estimate how many prisoners were held in Soviet labor camps, he responded angrily and asked, “Why do you people only ask about the number of people in prison camps? Why don’t you also ask about the number deprived of liberty?” He estimated that approximately 13,500,000 people were held as prisoners in NKVD camps, local prison facilities, and isolation facilities for political prisoners.[xvii] He complimented Dallin and Nikolaevskiy for doing the best they could in their book Forced Labor in Soviet Russia in estimating the number of prison camps in the Soviet Union; however, he claimed they estimated too high a number, and he disagreed with their thesis the forced labor was cost effective.[xviii] Although thousands of labor inmates were forced to work for the Soviet state, they represented only a portion of the total prisoner population, which demanded significant resources from the Soviet government to feed and house. Consequently, Artemyev assessed that the prison population cost more than the benefit it provided in free labor.[xix]
Artemyev distinguishes between an NKVD forces commander, which he was, and a “chekist,” which he claims he was not. In Artemyev’s estimation, a chekist was an NKVD operational officer from the Main Administration of State Security (Главное Управление Государственной Безопасности; GUGB), which in 1941 was separated from the NKVD and made a separate Народный Комиссариат Внешних Дел (People’s Commissariat of State Security; NKGB). Artemyev never worked in the GUGB/NKGB, and thus he did not claim the title “chekist.”[xx]
Artermyev’s status as a full Soviet citizen was eventually renewed. In 1940 he became a candidate for Party membership, and in 1941, after he had arrived at Karlag, he became a full Party member.[xxi] He claimed that he joined the party only to end the badgering from the party bosses and to prove that he had nothing to hide.[xxii] Nevertheless, he was highly critical of party control of military decision making through political commissars. He expressed frustration about commissars’ interference in the military command structure. He endured many arguments between unit commanders and commissars, and, as chief of staff, he was often held responsible for the delays that those arguments caused.[xxiii]
Artemyev discussed the organization of corrective-labor camps and the roles of different NVKD sections and Party cells in the camps during his Harvard Program interviews in late 1950. His comments were based on a two-part essay he was writing at about the same time under the auspices of the Research Program on the USSR.[xxiv] Artemyev’s essay, Исправительно-Трудовые Лагеря МВД СССР (Corrective Labor Camps of the USSR MVD), provides an extensive description of the structure and functions of Soviet corrective-labor camps, how they related to the GULAG in Moscow, prisoners’ living conditions, Soviet use of forced labor, and the security systems in the camps.
He introduced the book, saying, “This book is not designed for a wide circle of readers; it would have interest only for those who desire to study the Soviet camp system and its purpose.”[xxv] A group that did have that interest was the International Commission Against Concentration Regimes, which was founded in Brussels by David Rousset, a survivor of a Nazi concentration camp during World War II. The Commission endorsed Artemyev’s essay, and Artemyev appeared before the commission in May 1951 as an expert on Soviet concentration camps, basing his remarks on his essay.
Artemyev wrote that only a small portion of the millions of prisoners in Soviet corrective labor camps had committed what other regimes would consider crimes. Prisoners were held for telling an anti-Soviet joke or openly expressing disagreement with the Party’s or government’s policies; for having come from a privileged family during tsarist times or for holding a church position; for showing up to work more than 20 minutes late or refusing a work assignment; for having snuck into a kolkhoz field and picked wheat to make a few cakes for his starving family; for returning to the Soviet Union after having been a POW under the Nazis, even if they had been wounded in battle; or those whom the Nazis transported for forced labor. He contrasted the Soviet mindset with what he viewed as a typical Christian philosophy, which says that it is better to let 10 guilty people go free than to condemn one innocent person. In the Soviet Union, the philosophy was that if 10 people are “repressed” and one was actually guilty, then the repression was justified.[xxvi]
As of 1950, when Artemyev was writing his essay, he asserted that the chief of the GULAG in Moscow was the fourth deputy of the MVD, after the chief of the GUGB, Chief of the Главное Управление Пограничной и Внутренней Охраны (Main Administration of Border and Internal Security; GUPVO), and the chief of the Главное Управление Советской Милиции (Main Administration of Soviet Militia; GUM).[xxvii] The GUGB was represented in each prison camp by an Operational Section that was directly subordinate to the GUGB in Moscow, not to the camp director. It was a microcosm of the GUGB in general: it recruited agents among the staff of the camp, including in the guard force, to monitor signs of economic or political counterrevolution, and had the same powers to arrest as it did in other settings. It also developed extensive informant networks among the prisoner population to gauge the prisoners’ attitudes, political views, and reliability. Prisoners who were found to be politically reliable could be employed as a civilian employee at the camp after they completed their sentence. Artemyev had personal experience with this section, because the chief of the Operational Section had operational control over the guard force, where Artemyev worked.[xxviii] The second part of Artemyev’s essay was entirely devoted to the minute details of the organization, training, deployment of the camp guard force.
Artemyev wrote that while he was working at Karlag, a group of 250 soldiers arrived in August 1941 from the front to supplement the guard force. They came with horror stories about their experiences during the chaotic first months of the war. They had been assigned to guard a prison camp in Belarus, and they recounted instances where the camp administration was afraid of riots and mass disorder among prisoners, and, feeling the weakening of Soviet power, offered concessions to prisoners to prevent such occurrences.[xxix] However, the prisoners did not rise up against their captors because their personal will had atrophied to the point that they did not take advantage of the situation. Incidentally, it was in this environment that defector Ivan Georgiyevich Bessonov’s “Airdrop on the GULAG” operation dropped Soviet POWs trained to raise prisoner-armies at forced labor camps in the Soviet rear. Bessonov’s operation met with little success; no mass uprisings occurred among prisoners.
The frontline soldiers recounted that during this time an order came from Moscow to evacuate prisoners to the rear where possible, and where not possible, to destroy them.[xxx] The soldiers described the panic that ensued as the front advanced toward Minsk and prison camps hastily organized evacuations. The mass evacuations led to instances of mass escapes; it was during one of these breakouts that Anokhin (aka Nikolay Potapov) fled his Soviet captors in September 1941.[xxxi]
At the same time, the NKVD was ordered to arrest anyone who could be considered politically unreliable, adding huge numbers of new people to the prisons. Individuals of foreign origins were especially rounded up, even if they were Soviet citizens who had never traveled outside the Soviet Union. Consequently, the front was moving too quickly to evacuate the increasing number of prisoners, and the NKVD troops commenced to slaughter them. They opened fire and threw grenades into the prison, and lit it on fire, killing nearly 10,000 prisoners. Then NKVD forces departed the scene, leaving the Army soldiers who had been guarding the prison. Upon seeing the slaughter, the local population attacked the remaining guards, who fled eastward into Soviet-held territory, and eventually arrived in Moscow, where they were formed into a unit and assigned to the Karaganda Camps as a guard force.[xxxii]
The soldiers arrived in Karaganda with trunks full of money and valuables and large amounts of vodka that they had looted along the way. They caused havoc in the city, running around armed and drunk and ignoring the police. The Karaganda Camp guard force rounded up the unruly soldiers, packed them into trucks and took them to the camp, where they underwent political training and military disciplinary training. However, the horrendous scenes they had witnessed on the front left them cynical and disenchanted. The stories also had an impact on Artemyev, who had spent time in a Soviet forced labor camp himself several years earlier.
Artemyev worked in the Karlag for about a year. He then reenrolled at the Frunze Military Academy in 1942 and graduated in February 1943. Aleksandrov indicates that he was promoted to lieutenant colonel at the end of 1942 or beginning of 1943[xxxiii]; Artemyev himself, however, states that he was only a major in the Soviet Army.[xxxiv] He was originally slated to go to a staff position in the Far East after graduating from the academy; however, an assignment in the Far East meant leaving his family for a year and a half and working in a staff job instead of a command position. He appealed to the academy director, who refused to change the assignment. He resorted to flunking the course on staff work intentionally to remove himself from consideration for a staff job.[xxxv] The ploy worked; he was assigned as a commander of the 46th Guards Cavalry Regiment, serving on the front until September 1943, when he was captured as a POW.
Artemyev noted that when German troops captured him, they treated him respectfully and cared for wounds that he had received in battle.[xxxvi] Artemyev was held in the Lötzen Officers’ Camp (near modern-day Giżycko, Poland), where he was interrogated and performed unspecified work for the Germans.[xxxvii] He looked back at this time with a degree of relief, both because of the respectful treatment offered by the Germans, and because while he was POW he had the luxury of time to think. He reevaluated his thoughts about his career and prior assignments, leading him become increasingly disillusioned about the Soviet system. He asked himself, “Why did I not become critical before,” and he realized that he had been so busy during his career he had never had time to critically analyze what was happening around him. He claimed that these realizations were not the product of German propaganda, which was “so stupid, so idiotic, so base that it could not have influenced anyone,”[xxxviii] but rather the result of unoccupied time he had to think.
In June 1944, he joined the ROA and was assigned as commander of the Second Grenadier Regiment, First Infantry Division of the KONR military forces. Artemyev indicated that there was conflict between Vlasov and the Germans about plans for using the ROA, and that Vlasov had even instituted a signal to his commanders about whether to obey a German order or sabotage it; if Vlasov disagreed with the order, he would sign his name on it with the last line going down; if he agreed with it, the last line of the signature would go up.[xxxix]
In April and May 1945, Artemyev commanded his unit in military actions around Prague, in some of the only combat that the KONR saw during the war. He encountered Soviet forces during these operations and entered into discussions about the handover of his KONR unit to Soviet forces, with promises from the Soviet commander guaranteeing life and freedom. He claims, however, that his parlaying was only a delaying tactic to allow time for the First KONR Infantry Division to escape Soviet control into U.S.-held territory.[xl]
After the war, Artemyev offered his services to U.S. forces in Germany as a research analyst on Soviet issues. From 1947 to 1950 he worked in a U.S. Army intelligence school in Regensburg, Germany, and from 1948 to 1951 he was an associate of Columbia University’s Research Program on the USSR. He wrote a number of monographs for those institutions during this time, focusing on Soviet intelligence structure, military doctrine, and Vlasov’s Army. He was also interviewed for the Harvard University Project on the Soviet Social System in November 1950.
In the mid-1950s, the Research Program on the USSR published a number of Artemyev’s papers, particularly those that dealt with Soviet state security services. In 1954, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who had recently completed his Ph.D. at Harvard, published a collection of essays by former Soviet military officers under the auspices of the Research Program on the USSR on the topic of political control of the Soviet military. The book included an essay by Artemyev titled Special Sections in the Soviet Army,[xli] which describes the duties of special sections (OOs), beginning with combatting foreign espionage, but going far beyond that to monitor the training, readiness, security, and above all, political reliability of Soviet military forces. It summarizes the approach that OOs take toward the military:
For the organs of state security, and for special sections in particular, ranks, social and service positions, and party membership do not exist. For them only people and their behavior exist. The special section views every military member, regardless of his position, above all as capable of committing a crime against the state, and the higher the position that a person occupies, the more dangerous it could be for the state.[xlii]
A later article by Artemyev on Soviet military law stated similarly, “The Soviet military law system makes no distinctions of rank. High and low alike share its weight and fear its impact. Indeed, the more senior the officer, the more apprehensive he may be, for in many instances even a minor transgression may mean the end of a career, regardless of prior distinctions and merits.”[xliii] He wrote separately, “Dictatorships tolerate no outstanding personalities except the personality of the dictator himself.”[xliv]
An updated treatment of OOs, which under the KGB became the Отдел контрразведки (Counterintelligence Department), appears in the U.S. Army journal Military Review in 1963. Artemyev cites new regulations that had had been promulgated in the 1950s and early 1960s, based on the same foundation of political control for which OOs were responsible.[xlv]
In 1957, Simon Wolin, a Soviet émigré to the United States,[xlvi] and Robert Slusser, an associate director of the Research Program on the USSR, co-edited another volume titled The Soviet Secret Police, which included several of Artemyev’s papers.[xlvii] Wolin and Slusser’s book included four essays co-authored by Artemyev and another more recent intelligence officer defector, Grigoriy Stepanovich Burlutskiy, who defected in June 1953. Like Artemyev, Burlutskiy had been assigned to Central Asia, and their essays touched on the organization, training, and activities of Soviet state security organizations, with Burlutskiy supplementing Artemyev’s knowledge with information about changes that occurred after World War II. The essays were titled
· Structure and Condition of the Soviet Organs of State Security After World War II[xlviii]
· Personnel, Conditions of Service and Training in the Border Troops[xlix]
· Internal Activities of the Soviet Organs of State Security After World War II[l]
· Postwar Activities of the Soviet Organs of State Security in Western Europe[li]
The majority of Artemyev’s writings focus on Soviet internal security and prison camp operations, as with the first three of these articles. However, he and Burlutskiy collaborated on an essay about Soviet foreign espionage in Western Europe that describes the advantages that Soviet intelligence activities enjoyed abroad and the disadvantages that impeded them. They identify the following as Soviet intelligence advantages:
· The wartime alliance with the Soviet Union gave Soviet intelligence opportunities to study Western military industry, communications, economics, and transportation
· Victory over Germany gave the Soviet Union access to the people and archives of the defeated countries
· The Soviet Union can dispatch agents among the flow of refugees being repatriated from Eastern to Western Europe
· The Soviet Union established various governmental representation offices and pro-Soviet/pro-communist organizations in Western Europe during the war, which, in addition to diplomatic representations, can serve as cover for intelligence activities
· The ease of travel in Western Europe, and the absence of restricted zones that exist in the Soviet Union, simplifies the movement of agents
· Western laws are lenient toward espionage
· Freedom of speech and the lack of censorship in the West makes it easier to learn about military and economic topics that in the Soviet Union are considered state secrets, and allows for the spread of pro-Soviet/pro-communist ideas and opinions[lii]
Soviet intelligence disadvantages are:
· Soviet intelligence lost credibility before the war because it failed to ascertain German preparations for attacking the Soviet Union; Nazi intelligence and counterintelligence blunted pre-war Soviet intelligence
· The war further destabilized Soviet intelligence; the banning and suppression of pro-communist organizations in European countries during the war impeded Soviet clandestine activity
· After the war, many Soviet individuals who possessed valuable information remained in the West, providing the West with knowledge of “many things which are kept strictly secret in the Soviet Union, among them many aspects of Soviet government activity, including state security organs, intelligence, and subversion” (Artemyev probably included himself in this group)
· Western counterintelligence has gradually gained a greater understanding of Soviet espionage and subversion techniques, allowing the West to develop increasingly effective countermeasures
· Soviet aggressive actions since the end of the war have undermined Soviet and communist prestige in the eyes of world public opinion, creating discontent even within communist parties[liii]
A review of Wolin and Slusser’s book by John Rondeau, published in Studies in Intelligence in 1958, disdainfully critiques Artemyev’s and Burlutskiy’s essays, asserting that they occupy a disproportionate amount of space in the volume. Rondeau questions Artemyev’s and Burlutskiy’s competence to discuss the topics they address, especially espionage in Western Europe.[liv] Rondeau disparages the authors for their “short and inadequate essay on espionage in Western Europe,” especially pointing to a statement that he claims denies “the elementary fact that Moscow closely supervises all foreign residencies and networks.”[lv] Rondeau is reacting to a comment in the essay that states, “It would be impossible for all this [the KGB’s] many-sided espionage in every country of the world to be directly organized and led from Moscow.”[lvi] While this and other unclear statements in the essay do detract from its credibility, the description of Soviet advantages and disadvantages are of some value.
Artemyev also wrote an essay for the Research Program on the USSR that touched on overseas trade and intelligence activities, with a particular emphasis on the Soviet trade representation in Iran. He begins this essay with a statement that the information contained in it originated with an individual who had been employee in the Soviet trade mission in Iran before World War II. Thus, Artemyev’s information in this area was second hand. Nevertheless, his essay describes the elaborate and strict screening of potential employees for Soviet trade missions abroad, political indoctrination, and even provocations directed at the candidate to determine how he or she would respond.
Once abroad, Soviet trade mission employees were expected to conclude trade deals in the Union’s favor and to collect whatever intelligence they could. While Soviet fur traders traveled throughout Iran, for example, they collected information about the condition of roads and bridges, military border zones, military and industrial installations, etc. They collected intelligence about market conditions and prices for commodities that the Soviet Union wanted to buy or sell. The Soviet trade officials took advantage of Iranian employees who were willing to take bribes to falsify trade arrangements or provide inside information. The NKVD office in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan, ran the intelligence activities of the Soviet Trade Mission in Iran and . Artemyev identified the chief of Soviet intelligence in Iran as Boris Yartsev.[lvii] Artemyev and his source may not have been aware that Yartsev was the cover name of Boris Arkadyevich Rybkin, a long-time Soviet intelligence officer.[lviii]
Artemyev identified several Soviet intelligence recruited agents in Iran:
· A Persian man nicknamed “Arvad” who worked as courier for the British consulate in Meshed. He provided information about British diplomatic correspondence. Collected material was photographed in a photography lab located in a safe house.
· An Armenian national nicknamed “Seid” who worked in the Meshed post office. He provided correspondence from large commercial firms.
· An Armenian named Aganov who worked in a bank and provided information about prominent bank clientele.[lix]
Iran’s road and rail infrastructure was a particularly prominent collection target for Soviet intelligence. An intelligence officer named Bazikov, who was covered as an economist at the Soviet Trade Mission in Tehran, ran sources in Iranian government institutions, including a senior official in the Ministry of Railroads, who provided plans for the construction along the Trans-Persian Railroad. Chauffeurs provided information about the construction of bridges and the status of rivers and reservoirs. The Soviet trade mission staff also sponsored excursions into the countryside for picnics and hunting, during which topography specialists collected cartographic information. Artemyev claims that this collection greatly assisted the Soviet army when it entered Iran in 1941, because Soviet maps were more accurate than the Iranians’ own maps.[lx]
Soviet intelligence services in Iran also maintained contact with Iranian communist organizations and supervised their activities. Soviet advisors created underground cells of eight to ten Iranians who met in teashops and brothels to plan intelligence and subversion activities. Covert support to Iranian communists included provision of propaganda materials and weapons for rebel tribes.[lxi]
Between 1962 and 1969, Artemyev wrote ten articles for the U.S. Army journal Military Review on topics of military doctrine, military discipline, party control of the military, Soviet internal security matters, and the ROA. Artemyev is described as a “graduate of the Soviet War College (Frunze Military Academy) [who] has written extensively on the Soviet armed forces.” Much of the material in these articles analyzes Soviet military affairs in the decades after Artemyev’s defection in 1943. They are often based on topics he had covered in earlier writings, but cite new material and events that Artemyev uses to show continuity in Soviet military affairs.
Artemyev’s final publication was a volume on the ROA, Первая дивизия РОА. Материалы к истории освободительного движения народов России (1941-1945) (First Division of the ROA: Historical Materials of the Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Russia (1941-1945)), which was published in 1974. He writes in the preface that he had begun writing the book in 1946 when his recollections were still fresh.[lxii] He sent six excerpts from the book to Boris Nikolaevsky in September 1950 based on notes that he had made contemporary with the depicted events, which allowed him to “produce with precision the events, dates, places, and real names as they unfolded at the time.” He tells Nikolaevsky that he is probably the only person remaining who was involved in those events who could describe them in such detail.[lxiii] There is no indication that Nikolaevsky took any steps to publish the material at the time.
Artemyev had tried at least one other time to publish his book in 1965 through the Regnery Publishing Company. A reviewer of the draft criticized it for lack of documentation and for claiming to recall long conversations 20 years after the events, although Artemyev reminder Regnery that he had recorded the conversations soon after they had taken place. Artemyev’s return address at the time was Oberammergau, Germany, where he was apparently teaching at the U.S. Army foreign area officers’ school.[lxiv]
He covered some of the material in an article in Military Review in November 1967 titled ”Soviet Volunteers in the German Army.”[lxv] But he finally published the book in its entirety in 1974 through the auspices of the Союз Борьбы за Освобождение Народов России (Union for the Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia; SBONR), which published Russian émigré literature in the 1970s and 1980s. The book was not a great commercial success, but Kirill Aleksandrov, who has written several scholarly works on the ROA and General Vlasov, cites it extensively as an authoritative source.[lxvi]
Artemyev left a wife a child in the Soviet Union when he fell into Soviet captivity. He never heard from them again. He subsequently married a German woman, Dagni von Erdmann, after arriving in Germany, and lived the rest of his life there, working as an instructor in U.S. Army intelligence schools. No further information is available about Artemyev after the publication of his book in 1974, and his date of death is unknown.
Notes
- [i] Photo from HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, box 233, folder 18 (microfilm reel 199).
- [ii] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule B, Vol. 15, Case 136 (interviewer H.B.), p. 10.
- [iii] Kirill Mikhailovich Aleksandrov, Офицерский Корпус Армии Генерал-Лейтенанта Ал. Власова, 1944-1945 (Officer Corps of the Army of General Lieutenant Vlasov, 1944-1945) (Saint Petersburg: Русско-Балтийский информационный центр, «БЛИЦ», 2001), pp. 72-75. Evgeniy Aleksandrovich Aleksandrov lists both places as possible origins in , Русские в Северной Америке: Биографический Словарь (Russians in North America: A Biographical Dictionary), (Hamden, CT; San Francisco; St. Petersburg: Congress of Russian Americans, 2005), p. 35.
- [iv] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule A, Vol. 11, Case 136 (interviewer A.P., type A4), p. 5-6.
- [v] Aleksandrov, Officer Corps of the Army of General Lieutenant Vlasov, 1944-1945, pp. 72-75.
- [vi] Vyacheslav Pavlovich Artemyev, Военная Наука и Подготовка Кадров Советской Армии (Military Science and the Preparation of Soviet Military Cadres), undated typescript, p. 7; Hoover Institution Archives, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 10 (microfilm reel 199).
- [vii] Artemyev, Military Science and the Preparation of Soviet Military Cadres, p. 8.
- [viii] Aleksandrov, Officer Corps of the Army of General Lieutenant Vlasov, 1944-1945, pp. 72-75.
- [ix] Vyacheslav Pavlovich Artemyev, Майор Дои Сан (Major Doi San), undated typescript, Hoover Institution Archives, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 15 (microfilm reel 199). Artemyev sent the story to Boris Nikolaevsky in September 1950 hoping it would be publishable. However, there is no indication that it was ever published; letter from Artemyev to Nikolaevsky, dated 25 September 1950, Hoover Institution Archive, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 17 (microfilm reel 199).
- [x] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule A, Vol. 11, Case 136 (interviewer A.P., type A4), p. 7-8.
- [xi] Leyba Nikolayevich Feldbin (aka Aleksandr Nikolayevich Orlov), wrote that the verdict was published on 23 January 1935; see Alexander Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 6.
- [xii] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule A, Vol. 11, Case 136 (interviewer A.P., type A4), p. 9.
- [xiii] Vyacheslav Pavlovich Artemyev, Медведь (Medved), typescript dated September 1951 in Bavaria, Hoover Institution Archives, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 14 (microfilm reel 199).
- [xiv] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule B, Vol. 1, Case 136 (interviewer S.H.), Section 1, p. 3; Section 2, p. 3; Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule A, Vol. 11, Case 136 (interviewer A.P., type A4), pp. 35-37.
- [xv] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule A, Vol. 11, Case 136 (interviewer A.P., type A4), p. 12
- [xvi] Vyacheslav Pavlovich Artemyev, Особый Карательный Взвод (Special Disciplinary Detachment), typescript dated January 1952 in Bavaria, Hoover Institution Archives, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 13 (microfilm reel 199).
- [xvii] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule B, Vol. 1, Case 136 (interviewer S.H.), Section 1, p. 7; Section 2, pp. 1-2.
- [xviii] David Dallin and Boris Nikolaevsky, Forced Labor in Soviet Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947).
- [xix] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule B, Vol. 1, Case 136 (interviewer S.H.), Section 2, p. 3
- [xx] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule B, Vol. 1, Case 136 (interviewer S.H.), Section 1, p. 4.
- [xxi] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule B, Vol. 1, Case 136 (interviewer S.H.), Section 2, p. 3.
- [xxii] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule A, Vol. 11, Case 136 (interviewer A.P., type A4), p. 40.
- [xxiii] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule A, Vol. 11, Case 136 (interviewer A.P., type A4), pp. 18-24.
- [xxiv] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule B, Vol. 1, Case 136 (interviewer S.H.), Section 2, pp. 1-9; Vyacheslav Pavlovich Artemyev, Исправительно-Трудовые Лагеря МВД СССР, Часть Первая: Организация Исправительно-Трудовых Лагерей, Режим, Трудоиспользование, Жизнь и Быт Заключенных (Corrective Labor Camps of the USSR MVD, Part One: Organization of Corrective Labor Camps, Regimen, Use of Labor, Life and Daily Activities of Prisoners), typescript dated 1953 in West Germany, Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Research Program on the USSR, Box 7; Artemyev, Исправительно-Трудовые Лагеря МВД СССР, Часть Вторая: Охрана Лагерей (Corrective Labor Camps of the USSR MVD, Part Two: Camp Security), typescript dated 1953 in West Germany, Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Research Program on the USSR, Box 7.
- [xxv] Artemyev, Corrective Labor Camps of the USSR MVD, Part One, p. 7.
- [xxvi] Artemyev, Corrective Labor Camps of the USSR MVD, Part One, pp. 5-6.
- [xxvii] Artemyev, Corrective Labor Camps of the USSR MVD, Part One, p. 11.
- [xxviii] Artemyev, Corrective Labor Camps of the USSR MVD, Part One, pp. 17-20.
- [xxix] Vyacheslav Pavlovich Artemyev, Фронтовики (Frontline Soldiers), typescript dated April 1952 in Bavaria, Hoover Institution Archives, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 12 (microfilm reel 199).
- [xxx] Artemyev, Frontline Soldiers, p. 18.
- [xxxi] Artemyev, Frontline Soldiers, p. 17.
- [xxxii] Artemyev, Frontline Soldiers, p. 19-21.
- [xxxiii] Aleksandrov, Officer Corps of the Army of General Lieutenant Vlasov, 1944-1945, pp. 72-75.
- [xxxiv] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule A, Vol. 11, Case 136 (interviewer A.P., type A4), p. 9
- [xxxv] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule A, Vol. 11, Case 136 (interviewer A.P., type A4), pp. 29-31,
- [xxxvi] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule B, Vol. 15, Case 136 (interviewer H.B.), p. 11.
- [xxxvii] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule B, Vol. 15, Case 136 (interviewer H.B.), p. 11.
- [xxxviii] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule A, Vol. 11, Case 136 (interviewer A.P., type A4), pp. 15-16.
- [xxxix] Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule B, Vol. 15, Case 136 (interviewer H.B.), p. 12.
- [xl] Kirill Mikhailovich Aleksandrov, Aрмия Генерала Власова 1944-1945 (General Vlasov’s Army 1944-1945) (Moscow: Yauza EKSMO, 2006), p. 396.
- [xli] V. P. Artemyev, “Special Sections in the Soviet Army,” in Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed., Political Controls in the Soviet Army. A Study Based on Reports by Former Soviet Officers (New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1954), pp. 60-73. Translated from Russian typescript, Особые Отделы Советской Армии, which Artemyev wrote for the U.S. Army intelligence school at Regensburg, Germany. A copy is held in the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Research Program on the USSR, Box 7.
- [xlii] Artemyev, Special Sections of the Soviet Army, typescript, p. 5.
- [xliii] Vyacheslav Pavlovich Artemiev, “Crime and Punishment in the Soviet Armed Forces,” Military Review, Vol. 42, No. 11 (November 1962), pp. 68-74.
- [xliv] Vyacheslav Pavlovich Artemyev, Военная Наука и Подготовка Кадров Советской Армии (Military Science and the Preparation of Soviet Military Cadres), undated typescript, p. 1; Hoover Institution Archives, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 10 (microfilm reel 199).
- [xlv] Vyacheslav Pavlovich Artemiev, “OKR: State Security in the Soviet Armed Forces,” Military Review, Vol. 43, No. 9 (September 1963), pp. 21-31.
- [xlvi] Wolin was the uncle of Alexander Dallin, a graduate student at Columbia University, who was one of the directors of the Research Program on the USSR.
- [xlvii] Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser, eds., The Soviet Secret Police (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974). Reprint of original edition (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1957).
- [xlviii] Wolin and Slusser, The Soviet Secret Police, pp. 152-178.
- [xlix] Wolin and Slusser, The Soviet Secret Police, pp. 280-321.
- [l] Wolin and Slusser, The Soviet Secret Police, pp. 322-337.
- [li] Wolin and Slusser, The Soviet Secret Police, pp. 338-354.
- [lii] Wolin and Slusser, The Soviet Secret Police, pp. 339-342.
- [liii] Wolin and Slusser, The Soviet Secret Police, pp. 343-345.
- [liv] John Rondeau, “Book Review: The Soviet Secret Police,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol 2., No. 3 (Winter 1958), pp. 123-129.
- [lv] Rondeau, “Book Review: The Soviet Secret Police,” p. 128.
- [lvi] Wolin and Slusser, The Soviet Secret Police, p. 347.
- [lvii] Viacheslav P. Artemiev, Selection and Training of Personnel for Trade Missions Abroad and the Soviet Trade Mission in Iran: Two Brief Essays, Mimeographed Series No. 68 (New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1954), pp 12-13, 16.
- [lviii] A biography of Рыбкин Борис Аркадьевич (Rybkin Boris Arkadyevich) is published on the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service website, http://svr.gov.ru/history/person/rybkin.htm.
- [lix] Artemiev, Selection and Training of Personnel for Trade Missions Abroad and the Soviet Trade Mission in Iran, pp. 17-18.
- [lx] Artemiev, Selection and Training of Personnel for Trade Missions Abroad and the Soviet Trade Mission in Iran, pp. 18-19.
- [lxi] Artemiev, Selection and Training of Personnel for Trade Missions Abroad and the Soviet Trade Mission in Iran, pp. 19-20.
- [lxii] Vyacheslav Pavlovich Artemiev, Первая дивизия РОА. Материалы к истории освободительного движения народов России (1941-1945) (First Division of the ROA: Historical Materials of the Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Russia (1941-1945)) (London, Canada: Publisher of the Union for the Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, 1974).
- [lxiii] Letter from Artemyev to Nikolaevsky, dated 1 September 1950, Hoover Institution Archive, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 17 (microfilm reel 199). The six excerpts are in Hoover Institution Archive, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 16 (microfilm reel 199).
- [lxiv] Letter from Artemyev to Henry Regnery, dated 9 April 1965, Hoover Institution Archives, Henry Regnery Collection, Box 4, Folder 18.
- [lxv] Vyacheslav Pavlovich Artemiev, “Soviet Volunteers in the German Army,” Military Review, Vol. 47, No. 11 (November 1967), pp. 56-64.
- [lxvi] Aleksandrov frequently cites Artemyev’s book in Генералитет и Офицерские Кадры Вооруженных Формирований Комитета Освобождения Народов России 1943–1946 гг. (General and Officer Corps of the Armed Formations of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia 1943-1946), dissertation for the Russian Academy of Sciences, Saint Petersburg History Institute, 2015.
Published works
- Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser
- eds.
- The Soviet Secret Police (New York: Praeger
- 1957): • “Structure and Condition of the Soviet Organs of State Security After World War II
- ” pp. 152-178. • “Personnel
- Conditions of Service and Training in the Border Troops
- ” pp. 280-321. • “Internal Activities of the Soviet Organs of State Security After World War II
- ” pp. 322-337. • “Postwar Activities of the Soviet Organs of State Security in Western Europe
- ” pp. 338-354. Режим и охрана исправительно-трудовых лагерей МВД (Operation and Security of MVD Corrective Labor Camps) (Munich: Институт по изучению СССР
- 1956). “Crime and Punishment in the Soviet Armed Forces
- ” Military Review
- Vol. 42
- No. 11 (November 1962)
- pp. 68-74. “OKR: Soviet State Security
- ” Military Review
- Vol. 43
- No. 9 (September 1963)
- pp. 21-31. “The Party and Soviet Forces
- ” Military Review
- Vol. 44
- No. 2 (February 1964)
- pp. 29-37. “Party Political Work
- ” Military Review
- Vol. 44
- No.3 (March 1964)
- pp. 62-68. “Soviet Military Educational Institutions
- ” Military Review
- Vol. 46
- No 1 (January 1966)
- pp. 11-14. “Soviet Mobilization Doctrine
- ” Military Review
- Vol. 46
- No. 6 (June 1966)
- pp. 63-69. “Soviet Volunteers in the German Army
- ” Military Review
- Vol. 47
- No. 11 (November 1967)
- pp. 56-64. “Soviet Military Penal Units
- ” Military Review
- Vol. 48
- No. 4 (April 1968)
- pp. 90-96. “Soviet Officer Courts of Honor
- ” Military Review
- Vol. 48
- No. 11 (November 1968)
- pp. 53-58. “Coercion and Fear in the Soviet Armed Forces
- ” Military Review
- Vol. 49
- No. 11 (November 1969)
- pp. 51-55. Первая дивизия РОА. Материалы к истории освободительного движения народов России (1941-1945) (The First ROA Division: Material on the History of the Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Russia (1941-1945))
- (London (Canada): Издательство Союза Борьбы за Освобождение Народов России
- 1974). Other published works in Columbia Univ
- Research Project on the USSR and Hoover Institute Archives
- Nikolaevskiy Collection.