Biography
Georgiy Sergeyevich Arutyunov, known in the West as Georges Agabekov and Nerses Ovsepyan, arrived in Paris in June 1930 and immediately began to publish information about OGPU operations in the Middle East and South Asia, about which he possessed detailed knowledge.[i] He gained prominence among Russian émigrés in Europe for his memoirs and for his subsequent exploits, and eventually for his disappearance, likely at the hands of his former employer. Two detailed accounts of Arutyunov’s life have since appeared, one by Gordon Brook-Shepherd in 1977,[ii] and one by Boris Volodarsky in 2013.[iii] These accounts cover mostly his life after defection, touching only lightly on his pre-defection career and the information he revealed about Soviet intelligence activities. Most of what we know about his pre-defection career comes from his own writings and from British interrogations, which were prompted by his claims about penetrations of the British government. Pieces of his writings were published serially in 1930 in various newspapers in Europe and the United States, and eventually compiled into two books: OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror, published in early 1931[iv]; and the more detailed ЧК За Работой (The ChK at Work) published later in 1931.[v]
Arutyunov was born to an Armenian blacksmith in Ashkhabad, Turkestan, in 1895. He left Ashkhabad at around 20 years old and returned only seldom for visits. In The ChK at Work, Arutyunov describes traveling to Ashkhabad, then the capital of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic, in January 1928 and visiting relatives whom he had not seen for some time.[vi]
Several versions of Arutyunov’s early career have appeared, each showing possible biases. He himself wrote that he was drafted into the Russian Imperial Army before World War I and served as a soldier until late 1916, when he was sent to a warrant officer’s course in Tashkent, graduating in about March 1917. After graduation he commanded a platoon, and then, thanks to his language proficiency, was assigned as a Turkish interpreter for the 46th Reserve Regiment, deployed to the Romanian front in southern Ukraine.[vii] In March 1918, Arutyunov joined the Red Army and participated in the Civil War, serving as a battalion commissar at the age of 24.
An alternate version of Arutyunov’s background appears in an article written in December 1931 by an unknown author named Surebeli, who purported to have known Arutyunov before World War I. Surebeli claimed that Arutyunov was a tsarist police informant and joined a police unit in 1915. Surebeli claimed that Arutyunov disliked police work and was not suited for it, being illiterate. The police unit itself recommended Arutyunov for military service to get rid of him.[viii] In this version, he entered warrant officer’s school in Tbilisi, not Tashkent. The accuracy of this unflattering account cannot be verified, and it may have been written—or ghost written—by someone with whom Arutyunov clashed after his defection.
In 1920, he joined the Bolshevik Party and commanded a battalion of internal security troops in Yekaterinburg. There the ChK noticed him and selected him for ChK duty, beginning a 10-year career as a Soviet intelligence officer. He was initially a true believer in the Bolshevik cause, and he described his early time in the ChK as fulfilling his revolutionary duty.[ix] He began as a case officer in the ChK Counterrevolution Section in Yekaterinburg, where his primary targets were deserters and oppositionists. Throughout 1921 he held counterintelligence and internal security positions in Yekaterinburg and Tyumen.[x]
Similar to other OGPU defectors, Arutyunov writes of ChK cellars and prisoner executions, and he describes a particular session during which the Yekaterinburg ChK Collegium ruled on execution cases. The Collegium consisted of a trio of officers, including a bloodthirsty 25-year-old Latvian woman named Shtalberg, who not only condemned people to execution but also personally carried out the sentences. The Collegium ruled on the cases as quickly as possible to make room in the cellars for more “enemies of the revolution.”[xi] Arutyunov and Shtalberg met again in 1929 when Arutyunov was assigned as an OGPU representative to the Communist Party Central Control Commission, which was responsible for ruling on disciplinary cases for Party members. Arutyunov quotes Shtalberg then as complaining, “In the good old days I would have simply condemned them to execution, but now we have to fuss with their files.”[xii]
In October 1921, Arutyunov was briefly assigned to ChK headquarters in Moscow, saved from the internecine intrigues in the Tyumen ChK office by the ChK’s need for language-skilled officers.[xiii] During this tour in Moscow Arutyunov was introduced into foreign operations, where he would remain for the rest of his career. It was also at this time that he first met Trilisser. Arutyunov describes Trilisser in markedly positive terms, considering him a mentor and contrasting him with the “sadists, drunkards, and hard-headed adventurists” who made up most of the OGPU leadership.[xiv]
Arutyunov began working in the Eastern Section, which oversaw intelligence operations in countries from the Middle East to East Asia—he returned six years later to lead this same section. As a Persian linguist, he was assigned to an Afghan account, and after seeing the lack of worthwhile reporting coming from the Afghan legation in Moscow he proposed an operation to penetrate the legation. His plan involved creating a diplomatically-covered position in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. However, the rivalry between the OGPU and the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs prevented his plan from proceeding; this was the first of many conflicts he recounted in his writings between the OGPU and the diplomatic service. Finding his plan for the Afghan legation confounded, he left Moscow after only two months for an assignment in the OGPU office in Turkestan in December 1921.[xv]
When Arutyunov arrived in Tashkent, the Soviet Union was struggling to solidify control of Turkestan, where local Islamic insurgents, labeled by the Soviets as basmachis, resisted Soviet rule. In 1921, the former Turkish Minister of War Ismail Enver, known as Enver Pasha, agreed with Lenin to lead the counterinsurgency against the basmachis. Enver arrived in Bukhara in December 1921 to what Arutyunov describes as a hero’s welcome from a population looking for a leader, and this reception convinced Enver of the weakness of Soviet power. Rather than supporting the Soviets, he reverted to his pan-Turkish aspirations, defected to basmachis, and designated himself their commander. Arutyunov was sent to Bukhara as chief of counterintelligence and, along with a Razvedupr officer named Osipov, he launched an operation to locate and assassinate Enver. He posed as a peddler, traveling into the remote area of modern-day Tajikistan were Enver was hiding and succeeded in gaining the locals’ trust, through which he learned the location of Enver’s camp. Arutyunov reported the camp to a waiting Red Army cavalry division, which attacked the camp and killed Enver and his entourage in August 1922.[xvi]
Arutyunov’s career progressed through a series of increasingly responsible and sensitive positions over the next several years. He served several times as an OGPU Communist Party cell leader, including in the Tashkent OGPU office, where he participated in a gathering[xvii] at which a Party official from Moscow solicited Party members’ views on Trotsky’s thesis of “permanent revolution.” To Moscow’s dismay, many of the OGPU party members sided with Trotsky.[xviii] He later describes a later Party chistka (cleansing) that began in 1928, where OGPU officers were called before the Party collective to describe their backgrounds and their parents’ positions before the revolution and to vouch for their own revolutionary roots. OGPU employees dreaded the prospect of being “cleansed” from the Party, because to lose Party membership meant being sacked from the OGPU, and no one would hire for former OGPU officer. With reticence typical of Arutyunov’s writings, he never mentions his own views on Trotsky or his own experience before the Chistka Committee.[xix]
He returned to Moscow in early 1924 for training in clandestine collection and communication methods, and was then assigned as OGPU rezident in Kabul, Afghanistan, from June 1924 to March 1926. It was during this assignment that British intelligence first learned of his existence an OGPU officer.[xx] He returned briefly to INO Headquarters, and then was assigned as rezident in Tehran, Iran, from August 1926 to May 1928. SIS also received intelligence in 1927 confirming his presence in Tehran.[xxi]
Over the course of his career, Arutyunov several times encountered the results of other Soviet intelligence officer defectors, possibly not even realizing that previous defectors were involved. In one instance, Arutyunov identified the Soviet military attaché in Tehran in 1927 as a former Tsarist Army colonel named Bobrishchev, who had “made a mess of it” while previously working in Finland.[xxii] This is likely a reference to Ardalyon Aleksandrovich Bobrishchev, who was expelled from Finland in 1923 partially based on information supplied to the Finns by defector Aleksandr Sipelgas. Arutyunov reported that Bobrishchev was also expelled from Tehran in 1927.[xxiii]
During his tour of duty in Tehran two Soviet officials, Boris Georgiyevich Bazhanov and Arkadiy Romanovich Birger, who was known by his Party handle Maksimov, crossed the border from Turkmenistan into Iran and requested asylum. Arutyunov writes that he first heard of Bazhanov’s and Maksimov’s defection from a newspaper on 3 January 1928, and later the same day received telegram from Moscow. In an unusual display of unanimity, both the OGPU and the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs agreed on a plan to assassinate Bazhanov, which Arutyunov interpreted as an indicator the decision had come from Stalin himself. Arutyunov was dispatched to Mashhad to lead the OGPU effort to liquidate the defectors, particularly targeting Bazhanov, who had been a personal assistant to Stalin from 1923 to 1925. But unanimity was short lived. After establishing a network of agents to report on the whereabouts of and security surrounding the defectors, Arutyunov received a countermanding order from Trilisser to stand down and not touch them. At the same time, the OGPU office in Ashkhabad received an order from the other Yagoda to continue the operation. Arutyunov concluded, the “right hand doesn’t know what the left hand is doing.”[xxiv] Arutyunov claims to have first begun to have doubts about his career during this confused operation.[xxv]
Arutyunov traveled to Moscow in March 1928 planning to take two months of leave and then to return to Tehran. However, staff at the Soviet embassy in Tehran had begun circulating accusations against him, and Trilisser decided his presence in Tehran would cause too much discord.[xxvi] The rumors in Tehran were part of typical life at a Soviet diplomatic establishment to which Arutyunov referred often in his writings. He discusses love triangles, embezzlement, and laziness that typified Soviet life abroad. He especially highlighted extramarital affairs, describing animosity and intrigue surrounding the few women assigned abroad, which often led to OGPU officers and embassy staff being recalled to Moscow.
Rumors about Arutyunov continued to circulate within the OGPU years after his defection. A later defector, Aleksandr Fedorovich Chikalov, wrote in about 1949 about an incident he claims occurred in China in the late 1920s in which Arutyunov was allegedly involved. He recounted that the Soviet Union was actively working to establish communist dominance in Xinjiang and that Soviet enterprises were launching commercial ventures to sell lumber and exploit silver deposits in the region. These commercial opportunities attracted shady business schemes, including one initiated by a Soviet diplomat in China named Tairov, with Arutyunov’s cooperation. The scheme was uncovered and Tairov was recalled to Moscow and expelled from the Party—he was later reinstated, recruited into the OGPU, and sent back to China as an intelligence officer. Agabekov, according to Chikalov, avoided punishment by defecting.[xxvii] Chikalov served a temporary duty assignment in China in 1932, so it is possible that he heard about this incident at that time, possibly even from Tairov himself. However, there is no other evidence that Agabekov was involved with operations in China and his career suffered no negative effects. Nevertheless, Chikalov seemed to accept the story as legitimate.
Trilisser retained Arutyunov in Moscow, assigning him as Chief of the INO Eastern Section and acting chief of the British-American Section. As an INO section chief, operations against Britain continued to occupy a large part of his effort. This included a regular flow of intercepted correspondences from British and other European diplomatic representations in the Middle East and South Asia. According to Arutyunov, the OGPU recruited agents in postal systems around the region who provided the OGPU access to diplomatic mail. Specially trained OGPU Officers carefully unsealed diplomatic mail from foreign missions in Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt, photographed it, and resealed it so expertly as to leave no trace of tampering. The operations yielded valuable intelligence not only about British and other European activities in Asia, but about the local politics of Asian countries as reported by European diplomats. By 1929, when the OGPU was planning further operations in Egypt, Arutyunov advised that there was no need to bother recruiting any more sources with access to British High Commission diplomatic communications there, because they were already being fully exploited.[xxviii]
During British interrogations, Arutyunov provided partial identifying information for a 25-year-old British Jew named Fisher who worked as an OGPU linguist in 1928 translating intercepted British mail.[xxix] Fisher was also in training to be an OGPU illegal for duty in an English-speaking country.[xxx] Arutyunov’s description was insufficient to identify Fisher in the 1930s; the Metropolitan Police Special Branch attempted but failed to figure out who he was.[xxxi] However, this was probably the first partial reference to an individual named William August Fisher, who became famous in 1957 as the Soviet KGB illegal Rudolph Abel when he was arrested and tried in the United States. Fisher/Abel was born in 1903, making him 25 years old in 1928, and was recruited into the OGPU in 1927.[xxxii] Fisher/Abel was dispatched to the United States as an illegal in 1949, and was subsequently compromised to the FBI by another Soviet intelligence officer defector, Reino Hayhanen.[xxxiii] The Soviet Union did not reveal Abel’s real identity as William August Fisher until after his death in 1971, over 40 years after Arutyunov’s partial clue.
Arutyunov’s next assignment was to become the first OGPU illegal rezident in India, where Britain would again be his primary target. But as Arutyunov was preparing for his trip to India, the chargé d'affaires at the Soviet embassy in Paris, Grigoriy Besedovskiy, refused to return to the Soviet Union and instead joined forces with anti-Soviet émigrés in France. Trilisser summoned Arutyunov and tasked him to travel to Paris before going to India to assassinate Besedovskiy. However, Trilisser cancelled the assignment the following day; Besedovskiy had already published his story in French newspapers, and the Soviet leadership was concerned that Besedovskiy’s assassination would do more harm to Soviet relations with France than the good of eliminating a vocal Soviet opponent.[xxxiv]
His assignment to India was finally derailed, however, by yet another “enemy of the Party.” The illegal OGPU rezident in Constantinople, Yakov Grigoryevich Blyumkin, was arrested for alleged association with Lev Trotsky and was executed in October 1929. The OGPU assessed that the Constantinople illegal rezidentura was more valuable than a new rezidentura in India, and Arutyunov was sent to Constantinople fill Blyumkin’s place and run OGPU source networks in Greece, Syria, Egypt, and Palestine. On 22 October 1929, Arutyunov traveled to Constantinople under the pseudonym Nerses Ovsepyan.[xxxv]
Arutyunov quickly made contacts among the Armenian community in Constantinople and established himself as a merchant, being accepted into the Chamber of Commerce in Constantinople after only a short time. He simultaneously established communication channels with Blyumkin’s agents across the Middle East. Palestine fell within Arutyunov’s area of responsibility, and the OGPU priority there was to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict to the Soviet Union’s strategic advantage. Assuming that the British would side with one party or the other in the conflict, the Soviet Union hoped to exploit whichever party the British offended and leverage their distrust of Britain. Soviets were particularly interested in Palestine as a strategic point from which to impede shipping lanes through the Red Sea in case of war with England.[xxxvi]
Arutyunov also began to pursue contacts in the British expatriate community in Constantinople. In a likely effort to increase his contacts for operational exploitation, Arutyunov advertised for an English language tutor. The person who responded to the advertisement, a 20-year-old British woman named Isabel Streater, changed his life forever. It is unclear whether he specifically targeted Isabel for recruitment to gain access to the British consulate, where her sister, Sybil, was employed[xxxvii]; such a scenario is plausible, although Arutyunov never directly mentions Isabel in any of his published writings. Nevertheless, he quickly became enchanted with Miss Streater, prompting him to break with his usual reticence about discussing his personal opinions. In January 1930 he revealed to her his real purpose for being in Constantinople, along with frustrations about his career. Likely on her insistence, Arutyunov approached the British military attaché in Constantinople in February 1930 offering to reveal how the OGPU was intercepting British diplomatic mail.[xxxviii] The military attaché declined interest. Arutyunov tried several more times to establish contact with the British in Constantinople, revealing the name Agabekov that he had used in Afghanistan and Iran. The British in Constantinople knew only that the Nerses Ovsepyan who approached them was an Armenian businessman ran a bicycle and typewriter shop, which they suspected of being a cover for drug dealing. They claimed as of April 1930 to have no evidence that he was a Soviet agent—his cover was apparently successful—and the British mission never responded to his offer.[xxxix] It was not until July, after press reports of Arutyunov’s unveiling in Paris, that SIS connected previous reporting about the presence of an OGPU officer named Agabekov in Afghanistan and Iran with Arutyunov’s claims.[xl]
The British mission’s hesitation to accept Arutyunov was further fueled by Isabel’s family, who objected strenuously to her association with Arutyunov due to his “repulsive appearance.” Sybil in particular “did all in her power to stop the affair,”[xli] likely including appeals to her supervisors at the consulate. The family tried desperately without success to separate the two, and in June contacted Isabel’s sister Joyce in Paris, who agreed that she should come to live there to get away from Constantinople. Rather than discouraging their contact, however, Isabel’s move sealed Arutyunov’s plans, and in the absence of a response from the British in Constantinople, he resolved to follow Isabel to Paris. He had already completed the notes for his book, and he sent them to Paris via a “sure channel,” meaning with Isabel.[xlii] He left Constantinople on 19 June 1930 on a ship bound for Marseilles and arrived in Paris on 26 June 1930. He approached Joyce and her husband Charles Lee the next day and offered Charles a percentage of the profit from his book sales, but Mr. Lee “refused to entertain the idea.” Instead, Charles lodged a complaint to the British Consulate General in Paris requesting assistance “from official sources to prevent the continuance of the situation.”[xliii]
Receiving Charles Lee’s refusal, Arutyunov approached a literary agent in Paris to inquire about publishing his memoirs and on 2 July 1930, the Agence Littéraire Internationale agreed to work with him. He continued to meet with representatives of that company until 4 August, when the French government informed him that he was no longer welcome in France.[xliv] Charles Lee’s influence persuaded both the Political Section of the Sûreté Général and the British Consul General in Paris to expel Arutyunov,[xlv] and he was forced to flee to Brussels, where he moved in with fellow intelligence officer defector Yevgeniy Dumbadze, who acted for a time as a courier to carry materials to France that Arutyunov could no longer take himself.[xlvi]
Arutyunov’s and Dumbadze’s careers paralleled in a number of aspects. Both began as young military commissars in the early 1920s. Both were drafted into the ChK from their Party positions and were assigned to ChK units responsible for internal monitoring of the Soviet population. Their careers diverged for a time when Dumbadze began studying in university while Arutyunov transitioned into the INO. But they converged again when Dumbadze was assigned as a Comintern official in Constantinople, and then defected to Paris, subsequently moving to Brussels. While it is unclear where in this timeline Arutyunov and Dumbadze became aware of each other, it is certain that Arutyunov would have known of Dumbadze’s defection in June 1928, which occurred while Arutyunov was chief of the INO Eastern Section responsible for operations in Constantinople. Both chose Paris as their post-defection location, and both later moved to Brussels, where their paths converged when Arutyunov roomed with Dumbadze and enlisted his assistance.
Within days of his arrival in Paris, Arutyunov also met Grigoriy Besedovskiy, whom he was assigned to assassinate two years earlier, and Besedovskiy put him in contact with the Russian émigré newspaper Последние Новости (Poslednie Novosti; Latest News). Arutyunov began a correspondence with Nikolay Platonovich Vakar, a Poslednie Novosti journalist, who represented his interests in Paris until his book was published. Over the next several months, Arutyunov and Vakar exchanged numerous letters discussing translation fees, offers to publish the book in various countries, and royalty amounts. In his correspondence with Vakar, Arutyunov also frequently requested news of Isabel, whom he described as his fiancée, and sent letters through Vakar to her. Despite multiple attempts, however, Vakar was never received at the Lee home and was unable to establish contact with Isabel, and by mid-August he learned that she had left France and returned to Turkey.[xlvii] However, Isabel’s family could not legally keep them separated forever. Isabel turned 21 on 30 August 1930. Eventually, Arutyunov was reunited with Isabel and they were married in late 1930.[xlviii]
According to Arutyunov’s writings, Britain dominated OGPU planning and operations across Asia in the 1920s. As early as 1923, when Arutyunov was posted to Turkestan, he tasked an agent to obtain a copy of a document that purportedly proved that the British were supplying weapons and money to basmachis to fight against Bolsheviks. The OGPU sought the document to display to the world the British imperialist war against the peace loving Soviets. He subsequently learned no such document existed.[xlix] While Arutyunov was in Afghanistan, he concentrated much of his effort on collecting intelligence on British influence on the Afghan government; the OGPU saw nefarious motives in any British move in South Asia.[l] When interacting with Afghan officials, Arutyunov’s goal was to draw them to the Soviet side of what the Soviets viewed as an already existing Soviet-British conflict; he told one Afghan official, “Our objective is to fight the English.”[li]
On a trip to Moscow in early 1927, Arutyunov was summoned to a meeting with Trilisser, who asked about the feasibility of using clandestine OGPU contacts in Afghanistan to insert Comintern personnel, including the chief of the Indian revolutionary party Manabendra Nath Roy, into British India. Roy’s trip was subsequently planned and ready to launch, but was suddenly postponed when the UK Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain sent a diplomatic note to USSR threatening to sever diplomatic relations in retaliation for Soviet interference in UK internal affairs. According to Arutyunov, the note frightened the Soviets, and the Politburo ordered that all influence activities in the East be suspended. Several months later, Arutyunov was called again to Moscow to revive the plan; however, this attempt was also stymied when British-sponsored raids against the Soviet embassy and consulate in China yielded damning information about Comintern clandestine influence activities in China and India.[lii]
While he was in Iran, Arutyunov discussed with his colleagues the advantages of establishing an illegal rezidentura in Iran. Arutyunov frequently referred to diplomats’ interference in OGPU operations, and an illegal rezidentura freed OGPU operations from the constraints of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, allowing OGPU officers to operate independent of any Soviet diplomatic establishment. A more substantive reason, however, was a Soviet fear in the late 1920s that a war could break out at any time with the United Kingdom, and the OGPU began to plan illegal rezidenturas as stay-behind operations in case diplomatic relations were severed. Arutyunov particularly began to study the possibility of establishing an illegal rezidentura among the tribes in Iran.[liii]
OGPU activity in the United States was of secondary importance, and was concentrated in several narrow operational lines: conducting influence operations to obtain U.S. diplomatic recognition, and acquiring U.S. passports to use in covered travel. The OGPU valued U.S. travel documents because of a perception that Americans could travel freely around the world. The United States was also a waypoint in travel to other parts of the world; OGPU officers traveling to the Far East would often stop in the United States en route because it was easier to enter the United States than other countries.[liv]
The conventional wisdom that has developed around Arutyunov ties his motivation for defection exclusively to his relationship with Isabel Streater. Prikhorov and Lemekhov claim, “The real reason for Agabekov’s treason was, not surprisingly, love.”[lv] Brook-Shepherd asserts that “Stalin’s secret policeman fled to the West because he had fallen hopelessly in love with a young English girl….” Brook-Shepherd goes so far as claiming that disillusionment about Communism in Russia, which Arutyunov cited as a reason for his defection, was one of his “gross misrepresentations.”[lvi] Brook-Shepherd gives no reason for distrusting Arutyunov’s own claims.
However, while Arutyunov was clearly smitten by Isabel, his love for her was not the sole reason for his defection. He never discusses his relationship with Isabel Streater in his published works, although he writes about her in his personal correspondence.[lvii] The terms he uses in his published writings to describe women are almost universally negative; most of the women he cites are bloodthirsty, conniving, and self interested. He never directly indicates having entered into a personal relationship with any woman, with one possibly indirect exception. He writes of a woman named Lyusya whom he met early in his career in Yekaterinburg whom he visited frequently at her ramshackle house, and for whom he developed pity because of her indigent circumstances. He claims to have recruited her as an agent expressly so he could offer her a salary to buy food for herself and her younger brother. However, even this one woman whom he discusses in tender terms turned out to be harboring counterrevolutionaries; he eventually used her to identify, locate, and neutralize a cell of deserters who were preparing a counter-Bolshevik insurgency. She was arrested for collaborating with the enemy.[lviii]
On the other hand, he does write about doubts about his OGPU employment, which began to form long before he made his final break, although he must have kept those doubts to himself, or he would never been sent to Turkey as an illegal rezident. The seeds of doubt were planted early in his career, when he encountered uneducated, crude ChK officers who were willing to perpetrate inhumane violence. As early as early 1928, he began to question the value of his work.[lix] Then, while traveling to Constantinople in October 1929, he was tempted to turn back and tell his OGPU superiors that he no longer wanted to work for the OGPU, but he was deterred by the fear that he would be seen as a coward for refusing to accept an assignment as an illegal.[lx] He drafted his book exposing OGPU operations while he was still in Constantinople, minimizing the likelihood that his books were manipulated to conform to anti-Soviet émigré propaganda. Soon after his arrival in Paris he was quoted as stating that he left the OGPU because of the “intolerable conditions” in which he worked.[lxi]
His life after defection never calmed. As noted earlier, Brook-Shepherd and Volodarsky provide detailed accounts of Arutyunov’s exploits after defection, which will not be reproduced in total here. However, within a year of his defection, the OGPU attempted to lure him to Romania, kidnap him, and forcibly return him to the Soviet Union. Dumbadze also recounted that Arutyunov embarked on a series of money-making ventures, attempting to employ the skills he had gained as an OGPU officer to obtain enough money to live on. Belgian authorities arrested him several times in 1935 and 1936 for theft, and he disappeared in 1937, probably assassinated by OGPU agents.[lxii]
Initial reviews of Arutyunov’s information were negative. A British Home Office Warrant, issued on 25 July 1930, describes Arutyunov’s escape from Constantinople as “theatrical” and his information “lurid.” It goes on to state, “It is strongly suspected both by the War Office department concerned and ourselves [Scotland Yard] that he may be acting as an agent provocateur.”[lxiii] SIS interrogated him in late July 1930 in Paris, resulting in an assessment that “the first impression he made was very unfavorable…His replies were very vague and when questioned on military matters he professed complete ignorance and indifference”[lxiv]: the interrogator seems to have missed the fact that his expertise was not in military matters. Nevertheless, SIS assessed that he was not willfully fabricating information.[lxv] French interrogators gave a similarly low estimation of his information, taking issue with Arutyunov’s revelation that the Soviets had intercepted French diplomatic communications dispatched from Ankara.[lxvi] Neither the French nor the British seemed to realize that information was his only marketable commodity, and that he may have been withholding information because he had planned even before leaving Constantinople to publish his memoirs as a primary source of income. They also failed to assess the areas where he actually possessed knowledge, concentrating on the areas where did not.
The SIS broke contact with Arutyunov in 1933. An SIS source in 1933 claimed that, after reading Arutyunov’s book (not specifying which one), he “thought a lot of it was fiction,” and that he “frequently heard from many friends in the OGPU that book contained many inaccuracies,” although the source did not specify the nature of the inaccuracies, nor did the SIS consider the possibilities the a OGPU source might be intentionally trying to discredit Arutyunov’s information.[lxvii] By 1936, the SIS had expressed further doubts about the information Arutyunov had continued to report.[lxviii] This perception followed Arutyunov for many years, and reappeared in a 1947 MI5 report on Soviet espionage, which asserted that, “His book was a ‘blood and thunder’ thriller with very little serious intelligence interest.”[lxix]
However, a 1992 reprint of Arutyunov’s The ChK at Work, the first edition published in Russia, included detailed annotations identifying the people, places, and events that Arutyunov named.[lxx] The notes corroborate much of Arutyunov’s material, indicating that his writings were largely accurate, with the exception of some specific dates. His frequent intersections with the lives and consequences of other Soviet intelligence officer defectors reinforced both his and their credibility. Although his interrogators never seemed to realize it, he provided them with valuable information about Soviet intelligence operations, including operations directed against Britain.
Arutyunov was born to an Armenian blacksmith in Ashkhabad, Turkestan, in 1895. He left Ashkhabad at around 20 years old and returned only seldom for visits. In The ChK at Work, Arutyunov describes traveling to Ashkhabad, then the capital of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic, in January 1928 and visiting relatives whom he had not seen for some time.[vi]
Several versions of Arutyunov’s early career have appeared, each showing possible biases. He himself wrote that he was drafted into the Russian Imperial Army before World War I and served as a soldier until late 1916, when he was sent to a warrant officer’s course in Tashkent, graduating in about March 1917. After graduation he commanded a platoon, and then, thanks to his language proficiency, was assigned as a Turkish interpreter for the 46th Reserve Regiment, deployed to the Romanian front in southern Ukraine.[vii] In March 1918, Arutyunov joined the Red Army and participated in the Civil War, serving as a battalion commissar at the age of 24.
An alternate version of Arutyunov’s background appears in an article written in December 1931 by an unknown author named Surebeli, who purported to have known Arutyunov before World War I. Surebeli claimed that Arutyunov was a tsarist police informant and joined a police unit in 1915. Surebeli claimed that Arutyunov disliked police work and was not suited for it, being illiterate. The police unit itself recommended Arutyunov for military service to get rid of him.[viii] In this version, he entered warrant officer’s school in Tbilisi, not Tashkent. The accuracy of this unflattering account cannot be verified, and it may have been written—or ghost written—by someone with whom Arutyunov clashed after his defection.
In 1920, he joined the Bolshevik Party and commanded a battalion of internal security troops in Yekaterinburg. There the ChK noticed him and selected him for ChK duty, beginning a 10-year career as a Soviet intelligence officer. He was initially a true believer in the Bolshevik cause, and he described his early time in the ChK as fulfilling his revolutionary duty.[ix] He began as a case officer in the ChK Counterrevolution Section in Yekaterinburg, where his primary targets were deserters and oppositionists. Throughout 1921 he held counterintelligence and internal security positions in Yekaterinburg and Tyumen.[x]
Similar to other OGPU defectors, Arutyunov writes of ChK cellars and prisoner executions, and he describes a particular session during which the Yekaterinburg ChK Collegium ruled on execution cases. The Collegium consisted of a trio of officers, including a bloodthirsty 25-year-old Latvian woman named Shtalberg, who not only condemned people to execution but also personally carried out the sentences. The Collegium ruled on the cases as quickly as possible to make room in the cellars for more “enemies of the revolution.”[xi] Arutyunov and Shtalberg met again in 1929 when Arutyunov was assigned as an OGPU representative to the Communist Party Central Control Commission, which was responsible for ruling on disciplinary cases for Party members. Arutyunov quotes Shtalberg then as complaining, “In the good old days I would have simply condemned them to execution, but now we have to fuss with their files.”[xii]
In October 1921, Arutyunov was briefly assigned to ChK headquarters in Moscow, saved from the internecine intrigues in the Tyumen ChK office by the ChK’s need for language-skilled officers.[xiii] During this tour in Moscow Arutyunov was introduced into foreign operations, where he would remain for the rest of his career. It was also at this time that he first met Trilisser. Arutyunov describes Trilisser in markedly positive terms, considering him a mentor and contrasting him with the “sadists, drunkards, and hard-headed adventurists” who made up most of the OGPU leadership.[xiv]
Arutyunov began working in the Eastern Section, which oversaw intelligence operations in countries from the Middle East to East Asia—he returned six years later to lead this same section. As a Persian linguist, he was assigned to an Afghan account, and after seeing the lack of worthwhile reporting coming from the Afghan legation in Moscow he proposed an operation to penetrate the legation. His plan involved creating a diplomatically-covered position in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. However, the rivalry between the OGPU and the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs prevented his plan from proceeding; this was the first of many conflicts he recounted in his writings between the OGPU and the diplomatic service. Finding his plan for the Afghan legation confounded, he left Moscow after only two months for an assignment in the OGPU office in Turkestan in December 1921.[xv]
When Arutyunov arrived in Tashkent, the Soviet Union was struggling to solidify control of Turkestan, where local Islamic insurgents, labeled by the Soviets as basmachis, resisted Soviet rule. In 1921, the former Turkish Minister of War Ismail Enver, known as Enver Pasha, agreed with Lenin to lead the counterinsurgency against the basmachis. Enver arrived in Bukhara in December 1921 to what Arutyunov describes as a hero’s welcome from a population looking for a leader, and this reception convinced Enver of the weakness of Soviet power. Rather than supporting the Soviets, he reverted to his pan-Turkish aspirations, defected to basmachis, and designated himself their commander. Arutyunov was sent to Bukhara as chief of counterintelligence and, along with a Razvedupr officer named Osipov, he launched an operation to locate and assassinate Enver. He posed as a peddler, traveling into the remote area of modern-day Tajikistan were Enver was hiding and succeeded in gaining the locals’ trust, through which he learned the location of Enver’s camp. Arutyunov reported the camp to a waiting Red Army cavalry division, which attacked the camp and killed Enver and his entourage in August 1922.[xvi]
Arutyunov’s career progressed through a series of increasingly responsible and sensitive positions over the next several years. He served several times as an OGPU Communist Party cell leader, including in the Tashkent OGPU office, where he participated in a gathering[xvii] at which a Party official from Moscow solicited Party members’ views on Trotsky’s thesis of “permanent revolution.” To Moscow’s dismay, many of the OGPU party members sided with Trotsky.[xviii] He later describes a later Party chistka (cleansing) that began in 1928, where OGPU officers were called before the Party collective to describe their backgrounds and their parents’ positions before the revolution and to vouch for their own revolutionary roots. OGPU employees dreaded the prospect of being “cleansed” from the Party, because to lose Party membership meant being sacked from the OGPU, and no one would hire for former OGPU officer. With reticence typical of Arutyunov’s writings, he never mentions his own views on Trotsky or his own experience before the Chistka Committee.[xix]
He returned to Moscow in early 1924 for training in clandestine collection and communication methods, and was then assigned as OGPU rezident in Kabul, Afghanistan, from June 1924 to March 1926. It was during this assignment that British intelligence first learned of his existence an OGPU officer.[xx] He returned briefly to INO Headquarters, and then was assigned as rezident in Tehran, Iran, from August 1926 to May 1928. SIS also received intelligence in 1927 confirming his presence in Tehran.[xxi]
Over the course of his career, Arutyunov several times encountered the results of other Soviet intelligence officer defectors, possibly not even realizing that previous defectors were involved. In one instance, Arutyunov identified the Soviet military attaché in Tehran in 1927 as a former Tsarist Army colonel named Bobrishchev, who had “made a mess of it” while previously working in Finland.[xxii] This is likely a reference to Ardalyon Aleksandrovich Bobrishchev, who was expelled from Finland in 1923 partially based on information supplied to the Finns by defector Aleksandr Sipelgas. Arutyunov reported that Bobrishchev was also expelled from Tehran in 1927.[xxiii]
During his tour of duty in Tehran two Soviet officials, Boris Georgiyevich Bazhanov and Arkadiy Romanovich Birger, who was known by his Party handle Maksimov, crossed the border from Turkmenistan into Iran and requested asylum. Arutyunov writes that he first heard of Bazhanov’s and Maksimov’s defection from a newspaper on 3 January 1928, and later the same day received telegram from Moscow. In an unusual display of unanimity, both the OGPU and the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs agreed on a plan to assassinate Bazhanov, which Arutyunov interpreted as an indicator the decision had come from Stalin himself. Arutyunov was dispatched to Mashhad to lead the OGPU effort to liquidate the defectors, particularly targeting Bazhanov, who had been a personal assistant to Stalin from 1923 to 1925. But unanimity was short lived. After establishing a network of agents to report on the whereabouts of and security surrounding the defectors, Arutyunov received a countermanding order from Trilisser to stand down and not touch them. At the same time, the OGPU office in Ashkhabad received an order from the other Yagoda to continue the operation. Arutyunov concluded, the “right hand doesn’t know what the left hand is doing.”[xxiv] Arutyunov claims to have first begun to have doubts about his career during this confused operation.[xxv]
Arutyunov traveled to Moscow in March 1928 planning to take two months of leave and then to return to Tehran. However, staff at the Soviet embassy in Tehran had begun circulating accusations against him, and Trilisser decided his presence in Tehran would cause too much discord.[xxvi] The rumors in Tehran were part of typical life at a Soviet diplomatic establishment to which Arutyunov referred often in his writings. He discusses love triangles, embezzlement, and laziness that typified Soviet life abroad. He especially highlighted extramarital affairs, describing animosity and intrigue surrounding the few women assigned abroad, which often led to OGPU officers and embassy staff being recalled to Moscow.
Rumors about Arutyunov continued to circulate within the OGPU years after his defection. A later defector, Aleksandr Fedorovich Chikalov, wrote in about 1949 about an incident he claims occurred in China in the late 1920s in which Arutyunov was allegedly involved. He recounted that the Soviet Union was actively working to establish communist dominance in Xinjiang and that Soviet enterprises were launching commercial ventures to sell lumber and exploit silver deposits in the region. These commercial opportunities attracted shady business schemes, including one initiated by a Soviet diplomat in China named Tairov, with Arutyunov’s cooperation. The scheme was uncovered and Tairov was recalled to Moscow and expelled from the Party—he was later reinstated, recruited into the OGPU, and sent back to China as an intelligence officer. Agabekov, according to Chikalov, avoided punishment by defecting.[xxvii] Chikalov served a temporary duty assignment in China in 1932, so it is possible that he heard about this incident at that time, possibly even from Tairov himself. However, there is no other evidence that Agabekov was involved with operations in China and his career suffered no negative effects. Nevertheless, Chikalov seemed to accept the story as legitimate.
Trilisser retained Arutyunov in Moscow, assigning him as Chief of the INO Eastern Section and acting chief of the British-American Section. As an INO section chief, operations against Britain continued to occupy a large part of his effort. This included a regular flow of intercepted correspondences from British and other European diplomatic representations in the Middle East and South Asia. According to Arutyunov, the OGPU recruited agents in postal systems around the region who provided the OGPU access to diplomatic mail. Specially trained OGPU Officers carefully unsealed diplomatic mail from foreign missions in Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt, photographed it, and resealed it so expertly as to leave no trace of tampering. The operations yielded valuable intelligence not only about British and other European activities in Asia, but about the local politics of Asian countries as reported by European diplomats. By 1929, when the OGPU was planning further operations in Egypt, Arutyunov advised that there was no need to bother recruiting any more sources with access to British High Commission diplomatic communications there, because they were already being fully exploited.[xxviii]
During British interrogations, Arutyunov provided partial identifying information for a 25-year-old British Jew named Fisher who worked as an OGPU linguist in 1928 translating intercepted British mail.[xxix] Fisher was also in training to be an OGPU illegal for duty in an English-speaking country.[xxx] Arutyunov’s description was insufficient to identify Fisher in the 1930s; the Metropolitan Police Special Branch attempted but failed to figure out who he was.[xxxi] However, this was probably the first partial reference to an individual named William August Fisher, who became famous in 1957 as the Soviet KGB illegal Rudolph Abel when he was arrested and tried in the United States. Fisher/Abel was born in 1903, making him 25 years old in 1928, and was recruited into the OGPU in 1927.[xxxii] Fisher/Abel was dispatched to the United States as an illegal in 1949, and was subsequently compromised to the FBI by another Soviet intelligence officer defector, Reino Hayhanen.[xxxiii] The Soviet Union did not reveal Abel’s real identity as William August Fisher until after his death in 1971, over 40 years after Arutyunov’s partial clue.
Arutyunov’s next assignment was to become the first OGPU illegal rezident in India, where Britain would again be his primary target. But as Arutyunov was preparing for his trip to India, the chargé d'affaires at the Soviet embassy in Paris, Grigoriy Besedovskiy, refused to return to the Soviet Union and instead joined forces with anti-Soviet émigrés in France. Trilisser summoned Arutyunov and tasked him to travel to Paris before going to India to assassinate Besedovskiy. However, Trilisser cancelled the assignment the following day; Besedovskiy had already published his story in French newspapers, and the Soviet leadership was concerned that Besedovskiy’s assassination would do more harm to Soviet relations with France than the good of eliminating a vocal Soviet opponent.[xxxiv]
His assignment to India was finally derailed, however, by yet another “enemy of the Party.” The illegal OGPU rezident in Constantinople, Yakov Grigoryevich Blyumkin, was arrested for alleged association with Lev Trotsky and was executed in October 1929. The OGPU assessed that the Constantinople illegal rezidentura was more valuable than a new rezidentura in India, and Arutyunov was sent to Constantinople fill Blyumkin’s place and run OGPU source networks in Greece, Syria, Egypt, and Palestine. On 22 October 1929, Arutyunov traveled to Constantinople under the pseudonym Nerses Ovsepyan.[xxxv]
Arutyunov quickly made contacts among the Armenian community in Constantinople and established himself as a merchant, being accepted into the Chamber of Commerce in Constantinople after only a short time. He simultaneously established communication channels with Blyumkin’s agents across the Middle East. Palestine fell within Arutyunov’s area of responsibility, and the OGPU priority there was to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict to the Soviet Union’s strategic advantage. Assuming that the British would side with one party or the other in the conflict, the Soviet Union hoped to exploit whichever party the British offended and leverage their distrust of Britain. Soviets were particularly interested in Palestine as a strategic point from which to impede shipping lanes through the Red Sea in case of war with England.[xxxvi]
Arutyunov also began to pursue contacts in the British expatriate community in Constantinople. In a likely effort to increase his contacts for operational exploitation, Arutyunov advertised for an English language tutor. The person who responded to the advertisement, a 20-year-old British woman named Isabel Streater, changed his life forever. It is unclear whether he specifically targeted Isabel for recruitment to gain access to the British consulate, where her sister, Sybil, was employed[xxxvii]; such a scenario is plausible, although Arutyunov never directly mentions Isabel in any of his published writings. Nevertheless, he quickly became enchanted with Miss Streater, prompting him to break with his usual reticence about discussing his personal opinions. In January 1930 he revealed to her his real purpose for being in Constantinople, along with frustrations about his career. Likely on her insistence, Arutyunov approached the British military attaché in Constantinople in February 1930 offering to reveal how the OGPU was intercepting British diplomatic mail.[xxxviii] The military attaché declined interest. Arutyunov tried several more times to establish contact with the British in Constantinople, revealing the name Agabekov that he had used in Afghanistan and Iran. The British in Constantinople knew only that the Nerses Ovsepyan who approached them was an Armenian businessman ran a bicycle and typewriter shop, which they suspected of being a cover for drug dealing. They claimed as of April 1930 to have no evidence that he was a Soviet agent—his cover was apparently successful—and the British mission never responded to his offer.[xxxix] It was not until July, after press reports of Arutyunov’s unveiling in Paris, that SIS connected previous reporting about the presence of an OGPU officer named Agabekov in Afghanistan and Iran with Arutyunov’s claims.[xl]
The British mission’s hesitation to accept Arutyunov was further fueled by Isabel’s family, who objected strenuously to her association with Arutyunov due to his “repulsive appearance.” Sybil in particular “did all in her power to stop the affair,”[xli] likely including appeals to her supervisors at the consulate. The family tried desperately without success to separate the two, and in June contacted Isabel’s sister Joyce in Paris, who agreed that she should come to live there to get away from Constantinople. Rather than discouraging their contact, however, Isabel’s move sealed Arutyunov’s plans, and in the absence of a response from the British in Constantinople, he resolved to follow Isabel to Paris. He had already completed the notes for his book, and he sent them to Paris via a “sure channel,” meaning with Isabel.[xlii] He left Constantinople on 19 June 1930 on a ship bound for Marseilles and arrived in Paris on 26 June 1930. He approached Joyce and her husband Charles Lee the next day and offered Charles a percentage of the profit from his book sales, but Mr. Lee “refused to entertain the idea.” Instead, Charles lodged a complaint to the British Consulate General in Paris requesting assistance “from official sources to prevent the continuance of the situation.”[xliii]
Receiving Charles Lee’s refusal, Arutyunov approached a literary agent in Paris to inquire about publishing his memoirs and on 2 July 1930, the Agence Littéraire Internationale agreed to work with him. He continued to meet with representatives of that company until 4 August, when the French government informed him that he was no longer welcome in France.[xliv] Charles Lee’s influence persuaded both the Political Section of the Sûreté Général and the British Consul General in Paris to expel Arutyunov,[xlv] and he was forced to flee to Brussels, where he moved in with fellow intelligence officer defector Yevgeniy Dumbadze, who acted for a time as a courier to carry materials to France that Arutyunov could no longer take himself.[xlvi]
Arutyunov’s and Dumbadze’s careers paralleled in a number of aspects. Both began as young military commissars in the early 1920s. Both were drafted into the ChK from their Party positions and were assigned to ChK units responsible for internal monitoring of the Soviet population. Their careers diverged for a time when Dumbadze began studying in university while Arutyunov transitioned into the INO. But they converged again when Dumbadze was assigned as a Comintern official in Constantinople, and then defected to Paris, subsequently moving to Brussels. While it is unclear where in this timeline Arutyunov and Dumbadze became aware of each other, it is certain that Arutyunov would have known of Dumbadze’s defection in June 1928, which occurred while Arutyunov was chief of the INO Eastern Section responsible for operations in Constantinople. Both chose Paris as their post-defection location, and both later moved to Brussels, where their paths converged when Arutyunov roomed with Dumbadze and enlisted his assistance.
Within days of his arrival in Paris, Arutyunov also met Grigoriy Besedovskiy, whom he was assigned to assassinate two years earlier, and Besedovskiy put him in contact with the Russian émigré newspaper Последние Новости (Poslednie Novosti; Latest News). Arutyunov began a correspondence with Nikolay Platonovich Vakar, a Poslednie Novosti journalist, who represented his interests in Paris until his book was published. Over the next several months, Arutyunov and Vakar exchanged numerous letters discussing translation fees, offers to publish the book in various countries, and royalty amounts. In his correspondence with Vakar, Arutyunov also frequently requested news of Isabel, whom he described as his fiancée, and sent letters through Vakar to her. Despite multiple attempts, however, Vakar was never received at the Lee home and was unable to establish contact with Isabel, and by mid-August he learned that she had left France and returned to Turkey.[xlvii] However, Isabel’s family could not legally keep them separated forever. Isabel turned 21 on 30 August 1930. Eventually, Arutyunov was reunited with Isabel and they were married in late 1930.[xlviii]
According to Arutyunov’s writings, Britain dominated OGPU planning and operations across Asia in the 1920s. As early as 1923, when Arutyunov was posted to Turkestan, he tasked an agent to obtain a copy of a document that purportedly proved that the British were supplying weapons and money to basmachis to fight against Bolsheviks. The OGPU sought the document to display to the world the British imperialist war against the peace loving Soviets. He subsequently learned no such document existed.[xlix] While Arutyunov was in Afghanistan, he concentrated much of his effort on collecting intelligence on British influence on the Afghan government; the OGPU saw nefarious motives in any British move in South Asia.[l] When interacting with Afghan officials, Arutyunov’s goal was to draw them to the Soviet side of what the Soviets viewed as an already existing Soviet-British conflict; he told one Afghan official, “Our objective is to fight the English.”[li]
On a trip to Moscow in early 1927, Arutyunov was summoned to a meeting with Trilisser, who asked about the feasibility of using clandestine OGPU contacts in Afghanistan to insert Comintern personnel, including the chief of the Indian revolutionary party Manabendra Nath Roy, into British India. Roy’s trip was subsequently planned and ready to launch, but was suddenly postponed when the UK Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain sent a diplomatic note to USSR threatening to sever diplomatic relations in retaliation for Soviet interference in UK internal affairs. According to Arutyunov, the note frightened the Soviets, and the Politburo ordered that all influence activities in the East be suspended. Several months later, Arutyunov was called again to Moscow to revive the plan; however, this attempt was also stymied when British-sponsored raids against the Soviet embassy and consulate in China yielded damning information about Comintern clandestine influence activities in China and India.[lii]
While he was in Iran, Arutyunov discussed with his colleagues the advantages of establishing an illegal rezidentura in Iran. Arutyunov frequently referred to diplomats’ interference in OGPU operations, and an illegal rezidentura freed OGPU operations from the constraints of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, allowing OGPU officers to operate independent of any Soviet diplomatic establishment. A more substantive reason, however, was a Soviet fear in the late 1920s that a war could break out at any time with the United Kingdom, and the OGPU began to plan illegal rezidenturas as stay-behind operations in case diplomatic relations were severed. Arutyunov particularly began to study the possibility of establishing an illegal rezidentura among the tribes in Iran.[liii]
OGPU activity in the United States was of secondary importance, and was concentrated in several narrow operational lines: conducting influence operations to obtain U.S. diplomatic recognition, and acquiring U.S. passports to use in covered travel. The OGPU valued U.S. travel documents because of a perception that Americans could travel freely around the world. The United States was also a waypoint in travel to other parts of the world; OGPU officers traveling to the Far East would often stop in the United States en route because it was easier to enter the United States than other countries.[liv]
The conventional wisdom that has developed around Arutyunov ties his motivation for defection exclusively to his relationship with Isabel Streater. Prikhorov and Lemekhov claim, “The real reason for Agabekov’s treason was, not surprisingly, love.”[lv] Brook-Shepherd asserts that “Stalin’s secret policeman fled to the West because he had fallen hopelessly in love with a young English girl….” Brook-Shepherd goes so far as claiming that disillusionment about Communism in Russia, which Arutyunov cited as a reason for his defection, was one of his “gross misrepresentations.”[lvi] Brook-Shepherd gives no reason for distrusting Arutyunov’s own claims.
However, while Arutyunov was clearly smitten by Isabel, his love for her was not the sole reason for his defection. He never discusses his relationship with Isabel Streater in his published works, although he writes about her in his personal correspondence.[lvii] The terms he uses in his published writings to describe women are almost universally negative; most of the women he cites are bloodthirsty, conniving, and self interested. He never directly indicates having entered into a personal relationship with any woman, with one possibly indirect exception. He writes of a woman named Lyusya whom he met early in his career in Yekaterinburg whom he visited frequently at her ramshackle house, and for whom he developed pity because of her indigent circumstances. He claims to have recruited her as an agent expressly so he could offer her a salary to buy food for herself and her younger brother. However, even this one woman whom he discusses in tender terms turned out to be harboring counterrevolutionaries; he eventually used her to identify, locate, and neutralize a cell of deserters who were preparing a counter-Bolshevik insurgency. She was arrested for collaborating with the enemy.[lviii]
On the other hand, he does write about doubts about his OGPU employment, which began to form long before he made his final break, although he must have kept those doubts to himself, or he would never been sent to Turkey as an illegal rezident. The seeds of doubt were planted early in his career, when he encountered uneducated, crude ChK officers who were willing to perpetrate inhumane violence. As early as early 1928, he began to question the value of his work.[lix] Then, while traveling to Constantinople in October 1929, he was tempted to turn back and tell his OGPU superiors that he no longer wanted to work for the OGPU, but he was deterred by the fear that he would be seen as a coward for refusing to accept an assignment as an illegal.[lx] He drafted his book exposing OGPU operations while he was still in Constantinople, minimizing the likelihood that his books were manipulated to conform to anti-Soviet émigré propaganda. Soon after his arrival in Paris he was quoted as stating that he left the OGPU because of the “intolerable conditions” in which he worked.[lxi]
His life after defection never calmed. As noted earlier, Brook-Shepherd and Volodarsky provide detailed accounts of Arutyunov’s exploits after defection, which will not be reproduced in total here. However, within a year of his defection, the OGPU attempted to lure him to Romania, kidnap him, and forcibly return him to the Soviet Union. Dumbadze also recounted that Arutyunov embarked on a series of money-making ventures, attempting to employ the skills he had gained as an OGPU officer to obtain enough money to live on. Belgian authorities arrested him several times in 1935 and 1936 for theft, and he disappeared in 1937, probably assassinated by OGPU agents.[lxii]
Initial reviews of Arutyunov’s information were negative. A British Home Office Warrant, issued on 25 July 1930, describes Arutyunov’s escape from Constantinople as “theatrical” and his information “lurid.” It goes on to state, “It is strongly suspected both by the War Office department concerned and ourselves [Scotland Yard] that he may be acting as an agent provocateur.”[lxiii] SIS interrogated him in late July 1930 in Paris, resulting in an assessment that “the first impression he made was very unfavorable…His replies were very vague and when questioned on military matters he professed complete ignorance and indifference”[lxiv]: the interrogator seems to have missed the fact that his expertise was not in military matters. Nevertheless, SIS assessed that he was not willfully fabricating information.[lxv] French interrogators gave a similarly low estimation of his information, taking issue with Arutyunov’s revelation that the Soviets had intercepted French diplomatic communications dispatched from Ankara.[lxvi] Neither the French nor the British seemed to realize that information was his only marketable commodity, and that he may have been withholding information because he had planned even before leaving Constantinople to publish his memoirs as a primary source of income. They also failed to assess the areas where he actually possessed knowledge, concentrating on the areas where did not.
The SIS broke contact with Arutyunov in 1933. An SIS source in 1933 claimed that, after reading Arutyunov’s book (not specifying which one), he “thought a lot of it was fiction,” and that he “frequently heard from many friends in the OGPU that book contained many inaccuracies,” although the source did not specify the nature of the inaccuracies, nor did the SIS consider the possibilities the a OGPU source might be intentionally trying to discredit Arutyunov’s information.[lxvii] By 1936, the SIS had expressed further doubts about the information Arutyunov had continued to report.[lxviii] This perception followed Arutyunov for many years, and reappeared in a 1947 MI5 report on Soviet espionage, which asserted that, “His book was a ‘blood and thunder’ thriller with very little serious intelligence interest.”[lxix]
However, a 1992 reprint of Arutyunov’s The ChK at Work, the first edition published in Russia, included detailed annotations identifying the people, places, and events that Arutyunov named.[lxx] The notes corroborate much of Arutyunov’s material, indicating that his writings were largely accurate, with the exception of some specific dates. His frequent intersections with the lives and consequences of other Soviet intelligence officer defectors reinforced both his and their credibility. Although his interrogators never seemed to realize it, he provided them with valuable information about Soviet intelligence operations, including operations directed against Britain.
Notes
- [i] Photo from Paris Police Prefecture Archive file, Agabekoff, File number BA1980/5184.
- [ii] Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Petrels (London: Collins, 1977), pp. 107-151.
- [iii] Boris Volodarsky, “Unknown Agabekov,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28 (2013), No. 6, pp. 890-909.
- [iv] Georges Agabekov, OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror (New York: Brentano’s, 1931).
- [v] Georgiy Agabekov, ЧК За Работой (The ChK at Work) (Berlin, Strela, 1931).
- [vi] Agabekov, ЧК За Работой (The ChK at Work) (Berlin, Strela, 1931).
- [vii] His autobiography presents a slightly different chronology, indicating that he was visiting Odessa, probably during his service with the 46th Reserve Regiment, when the February 1917 revolution occurred. See Agabekov, The ChK at Work, p. 135.
- [viii] Surebeli, “Похождения Агабекова” (“The Adventures of Agabekov”), Hoover Institution Archives, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 746, Folder 25.
- [ix] Agabekov, OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror, p. 250.
- [x] Agabekov, OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror, pp. 5-8.
- [xi] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, pp. 24-25.
- [xii] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, p. 124.
- [xiii] Agabekov, OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror, pp. 11-12.
- [xiv] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, p. 82.
- [xv] Agabekov, OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror, pp. 14-15.
- [xvi] Agabekov, OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror, pp. 23-27; Agabekov, The ChK at Work, pp. 34-40. See also Georgiy Agabekov, “Убийство Евнер Паши» (“The Murder of Enver Pasha”), manuscript dated August 1930, in Hoover Institution Archives, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 104, Folder 9 (microfilm reel 86).
- [xvii] In The ChK at Work, Arutyunov writes that the meeting was called in late 1923 to discuss Lev Trotsky’s book, Уроки Октября (Lessons of October). However, the date is an error, because Trotsky’s book was not published until October 1924.
- [xviii] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, pp. 54-58; Agabekov, OGPU: Russian Secret Terror, p. 38-40.
- [xix] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, pp. 130-134.
- [xx] Precis of information about Nerses Ovsepian, aka George Agabekov, dated 11 July 1930, TNA KV 2/2398, serial 6A.
- [xxi] Memo from Major W. A. K. Fraser, British military attaché dated 12 July 1927, TNA KV 3/326, serial 6A. Also in cross-reference as the first entry in the MI5 file titled Nerses Ovsepian, aka Agabekov, dated 15 July 1927, TNA KV 2/2398, serial 1a.
- [xxii] Agabekov, OGPU: The Russia Secret Terror, p. 105. Memo from Major W. A. K. Fraser, British military attaché dated 12 July 1927 confirmed Bobrishchev’s presence as Soviet military attaché in Tehran, TNA KV 3/326, serial 6A.
- [xxiii] Agabekov, OGPU: The Russia Secret Terror, p. 105.
- [xxiv] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, p. 95-101.
- [xxv] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, p. 97.
- [xxvi] Agabekov, OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror, pp. 101-102, 146.
- [xxvii] A. F. Almazov (pseudonym of Aleksandr Fedorovich Chikalov), “On Tairov,” in an undated collection of essays contained in HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 8 (microfilm reel 199).
- [xxviii] Agabekov, OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror, p. 236.
- [xxix] Memo dated 25 July 1930, TNA KV 2/2398, serial 20a.
- [xxx] Interrogation report, “Details of Workers in the INO OGPU,” dated December 1930, TNA KV 3/12, serial number obliterated.
- [xxxi] Metropolitan Police Special Branch memo dated 1 August 1930, TNA KV 2/2398, serial 22a.
- [xxxii] Vin Arthey, Like Father Like Son: A Dynasty of Spies. (London: St. Ermin's Press, 2004), p. 81.
- [xxxiii] More information about Hayhanen and the Abel arrest is below.
- [xxxiv] Agabekov, OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror, pp. 232-233.
- [xxxv] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, pp. 134-139.
- [xxxvi] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, p. 136.
- [xxxvii] British Consulate General, Paris, “Memorandum on the Case of Isabel Streater and Guicha Serguevitch Agabekof,” dated 3 July 1930, TNA KV 2/2398.
- [xxxviii] Agabekov, OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror, p. 247. He does not identify the British consulate specifically.
- [xxxix] Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Petrels, pp. 112-114.
- [xl] Precis of information about Nerses Ovsepian, aka George Agabekov, dated 11 July 1930, TNA KV 2/2398, serial 6A.
- [xli] British Consulate General, Paris, “Memorandum on the Case of Isabel Streater and Guicha Serguevitch Agabekof,” dated 3 July 1930, TNA KV 2/2398.
- [xlii] Agabekov, OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror, p. 248.
- [xliii] British Consulate General, Paris, “Memorandum on the Case of Isabel Streater and Guicha Serguevitch Agabekof,” dated 3 July 1930, TNA KV 2/2398.
- [xliv] Letter from Mr. Schwartz, Agence Littéraire Internationale to Georges Agabekof, care of the newspaper Les Dernieres Nouvelles (Poslednie Novosti), dated 2 July 1930, Hoover Institution Archive, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 104, Folder 4 (microfilm reel 86).
- [xlv] Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Petrels, p. 117.
- [xlvi] Letter from Agabekov to Vakar, dated 10 August 1930, Hoover Institution Archive, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 104, Folder 4 (microfilm reel 86).
- [xlvii] Letter from Vakar to Agabekov dated 13 August 1930, Hoover Institution Archive, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 104, Folder 4 (microfilm reel 86).
- [xlviii] Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Petrels, p. 124.
- [xlix] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, pp. 62-63.
- [l] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, pp. 50-54; Agabekov, OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror, pp. 35-36, 44.
- [li] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, p. 65.
- [lii] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, pp. 81-85; Agabekov, OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror, pp. 77-79, 92-93. Chamberlain’s note was dated 23 February 1927, corresponding with the first postponement of Roy’s trip to India (see Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Harold Henry Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 370-371, for discussion of the Soviet reaction to Chamberlain’s diplomatic note). The raids on Soviet diplomatic establishments in China occurred in April 1927, about the time Roy’s trip was finally cancelled. Britain severed diplomatic relations with the USSR in May 1927 after MI5 raids on the All-Russian Cooperative Society (ARCOS) in London uncovered evidence of Soviet intelligence activities in the UK.
- [liii] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, pp. 91-92.
- [liv] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, p. 123.
- [lv] Dmitriy P. Prokhorov, Oleg I. Lemekhov, Перебежчики Заочно Расстреляны (Defectors Executed in Absentia) (Moscow: Veche, 2001), p. 27.
- [lvi] Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Petrels, pp. 108-109.
- [lvii] Arutyunov letters to Vakar dated 10, 12, 13, 14, 16 August 1930, Hoover Institution Archives, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 104, Folder 4 (microfilm reel 86).
- [lviii] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, pp. 21-24.
- [lix] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, p. 97.
- [lx] Agabekov, The ChK at Work, p. 138.
- [lxi] “Moscow’s Grip on Egypt: Better Informed then Mr. Henderson: How Secrets Leak Out,” Evening News, 3 July 1930, clipping in TNA KV 2/2398, serial 4a.
- [lxii] Joint Intelligence Committee, A Study of Defectors from the U.S.S.R., August 1948, TNA, FO 1093/551.
- [lxiii] Home Office Warrant, 25 July 1930, TNA KV 3/2398, serial 12a.
- [lxiv] Cross-reference from SIS to MI5 files, dated 29 July 1930, TNA KV 2/2398, serial 15a.
- [lxv] Ibid.
- [lxvi] SIS memo, received at MI5 on 20 August 1930, TNA KV 2/2398, serial number torn off.
- [lxvii] Cross-reference from SIS to MI5 files, dated 29 May 1933, TNA KV 2/2398, serial 88b.
- [lxviii] Cross-reference from SIS to MI5 files, dated 20 November 1936, TNA KV 2/2398, serial 95a.
- [lxix] TNA 2/2399, serial 129a, dated 22 December 1947.
- [lxx] Georgiy Agabekov, ЧК За Работой (The ChK at Work) (Moscow: Otechestvennye Arkhivy, 1992).
Published works
- Г. П. У. Записки чекиста (The GPU: Notes of a Chekist) (Berlin
- 1930) OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror (New York: Brentano's
- 1931). ЧК за работой (The Cheka at Work) (Berlin: Strela
- 1931)