Intelligence and state security officers who left Soviet serviceCompiled by Kevin Riehle

Entry 89 of 121 · revised 2026-11-22

Boris Ivanovich Baklanov

Known asA. Romanov

Борис Иванович Бакланов

Biography

Boris Ivanovich Baklanov was a Soviet counterintelligence officer who was deployed to the Central Group of Soviet Forces in Vienna when he defected in July 1947 after about five years of Soviet state security service. Most of what we know about Baklanov comes from his own autobiography, Nights Are Longest There, published under the pseudonym A. I. Romanov 25 years after his defection.[i] Unlike other SMERSH officers who typically spent their career in one SMERSH department, Baklanov served in three different departments, and provided insights into a variety of clandestine operations, including covert sabotage and repatriation operations. His autobiography shows that he was a status conscious, possibly stemming from his privileged upbringing, and that he shied away from mundane work and was always seeking prestigious, exciting work.

Nigel West erroneously writes in the foreword to Vadim Birstein’s 2013 book Smersh: Stalin's Secret Weapon, “The first eye-witness of SMERSH from the inside emerged in 1972 when Captain Boris Baklanov published his memoirs.”[ii] Brook-Shepherd, on the other hand, claimed Baklanov and Granovskiy were the only two Soviet intelligence officers who defected between the end of World War II and 1954, but that “neither was of any great significance.”[iii] Both West and Brook-Shepherd are mistaken. Baklanov was clearly not the first SMERSH officer to defect or to publish his memoirs; Mondich and two individuals from the KGB Wanted List—entries 75 and 81—had been employed by SMERSH and had defected over a year prior to Baklanov. But his book on his SMERSH service, along with Mondich’s, provides valuable public glimpses into Soviet military counterintelligence.

Baklanov provides only vague references to the locations and dates of his childhood. Even his birth year is uncertain, although it was likely 1923 or 1924. He finished his 10-year secondary schooling in 1941, likely placing his birth year in 1924. He wrote that he was nineteen years old when he was inducted into the NKVD, which occurred when “the Germans had surrounded Leningrad, fighting was going on in the approaches to Stalingrad, and they weren’t all that far from Moscow either.”[iv] That would place his NKVD induction probably in 1942, and his birth in about 1923. An article published after his death reported that he was 59 years old in January 1984, placing his birth year in 1924 or 1925.[v]

Baklanov writes that he was born in a town along the Don River. His family moved to the Voronezh area, where his father was a senior Party official. He writes about being a mischievous boy and pulling a number of pranks around the town, but getting away with them because of his father’s position. His autobiography shows that he was status conscious, possibly stemming from his privileged upbringing, and that he shied away from mundane work and was always seeking prestigious, exciting work. He described himself as not a serious student, and throughout his book he placed a higher priority on pursuing women than an education. His book is unusual for its frankness in describing his exploits with local schoolgirls, nurses, and other women where ever he could find them. His autobiography shows that he was status conscious, possibly stemming from his privileged upbringing, and that he shied away from mundane work and was always seeking prestigious, exciting work.

Baklanov was recruited into the NKVD auxiliary service as a teenager and participated in setting explosive detonators in buildings around Voronezh in case of foreign invasion. He was living in Voronezh when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941 and witnessed the military parade in November of that year where Marshal Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko, commander of Soviet troops in the central region, presided. He expressed a desire to enter the military when he finished secondary school, but his father, who was a member of the Voronezh Regional Defense Committee, forbid it and sent him to a university prep school instead.[vi] He was still at the school in May 1942 when his grandfather died. Baklanov’s NKVD auxiliary unit was deployed to defend the approaches to Voronezh in the Battle of Voronezh in June-July 1942, during which Baklanov was wounded and evacuated to the rear.

While he was convalescing, his father arranged for Baklanov to enter the Molotov Anti-Aircraft Artillery School in Gorkiy. He started the school, but complained that the discipline and rigor was more than he liked; he had not lost his teenage mischievousness and lack of motivation for hard work. However, he did not stay there long. After a short while he received orders to the NKVD school near Moscow, where he began his career in counterintelligence, probably in late 1942. The orders probably stemmed from his time in the NKVD auxiliary as a teenager.

Baklanov described the main thrust of the lessons taught at the NKVD school. Special Subject Number 1 was the organization and activities of Soviet state security. To Baklanov’s surprise, political studies did not take a primary place among the school’s lessons. He surmised that the students at the NKVD school were all politically screened and reliable, so political training was not a priority.

Baklanov provided brief descriptions of the departments of SMERSH, which remained consistent when the name SMERSH was dropped and the organization was renamed the Counterintelligence Directorate (Управление Контрразведки; UKR). His descriptions were corroborated by debriefings of Rafael Ilych Goldfarb, who defected two years after Baklanov. The First Department was responsible for counterintelligence within Soviet military units, and First Department officers were embedded in units down to the independent company. Baklanov had a low opinion of this department because its primary mission was to monitor Soviet soldiers from the most senior commanders to the lowliest private. The First Department recruited informants among Soviet soldiers to report on each other: “No one was above suspicion.” Baklanov’s first SMERSH position screening criminals near Saratov was under the First Directorate. The Second Department ran operations into the adversary’s rear area. During the war, this department dropped agents behind German lines to collect intelligence and conduct sabotage operations. This department also manned security details of senior Soviet military officials and maintained a company of special security troops in each army-level unit for rear-area security. (the department in which Samusev worked.) After the war, agent operatons were redirected against Allied forces. The Third Department was the main hub of SMERSH operations in the field. It was the conduit for orders from SMERSH headquarters in Moscow to other departments in the field. It received and consolidated all of the information collected by other departments, analyzed it for operational use, and reported into to Moscow.[vii] Baklanov was in the Third Department when he was assigned to Austria and Hungary. The Fourth Department conducted investigations in preparation for military tribunals. The department investigated primarily allegations of anti-Soviet activity and espionage. (the department in which Goldfarb, Kravchenko? worked.) The Fifth Department ran military tribunals, which tried the cases that the Fourth Department brought before the court.[viii] (the department in which Harvard Interviewee number 525 worked.)

Special Subject Number 2 was the organization and activities of foreign intelligence services. During his first year at the school, Germany dominated the curriculum in this subject. The instructor taught about Soviet operations directed at German intelligence and counterintelligence services, including stay-behind agents and false volunteers. The agents were to penetrate all aspects of the German military and police and to sabotage and paralyze German activities on the front and in the rear. The teacher evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the German system, including among the strengths the total absence of liberal-democratic ethics, and among the weaknesses the Germans’ ethnic arrogance and inability to improvise.[ix] Lessons on Hungarian and Romanian secret services were also included as allies of Germany.

During Baklanov’s second year in the NKVD school in 1943, Special Subject Number 2 also began to include lessons on British and American special services. The teacher gave his opinion that the British intelligence service was the best in the capitalist world. British strengths included worldwide experience, sound financial backing, and a high level of education among intelligence officers. Among the British weaknesses were dilettantism and a British sense of superiority. The teacher assessed that the Americans had not yet “managed to set up a respectable intelligence service,” but the potential was there, despite Americans’ political immaturity.[x] Nevertheless, NKGB foreign intelligence directorate had “discovered” America on a large scale for the first time in about 1943 and had dispatched numerous agents to collect on the United States.[xi] Baklanov never heard instructors during his NKVD training refer to Great Britain or the United States as allies.

The remaining special subjects were 3) Operational work; 4) Law of the Soviet state, military statutes, the criminal code and special statutes of the NKVD internal troops; and 5) Operational equipment. Training also included an infantry officer’s course, because NKVD officers were expected to be able to take command of any military unit up to a battalion.[xii]

Baklanov was concerned that the war would end before he finished school and before he had his chance to fight on the front, so he volunteered for early release from the school. He got his wish, but not to the front. In early 1944 he was assigned to the SMERSH First Department at a prison camp near Saratov. He considered the position to be “total ignominy and disgrace.”[xiii] His job was to interview convicts of non-political crimes and determine whether they were suitable to be sent to frontline units. Most were sent to the front, but a small number had special skills and were sent to NKVD headquarters for further exploitation. One such was a convicted forger who was sent to Moscow to use his abilities in support of NKVD operations.[xiv]

Baklanov worked in the prison camp for only about six months. Later in 1944, he was transferred to Lvov, Ukraine, where he was assigned to support partisan operations against German forces. He did not give the date of his transfer, but noted that is was not long after Lvov had been liberated from German occupation in July 1944. His SMERSH unit was under the Second Department and was responsible for dispatching partisans behind German lines and receiving them when they returned to be debriefed and retasked. Baklanov described two types of partisan cells: intelligence-sabotage groups, which were primarily tasked with observation and reporting, with sabotage being a secondary mission; and operational-sabotage groups, which were directed to destroy military facilities, such as bridges, airfields, and buildings and to target specific German or German-allied individuals for assassination. The NKVD agents also supplied underground communist cells in German-occupied territory with arms, ammunition, medical supplies, and personnel so they could conduct sabotage and assassination operations against the Germans. Agents were sent into German-held territory under cover as local citizens whose cover included overt cooperation with the Germans, sometimes in German military or police offices, and posing as if they were loyal to the occupiers, while clandestinely fulfilling Soviet missions. To strengthen their cover identities and to convince the Germans of their hatred for the Soviets, agents pretended to have escaped Soviet repression or prison camps. Orders for partisan operations came from Moscow to Baklanov’s unit, which dispatched partisan cells out to fulfill the orders.[xv]

Baklanov participated in a mission behind German lines into Poland while posted to the SMERSH unit in Lvov. He airdropped with a team of SMERSH officers into a remote location in a Polish forest to deliver orders for future missions to a covert action detachment. The detachment handled Polish agents who observed German troop movements and concentrations and identified roads suitable for future Soviet tank travel. They also collected the names of Poles who collaborated with the Germans for future counterintelligence operational use, as well and the names of local Polish civic leaders and political figures for the future occupation of Poland.[xvi]

Baklanov recalled the mood in the MGB at the end of the war. His unit commander told the MGB troops that, while for some the war was over, for chekists it was not. “The real war, to bring about the final destruction of the capitalist world, was only just beginning. We had annihilated just its ugliest manifestation—Hitler and his empire. The fight to annihilate the rest lay ahead.”[xvii] America’s possession of an atomic weapon caused a great deal of Soviet concern and was the topic of Soviet propaganda spread throughout Soviet forces. The propaganda claimed that the Soviet Union must counter American militarism and prepare to occupy all of Western Europe and the British Isles, assuming that the Americans would not drop their atomic bomb on British or French territory.[xviii] SMERSH in Vienna kept Allied units, officials of the Allied Control Commission, military police, and the occupation government headquarters under constant surveillance. SMERSH recruited cleaners, translators, secretaries, typists and other locally hired employees as sources inside the Allied institutions.[xix]

Just after the end of the war, Baklanov was promoted to senior lieutenant and assigned to the Third Department of the SMERSH, which was soon to be renamed the MGB UKR. As Soviet forces moved westward, Baklanov’s SMERSH unit turned to the south to become part of the Soviet Central Group of Forces headquartered at Baden bei Wien, Austria, which commanded Soviet occupation forces in Austria and Hungary. His unit received briefings about U.S. and British counterintelligence units in Austria to prepare unit members for their assignment. The briefings cast an unfavorable light on U.S. counterintelligence, claiming that American officers received only a crash course in counterintelligence tradecraft before deploying to Europe. British counterintelligence was made up of two types: Field Security Service (FSS) and Public Security Officers (PSO). The FSS officers were often British policemen who were deployed to military service, but the PSO officers received the same training as the Americans. The French security forces were manned with many pro-communist officers, and thus were often sympathetic to the Soviet Union.[xx]

Soon after arriving in Austria, Baklanov was assigned to temporary duty in Budapest, Hungary. His mission was to supplement SMERSH First Department officers in screening demobilized soldiers for possible future duty with MVD troops. The soldiers were transiting Hungary on their way back to the Soviet Union, and SMERSH was responsible for identifying politically reliable, physically fit, battled hardened soldiers who could remain in Europe to fill the special units. The demobilized soldiers gained a reputation as robbers and rapists, and the Soviet administration in Hungary demanded that the soldiers be removed. However, SMERSH’s screenings were less focused on criminal activities than on political reliability.[xxi] Nevertheless, when Baklanov witnessed a rape by Soviet soldiers on a train, he used his SMERSH authority to ensure that the perpetrators were punished for their crime.[xxii]

Bakanov’s main mission in Austria was to screen repatriated Soviet citizens before they returned to the Soviet Union. Baklanov disdainfully viewed the U.S. and British governments for naively accepting the Soviet insistence of repatriation. He writes, “Our allies were apparently unaware that the members of the missions were regular Chekist officers from SMERSH.”[xxiii] UKR divided Soviet repatriatees into three categories: enemies of the people, who were sent directly to prison camps or political prisons; relatively clean people in a political sense, who were either sent home and monitored, or set for 2-3 years to a forced labor project; and more or less reliable ones, who were hired as civilians to support Soviet occupation forces.[xxiv] The repatriation mission was so big that extra officers were brought in from Soviet Union-based MGB and MVD units to get through the screenings.

Baklanov began having doubts about his MGB duties while he was in Hungary. He wrote the Soviet Union’s aims were little different after the war than they were in 1917, and that he had no desire to destroy the old world and create a new one.[xxv] He became disenchanted with his job and with the Soviet Union because of the difference he saw between a wartime chekist and a peacetime chekist. He felt that fighting a foreign enemy was one thing, but fighting one’s own people was too much for him. Forcing Soviet citizens to repatriate and dooming them to Soviet prison camps was more than he could stand.[xxvi] Baklanov also questioned the official MGB propaganda that the West was preparing for war against the Soviet Union; what he witnessed in Europe did not look to him like the British and the Americans wanted to attack.[xxvii]

He also recalled the special privileges that chekists enjoyed in contrast to the typical Soviet citizen, and while he initially exploited it, he later realized that many Soviet officers abused the power. He also lost a girlfriend because of power of his chekist status: when Baklanov was in Budapest, he was traveling with his girlfriend and approached a checkpoint. He had told his girlfriend that he was a journalist, but when he approached the checkpoint and showed his identification, the guard jumped to attention and showed great deference. The girlfriend realized he had withheld from her who he really was, and she stopped seeing him out of fear of what he could do to her.[xxviii]

Baklanov decided in July 1947 to defect. He debated in his head whether to defect to the Americans or the British, and decided that he would initially defect to the Americans, because they had a better operational infrastructure in Austria, but he would later move to Great Britain. He used his knowledge of clandestine operations learned in security service school and access to false documentation to secure his path out of Soviet control.[xxix]

Little public information is available about Baklanov’s life after defection. He was undoubtedly debriefed by both U.S. and British counterintelligence services, although the debriefings have not been made public. He was naturalized as a British citizen in October 1960,[xxx] and he legally changed his name to Boris Hatton in March 1963,[xxxi] both while living at an address in Wimbledon, London. He may have served as a consultant for the British government, possibly explaining why few references to him have been declassified in British or U.S. archives. He referenced in the epilogue of his book the September 1971 British expulsion of 105 Soviet diplomats, calling it a “brave deed of my fellow Britons,” and something “we did.”[xxxii]

On 15 January 1984, Baklanov was found dead floating in a pond in south London. The cause of death, whether suicide, homicide, or accident, was never established. It was reported that Baklanov had been a resident in a psychiatric institution being treated for depression prior to his death. But foul play related to his former profession could not be ruled out.[xxxiii] Curiously, the KGB Wanted List contains no reference to him or to anyone who fits his description.

Notes

  1. [i] A. I. Romanov, Nights Are Longest There (Boston: Little Brown, 1972).
  2. [ii] Vadim Birstein, Smersh: Stalin's Secret Weapon (London: Biteback Publishing, 2013), foreword.
  3. [iii] Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds (New York: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1989), p. 67.
  4. [iv] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 46.
  5. [v] “Drowning Probed,” The Telegraph, 1 May 1984, p. 5.
  6. [vi] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 30.
  7. [vii] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 70.
  8. [viii] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 71.
  9. [ix] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 53.
  10. [x] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, pp. 57-58.
  11. [xi] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 120.
  12. [xii] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, pp. 61-62.
  13. [xiii] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 67.
  14. [xiv] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, pp. 79-80.
  15. [xv] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, pp. 89-94
  16. [xvi] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, pp. 95-99.
  17. [xvii] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 144.
  18. [xviii] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, pp. 195-196.
  19. [xix] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 158.
  20. [xx] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, pp. 160-161.
  21. [xxi] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, pp. 198-199.
  22. [xxii] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 207.
  23. [xxiii] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 171.
  24. [xxiv] Romanov, Nights Are Longest There, p. 173.
  25. [xxv] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 249.
  26. [xxvi] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, pp. 239-241.
  27. [xxvii] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 226.
  28. [xxviii] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 206.
  29. [xxix] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, pp. 241-245.
  30. [xxx] United Kingdom. The London Gazette, Issue 42170, 18 October 1960 (London), p. 7021, https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/42170/page/7021/data.pdf.
  31. [xxxi] United Kingdom. The London Gazette, Supplement 42938, 8 March 1963 (London), p. 2158, https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/42938/supplement/2158.
  32. [xxxii] Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 249.
  33. [xxxiii] “Drowning Probed,” The Telegraph, 1 May 1984, p. 5.

Published works

  • Nights are Longest There: A Memoir of the Soviet Security Services (Boston: Little
  • Brown
  • 1972).   Nights Are Longest There: SMERSH From the Inside (London: Hutchinson
  • 1972).

Cite this entry

Kevin Riehle, “Baklanov, Boris Ivanovich,” Soviet Defectors Database, revised 2026-11-22, https://sovietdefectors.com/defector/baklanov-boris-ivanovich/