Intelligence and state security officers who left Soviet serviceCompiled by Kevin Riehle

Entry 104 of 121 · revised 2026-11-22

Rafail Illych Goldfarb

Рафаил Ильич Гольдфарб

Biography

Rafael Ilych Goldfarb[i] was a German language counterintelligence interpreter who provided detailed information to the U.S. CIC about Soviet counterintelligence operations directed against the United States, Britain, and to a lesser extent France. He was a willing interrogation subject whom CIC interrogators described as having a “remarkable memory,” along with a package of notes that he brought with him.[ii]

Another American interrogator gave a somewhat different impression of Goldfarb: he “appears to be a completely cynical and shrewd opportunist. His own characterization of the majority of Soviet officials as careerists (shkurniki), seems highly applicable to him. His manner reflects an unpleasant blend of extreme nervousness and the arrogance of a police investigator. The unfavorable impression which it creates is, however, partly offset by his sarcastic but shrewdly humorous remarks. He displays a tendency, probably the result of habit, to make provocative remarks and to interrogate his interrogator. It would seem that his attitude toward the mass of mankind, particularly toward the Russian people, is a mixture of contempt and fear. The extreme obesity of the source, his asthmatic breathing and constant squirming heighten the unpleasant impression that he creates.”[iii]

Goldfarb was born in November 1913 in Leningrad and lived in Leningrad until he was deployed in the army in 1939. His father was a physician trained during tsarist times who ran a medical clinic in Leningrad until the Bolshevik revolution, when he was imprisoned and his clinic was nationalized. He was forced to work as a doctor in a government clinic until the NEP, when he was allowed to reopen his clinic and even acquired a second one. In 1928, he was again forced to close the clinics and travel to Karelia to find work as a village doctor.

Goldfarb enrolled in the historic St. Peter’s School (Petrischule) in 1921, where all courses were taught in German. Peter the Great had originally established the school in the early 18th century for foreign merchants living in St. Petersburg. Goldfarb graduated in 1929, and his study at St. Peter’s resulted in strong German language abilities, which later led to his recruitment into Soviet counterintelligence.

Goldfarb’s father was arrested in 1931 in what Goldfarb described as an OGPU operation to confiscate money, gold, and other valuables from rich citizens. Goldfarb and his mother were arrested and the harsh conditions in prison convinced her to surrender her husband’s valuables. His father was released and found a job in a factory clinic until 1937, when he was arrested again and he died in prison in 1938. Goldfarb later described his father as an outspoken opponent of the Soviet system, which led to his arrest.[iv]

Goldfarb entered the Lensoviet Chemical-Technological Institute in 1931 to study paints and varnishes; however, he was expelled in 1934 without explanation, likely related to his father’s status. Goldfarb tried again to continue his education, enrolling in 1935 in the Leningrad Industrial Institute; however, he was expelled in 1937 after his father’s arrest. Each time he applied to an institute he concealed his father’s bourgeois background, but it eventually caught up to him. He was forced to take a job as a photographer in a hospital, taking pictures of operations and medical procedures.[v]

Goldfarb was drafted into the army in August 1939 and trained as a military medic. He was deployed to the Finnish Front in October 1939, and his unit was posted in the town of Suojärvi, now in the Russian Republic of Karelia. Goldfarb’s worked as an ambulance driver transporting wounded to a military hospital. His unit was demobilized in mid-1940 and Goldfarb returned to his job as a photographer.

Goldfarb was called back into the army in June 1941, immediately after the German invasion, and was assigned to an army medical unit. His unit retreated from the Leningrad Front into Leningrad in the face of advancing German forces. During the battle, a wounded German soldier fell into Soviet hands, and an intelligence officer came to interrogate him, but needed an interpreter. When the interrogator learned that Goldfarb was proficient in German, he ordered him to assist, and he became involved in intelligence for the first time.[vi]

The OO NKVD officer assigned to the hospital where Goldfarb worked summoned him for an interview after his first interpreting assignment and told him to write his autobiography. Goldfarb omitted references to his father’s arrest and conviction as an enemy of the people, and historical NKVD records for the Leningrad region were not accessible to check his background: NKVD files had been transported from Moscow and Leningrad to Sverdlovsk during the war. Consequently, he was recruited into the OO NKVD of the 70th Rifle Division in June 1942 despite his father’s past. He reported that his salary immediately rose from 100 to 900 rubles per month when he joined the NKVD.[vii] His job seldom included interpreting during his time in the 70th, because the unit seldom took German POWs. Most of his time was spent as a clerk typist transcribing agent denunciations, of which the OO NKVD received many. He also participated in propaganda work, riding in a propaganda van broadcasting anti-fascist propaganda material in German.

In June 1943, Goldfarb was reassigned to the SMERSH office of the Leningrad Front as an interpreter for interrogations and for recruitment operations among German POWs. As Soviet forces began to push the Germans back out of Soviet territory, Goldfarb’s unit moved from the Leningrad Front to Estonia, and then to Poland. His unit supported Polish anti-Nazi partisans and participated in the arrests of thousands of Poles. Goldfarb’s job during this time included translating documents captured from Gestapo offices in territory occupied by Soviet forces.

His unit was subordinated to the 2nd Belarusian Front, which in April 1945 advanced into Prussia. At that time, Goldfarb learned that his mother had been seriously injured and Goldfarb managed to get a 20-day leave to visit her in Leningrad. He found his mother paralyzed and unable to speak, and he gave his friends some money to take care of his mother. He also took time during his leave to marry his friend, Sofiya Aleksandrovna Tsybulevskaya. He was in Leningrad when Germany capitulated in May 1945.

When he returned to his unit, it was beginning to conduct operations and recruit agent networks in repatriation camps, for which he worked as an interpreter. He also continued to translate captured German documents. In March 1946, his unit was transferred to Potsdam to the headquarters of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, where he was assigned to the 4th (Investigation) Section, where he worked until his defection in July 1949. He became a party member in May 1947 and was promoted to senior lieutenant in July 1948.

Goldfarb reported that during the summer of 1948, MGB headquarters transmitted a message signed by Minister of State Security Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov to all Soviet state security offices inside the Soviet Union and in military units, including in Soviet occupation forces in Germany. Goldfarb expressed skepticism about whether it actually came from Abakumov, assuming that it may have come from the Politburo instead.[viii] Regardless, the message was highly critical of Soviet counterintelligence offices for their lack of vigilance in pursuing and neutralizing foreign intelligence threats. Foreign intelligence services of the “imperialist” powers, it said, particularly American and British, actively use embassy officials and journalists for intelligence purposes. The message censured Soviet counterintelligence officers for their laxity in handling intelligence agents, noting one example of an officer who accepted “gifts” from his agent, who had gotten the gifts from the foreign counterintelligence target himself. It contended that the majority of Soviet counterintelligence operations were either useless or had been doubled. Soviet counterintelligence officers were ordered to relook all of their agent networks, close down those that had been compromised and arrest double agents. They were to increase efforts to recruit and train agents with access to foreigners, who were to be kept under constant surveillance: “follow targets relentlessly, walk in foreigners’ footsteps.” Abakumov closed the message with, “It is imperative to reach such a situation in which not a single foreigner could have free and unobserved access to any corner of the USSR.”[ix]

When he defected, Goldfarb provided detailed information about the structure and functions of MGB counterintelligence in Germany, especially about the Fourth Department to which he belonged, which conducted interrogations to collect evidence for military tribunals. He provided the identities and descriptions of numerous Soviet counterintelligence personnel and the locations and businesses that the MGB used for operational purposes. MGB counterintelligence urgently sought to arrest agents of “imperialist” intelligence services, particularly American or British. Goldfarb claimed that many Germans were arrested for simply talking to a suspected American of British agent once. Goldfarb served as an interpreter during interrogations and at military tribunals.

The Directorate of Counterintelligence (Управление Контрразведки; UKR) in the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany was the direct descendent of the organizations known as OO NKVD up to 1943 and SMERSH from 1943 to 1945. The organization changed names during that period, but its mission changed little. Most of the officers who had been in OO NKVD, including Goldfarb, transitioned into SMERSH and then into UKR.[x] The UKR was divided into four main departments.

The First Department of the UKR conducted internal counterintelligence within the headquarters of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. This department recruited agents looking for any indication of disloyalty or espionage among the headquarters staff. It conducted background investigations in Soviet staff to authorize access to top secret information; Goldfarb himself may have fallen victim to one of these investigations that uncovered evidence of his father’s tainted background. The First Department also conducted security operations at Soviet mass celebrations, such as a to anniversary of the October Revolution.[xi]

Up to mid-1948, the Second Department of the UKR conducted counterintelligence operations in the western occupation zones of Germany and in the Allied zones of Berlin. It was organized by the three Western occupation powers, with sections for American, British and French intelligence. The Second Department particularly recruited among Soviet citizens who had been repatriated from DP camps in Western zones and who still had connections in the Western zones. It collected and analyzed information about foreign intelligence services, which was used in investigations against potential espionage subjects. Goldfarb did not have regular access to this analytic information, but he did review it occasionally in relation to Fourth Department interrogations and investigations. He remarked that British and French intelligence services were more efficient than the Americans; he was aware of a large number of French agents that the UKR faced, and the British, while running fewer agents in number, worked with particular finesse.[xii]

In mid-1948, after Abakumov’s directive, the Second Department’s mission changed. Many of the case officers who had been running agents into the Western zones were transferred to MGB operational sectors, which were responsible for positive intelligence. The new mission of the Second Department was to operate within the Soviet military and civilian employees in Germany investigating traitors, spies and foreign intelligence penetrations. Second Department investigations were focused on espionage among Soviet forces, and involved Germans only when the Germans were involved with Soviet citizens. Goldfarb noted that this new mission was disadvantageous for MGB officers working in the Second Department, because MGB counterintelligence officers were evaluated by numbers of arrests, and this new mission deprived them of the most their most important operational method—arresting Germans.[xiii]

In addition to its investigative mission, the Second Directorate acquired a new sub-element in about May 1949, just before Goldfarb’s defection, called the “Special Operational Group.” This group’s mission was to kidnap defectors to the Western zone and exfiltrate them to the East. Goldfarb had secondhand information about cases of kidnappings, including instances when the MGB had recruited German policemen who facilitated the operations.[xiv] Goldfarb probably feared such an operation himself after his defection.

The Third Department controlled all counterintelligence activities in the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. It was the supervisory department that received reports and tasked military counterintelligence units to initiate investigations. Rather than being organized by threat, the Third Department was organized by Soviet military units, assigning desk officers to each. These desk officers received and transmitted messages to their assigned units, and they occasionally visited them to perform inspections. Goldfarb reported that there was never an instance where a Third Department inspector visited a unit and found no faults. In fact, if a Third Department officer were to return from a unit visit without any discrepancies, he would be reprimanded for lacking conscientiousness and for being too friendly with the inspected unit. The Third Department was also responsible for conducting a special purge of Soviet officers in the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany in late 1948 and early 1949, which resulted in the recall of a number of officers who never learned why they were recalled.[xv]

Most of Goldfarb’s personal experience was in the Fourth Department, which supported the procuracy and military tribunal by collecting information through interrogations. Its main function was to use interrogations to develop sufficient prosecutable information on a subject. Goldfarb was very familiar with the procedures used in the Fourth Department and he provided minute details about investigative and interrogation methods, along with forms and documents that the department used. The Fourth Department had a variety of methods available to extract information and they raised prisoners’ hopes by telling them they their prison experience would be more tolerable and possibly even shorter it they cooperated as an agent.[xvi] Then they recruited them as informants inside the prison. They used the “whip and cake method,” which translates roughly into English as the “carrot and stick.” The “whip” could include an isolation cell or agent networks within the prison itself. The “cake” method might include offering luxuries like tobacco or extra food.

The Fourth Department was also responsible for gathering the information to be used in an MGB “special councils.” When verified evidence was insufficient to convict a person for espionage in a military tribunal, the MGB convened a “special council,” an extra-constitutional court proceeding that was a direct descendant of the “troikas” of the OGPU era. A defendant did not need to be present at a “special council,” and the evidence presented was derived from clandestine collection, often through human agents. There is no effort made to verify human source information, and it was often based on false denunciations of officers for which a decision had been made to convict them. For example, a “special council” could be convened to try MGB officers who were suspected of having been recruited by a foreign intelligence service.[xvii] Defendants were nearly always convicted in a “special council” for which there was no appeal.

Goldfarb provided details of seven cases that illustrated the methods that the UKR used in investigating and arresting suspects.

· The MGB arrested and executed a former Nazi officer who had admitted to a friend that he had killed Jews during the war.[xviii]

· One case involved a man named Gerhard Penzel who was accused of passing Soviet information to American intelligence through his acquaintance, Kurt Melsa, who reportedly had direct contact with American officers. Penzel initially denied any connection with American intelligence during Fourth Department interrogations, at which Goldfarb was the interpreter.[xix] When threatened with physical harm, Penzel admitted having been recruited as an American agent assigned to collect information about Soviet personnel and vehicles, to steal letters from Soviet officers apartments, and to provide Soviet military newspapers. Penzel, Melsa and several other associates were sentenced in August 1947 to 25 years forced labor, although they served only about eight years. Penzel and Melsa were interviewed in 2000 for the “Von Potsdam nach Workuta” (“From Potsdam to Vorkuta”) project, which gathered the stories of German former Soviet prison camp inmates. Penzel and Melsa both denied having had any connection with foreign intelligence. Penzel said that he was sentenced to 25 years for nothing,[xx] and Melsa claimed to have signed a confession only because the MGB had threatened to bring his mother from West to East Germany.[xxi]

· One case involved a couple, Yakov Litvinenko and his Polish wife, Jadwiga Feliksovna Litvinenko, who attempted to escape to the American zone of Germany. Yakov was an actor in the Soviet officers’ club in Potsdam. Jadwiga expressed to a friend the desire to escape to the West instead rather than returning to the Soviet Union. An acquaintance put her in contact with an individual, who connected her with American intelligence. The Americans reportedly offered to assist the Litvinenkos to escape, but first asked that they provide information about the command staff of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany and about the officers’ club. However, before they could escape, their contact with American intelligence changed his mind and informed the MGB about the Litvinenkos’ plan. They were arrested and sentenced to 25 years forced labor. Jadwiga is noted among Polish citizens who spent time in the Vorkuta prison camp.[xxii]

· A Soviet topographic engineer named Pilipenko escaped to the U.S. zone of Germany and wrote a letter to his friend to join him. The friend and his girlfriend were arrested and sentenced to 25 years forced labor for receiving a letter from a traitor.[xxiii]

· A case involved a Colonel Yarkho, a Soviet engineer who became involved in a convoluted case with his mistress. Yarkho had been arrested in 1937 during the Yezhovshchina, but because NKVD records were disorganized, his arrest did not come up during his background investigation and he was sent to Germany. Once he arrived, he fell in love with a German woman, Lieselotta Wieck, whose husband was a former Nazi bürgermeister. In order to free themselves of the husband, Yarkho and Wieck planted a pistol on him and had him arrested. However, Wieck’s maid found out about the incident and blackmailed Wieck. Wieck responded by murdering the maid, and Yarkho and Wieck fled to the West. However, a German who facilitated their escape was an MGB agent and the UKR used him to lure them back into the Soviet zone. Yarkho and Wieck were arrested and sentenced, Yarkho to execution and Wieck to 10 years forced labor. Yarkho’s sentence was later commuted to 25 years forced labor.[xxiv]

· A Swedish Red Cross employee, a Mr. Andersen, was arrested in Berlin in early 1948 for espionage. He denied any association with a foreign intelligence service and did not break during interrogation. Soviet law required that a suspect could be held for only 48 hours without being formally charged, but Andersen was held for over a year and the UKR could bring no charge against him. Goldfarb asserted that, while the UKR and MGB publicly declare their adherence to the letter of Soviet law, they often ignore it in practice. Andersen was still in “temporary custody” in July 1949 when Goldfarb defected.[xxv]

In June 1949, Goldfarb himself received an order to return to the Soviet Union. He suspected that his father’s arrest as an enemy of the people had finally caught up to him again, and he immediately made plans to defect. He went through the motions of packing his personal goods for shipment to the Soviet Union. He delayed telling his wife about his plans until just before he escaped. He told his colleagues that he planned to send his family to the Soviet Union by airplane, giving him an excuse to travel to the Schönefeld Airport in Berlin. He then crossed into the U.S. zone of Berlin with his family.[xxvi]

He told his American interrogators that his defection was the culmination of a long repugnance for the Soviet dictatorship. He wrote, “It could not be said that I suddenly became disenchanted with the Soviet system.”[xxvii] However, he did not consider defection until his mother died in 1947. He expressed regret for placing his wife’s parents in danger, but he was sure when he received an order to return to the Soviet Union “for continued service” that he would be arrested when he arrived. He also had heard that as late as 1946, American forces turned back Soviet defectors.[xxviii] He noted the irony that he, the son of an “enemy of the people” who had considered himself an enemy of the Soviet system for years, ended up in Soviet counterintelligence.[xxix]

U.S. CIC agents debriefed Goldfarb for several months after his defection, and he wrote short monographs on his own autobiography, the espionage cases he could recall, and the structure and mission of the UKR. In February 1950, he was debriefed at the High Commission on Occupied Germany (HICOG), which focused questions primarily on political and Party matters. HICOG interrogators inquired about Communist Party control of Soviet society. While Goldfarb claimed ignorance of Party details, he mentioned that during the war, Party control had loosened and Party meetings were held infrequently. But he asserted that this loosening resulted in many MGB employees having “disintegrated” under the influence of capitalist surroundings in Germany. After the war, special Party representatives were dispatched to military units to inspect the Party work in counterintelligence units.[xxx]

After his initial debriefings, Goldfarb settled in Germany with his wife and children. While it does not appear that he was interviewed for the Harvard Program on the Soviet Social System, David Dallin, one of the HPSSS interviewers, met him separately on September 1951 and took notes on his conversation, in which Goldfarb largely repeated what he had told CIC.[xxxi]

According to the KGB Wanted List, U.S. intelligence hired Goldfarb to train U.S. agents for infiltration into Soviet-held territory. He was reportedly living in Frankfurt-am-Main, but may have immigrated to the United States in 1959.[xxxii] No further information is available about Goldfarb or his family after that. His name subsequently disappeared into obscurity, probably because he took a new identity.

In 2012 was his name made public by German researchers Ines Reich and Maria Schultz, who found Goldfarb in U.S. counterintelligence archives and included his history in an exhibition of the Soviet MGB prison in Potsdam. They used his information to illustrate Soviet state security activities in the Soviet zone of Germany.[xxxiii]

Notes

  1. [i] Photo from Positive Intelligence Section, Headquarters, 66th Counter Intelligence Corps, “UKR Upravlenie Kontra-Razvedki, “Counter-Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Army, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314A.
  2. [ii] 66 CI Detachment interrogation report, R-M62-49, dated 17 February 1950, NARA, RG 319, Entry 134A, Box 107.
  3. [iii] HICOG Frankfurt, “Soviet Defector Interrogation Report (Sponge No. 5),” p. 13.
  4. [iv] High Commission for Occupied Germany (HICOG) Frankfurt, “Soviet Defector Interrogation Report (Sponge No. 5),” dated 11 February 1950, p. 10, NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1950-1954, Box 3800, Serial 761.00/2-650.
  5. [v] Rafael Ilych Goldfarb, “Автобиография” (“Autobiography”), dated 1 August 1949, pp. 4-5, NARA, RG 319, Entry 134B, Box 236.
  6. [vi] Rafael Ilych Goldfarb, “Автобиография” (“Autobiography”), dated 1 August 1949, p. 8, NARA, RG 319, Entry 134B, Box 236.
  7. [vii] HICOG Frankfurt, “Soviet Defector Interrogation Report (Sponge No. 5),” p. 11.
  8. [viii] HICOG Frankfurt, “Soviet Defector Interrogation Report (Sponge No. 5),” p. 21.
  9. [ix] Rafael Ilych Goldfarb, “Приказ Министра государственной безопасности Союза ССР” («Order of the Minister of State Security of the Union of SSR”), NARA, RG 319, Entry 134A, Box 107.
  10. [x] Rafael Ilych Goldfarb, “Структура Советской Военной Разведки” (“Structure of Soviet Military Counterintelligence”), dated 19 December 1949, NARA, RG 319, Entry 134B, Box 236, Goldfarb. An English translation of this document is HQ 66th CIC Det Memo, “Counter Intelligence Directorate, Ministry of State Security, GOFG,” R-M62-49, dated 17 February 1950, in NARA, RG 319, Entry 134A, Box 107.
  11. [xi] Goldfarb, “Structure of Soviet Military Counterintelligence,” pp. 9-14; HQ 66th CIC Det Memo, “Counter Intelligence Directorate, Ministry of State Security, GOFG,” pp. 9-13.
  12. [xii] HICOG Frankfurt, “Soviet Defector Interrogation Report (Sponge No. 5),” pp. 18-19.
  13. [xiii] Goldfarb, “Structure of Soviet Military Counterintelligence,” pp. 15-18; HQ 66th CIC Det Memo, “Counter Intelligence Directorate, Ministry of State Security, GOFG,” pp. 13-16.
  14. [xiv] Goldfarb, “Structure of Soviet Military Counterintelligence,” p. 18; HQ 66th CIC Det Memo, “Counter Intelligence Directorate, Ministry of State Security, GOFG,” pp. 15-16.
  15. [xv] Goldfarb, “Structure of Soviet Military Counterintelligence,” pp. 24=64; HQ 66th CIC Det Memo, “Counter Intelligence Directorate, Ministry of State Security, GOFG,” pp. 19-45.
  16. [xvi] Goldfarb, “Structure of Soviet Military Counterintelligence,” pp. 19-23; HQ 66th CIC Det Memo, “Counter Intelligence Directorate, Ministry of State Security, GOFG,” pp. 16-19.
  17. [xvii] Goldfarb, “Structure of Soviet Military Counterintelligence,” pp. 34-38; HQ 66th CIC Det Memo, “Counter Intelligence Directorate, Ministry of State Security, GOFG,” pp. 25-28; HICOG Frankfurt, “Soviet Defector Interrogation Report (Sponge No. 5),” p. 22.
  18. [xviii] Rafael Ilych Goldfarb, “Перечень и Описание Наиболее Характерных Следственных Дел на Лиц, Арестованных Органами Советской Контрразведки ГСОВ в Германии за Период с 1946 ь 1949 годы”) (“List and Description of the More Characteristic Investigations into People Arrested by Soviet Counterintelligence Organs in the GSOF in Germany for the period from 1946 to 1949”), pp. 1-2, NARA, RG 319, Entry 134B, Box 236, Goldfarb, part 2.
  19. [xix] Goldfarb, “List and Description of the More Characteristic Investigations, pp. 3-9.
  20. [xx] Goldfarb, “List and Description of the More Characteristic Investigations, pp. 3-9; Memorial Germany Foundation, “Biography of Gerhard Penzel,” Von Potsdam nach Workuta (From Potsdam to Vorkuta), an exhibition of the Soviet prison at Leistikowstrasse in Potsdam, Germany, http://www.von-potsdam-nach-workuta.de/penzel.php.
  21. [xxi] Memorial Germany Foundation, “Biography of Kurt Melsa,” From Potsdam to Vorkuta, http://www.von-potsdam-nach-workuta.de/melsa.php.
  22. [xxii] Goldfarb, “List and Description of the More Characteristic Investigations, pp. 10-15; International “Memorial” Foundation, “Польские заключенные воркутинских лагерей” (“Polish Prisoners of the Vorkuta Camps”) in Жертвы политического террора в СССР (Victims of Political Terror in the USSR), http://lists.memo.ru/d20/f226.htm.
  23. [xxiii] Goldfarb, “List and Description of the More Characteristic Investigations, p. 26.
  24. [xxiv] Goldfarb, “List and Description of the More Characteristic Investigations, pp. 16-21.
  25. [xxv] Goldfarb, “List and Description of the More Characteristic Investigations, pp. 22-26.
  26. [xxvi] Rafael Ilych Goldfarb, “Autobiography,” dated 1 August 1949, p. 15, NARA, RG 319, Entry 134B, Box 236.
  27. [xxvii] Rafael Ilych Goldfarb, “Autobiography,” dated 1 August 1949, p. 15, NARA, RG 319, Entry 134B, Box 236.
  28. [xxviii] HICOG Frankfurt, “Soviet Defector Interrogation Report (Sponge No. 5),” p. 13.
  29. [xxix] Rafael Ilych Goldfarb, “Autobiography,” dated 1 August 1949, p. 16, NARA, RG 319, Entry 134V, Box 236.
  30. [xxx] HICOG Frankfurt, “Soviet Defector Interrogation Report (Sponge No. 5),” pp. 16-17.
  31. [xxxi] David Dallin Notes on the NKVD, David Dallin Manuscripts 1947-1951, Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library.
  32. [xxxii] “KGB Wanted List," Entry number 7, HIA, Vladislav Krasnov Writings file.
  33. [xxxiii] Ines Reich, Maria Schultz (eds.), Sowjetisches Untersuchungsgefängnis Leistikowstraße Potsdam (The Soviet Investigative Prison, Leistikowstrasse, Potsdam), Brandenburg Memorial Foundation Series, vol. 33 (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2012).

Cite this entry

Kevin Riehle, “Goldfarb, Rafail Illych,” Soviet Defectors Database, revised 2026-11-22, https://sovietdefectors.com/defector/goldfarb-rafail-illych/