Intelligence and state security officers who left Soviet serviceCompiled by Kevin Riehle

Entry 83 of 121 · revised 2026-11-22

Anatoliy Mikhailovich Granovskiy

Анатолий Михайлович Грановский

Biography

Anatoliy Mikhailovich Granovskiy’s affiliation with the NKVD began as a secret collaborator (seksot) and he refers to himself as an “NKVD agent.” But he subsequently completed an NKVD clandestine operator’s course, apparently including training to be an illegal, and he served in an operational capacity in Czechoslovakia for a year, indicating that he was accepted as a staff NKGB officer.[i]

His revelations indicate that he was involved in several different types of operations during his brief career. Initially, he supported internal security operations directed against the children of arrested Soviet leaders, who had grown up with the same state privileges he had enjoyed and then lost them just as he had. He then supported SMERSH counterintelligence activities within the Moscow air defense forces. At his request, after exhibiting an acceptable level of reliability, he was enrolled in a 6-month NKGB espionage and sabotage course, after which he received individual training to prepare him for future operations as an illegal working against the West. In both Uzhgorod and Prague, he conducted operations to both Sovietize the local populations and to recruit and prepare agents for long-term missions as refugees and émigrés in the West. He was assigned to prepare for a similar long-term assignment himself, but the NKGB never launched the operation. He also completed a brief mission to confiscate vehicles from defeated Germany for NKGB use in 1945.

Information about Granovskiy comes from several publicly available sources that are largely consistent but with some differences in details and emphasis. The first is a debriefing by Swedish police in October 1946 in which he gave his life story.[ii] The length and level of detail in the 100-page typed debriefing report make it appear that he may have begun compiling his life story even before defecting—he did indicate that he had considered defecting six months before he finally did. He also wrote letters to Swedish officials while he was in Swedish custody explaining his motivation for defecting and pleading for them not to repatriate him to the Soviet Union.[iii]

The U.S. CIG facilitated Granovskiy’s movement from Sweden through Denmark to Germany in late 1946, where he was debriefed by the CIG’s Berlin Operations Base.[iv] Although his CIG debriefing is not publicly available, he reportedly provided the CIG with “its first solid information on the organization, personnel, and methodology of the NKGB.”[v]

The next was a serialized book published in the São Paolo, Brazil, newspaper A Noite titled “Eu Fui Espião de Stalin” (“I Was Stalin’s Spy”).[vi] Although not acknowledged publicly, his U.S. government connections may have facilitated the publication so he could earn money in his new country. This version devotes particular detail to operations in Czechoslovakia and planning for post-war, Western-oriented Soviet operations. It does not mention that Granovskiy approached the U.S. embassy before being interned by the Swedish government.

His first English-language book, All Pity Choked: The Memoirs of a Soviet Agent, was published in 1955 in London.[vii] The same book was published in the United States in 1962 under the title, I Was an NKVD Agent: A Top Soviet Spy Tells His Story.[viii] The subtitle “a top Soviet spy” is somewhat misleading: although he did conduct various intelligence and sabotage missions, he was never a “top spy.”

Granovskiy was born into a family of privilege in January 1922. His father, Mikhail Aleksandrovich Granovskiy, participated in the Bolshevik revolution and became a trusted senior Bolshevik official. He joined the Bolshevik Party early after the revolution and returned to university to complete a degree in chemical engineering in 1920. He fought in the civil war and became a member of the Party Central Executive Committee soon after Lenin died, holding a series of increasingly responsible positions throughout the 1920s. Granovskiy benefitted from his father’s position by living in good houses, having good food, and never wanting for anything. He counted among his friends the children of the Soviet elite; enjoyed special vacation resorts reserved for the Party leaders; and played tennis with Stalin’s private secretary, Alexander Nikolayevich Poskrebyshev.[ix]

In the mid-1930s, when Granovskiy was a teenager, his comfortable life began to be undermined. After Kirov’s assassination in December 1934, the NKVD began to arrest Granovskiy’s neighbors in the special elite apartment building where his family lived. Then in October 1937, Granovskiy’s life changed overnight when his father was arrested and accused of being an enemy of the people.

His family was evicted from their comfortable apartment and sent to live in a small communal flat. The burden of providing for the family fell to Granovskiy, who turned sixteen in January 1938. He got a job with the help of a friend of his father’s, Bruskin. However, Bruskin was also arrested in May 1938, and Granovskiy was interrogated about his relationship to Bruskin and fired from his job in June.

One theme that differs between Granovskiy’s Swedish debriefing and his published accounts is his description of his mother. In his debriefing he recounts that, because his mother had grown accustomed to privilege and plenty as the wife of senior official, she refused to take any action to ameliorate their new situation. Granovskiy also noted that his mother refused to make inquiries about his father’s fate. He took on the responsibility of waiting in line at the prison where he thought his father was being held and submitting formal requests that went unanswered. He never received any news of his father, and unbeknownst to Granovskiy, his father was executed in August 1938.[x] However, he continued to submit requests for information at the prison until January 1939, when he took drastic step—he allowed himself to be arrested, thinking that by so doing he could make direct contact with State Security officials and learn of his father’s fate from them. This was one of a series of unorthodox decisions that Granovskiy made that eventually led to his decision to defect.

His efforts to get arrested succeeded and he was taken to a Moscow prison and repeatedly interrogated on suspicion of espionage. He explained during interrogations that he had learned how to recognize plain-clothes NKVD officers who patrolled around the special government employee housing where he lived before his father’s arrest. He used that knowledge to attract the NKVD‘s attention on Red Square intentionally so they would arrest him. He was held in prison for six months, during which time he wrote letters to Soviet officials asking about his father and appealing for his freedom and the opportunity to work to provide for his family. He never learned of his father’s fate. But he was released in July 1939 after signing a statement promising to work for the NKVD. He went so far as to refuse to leave the prison until the NKVD promised to give him work. He agreed at that time to be an NKVD seksot.[xi]

Soon after beginning his cooperation with the NKVD, Granovskiy asked his handler to arrange a seat for him in a military school. Before the NKVD would help him with that, he was given an initial assignment to monitor and report the attitudes of his former friends whose fathers had been arrested.[xii] He found that these friends were so cautious in their conversations that he obtained no incriminating information from them. Additionally, the threshold for arrests had risen under Beriya, and it was no longer sufficient to arrest someone purely on suspicion, as it had been under Yezhov. Consequently, his handler criticized him or not providing more useful, actionable information. He continued to write reports about his associates, but he claims with some relief that his reports never led to any arrests.[xiii]

In January 1940, he was enrolled in the air defense school in Moscow, and he completed the school as an air defense officer before the German invasion began in June 1941. He was assigned to work with an NKVD officer within the Air Defense Forces structure, likely meaning the SMERSH section. However, when Germany began air raids on Moscow in July 1941, Granovskiy’s air defense duties overshadowed his secret collaborator work. He recounts that his air defense supervisor was fired at about the same time after killing a pedestrian in a drunk driving accident, leaving all of his duties to Granovskiy. In September, he was appointed to the Air Defense Board for the Moscow Oblast.[xiv]

By October, it seemed to Granovskiy that the NKVD had forgotten about him. So he voluntarily re-established contact with the NKVD and was assigned a new handler, who gave him low-level reporting assignments. In January 1942, his first NKVD handler re-contacted him and asked about his NKVD work, but Granovskiy refused to tell him anything without first consulting with his new handler. Granovskiy assessed that these two moves—voluntarily re-contacting the NKVD and maintaining the security of his work—increased the NKVD’s faith in him as a reliable asset. This gave him confidence to phone directly to Beriya and request to be assigned to a clandestine mission behind German lines. This desire increased by the middle of 1942 when German air raids ceased over Moscow and the job of an air defense officer became less exciting.

He asked to be sent to an intelligence school, and in October 1942 the NKVD granted his wish. He attended an espionage and sabotage school until March 1943, when his training took on a different character. He began special individual training to prepare to be infiltrated clandestinely into Germany. He was only 20 years old, so was being trained to join pro-German youth groups in Ukraine and Belarus, make contact with Vlasov forces, and through them to gain the Germans’ trust. His training envisioned retreating with German forces when they eventually pulled back out of Soviet territory and allowing himself to be captured by British or other forces, thus making his way to the West.[xv] He quotes his instructor’s explanation of his future mission: “You are being trained not merely to penetrate to the German rear, but to be accepted by them and to win their trust. We shall in all likelihood require of you that you join in their political life, become a member of certain organizations and be known as an enemy of our regime. Then you can be of enormous service when the time is ripe.”[xvi]

During his special training, he was assigned to read foreign books about espionage. One that he particularly remembered was The Dark Invader: War-Time Reminiscences of a German Naval Intelligence Officer. The book was written by Franz Von Rintelen, who had operated clandestinely in the United States during World War I.[xvii] This and other books prepared Granovskiy for his ultimate target, which was Western European countries or the United States. He also indicated that he was trained to seduce women. This skill was particularly to be directed at women in the West, who could be valuable as agents in influencing their husbands and through powerful women’s organizations.[xviii]

He described another scenario that the NKGB was considering for infiltrating into Germany. He would be parachuted behind German lines with four other men on a supposed sabotage mission. They would be dropped in the dark and each would make his way to a designated rendezvous point. But instead of going straight to the rendezvous, Granovskiy would locate and kill three of the others, while seriously wounding the fourth. He would then turn himself in to the Germans claiming to have deserted and abandoned his sabotage mission. The fourth man would be left alive to be captured by Germans and corroborate Granovskiy’s story. This plan was never carried out.[xix]

When he finished his training, he says that he was promoted to captain of state security. He was introduced to Major General Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov, who commanded the NKGB’s unit that conducted sabotage and assassination operations behind German lines. Granovskiy quotes Sudoplatov as saying, “You have an interesting duty to perform, Captain Granovskiy, as soon as we can be sure that you can be trusted. You may be sent abroad to remain there for years, maybe all your life, as a permanent agent of the People’s Commissariat of State Security. You will have the chance to win great honors.”[xx]

While he was waiting to be dispatched behind German lines, he conducted counterintelligence operations in Moscow. In June 1943, met a group of students from the Moscow Aviation Institute. Among them was an expert artist engraver, who forged papers that granted access to goods and services in Moscow. Granovskiy reported them to NKVD counterintelligence, leading to their arrests and later unveiling as German spies. Granovskiy noted in his debriefing that this was his first operation as an intelligence officer, and the first time information he had supplied that directly resulted in arrests.[xxi]

He was also involved in a provocation operation directed against an individual living in Moscow. The individual was suspected of being a German agent, and Granovskiy was instructed to make contact with him posing as a Soviet soldier who had just redeployed from German-occupied territory as a proponent of General Vlasov. Granovskiy developed a relationship with the individual, who became a conduit for information about Germany.[xxii]

He also met a woman who worked as a locally hired interpreter for a U.S. military officer stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The interpreter did not provide much information of value, but she did mention that the U.S. Ambassador Averell Harriman was displeased that U.S. supplies provided to the Soviet Union went only to the elite and not to the population.[xxiii] He also befriended a group of French officers who were working in Moscow and targeted them for counterintelligence purposes.[xxiv]

All of this occurred while he was waiting to be dispatched on a mission behind German lines. He notes in his book that during this time he conducted several short–duration sabotage missions, including a mission to destroy a Gestapo headquarters in western Ukraine.[xxv] But the promised long-term mission was repeatedly delayed. He wrote that he was approached with a proposition to be trained as a priest so that he could penetrate the Russian Orthodox Church abroad. He was told that by so doing, the organs of Soviet State Security could control the Russian émigré populations abroad. He refused the assignment.[xxvi]

He grew impatient that his mission abroad was delayed, so he went directly to Sudoplatov’s office in January 1944. He was received by Sudoplatov’s secretary, who listened to his story about having been trained for a mission behind German lines. He complained that the mission had been repeatedly deferred and he had been without a permanent assignment since completing his training. The secretary promised to take the matter up with Sudoplatov. However, this act did more harm than good to his cause, because his NKVD superiors were angry that he went over their heads. The Fourth Department officers, who ran sabotage operations behind enemy lines, cut ties with him and handed him over to the Second Department, Counterintelligence.[xxvii]

He continued to conduct counterintelligence investigations in Moscow targeting foreigners. However, his desire to go abroad had not faded. During his time in Moscow, he met Sudoplatov’s son and learned Sudoplatov’s home address. In November 1944, he called on the general unannounced, but was unable to see him because Sudoplatov was sick. But when his supervisors learned that he had again gone straight to the general, and even more so at his personal home, they angrily informed him that he was fired and that he would be stripped of his commission and sent to the front as a private.[xxviii]

In reaction to this turn of events, Granovskiy deserted his post in December 1944 and traveled to Minsk, and then to Kiev, where one of his former Fourth Department supervisors, Kulagin, was working. Although he was officially a deserter, Kulagin accepted him into his operations and took him to Uzhgorod in Carpathian Ruthenia to begin to become accustomed to Czech culture, with the eventual goal of infiltrating him into Czechoslovakia. He was put to work screening non-Soviet nationals living in Carpathian Ruthenia to recruit them as agents to infiltrate back into their home countries as refugees, with the eventual goal of the refugees making their way to the West. Among these was a Pole who had relatives in the United States, who was instructed to emigrate and await instructions. He wrote, “In the early spring of 1945 while the fighting armies were still rolling over the lands of eastern and western Europe, the maximum advantage had to be wrought from our position it the newly conquered territories. The time was ripe now to sow the seeds of future advances. Our agents had to ‘flee’ and ‘escape’ while the world thought that confusion reigned and before the iron curtain could clamp down along the eastern perimeter of western Europe.”[xxix]

Granovskiy’s cover assignment in Uzhgorod was as an advisor to the Uzhgorod city government, where he describes himself as “practically speaking, the governor of Uzhgorod.” The Soviet Union had placed NKGB personnel in key positions throughout the nominally independent Carpathian Ruthenia government to pave the way for eventual annexation. The task was not a difficult one, because the population of the region had suffered under the Austrian, Hungarian, and Czechoslovakian regimes, and the people were looking forward to more prosperous times under Soviet rule. His job entailed enticing the local population into a sense that the Soviet government was a better option than what they had experienced previously.[xxx]

Along with this daytime assignment, was also preparing for a long-term mission to penetrate Czech society, and from there to become a “refugee” himself and eventually immigrate to the United States. He was tasked to court, and eventually marry, a Czech woman named Margarita Rachkova[xxxi] who owned a restaurant in Uzhgorod. He was to use his training in satisfying women to gain control over her, marry her, and then suggest that they “escape” to the West together. His NKVD supervisor reportedly told him, “Your real work, and the object of all this will be in the United States of America, where such a wife will be very useful to you.” Once he got to America, the NKGB would invest funds to establish a restaurant, which would provide cover for intelligence activities in the United States.[xxxii] At the same time as he was developing a relationship with Rachkova, Granovskiy met an American soldier named Bill who was staying in Uzhgorod. The NKGB viewed this encounter as fortuitous, because Granovskiy could contact Bill once he arrived in America and Bill could vouch for his identity as a Czech émigré. The operation failed because Rachkova had other suitors who became jealous and obstructed Granovskiy’s attentions.[xxxiii]

In late April 1945, Granovskiy was given another assignment to travel to Berlin confiscate vehicles and bring them back to Kiev for the NKGB’s use. Along with confiscating vehicles, he witnessed the Soviet Union’s efforts to dismantle German factories and round up German scientists and send them to the Soviet Union.[xxxiv] He also reported how SMERSH was recruiting agents in what would become the Western zones of Berlin with the intention of pre-positioning collection networks before of the establishment of occupation zones.[xxxv] He finally arrived back in Kiev with the vehicles in June after seeing the result of Soviet occupation of Poland and eastern Germany.[xxxvi]

From Kiev he left for another operation, this time with an NKGB team into Czechoslovakia in July 1945. He received papers identifying him as a Czech citizen indicating his origin as Carpathian Ruthenia, which he was to use as cover to run NKGB operations. The team set up operations in Dobříš Castle, owned by the Czech nobleman Count Colloredo-Mansfeld, whom the NKGB had recruited as an agent. The Czech Communist Party had taken over the castle and offered it as a Soviet intelligence cover location.[xxxvii] Granovskiy’s mission at this time was to prepare Czechoslovakia for communist rule, which he did by running agents with access to the Czech government. Among these was reportedly Klement Gottwald, the long-time Czech Communist Party leader, who was a leader of the Czech underground during the period of German occupation. Granovskiy stated that his mission included spreading rumors about Czech officers in military units trained by the British and the Americans to divide the Czech forces and discredit the officers so the men would no longer obey them and they had to be removed.[xxxviii]

Count Colloredo-Mansfeld was eventually evicted and his belongings nationalized, but not before Granovskiy had spent several months becoming acquainted with him and acting as his handler. He had become close to the count, and he was upset when the count was arrested and held in a prison where he was likely to die due to fragile health. Granovskiy conceived of the idea that if he could save Colloredo-Mansfeld, he could escape with him to the West and take advantage of the count’s respectability to help establish himself. In October 1945, Granovskiy violated his orders as a clandestine Soviet officer under Czech identity and visited the Soviet embassy in Prague. As an illegal, he was supposed to have no contact with the official Soviet government. However, he approached the embassy and asked that a message be sent to NKGB headquarters in Kiev complaining about the way the count was being treated. The message precipitated an urgent order for Granovskiy to travel to Kiev in October 1945, where he was chastised for interfering in the case of the count.[xxxix]

With Kulagin’s the help, Granovskiy recovered from this error and returned to Prague in November to continue operating as a Czech citizen and run agents in Prague directed at both the Sovietization of Czechoslovakia and infiltrating into the West.

At about this time, Granovskiy, along with many other Soviet intelligence officers around the world, received a radio message from NKGB headquarters instructing officers to reduce meetings with agents and re-vet agents and their relationships, especially is they had anti-Soviet associates. The message was a reaction to the defection of Igor Sergeyevich Gouzenko in Canada in September 1945. The NKGB disseminated the message even fearing that Gouzenko’s revelations about GRU activities could spill over into Soviet civilian intelligence. Granovskiy conducted closer investigations of his agents’ backgrounds and found that one had a boyfriend who was considered questionable. He was ordered to drop her immediately.[xl]

His experience with the Count Colloredo-Mansfeld, compounded by his experiences in Berlin and the overall nature of his operational work, left him doubting the Soviet cause, leading to his the first attempt to defect in March 1946. He gives two different versions of the incident. In his Swedish debriefing, he reported that he approached the French legation in Prague asking for a visa to immigrate to France. The legation rejected his application outright, thinking he was a stateless Carpatho-Ukrainian.[xli] In I Was an NKVD Agent, he claimed to have approached the French legation asking to join the French Foreign Legion. In this telling, his application was accepted without an enquiry about his nationality, but he was told to wait until May for acceptance. This turned out to be too long, because his time in Prague was to end before May.[xlii]

According to his Swedish debriefing, when he returned to Prague in November 1945, he was left to operate without receiving sufficient funds. After being forced to borrow funds from his sources to survive, he again violated orders in March 1946 and approached the Soviet legation in Prague asking that an urgent message be sent to NKGB leadership in Kiev asking for money. The embassy did send the message, but instead of sending money, the NKGB leadership sent a recall notice, ordering him to report to Kiev immediately.[xliii]

He left Prague on 1 April 1946 for Kiev. When he arrived, his supervisor informed him that his imprudent approach to the Soviet embassy had spoiled months of clandestine work; he was to wait at Kiev until the situation could calm down. Granovskiy was loath to sit again without active work, so Kulagin, who continued to be his NKGB benefactor, proposed that he join the merchant navy. Kulagin contacted an MGB officer in Odessa and arranged for Granovskiy to sign on to the crew of the ship “Petrodvorets,” which was in refit in Stockholm, Sweden. He received papers officially “demobilizing” him from the Soviet Army, and made for Odessa to contact the MGB.[xliv]

As he was preparing join the crew of the “Petrodvorets” in Odessa in June 1946, an MGB officer summoned him and gave him instructions to work as an MGB agent on board the ship to monitor the crew. The officer reportedly told him, “you have worked for seven years for the NKVD and know what to do.” The MGB had another agent on board the ship as well, but he told Granovskiy, “I trust you more.” If he saw or heard anything worth reporting, he could send it by radio through the ship’s security officer.[xlv] He later wrote that he accepted the mission because it put him in a position to go abroad to escape.[xlvi]

The crew traveled by train from Odessa to Leningrad with a short stopover in Moscow. The length of time he spent in Moscow varies in different tellings of his story; in I Was an NKVD Agent, Granovskiy writes that he was in Moscow for only an hour and a half.[xlvii] In his Swedish debriefing he says that he got sick en route from Odessa to Moscow and the he stayed in Moscow for three days.[xlviii] Either way, he made a brief visit to his mother in Moscow and told her that he had been working for the NKVD and NKGB, and the he was at risk of being arrested in Moscow for desertion. He did not tell her, however, that he planned to remain abroad once he was on board the ship.

He finished the trip to Leningrad and boarded the ship “Sestroretsk” for Stockholm. The “Petrodvorets” was already in Stockholm in refit and he joined its crew there. He arrived in July 1946 planning to stay with the ship until the refit was completed and then sail to Gibraltar and defect to Spain, assuming that the Spanish would accept him because of anti-Soviet attitudes there.[xlix] He did not mention Spain during his Swedish debriefing, but claimed instead that he had planned from his first arrival in Stockholm to approach the U.S. embassy there.[l] Regardless, on 17 September, the crew received word that the refit contract had been broken and the ship’s stay in Stockholm would be cut short. The ship would leave for Liepaja, Lithuania, in three days.[li] He quickly made the decision to leave the ship in Stockholm and approach the U.S. embassy and ask for asylum. He gave no indication that he planned to defect to the Swedish government.

Granovskiy approached a U.S. naval attaché with the intent to ask for political asylum. But the attaché did not speak Russian, and Granovskiy resorted to broken German to explain who he was and what he wanted—to be sent to the U.S. zone of Germany. The attaché promised to help, even putting him up in a room to prepare for a flight to Germany. However, rather than putting him on a plane to Germany, the U.S. government turned him over to the Swedish government, which interned him while considering his asylum request. The U.S. government hoped that Swedish police could discern whether Granovskiy was a bona fide defector, and then make the determination about whether to accept him into U.S. custody.

Granovskiy’s defection occurred while Afanasiy Mikhailovich Shorokhov (better known as Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov) was serving at the Soviet Embassy in Sweden as the chief of MGB Line SK, with responsibility over the security and loyalty of Soviet citizens in Sweden. Shorokhov/Petrov himself defected in 1954 in a subsequent assignment in Australia. But from 1943 to 1947, he handled the investigations of and contact with Soviet merchant seaman who deserted their ships in Sweden, specifically noting the July 1947 defection of seaman Vladimir Semenchenko.[lii] Shorokhov/Petrov assuredly would have known about Granovskiy’s defection; however he curiously makes no mention of it in his book, which was published in 1956.

While Granovskiy was in Swedish custody, he wrote letters to the Swedish Prime Minister and the Council of State pleading to not be repatriated to the Soviet Union and expressing his motivations for defecting.[liii] He wrote, “Disapproving of the Soviet dictatorship, which has led to severe suffering of my family and me, I came to Stockholm on 21 September 1946 to the side of a real democratic power. In that regard, I feel strongly about one goal: to use my knowledge of the Soviet reality to help democratic countries in their actions directed toward stopping the suffering of the millions of people of the USSR from the dictatorial-absolutist government of Stalin.” He dedicated the rest of his life to shedding light through his writings and his professional career on what he saw as Stalinist excesses.

Granovskiy’s defection occurred at sensitive time in Swedish-Soviet relations. The Swedish government had agreed to repatriate Baltic refugees who had fled to Sweden when the USSR invaded and annexed their homelands in 1940—Sweden had already repatriated a unit of soldiers from the Baltic republics who had served in the German Army. Additionally, the Swedish cabinet was involved in delicate commercial negotiations with the USSR.[liv] Furthermore, the Swedish government was attempting to learn the fate of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who had disappeared in Hungary in 1945.[lv] But despite the potential ramifications, on 8 November 1946, the Swedish Minister of Justice ruled that Granovskiy would be allowed to leave Sweden for a country that would not extradite him back to the Soviet Union.[lvi]

Although the U.S. government had initially turned Granovskiy over to Sweden, his contact with the U.S. naval attaché was not in vain. After the Swedish government’s decision not to send him back to the Soviet Union, it handed him over clandestinely to the U.S. government, which gave him the codename SAILOR. Using the services of a former OSS agent, who helped to manufacture false Czech and Polish documents, the CIG smuggled Granovskiy through Denmark to the U.S. zone of Germany in late 1946.[lvii]

Granovskiy was the first Soviet defector that the CIG handled after the war. The CIG fully debriefed him over the following several months. This debriefing has not been publicly released. However, Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey provide the only hint to what information the U.S. obtained, noting that “Granovsky’s description of NKGB operations in the Ukraine, in the newly acquired territory of Ruthenia ceded to the USSR by Czechoslovakia, and in the Soviet Zone at war’s end, provided BOB [Berlin Operations Base] with its first solid information on the organization, personnel, and methodology of the NKGB.”[lviii]

After he was fully debriefed, the U.S. government assisted him in resettling in Bolivia in October 1947. In April 1948, he entered Brazil illegally, but the Brazilian government legalized his immigration and in October his presence in Brazil became known publicly.[lix] Beginning on 30 December, his autobiography was published for the first time in a serialized book that ran until May 1949. He was also later employed by Brazilian intelligence as a consultant.

Granovksiy moved to the United States in 1958 with the help of influential U.S. government officials, and he worked for the U.S. government, while also continuing his efforts to publicize the plight of the Soviet people. This attracted the attention the conservative John Birch Society, which agreed to publish an inexpensive paperback edition of his book in the United States in 1962. However, although Granovskiy welcomed the publication of his book, he was not impressed by the Birch Society’s controversial form of conservatism. He reportedly wrote, "The Soviet Communists would sacrifice a thousand American Communists to save the John Birch Society, for instance. I don't mean the Birch Society is Communist-infiltrated. It doesn't have to be. By discrediting prominent Americans, it confuses the population about whom to trust.”[lx]

After settling in the United States, he worked as a consultant for U.S. intelligence. He died of heart and lung disease complications on 4 September 1974 at his home in the Washington, DC, area.

The 1969 “KGB Wanted List” contains a partial description of Granovskiy. The entry makes no mention of his intelligence affiliation, and it apparently uses a different name, because Krasnov includes Granovskiy among defectors whose names are missing from the list.[lxi] The entry mentions only that he was a merchant marine aboard the “Petrodvorets,” and that he was living in Brazil as of 1952 working for Brazilian police. The KGB was seeking him as of 1969, but no judicial sentence is noted against him. The entry further notes that the most recent photograph of him was dated 1943.[lxii]

Notes

  1. [i] Photograph from Anatoli Granovski, “Eu Fui Espião de Stalin” (“I Was Stalin’s Spy”), A Noite (Saō Paolo), 3 February 1949.
  2. [ii] Stockholm Police debriefing report, 11 October 1946, National Archives of Sweden, Statens Utlänningskommission (State Immigration Commission), Hemliga Arkivet (Classified Archive), F4, Volume 7, Granovski, Anatoli Michailovitj.
  3. [iii] Letters from Granovskiy to the Swedish Prime Minister and Council of State, dated 16 October 1946; National Archives of Sweden, Justitedepartemenet (Ministry of Justice) Classified Archive, E1, Volume 36, Regr. No. HD1213.
  4. [iv] Kevin Conley Ruffner, Eagle and Swastika: CIA and Nazi War Criminals and Collaborators, p. 20 (unpublished manuscript of a CIA-sponsored book, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
  5. [v] David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 458 n50.
  6. [vi] Anatoli Granovski, “Eu Fui Espião de Stalin” (“I Was Stalin’s Spy”), A Noite, serialized from 30 December 1948 to 10 May 1949.
  7. [vii] Anatoliy Mikhailovich Granovskiy, All Pity Choked: The Memoirs of a Soviet Agent (London: Kimber, 1955).
  8. [viii] Anatoliy Mikhailovich Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent: A Top Soviet Spy Tells His Story (New York: Devin-Adair, 1962).
  9. [ix] Stockholm Police debriefing report, p. 5, Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, p. 17.
  10. [x] Entry for Mikhail Aleksandrovich Granovskiy, "Жертвы политических репрессий, расстрелянные и захороненные в Москве и Московской области в период с 1918 по 1953 год" (“Victims of Political Repressions, Executed and Buried in Moscow and the Moscow Oblast during the Period 1918 through 1953”), compiled by the Sakharov Center, http://www.sakharov-center.ru/asfcd/martirolog/?t=page&id=5274.
  11. [xi] Stockholm Police debriefing report pp. 30-31.
  12. [xii] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, pp. 92-94.
  13. [xiii] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, pp. 99-106; Stockholm Police debriefing report p. 33.
  14. [xiv] Stockholm Police debriefing report, pp. 35-36.
  15. [xv] Stockholm Police debriefing report, p. 48
  16. [xvi] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, p. 129.
  17. [xvii] Captain Franz Von Rintelen, The Dark Invader: War-Time Reminiscences Of A German Naval Intelligence Officer (London: Taylor & Francis, 1933). Stockholm Police debriefing report, pp. 48-49.
  18. [xviii] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, pp. 138-142. Granovskiy did not mention this training during his Swedish debriefings.
  19. [xix] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, p. 148.
  20. [xx] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, pp. 143-144.
  21. [xxi] Stockholm Police debriefing report, p. 50.
  22. [xxii] Stockholm Police debriefing report, p. 49.
  23. [xxiii] Stockholm Police debriefing report, p. 52.
  24. [xxiv] Stockholm Police debriefing report, pp. 53-55.
  25. [xxv] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, pp. 150-154.
  26. [xxvi] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, pp. 173-176; his Swedish debriefing does not mention this episode.
  27. [xxvii] Stockholm Police debriefing report, pp. 56-57.
  28. [xxviii] Stockholm Police debriefing report, pp. 64-65.
  29. [xxix] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, pp. 194-198.
  30. [xxx] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, p. 204.
  31. [xxxi] She is referred to by the name Patjkova, of Pachkova, in the Swedish debriefing, pp. 69-70.
  32. [xxxii] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, p. 200.
  33. [xxxiii] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, pp. 216-127; Stockholm Police debriefing report, p. 70.
  34. [xxxiv] Granovskiy, “I Was Stalin’s Spy,” A Noite, 5 April 1949.
  35. [xxxv] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, p. 226.
  36. [xxxvi] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, pp. 227-233; Stockholm Police debriefing report, pp. 72-73.
  37. [xxxvii] Stockholm Police debriefing report, p. 75.
  38. [xxxviii] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, p. 256; see also Statement attributed to Granovskiy in a compilation of statements about the John Birch Society, "Conservative Critics of Robert Welch and the Birch Society," https://archive.org/stream/foia_JBS_Report--combined/JBS_Report--combined.
  39. [xxxix] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, pp. 245-250, 260-261; Stockholm Police debriefing report, p. 76.
  40. [xl] Granovskiy, “I Was Stalin’s Spy,” A Noite, 3 May 1949.
  41. [xli] Stockholm Police debriefing report, p. 79.
  42. [xlii] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, p. 262.
  43. [xliii] Stockholm Police debriefing report, p. 80.
  44. [xliv] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, p. 266-267.
  45. [xlv] Granovskiy, “I Was Stalin’s Spy,” A Noite, 10 May 1949, p. 12.
  46. [xlvi] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, p. 267.
  47. [xlvii] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, p. 267.
  48. [xlviii] Stockholm Police debriefing report, p. 86.
  49. [xlix] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, p. 269.
  50. [l] Stockholm Police debriefing report, p. 88.
  51. [li] Granovskiy, I Was an NKVD Agent, p. 269.
  52. [lii] Vladimir Petrov, and Evdokia Petrova, Empire of Fear (London: André Deutsch, 1956), p. 199. See also Johan Matz, “Soviet Refugees to Sweden 1941–1947 and the Raoul Wallenberg Case,” Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 46, No. 4 (December 2015), pp. 447-449.
  53. [liii] Letters from Granovskiy to the Swedish Prime Minister and Council of State, dated 16 October 1946; National Archives of Sweden, Justitedepartemenet (Ministry of Justice) Classified Archive, E1, Volume 36, Regr. No. HD1213.
  54. [liv] Frank J. Rafalko, ed., CI Reader: American Revolution Into the New Millennium (Washington, DC: National Counterintelligence Center, 2004), p. 69.
  55. [lv] C. G. McKay, Excerpts from McKay’s Notes on The Case of Raoul Wallenberg (2011), pp. 58-61, http://www.raoulwallenberg.org/mckay.pdf.
  56. [lvi] Letter from Justice Minister Herman Zetterberg to the State Immigration Commission, dated 8 November 1946; National Archives of Sweden, Justitedepartemenet (Ministry of Justice) Classified Archive, E1, Volume 36, Regr. No. HD1213.
  57. [lvii] Kevin C. Ruffner, “On the Trail of Nazi Counterfeiters,” Studies in Intelligence (2002), p. 51, n46. Ruffner cites Granovskiy’s book, I Was an NKVD Agent, is several CIA internal publications, lending it a sense of credibility.
  58. [lviii] David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 458 n50.
  59. [lix] "Fui Espião De Stalin!" (“I Was Stalin’s Spy”), A Noite, 7 October 1948, p 3.
  60. [lx] Statement attributed to Granovskiy in a compilation of statements about the John Birch Society, "Conservative Critics of Robert Welch and the Birch Society," https://archive.org/stream/foia_JBS_Report--combined/JBS_Report--combined.
  61. [lxi] Vladislav Krasnov, Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 179
  62. [lxii] Entry number 54, “KGB Wanted List," HIA, Vladislav Krasnov Writings file.

Published works

  • “Eu Fui Espião de Stalin” (“I Was Stalin’s Spy”)
  • A Noite
  • serialized from 30 December 1948 to 10 May 1949.   All Pity Choked: The Memoirs of a Soviet Agent (London: Kimber
  • 1955).   I Was an NKVD Agent: A Top Soviet Spy Tells His Story (New York: Devin-Adair
  • 1962)

Cite this entry

Kevin Riehle, “Granovskiy, Anatoliy Mikhailovich,” Soviet Defectors Database, revised 2026-11-22, https://sovietdefectors.com/defector/granovskiy-anatoliy-mikhailovich/