Intelligence and state security officers who left Soviet serviceCompiled by Kevin Riehle

Entry 8 of 121 · revised 2026-11-22

Yevgeniy Mikhailovich Kozhevnikov

Known asHovans

Евгений Михайлович Кожевников

Biography

Among the more colorful defectors of the pre-World War II era is Yevgeniy Mikhailovich Kozhevnikov,[i] an OGPU officer working at the Soviet military missions in Shanghai and Hankow, China, in the mid-1920s. Kozhevnikov used numerous aliases during his career, including Eugene Pik (Pick), Hovanskiy, Hovans, Dr. Carl Clige, Morskiy, Karskiy, and others, and he is frequently referred in his own and others writings by one of these pseudonyms.

His origins are a matter of debate. He may have been born into a merchant family in 1898 in the Astrakhan region of Russia.[ii] Or he may have been born to a Russian Imperial Army officer in Riga, Latvia, in 1900.[iii] He joined the army himself and served as a junior officer, later claiming to have been captured by Germans during World War I.[iv] He returned to Russia in 1918 and joined the Bolshevik Party, enrolling in a course for ChK officers. One unconfirmed report indicated that he may have served as a border guard commander for a brief period after the revolution.[v] Simultaneous with the ChK officer’s course, he studied at night at a Moscow theater school, where he assumed the name Hovanskiy.[vi] Kozhevnikov is rumored to have chosen the pseudonym Hovanskiy from the Mussorgsky opera Hovanshchina; he later gained fame as a talented singer.[vii]

Kozhevnikov’s first ChK assignment was in Turkestan, followed by Ukraine. He arrived in China in 1925, serving for a time at the Soviet embassy in Beijing before moving to Shanghai in 1926, where he worked as an OGPU officer under journalist cover at the Soviet Consulate. He later stated that Aleksandr Ilich Yegorov, the Soviet military attaché in Peking, sent him to Shanghai as assistant military attaché.[viii] In Shanghai he became acquainted with Patrick Givens, an Irishman serving as a police inspector with the British-run Shanghai Municipal Police, and a possible Secret Intelligence Service officer.[ix] Kozhevnikov apparently began an espionage relationship with Givens, supplying information about Soviet support to Chinese communists. Kozhevnikov initially communicated directly with Givens, but eventually used Vladimir Mikhailovich Kedrovilanskiy, as White Russian émigré working for the Shanghai Municipal Police, as a cut out.[x] It is unknown whether Givens recruited Kozhevnikov or if Kozhevnikov volunteered his services; however, judging from Kozhevnikov’s subsequent offers of services to several foreign intelligence services, the latter seems likely.

In late 1926 or early 1927, Givens asked Kozhevnikov to obtain a transfer to Hankow, presumably to increase his access the headquarters of Mikhail Markovich Borodin (real name Gruzenberg), the Comintern representative to the Chinese Nationalist government. Borodin, on Stalin’s orders, was responsible for leading the Soviet Union’s relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, supporting the Kuomintang’s revolutionary efforts, and reducing Western influence in China.[xi] Kozhevnikov gladly requested the transfer because he was on poor terms with the Soviet Consul General in Shanghai, Wilhelm F. Linde. He arrived in Hankow in March 1927, where he worked for an OGPU officer named Petrov, the senior OGPU officer on Borodin’s staff.[xii]

After establishing himself in Hankow, Kozhevnikov traveled back to Shanghai in April 1927, accompanying several Comintern representatives and other foreign Communists. While there, he re-contacted Givens. At about this same time, Chinese troops raided the Soviet Embassy in Peking, seizing documents showing Soviet instigation for revolutionary activities in China. Samples from the contents of this raid showing Soviet interference in the Nationalist government were published on 11 May 1927 in the North China Daily News, an English-language newspaper in Shanghai affiliated with the British consulate. The contents were later reprinted in the form of a pamphlet titled The Soviet in China Unmasked.[xiii] A short time later, the Shanghai Municipal Police raided the Soviet Consulate in Shanghai, facilitated by Kozhevnikov’s information about espionage operations being run from the consulate, in conjunction with information seized in the Peking raid.[xiv] According to a statement in the British House of Commons by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Austen Chamberlain, the raid was partially based on the “intensity of hostile feeling against the Soviet Consulate and its activities in Shanghai.”[xv] The raid led to prosecutions of 15 Russians in September 1927 for “agitating to produce internal disturbances in China.”[xvi]

Information supplied by Kozhevnikov probably also resulted in other Shanghai Municipal Police actions before his defection. Kozhevnikov named an Indian Communist, Daswandha Singh, a member of the "Society of Oppressed Peoples of Asia" and a representative of the Soviet-allied Hindustan Ghadar Party in China, who traveled with Kozhevnikov from Hankow to Shanghai in April. On 10 May, Chinese police arrested Singh and 18 other Indians on an order form Chiang Kai-shek.[xvii]

Also while in Shanghai in April 1927, Kozhevnikov approached Captain Jack P. Shelley, an intelligence officer in the British North China Command, offering to provide information to the British military mission in Shanghai.[xviii] He followed up on this offer after his defection.

Kozhevnikov’s proximate motivation for defection was to save his own skin. On 18 May 1927, Kozhevnikov was taken to a hospital in the French Concession of Hankow with a sword wound to his head. The French Consul asked Andrey Terentyevich Belchenko, a former Imperial Russian consul in Hankow who remained in China when the Bolshevik regime took control of Russian diplomatic establishments, to interview Kozhevnikov and determine what had happened. Kozhevnikov recounted to Belchenko his connection with Givens in Shanghai, indicating that a letter carried by Kedrovilanksiy had apparently fallen into Soviet hands, implicating Kozhevnikov in espionage. When Kozhevnikov returned to Hankow from Shanghai he was invited to a safe house for a meeting with Petrov, which he soon recognized as a trap where the OGPU, assisted by Chinese thugs, planned to capture him and return him the Soviet Union. Kozhevnikov escaped by jumping out a window and climbing over a wall, but not before one of the Chinese thugs sliced him with a sword.[xix]

Kozhevnikov, using the name Morskiy, gave Belchenko initial information about his OGPU tasks and the operations of the Comintern in China. Kozhevnikov described to Belchenko Soviet espionage operations directed against consulates in Hankow, facilitated by co-opted Chinese servants and employees whom the Soviets paid to report their observations and to supply foreign passport forms and stamps to be used for clandestine travel. Kozhevnikov’s initial reporting also included Soviet plots against White Russian émigrés living in China, including the kidnapping of a General Lebedev on Borodin’s orders, and even an assignment in March 1927 to assassinate Belchenko himself, which Kozhevnikov reportedly refused to do. He identified the leaders of the Soviet advisory staff in Hankow, indicating that Hankow was the center of a well-organized Soviet espionage and influence network.[xx]

Soviet commentators dismissed his information as “all kinds of rubbish about the ‘intrigues of Bolshevists in China…sprinkled with the names of Soviet workers in China, mercilessly confusing them’.”[xxi] However, the initial French evaluation of Kozhevnikov’s information was that it corroborated information obtained from other sources, including from the Peking and Shanghai raids. Seeing the danger Kozhevnikov faced in Hankow, the French shipped him to Shanghai to the safety of the French police.

Kozhevnikov’s life after defection began prosperously, but quickly declined. He re-contacted Shelley soon after arriving back in Shanghai, and Shelley assessed in June 1927 that “his value as an agent employed by us is nil,” since he was already compromised as an agent to the Shanghai Municipal Police. “He would be useful for identifying Soviet agents and Communists arriving in Shanghai, but his price is high and we have not the money to pay him.” Shelley reported to the War Office the four-point list of Kozhevnikov’s demands titled “Terms under which agent will undertake work”:

1. In the event of being placed in a dangerous situation in Hankow or Shanghai, arrangements must be made for concealing and protecting him;
2. If he is murdered by the Bol[sheviks], suitable financial assistance be made to his people -- $20,000;
3. He is receiving tael 500 per month. The information he has already given he considers valuable, but the amount to be paid him for this is left to us;
4. If engaged by us he requires payment of taels one thousand per month. For first few salary to be deposited and not paid.

Kozhevnikov promised that as long as Borodin and Petrov were in China he could furnish good information.[xxii]

Although Shelley declined to hire him as an agent, he was fully willing to accept his information. After recovering from his injury, Kozhevnikov provided numerous written reports to British, and presumably French, intelligence organizations, as well as to Shanghai newspapers, detailing the activities and leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, Soviet support to Chinese and other Asian revolutionaries, penetration of Western institutions in China, movement of weapons and contraband, and clandestine influence operations. He claimed that many of the Soviet officials supporting revolutionary communist activities in China in 1927, including his OGPU supervisor Petrov, were the same people who had conducted similar operations previously in Bulgaria.[xxiii] These would presumably have known the previous defectors Nesterovich and Dzevaltovskiy (see separate entries in this database). Viewing first hand the data that Kozhevnikov was making public regarding sensitive Soviet activities in China, Shelley predicted, “I shall be surprised if Pik dies a natural death.”[xxiv]

On 16 July 1927, the Shanghai Municipal Council authorized a raid of the Soviet Far Eastern Bank (Dalbank), based on “statements made by certain Communists in custody in Chinese territory,” undoubtedly referring to Kozhevnikov. The raid yielded abundant information showing Soviet financial support for the Chinese Communists.[xxv] Kozhevnikov continued to work with the Shanghai Municipal Police through the summer of 1927. Aleksey Vasiliyevich Blagodatov, a Soviet military representative in China, later recalled, “As soon as we set foot on land in Shanghai [in July 1927], an apparently English police official accompanied by a White émigré interpreter stopped me. He was, it later turned out, the notorious Pik, or more correctly ‘stoolie’.”[xxvi] Then, in August, Kozhevnikov published a pamphlet called China in the Grip of the Reds, which compiled materials previously printed in the North China Daily News naming numerous Soviet operatives and agents in China.[xxvii]

As an OGPU officer in a military unit, Kozhevnikov was probably a Special Section (Особый Отдел, OO) officer, responsible for counterintelligence in the Soviet military mission. In July 1927, Shelley forwarded to the War Office a report written by Kozhevnikov that presented a detailed description of OO activities and leadership in China. The OO monitored all personnel involved with Borodin’s Comintern operation, both Russian trainers and Chinese trainees, investigating their communications, acquaintances, and suspicious connections. According to Kozhevnikov, the OO in China had the following responsibilities:

1. That Chinese and Russian officers have no connections with any foreigners.
2. To open up all the mail going up to the military units addressed to all suspicious or not entirely trustworthy officers and commanders notwithstanding their rank or position.
3. To have liaison with the Censors Department in Hankow Cheka which controls and opens the mail of the citizens under suspicion.
4. Seeing the generals and officers do not have any connection with the Northerners – Say Chang Tao Lin or any of his Lieutenants.
5. Watching upon Commanders of Chinese units so they would not sell arms or deal in opium.
6. Watching upon workmen in arsenals and munition stores.
7. To prevent all complaints among the troops on the grounds of some discontent and to prevent all possible rioting in certain units (at the request of Bramin, and on Gallins’ confirmation several units were disbanded within two days, such was the case with the Chinese II National Corps).
8. To negotiate and bribe Generals who are on the enemy’s side.
9. Watching after the appointment and dismissal of the political staff and supervising their work but without ay reference to the Political Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.
10. Agents of OO are appointed to punitive detachments and are witnessing all executions as well as carrying out death penalties themselves. [xxviii]

Until about October 1927, he supplied a consistent flow of Soviet names and activities, but some readers began to suspect the veracity of his reporting. In September, Shelley wrote, “It is unnecessary for me to point out that, though Pick’s [Kozhevnikov’s] reports contain much good stuff and he has a wonderful aptitude for nosing things out (an aptitude that is unwelcome at times), everything that he says is not to be taken as gospel.”[xxix] When forwarding the May 1927 French report on Kozhevnikov’s defection, the Foreign Office Far Eastern Department claimed in October 1927 that the Assistant commissioner of the Shanghai Municipal Police refused to employ Kozhevnikov as a political detective. The Foreign Office further commented, “The account of the ‘terror’ in Hankow is very lurid and so sensational as to incline one to suspect exaggeration. On the other hand, the espionage work appears to take very hackneyed lines.”[xxx]

By 1928, Kozhevnikov’s fortunes began to shift. Possibly because his information was losing its luster, he turned to criminal activities to make a living. He resorted to extorting money from businesses posing as a Shanghai police official. In one case, Kozhevnikov, along with an American named Maurice Levitsky, demanded 12,000 dollars from a Chinese businessman for a forged license to set up a gambling house.[xxxi] He was arrested in May 1929 and tried for fraud; during his trial he claimed publicly that the Shanghai Municipal Council paid him 3,000 dollars to organize the 1927 raid on the Soviet Consulate in Shanghai, and that his pamphlet, China in the Grip of the Reds, was dictated by the Shanghai Municipal Police and was largely false. A police inspector testified that Kozhevnikov was paid a dollar a head for every Bolshevik he denounced, and that he had received 220 dollars, but was eventually dismissed for duplicating names. Kozhevnikov introduced himself at the trial as a newspaper correspondent and an employee of the British Secret Service, which caused a sensation.[xxxii] He was sentenced to several months in jail. Later he and Levitsky set up another scam claiming to sell contraband weapons worth two million dollars. He spent more time in jail for this scam in 1931.[xxxiii]

Little is known of Kozhevnikov from 1931 to 1937. He may have decided to go straight and focus his energy on his career as an entertainer. Kozhevnikov gained a reputation as an actor and director in Shanghai, recognizable among Russian theatergoers by the Tatar skullcap that he wore to hide scar from the wound he received when he defected.[xxxiv] He also performed as a singer, including appearances on the radio. Levitsky, whom U.S. forces interrogated in 1945 about his connections with Kozhevnikov, indicated that Kozhevnikov got married, but his wife died in 1935.[xxxv] However, he resurfaced on the intelligence front sometime in the mid-1930s, when he supposedly worked for a short time supporting German Gestapo sabotage operations against Allied ships in Shanghai.[xxxvi]

In May 1941, Kozhevnikov published another book, titled Финиш (Finish Line), a collection of essays about Comintern and other Soviet activities in China in the 1920s.[xxxvii] It also includes stories about British and German intelligence activities in China, based upon Kozhevnikov’s personal, occasionally biased, memories. The book attracted a number of positive reviews in the Russian émigré press in Shanghai,[xxxviii] although some of the stories contain significant apocryphal elements. The book reflects a clear anti-European slant, which is also apparent in his correspondence with Belchenko, with whom he maintained contact after his initial meeting after his defection. In a letter to Belchenko dated 30 July 1941, with which forwarded a complimentary copy of his book, he wrote, “In my convictions I am pro-Japanese, not because I understand the idea of the new movement, etc., but because they have treated me honestly,”[xxxix] contrasting the Japanese treatment with that of Britain and Germany.

He eventually became affiliated with the Japanese Naval Intelligence Bureau. At about time that the Japanese Army occupied China in 1937, a pro-Soviet Russian émigré named Sergey Mamоntov wrote an article in a Chinese newspaper exposing Kozhevnikov as a criminal. Mamontov was later found dead. Kozhevnikov was arrested and accused of contracting Mamontov’s murder, reportedly at the behest of the Japanese government, for which he was convicted on 24 November 1941 and sentenced to 15 years in prison.[xl] However, on 8 December 1941—the day the United States declared war on Japan—the Japanese Navy arranged for him to be released from prison and set him up in the Cathay Hotel in Shanghai, employing him on the Russian desk in the Naval Intelligence Office.[xli]

From 1941 to 1945, Kozhevnikov monitored foreign broadcast and print media and reported on local and foreign perceptions of the war for Japanese Naval Intelligence.[xlii] The U.S. Strategic Services Unit asserted that he was the only foreigner directly connected with the Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai.[xliii] While working for Japanese Naval Intelligence he probably originated a proposal to transport Allied prisoners of war from the Philippines to Japan to be used as human shields near sensitive Japanese facilities. U.S. troops found the written proposal when they searched the premises of the Japanese Naval Office after Japan’s capitulation; it was signed “C. E. C.,” which corresponds with a pseudonym Kozhevnikov was using at that time, Carl E. Clige.[xliv] From June to August 1944, Kozhevnikov also took a Japanese government-sponsored trip to the Philippines to lead a group assigned with assessing the reasons why Filipinos continued to resist Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Instead of collecting the required intelligence, however, Kozhevnikov and other members of the group became involved in criminal activities to supplement their salaries.[xlv]

Kozhevnikov also continued to have contact with German intelligence agents in China, with whom he swapped information and favors.[xlvi] However, he reportedly refrained from direct affiliation with the Gestapo because he felt that his earlier cooperation had not been sufficiently rewarded.[xlvii]

His ultimate motivation for defection in 1927 may have been a thirst for fame. A former Japanese intelligence officer characterized Kozhevnikov as a volatile individual who desired position and honor.[xlviii] His fame eventually led to an investigation in 1945 by the U.S. Strategic Services Unit to determine whether he should be indicted for war crimes. After interrogating captured Japanese officers and other associates of Kozhevnikov, the investigation concluded that, while he was involved in minor espionage for the Japanese and was viewed by many as an overall foul character, his actions did not reach the level of war crimes.[xlix]

Nevertheless, American forces arrested Kozhevnikov in 1946 and transferred him to Chinese authorities to serve the remainder of the 15-year sentence that he avoided thanks to the outbreak of the Pacific War. He sat in a Chinese prison for over two years, and when his case finally came to trial in September 1948 he claimed to be nothing but an actor, completely innocent of murder or of having ever worked for the Japanese.[l] In November 1948, Kozhevnikov wrote a letter from jail appealing to the American forces in China, claiming that his 1941 conviction for Mamontov’s murder in a “puppet court” was a set up, and that he had never worked for the Japanese. In fact, he claimed to have cooperated with U.S. intelligence in Shanghai in the late 1930s, a claim that may have been partially true, although rumors claimed that he was actually a double agent for the Japanese against the U.S. military attaché.[li]

In January 1949, a Chinese court convicted Kozhevnikov of espionage on behalf of the Japanese for his work as the chief of the Russian section of Japanese Naval Intelligence in Shanghai during the war. He repeated his claims of being nothing but a stage performer during the trial, but the Chinese court rejected his pleas and sentenced him to five years in prison. It is unclear how much of the resulting five-year sentence he served.[lii]

In November 1948, before his conviction in Shanghai, Kozhevnikov wrote a letter to National City Bank of New York in Tokyo requesting assistance with recovering money that had been deposited in Japanese banks on his behalf during the war. He wrote subsequent letters in 1949 repeating the requests. The U.S. occupation government in Japan could do little to locate the money, and in the midst of the process, Kozhevnikov disappeared and could not be located. His whereabouts after October 1949 are unknown, although he may have been in a Chinese prison.[liii] However, Captain Shelley in 1927 would probably have been surprised to learn that Kozhevnikov survived over 20 years after his defection.

Notes

  1. [i] Photo from NARA, RG 226, Entry UD182, Box 12, Hovans file.
  2. [ii] TNA, KV 2/1895, serial 19z.
  3. [iii] U.S. Strategic Services Unit, Japanese Intelligence Organizations in China, dated 4 June 1946, p. 82; NARA, RG 263, Entry ZZ-19, box 40, CIA FOIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/JAPANESE%20INTELLIGENCE%20ORGANIZATIONS%20IN%20CHINA%20%20%20%28WWII%29_0001.pdf
  4. [iv] The story of his World War I service later grew to include his having escaped from German captivity eleven times. Bernard Wasserstein, "Collaborators and renegades in occupied Shanghai," History Today, Vol. 48, no. 9 (September 1998).
  5. [v] U.S. Forces China report, Translation of “Written Statement By Japanese Naval Attache in Custody, Fukuhara,” 12 December 1945, NARA, RG 226, Entry UD182, Box 12, Hovans.
  6. [vi] Viktor Nikolaevich Usov, Советская разведка в Китае. 20-е годы XX века (Soviet Intelligence in China: The 20s of the 20th Century) (Moscow: OLMA Media Group, 2002), pp. 187-191.
  7. [vii] Amir Aleksandrovich Khisamutdinov, Русская Словесность в Шанхае (Russian Literature in Shanghai) (Vladivostok: Far Eastern University Publishing House, 2014), pp. 30-31.
  8. [viii] Report on Kozhevnikov (Pick) written by Andrey Terentyevich Belchenko to the French Consul General in Hankow on 31 May 1927, Hoover Institution Archives, Andrei Terent-evich Bel-chenko Papers, 1898-1962, Box 24, Folder 8. In October 1927, the French Foreign Ministry provided a copy to the British Foreign Office, which sent it to Shelley in Shanghai, 4 October 1927, TNA KV 3/146, serial 52a. An English translation is contained in TNA KV 2/1895, serial 52a.
  9. [ix] Frederic Wakeman, Jr., Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 160.
  10. [x] Belchenko report to French Consul General, op. sit.
  11. [xi] Yu Miin-Ling, “A Reassessment of Chiang Kaishek and the Policy of Alliance with the Soviet Union, 1923-1927,” in Roland Felber, A.M. Grigoriev, Mechthild Leutner, M.L. Titarenko, eds., The Chinese Revolution in the 1920s: Between Triumph and Disaster (London; New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 115-117.
  12. [xii] Belchenko report to French Consul General, op. sit.
  13. [xiii] A full copy is contained in TNA, KV 3/145.
  14. [xiv] John Powell, “Consuls Meet to Protest Picketing Soviet Office,” Buffalo Courier Express, 10 April 1927, p. 1
  15. [xv] House of Commons Debate, 11 April 1927, Vol. 205, cc10-2 , https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1927-04-11/debates/2899f67d-25b5-467f-8986-0b14f89855f4/CommonsChamber
  16. [xvi] “The Soviet Embassy Raid,” North China Daly News, 17 September 1927; forwarded by Shelley to the War Office on 27 September 1927, TNA, KV 3/145, serial 50a.
  17. [xvii] Belchenko report to French Consul General, op. sit.
  18. [xviii] Memo from Headquarters, Shanghai Defence Force to Office, dated 20 June 1927, TNA KV/1895, serial 15b. A deteriorated copy of the same memo is also contained in TNA KV 3/145, serial 15E.
  19. [xix] Belchenko report to French Consul General, op. sit. A variation on this story appeared in U.S. Strategic Services Unit, Japanese Intelligence Organizations in China, p. 82, 91. Rather than a sword attack, this version claims that Kozhevnikov’s injury came when Soviet officers tortured him by pouring boiling oil on his head. The French report, made immediately after his visit to a French hospital, is more reliable.
  20. [xx] Belchenko report to French Consul General, op. sit.
  21. [xxi] Vera Vladimirovna Vishnyakova-Akimova, Два года в восставшем Китае. 1925-1927. Воспоминания (Two Years in Revolutionary China, 1925-1927: Reminiscences) (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), p. 281.
  22. [xxii] Shelley to War Office, 20 June 1927, TNA KV/1895, serial 15b. A deteriorated copy of the same memo is also contained in TNA KV 3/145, serial 15e.
  23. [xxiii] Report by Kozhevnikov titled “Work of the Representatives of the “U.S.S.R.” in China,” forwarded by Shelley to the War Office on 20 June 1927, TNA KV 2/1895, serial 15b.
  24. [xxiv] Shelley to War Office, 11 July 1927, TNA 2/1895, serial 2a.
  25. [xxv] Shelley to War Office, 17 July 1927, TNA KV 3/145, serial 39a.
  26. [xxvi] The Russian word for “stoolie” is шпик (shpik), playing on Kozhevnikov’s pseudonym, Pik. Aleksey Vasiliyevich Blagodatov, Записки о китайской революции 1925-1927 гг. (Notes on the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1927) (Moscow: Nauka, 1979, pp. 271-272).
  27. [xxvii] Eugene Pick, China in the Grip of the Reds: Sketches of the Extravagant Effort Made by Soviet Russia to Set Up and Control a Red Regime in China With Strong Light Upon the Ruthless Character of Borodin and His Agents (Shanghai: North China Daily News, 1927).
  28. [xxviii] Shelley to War Office, 11 July 1927, TNA KV 3/145, serial 33e.
  29. [xxix] Shelley to War Office, 16 September 1927, TNA 2/1895, serial 3a.
  30. [xxx] Copy of memo from Foreign Office Far Eastern Department enclosing English translations of French reports of Kozhevnikov’s defection, dated 1 October 1927, TNA KV 2/1895, serial 4a.
  31. [xxxi] “Mysterious Capt. Pick: Strange Story of a Man of Many Names,” The Daily Herald (Shanghai), 10 July 1929, clipping in TNA KV 2/1895, serial 9a.
  32. [xxxii] “The Shanghai Anti-Soviet Raid: Serious Allegations Against Municipal Council,” Manchester Guardian, 12 July 1929, clipping in TNA KV 2/1895, serial 10a.
  33. [xxxiii] Usov, Soviet Intelligence in China, pp. 187-191. Livitsky was interviewed in December 1945 by U.S. forces in China, reporting his and Hovans’ arrests in 1929 and 1931; Office of Strategic Services, China Theater X-2 Branch, memo dated 10 December 1945, CIA FOIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000112836.pdf
  34. [xxxiv] Usov, Soviet Intelligence in China, pp. 187-191.
  35. [xxxv] Ibid.
  36. [xxxvi] Usov, Soviet Intelligence in China, p. 191
  37. [xxxvii] Yevgeniy M. Hovans, Финиш: Сборник Политических Рассказов (Finish Line: A Collection of Political Stories) (Shanghai: I. G. Romanov Shanghai Publishing House, 1941).
  38. [xxxviii] N. Severskiy, “’Финиш: Новая Книга Евгения Хованса” (“Finish: A New Book by Yevgeniy Xovans”), Слово (The Word), 25 May 1941; “Финиш: Евгений Хованс, Шанхай 1941 г.” (“Finish: Yevgeniy Hovans, Shanghai 1941”), Сегодня (Today), 5 July 1941, p. 29; “Все Это Было” (“This All Was”), unidentified newspaper clipping in Hoover Institution Archives, Andrei Terent'evich Bel'chenko Papers, Box 24, Folder 8 (Microfilm reel 31).
  39. [xxxix] Letter from Kozhevnikov to Belchenko, dated 30 July 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Andrei Terent'evich Bel'chenko Papers, Box 24, Folder 8 (Microfilm reel 31).
  40. [xl] Sergey Stanislavovich Balmasov, Белоэмигранты на военной службе в Китае (White Émigrés on Military Service in China) (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007).
  41. [xli] U.S. Strategic Services Unit, Japanese Intelligence Organizations in China, p. 83.
  42. [xlii] Ibid, p. 87
  43. [xliii] Ibid, p. 82
  44. [xliv] Ibid, p. 84-85; he also sometimes spelled his pseudonym Kliege.
  45. [xlv] Ibid, p. 91-97
  46. [xlvi] U.S. Strategic Services Unit, German Intelligence Activities in China during World War II, dated 1 March 1946, p. 84; NARA, RG 263, Entry ZZ-19, box 35,CIA FOIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/GERMAN%20INTELLIGENCE%20ACTIVITIES_0001.pdf
  47. [xlvii] U.S. Strategic Services Unit, Japanese Intelligence Organizations in China, p. 91
  48. [xlviii] Ibid, p. 87
  49. [xlix] Ibid, p. 98
  50. [l] “Hovans Denies Collaborated with Japanese,” China Press, 9 October 1948; clipping in NARA RG 319, Entry 134B, Box 316.
  51. [li] OSS China Theater, X-2 Branch report, “Eugene Pick-Hovans,” 7 September 1945, NARA, RG 226, Entry UD 182, Box 12, Hovans; Det “G” Intelligence Division, General Staff, U.S. Army, Shanghai Port Facility, Army Advisory Group memo to Commanding Officer, 441st Counterintelligence Corps Detachment, dated 3 December 1948, forwarding two letters written by Kozhevnikov from jail; NARA RG 319, Entry 134B, Box 316.
  52. [lii] “Японский Шпион и Соучастник Убийства Хованс-Кожевников Приговрен к Пяти Годам Тюрьмы” (“Japanese Spy and Accomplice to Murder Hovans-Kozhevnikov Sentenced to Five Years in Prison”), Новая Заря (New Dawn), 29 January 1941.
  53. [liii] GHQ SCAP Economic and Scientific Section letter, 20 April 1950, NARA, RG 331, Entry UD 1759, Box 7499, Hovans.

Published works

  • China in the Grip of the Reds
  • North China Daily News and Herald
  • August 1927.

Cite this entry

Kevin Riehle, “Kozhevnikov, Yevgeniy Mikhailovich,” Soviet Defectors Database, revised 2026-11-22, https://sovietdefectors.com/defector/kozhevnikov-yevgeniy-mikhailovich/