Biography
Salimanov was an NKVD official originally from Dagestan. No information is available about when he became an NKVD employee, but he was promoted to sergeant of state security in November 1937, and by February 1939 he was a commandant in the Dagestan NKVD office. During this time he reportedly distinguished himself for his cruelty towards arrestees.[i] However, he was fired from the NKVD in February 1939 for an unknown reason.[ii]
He apparently had a reversal of fortunes, because 10 years later he was a colonel in the MGB First Chief Directorate and had previously worked a logistics officer in Moscow.[iii] He arrived in Germany probably in 1949 as the Deputy Chief of the Soviet uranium mining operation Wismut AG and chief of the Wismut Logistics Directorate in the Soviet zone of Germany.[iv] He was the deputy to Wismut AG's director, Mikhail Mitrofanovich Maltsev, who had previously led the Main Directorate for Corrective Labor Camps (GULAG). Salimanov was the highest-ranking Soviet intelligence officer defector in the early post-war period.
The CIA received initial, incomplete reports about Salimanov in mid-1949, although it was several months before CIA received accurate information about him. An intelligence report from August 1949 listed a person named “General Salomonov” as an MVD officer who was the Wismut liaison to the SVAG in Berlin. Although the report misrepresented the name and rank, it likely referred to Salimanov.[v] The CIA received reports indicating Salimanov traveled to Berlin and Vienna frequently to purchase materials for Wismut. An intelligence report identified a Lieutenant Colonel Suleimanov (likely Salimanov) as a representative of the Soviet Purchasing Agency in Berlin responsible for large purchases of material and scrap from a former Austrian factory in August 1949.[vi] Another report identified a Colonel Suleimanov as the head of Wismut procurement as of August 1949, who traveled on the average of once per month to Vienna to purchase materials for Wismut. He worked through Austrian companies that purchased goods in the western zone of Germany and had them shipped to Berlin, from where they were transferred to Wismut. When a rail shipment of goods for Wismut approached the Soviet zonal border, Wismut arranged with the chief of the SVAG Transportation Division to allow it to pass. The report described Suleimanov (Salimanov) as about 40 years old with slightly Mongolian features,[vii] likely indicating that he was of Tatar or Central Asian origin.
The first report to provide a complete and accurate rendering of Salimanov’s name was published in January 1950. It discussed several large shipments of goods bound for Wismut, including coal, radio tubes, high-voltage condensers, and vehicles.[viii] A subsequent report indicated that Salimanov purchased 100 prefabricated wooden barracks from a Vienna-based company, which he said were destined for Wismut.[ix] Salimanov was reported to be in Berlin in December 1949 supervising the purchase of fuel and oxygen breathing apparatuses for mining operations. He also received a task while in Berlin to purchase 25 tons of copper tubing.[x] The types and amounts of goods that Salimanov purchased in the western zones provided U.S. and British intelligence important evidence of the type and amount of work being done at the mine.
In May 1950, Salimanov was informed that he was to be removed from his position and ordered back to the Soviet Union. Nothing is publicly available about the reasons for this sudden reversal, but womanizing might have been a factor. Dr. Arnold Kramish, an official with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission who supported CIA intelligence operations, characterized Salimanov as a “very distasteful character.” Eric Welsh, an SIS officer who specialized in atomic intelligence, regarded him as “very dangerous.”[xi] Rather than return home, Salimanov slipped away from his MGB minder and fled to West Germany.[xii]
He was interrogated jointly by U.S. and British intelligence officers in Germany and assigned the code name ICARUS. He was a logistics officer, not an atomic scientist, so his information was primarily non-technical. But he provided unparalleled information about the Soviet atomic program under MGB leadership; about numerous Soviet personnel; and about Wismut specifically. A CIA report dated August 1950, which provided a long list of equipment, machinery, and tools worth tens of millions of eastern deutschmarks, may have come from documents Salimanov brought with him when he defected.[xiii] His information also filled gaps in U.S. and British knowledge about Soviet intelligence headquarters and personnel, which informed counterespionage operations.[xiv] His information confirmed or corrected much of the information that U.S. and British intelligence already had on the Soviet atomic program.[xv]
Salimanov disappeared from the U.S. zone of Germany in July 1950, after only three months in the West, and U.S. and British intelligence agencies knew nothing of his whereabouts for months. He reportedly heard children celebrating U.S. Independence Day with fireworks, and the next day he went missing.[xvi] The British Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch, part of the Intelligence Division of the Control Commission for Germany, interrogated Salimanov’s chauffer in early 1951 and learned that Salimanov may have gone back to the Soviet zone.[xvii] Two of Salimanov’s girlfriends later fled to the West, but they could shed no light on his fate.[xviii] He had reportedly left another girlfriend in the Soviet zone when he defected in May. He became increasingly despondent in the West, and U.S. officials believed that prompted his re-defection[xix]; their intuition turned out to be right.
Although his brief stay in the West yielded valuable information about the Soviet atomic program, it also resulted in a Soviet security crackdown in East Germany that complicated future Western intelligence efforts to recruit sources at Wismut.[xx] When Salimanov disappeared, a number of Wismut personnel, both at Wismut headquarters and at the Soviet Purchasing Agency in Berlin, were arrested or transferred back to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Purchasing Agency, which Salimanov used as a venue to meet German and Austrian businessmen, was closed and moved to another location in Berlin. Several of Salimanov’s German contacts were also arrested.[xxi]
The Salimanov case also had serious implications for senior MGB leadership in Moscow. Colonel Mikhail Dmitriyevich Ryumin, a senior investigator in the MGB Investigative Section for Especially Important Cases, wrote a letter dated 13 June 1951 to the Communist Party Central Committee criticizing Minister of State Security Viktor Semenovich Abakumov for his handling of a series of critical national security investigations, among which was the Salimanov case. Ryumin wrote that Salimanov was arrested in Germany in August 1950, but despite the fact that Salimanov had revealed valuable information to the Americans and the case had significant state implications, Abakumov had hidden the existence of the investigation from the Central Committee for almost a year. Ryumin added that Salimanov had claimed during his MGB interrogation that the Americans already had detailed information about Wismut, which Ryumin interpreted as an indicator of deficient counterintelligence at the firm.[xxii] Another allegation in the same letter involved members of a Jewish youth organization who were plotting terrorist actions against the Soviet government leaders, the investigation of which Ryumin claimed Abakumov had also concealed. The combined weight of the allegations led to Abakumov’s arrest a few weeks later in July 1951.[xxiii]
An alternate version story came out in 1954, when Nikolay Yevgenyevich Khokhlov defected. Khoklov claimed that Ryumin’s letter was retaliation for Abakumov’s refusal to allow Ryumin to take leave. Ryumin also reported to the Central Committee that Abakumov maintained a “girl-friend” entourage, and Khokhlov believed that Abakumov’s womanizing was a factor in Abakumov’s arrest.[xxiv]
On 5 July 1951, Abakumov wrote a rebuttal to Ryumin’s letter, in which he implied that Salimanov’s return to the Soviet Union was not voluntary. He wrote that, thanks to a successful MGB clandestine operation, Salimanov was lured to the apartment of an MGB agent, grabbed, and exfiltrated to Moscow. Abakumov claimed to have contacted Stalin’s secretary, Aleksandr Nikolayevich Poskrebyshev, immediately and told him to inform Stalin of the arrest. He further claimed that the operation against Salimanov facilitated other operations against the Americans.[xxv] While Abakumov did not mention the bait that the MGB used to lure Salimanov, his girlfriend is a likely candidate; she was reportedly later sent to a prison camp. Salimanov was executed in 1952.[xxvii]
He apparently had a reversal of fortunes, because 10 years later he was a colonel in the MGB First Chief Directorate and had previously worked a logistics officer in Moscow.[iii] He arrived in Germany probably in 1949 as the Deputy Chief of the Soviet uranium mining operation Wismut AG and chief of the Wismut Logistics Directorate in the Soviet zone of Germany.[iv] He was the deputy to Wismut AG's director, Mikhail Mitrofanovich Maltsev, who had previously led the Main Directorate for Corrective Labor Camps (GULAG). Salimanov was the highest-ranking Soviet intelligence officer defector in the early post-war period.
The CIA received initial, incomplete reports about Salimanov in mid-1949, although it was several months before CIA received accurate information about him. An intelligence report from August 1949 listed a person named “General Salomonov” as an MVD officer who was the Wismut liaison to the SVAG in Berlin. Although the report misrepresented the name and rank, it likely referred to Salimanov.[v] The CIA received reports indicating Salimanov traveled to Berlin and Vienna frequently to purchase materials for Wismut. An intelligence report identified a Lieutenant Colonel Suleimanov (likely Salimanov) as a representative of the Soviet Purchasing Agency in Berlin responsible for large purchases of material and scrap from a former Austrian factory in August 1949.[vi] Another report identified a Colonel Suleimanov as the head of Wismut procurement as of August 1949, who traveled on the average of once per month to Vienna to purchase materials for Wismut. He worked through Austrian companies that purchased goods in the western zone of Germany and had them shipped to Berlin, from where they were transferred to Wismut. When a rail shipment of goods for Wismut approached the Soviet zonal border, Wismut arranged with the chief of the SVAG Transportation Division to allow it to pass. The report described Suleimanov (Salimanov) as about 40 years old with slightly Mongolian features,[vii] likely indicating that he was of Tatar or Central Asian origin.
The first report to provide a complete and accurate rendering of Salimanov’s name was published in January 1950. It discussed several large shipments of goods bound for Wismut, including coal, radio tubes, high-voltage condensers, and vehicles.[viii] A subsequent report indicated that Salimanov purchased 100 prefabricated wooden barracks from a Vienna-based company, which he said were destined for Wismut.[ix] Salimanov was reported to be in Berlin in December 1949 supervising the purchase of fuel and oxygen breathing apparatuses for mining operations. He also received a task while in Berlin to purchase 25 tons of copper tubing.[x] The types and amounts of goods that Salimanov purchased in the western zones provided U.S. and British intelligence important evidence of the type and amount of work being done at the mine.
In May 1950, Salimanov was informed that he was to be removed from his position and ordered back to the Soviet Union. Nothing is publicly available about the reasons for this sudden reversal, but womanizing might have been a factor. Dr. Arnold Kramish, an official with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission who supported CIA intelligence operations, characterized Salimanov as a “very distasteful character.” Eric Welsh, an SIS officer who specialized in atomic intelligence, regarded him as “very dangerous.”[xi] Rather than return home, Salimanov slipped away from his MGB minder and fled to West Germany.[xii]
He was interrogated jointly by U.S. and British intelligence officers in Germany and assigned the code name ICARUS. He was a logistics officer, not an atomic scientist, so his information was primarily non-technical. But he provided unparalleled information about the Soviet atomic program under MGB leadership; about numerous Soviet personnel; and about Wismut specifically. A CIA report dated August 1950, which provided a long list of equipment, machinery, and tools worth tens of millions of eastern deutschmarks, may have come from documents Salimanov brought with him when he defected.[xiii] His information also filled gaps in U.S. and British knowledge about Soviet intelligence headquarters and personnel, which informed counterespionage operations.[xiv] His information confirmed or corrected much of the information that U.S. and British intelligence already had on the Soviet atomic program.[xv]
Salimanov disappeared from the U.S. zone of Germany in July 1950, after only three months in the West, and U.S. and British intelligence agencies knew nothing of his whereabouts for months. He reportedly heard children celebrating U.S. Independence Day with fireworks, and the next day he went missing.[xvi] The British Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch, part of the Intelligence Division of the Control Commission for Germany, interrogated Salimanov’s chauffer in early 1951 and learned that Salimanov may have gone back to the Soviet zone.[xvii] Two of Salimanov’s girlfriends later fled to the West, but they could shed no light on his fate.[xviii] He had reportedly left another girlfriend in the Soviet zone when he defected in May. He became increasingly despondent in the West, and U.S. officials believed that prompted his re-defection[xix]; their intuition turned out to be right.
Although his brief stay in the West yielded valuable information about the Soviet atomic program, it also resulted in a Soviet security crackdown in East Germany that complicated future Western intelligence efforts to recruit sources at Wismut.[xx] When Salimanov disappeared, a number of Wismut personnel, both at Wismut headquarters and at the Soviet Purchasing Agency in Berlin, were arrested or transferred back to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Purchasing Agency, which Salimanov used as a venue to meet German and Austrian businessmen, was closed and moved to another location in Berlin. Several of Salimanov’s German contacts were also arrested.[xxi]
The Salimanov case also had serious implications for senior MGB leadership in Moscow. Colonel Mikhail Dmitriyevich Ryumin, a senior investigator in the MGB Investigative Section for Especially Important Cases, wrote a letter dated 13 June 1951 to the Communist Party Central Committee criticizing Minister of State Security Viktor Semenovich Abakumov for his handling of a series of critical national security investigations, among which was the Salimanov case. Ryumin wrote that Salimanov was arrested in Germany in August 1950, but despite the fact that Salimanov had revealed valuable information to the Americans and the case had significant state implications, Abakumov had hidden the existence of the investigation from the Central Committee for almost a year. Ryumin added that Salimanov had claimed during his MGB interrogation that the Americans already had detailed information about Wismut, which Ryumin interpreted as an indicator of deficient counterintelligence at the firm.[xxii] Another allegation in the same letter involved members of a Jewish youth organization who were plotting terrorist actions against the Soviet government leaders, the investigation of which Ryumin claimed Abakumov had also concealed. The combined weight of the allegations led to Abakumov’s arrest a few weeks later in July 1951.[xxiii]
An alternate version story came out in 1954, when Nikolay Yevgenyevich Khokhlov defected. Khoklov claimed that Ryumin’s letter was retaliation for Abakumov’s refusal to allow Ryumin to take leave. Ryumin also reported to the Central Committee that Abakumov maintained a “girl-friend” entourage, and Khokhlov believed that Abakumov’s womanizing was a factor in Abakumov’s arrest.[xxiv]
On 5 July 1951, Abakumov wrote a rebuttal to Ryumin’s letter, in which he implied that Salimanov’s return to the Soviet Union was not voluntary. He wrote that, thanks to a successful MGB clandestine operation, Salimanov was lured to the apartment of an MGB agent, grabbed, and exfiltrated to Moscow. Abakumov claimed to have contacted Stalin’s secretary, Aleksandr Nikolayevich Poskrebyshev, immediately and told him to inform Stalin of the arrest. He further claimed that the operation against Salimanov facilitated other operations against the Americans.[xxv] While Abakumov did not mention the bait that the MGB used to lure Salimanov, his girlfriend is a likely candidate; she was reportedly later sent to a prison camp. Salimanov was executed in 1952.[xxvii]
Notes
- [i] Sagim Ilyasovich Suleymanov, Книга памяти жертв политических репрессий 20-50-х гг. ХХ в. в Дагестане (Memory Book of the Victims of Political Repression, the 20s-50s of the XX Century in Dagestan) (Makhachkala, Dagestan: 2015), pp. 144-146.
- [ii] “Салиманов, Георгий Васильевич” (“Salimanov, Georgiy Vasilyevich”), Кадровый Состав Органов Государственной Безопасности СССР, 1935-1939 (Staff Personnel of the Organs of USSR State Security, 1935-1939), https://nkvd.memo.ru/index.php/Салиманов,_Георгий_Васильевич.
- [iii] David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 15.
- [iv] Georgiy G. Andreyev, “Списки Советских Специалистов, Работавших в САО «ВИСМУТ» 1945-1953, Часть III” (“Lists of Soviet Specialists Working at SAO “VISMUT” 1945-1953, Part III”), p. 415. This list part of Уран и люди. история СГАО «ВИСМУТ» в двух томах (Uranium and People: The History of SGAO “VISMUT” in Two Volumes) (Moscow: Spets-Adress Publishers, 2012).
- [v] CIA Information Report, “Personalities of the Wismut AG,” dated 20 August 1949, NARA, CIA FOIA Reading Room. Source descriptions are redacted from reports available on the CIA FOIA Reading Room.
- [vi] CIA Information Report, “Recent Developments in USIA,” dated 14 November 1949, CIA FOIA Reading Room. Administration for Soviet Property in Austria (Управление советским имуществом в Австрии; USIA) was a series of Soviet-administered companies in Austria created in June 1946 when the Soviet Union confiscated German assets as reparations for war damages.
- [vii] CIA Information Report, “Procurement of Equipment for Wismut AG,” dated 29 December 1949, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
- [viii] CIA Information Report, “Wismut AG, dated 9 January 1950, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
- [ix] CIA Information Report, “Purchase of Wooden Barracks by SMV for Shipment of Saxony Uranium Mines,” 29 March 1950, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
- [x] CIA Information Report, “Wismut AG: Personnel and Procurement of Supplies,” dated 27 March 1950, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
- [xi] Michael S. Goodman, Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 139.
- [xii] O. S. Smyslov, Генерал Абакумов. Палач или жертва? (General Abakumov: Executioner or Victim) (Moscow: Veche, 2012).
- [xiii] CIA Information Report, “Purchase of Materials by Wismut AG,” dated 24 August 1950, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
- [xiv] Rositzke Harry, The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), p. 141.
- [xv] Henry S. Lowenhaupt, “On the Soviet Nuclear Scent,” Studies in Intelligence, Volume 11 (1967), No. 4, p. 20; Henry S. Lowenhaupt, “Chasing Bitterfeld Calcium,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 17 (1973) No. 2., p. 27.
- [xvi] Goodman, Spying on the Nuclear Bear, p. 139.
- [xvii] Joint Scientific and Joint Technical Intelligence Committee (JS/JTIC) Meeting Notes, dated 8 March 1951, TNA, DEFE 41/10.
- [xviii] JS/JTIC Meeting Notes, dated 25 January 1951, TNA, DEFE 41/10.
- [xix] Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, p. 15.
- [xx] Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, p. 15.
- [xxi] CIA Information Report, “The Wismut AG: Organization and Personnel; West German Firms Dealing with Wismut,” dated 26 June 1951, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
- [xxii] Smyslov, General Abakumov: Executioner or Victim?
- [xxiii] M. V. Khodyakov, managing ed., Новейшая История Pоссии 1946-2007 гг. (Часть 2): Материалы к семинарским занятиям (Contemporary History of Russia 1946-2007 (Part 2): Seminar Materials) (St. Petersburg: New Alternative Polygraph, 2008), p. 8.
- [xxiv] Questions put to Khokhlov and His Answers Thereto, 13 May 1954, TNA, KV 5/107, serial 87a.
- [xxv] Smyslov, General Abakumov: Executioner or Victim?
- [xxvi] Nikita Petrov, Почетные граждане ГУЛага (Honored Citizens of the GULAG) (Moscow: International “Memorial” Foundation), http://ipvnews.org/hegemon_article13042011.php.