Biography
Little is known about Konstantin Volkov’s background besides the few brief bits of information he provided to the British Consulate General in Istanbul to pique British interest. He offered to defect in September 1945, but was cut short and forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union thanks to information leaked by Kim Philby. Journalist Ben Macintyre described the lack of information about Volkov:
Konstantin Volkov left no traces: no photograph, no file in the Russian archives, no evidence about whether his motives were mercenary, personal, or ideological. Neither his family nor that of his wife, Zoya, have ever emerged from the darkness of Stalin's state. He had been right to assume that his relatives were doomed. Volkov was not merely liquidated; he was expunged.[i]
That is an exaggeration. A file on Volkov undoubtedly does exist. Volkov was a clandestine case officer operating under diplomatic cover, and consequently the name by which he was known in Turkey is almost certainly a pseudonym. His fate and that of his family will likely not be known until his real name is revealed.
Even this name is unsure: Brook-Shepherd lists his patronymic as Petrovich, while Andrew and Mitrokhin list it as Dmitrievich. A history of Soviet intelligence published by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service in 2003 refers to him simply as Volkov.[ii]
The first publically available information about Volkov came from Philby himself, who handled the case for the SIS and described it after his own defection in his 1968 autobiography, My Secret War.[iii] His account is riddled with self-congratulating and disingenuous material. Since 1968, other authors have referenced this initial story, but few have shed additional details about Volkov himself. Two subsequent accounts offer some new insights, although still sparse: Gordon Brook-Shepherd in his 1989 book The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors,[iv] and Andrew and Mitrokhin in their 1999 book The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB.[v] Andrew refers to Brook-Shepherd’s account as being the most reliable.[vi] In addition to these published accounts, Volkov’s case is included in a study of intelligence officer defectors compiled by the British Joint Intelligence Committee in 1948, which provides some additional details about Volkov’s background.[vii] In 2015, the British Archives opened his file that contains discussions within the Foreign Office about how to handle him and the decision to dispatch Philby to Istanbul.[viii]
Volkov was in his early 30s in 1945, placing his birth date between 1910 and 1915; Prokhorov claims he was born 1915.[ix] He joined the NKVD in autumn of 1936,[x] and prior to his assignment to Istanbul he was assigned to the British Desk at NKGB Headquarters in Moscow, giving him access to files involving Soviet agents operating against the UK. He joined the Communist Party in 1942[xi] and Brook-Shepherd indicates that he was a lieutenant colonel when he and his wife arrived in Istanbul on his first foreign assignment in May 1945.[xii]
Volkov was operating in Istanbul under the cover of a vice consul at the Soviet Consulate General when, on 24 August 1945, he sent a note to his counterpart at the British Consulate asking for a meeting to discuss “important and urgent business.”[xiii] The British consul ignored the request, thinking it was prank using Volkov’s name. Philby wrote that he “was pretty certain that we had never heard of Volkov” before that date[xiv]; however, Volkov was actually well known to the British consulate in Istanbul in his cover position at that Soviet Consulate.
Volkov waited over a week without a reply. On 4 September, he walked into the British Consulate, identified himself as the Deputy Chief of the NKGB office in Istanbul and asked for political asylum. Once he began to reveal his intentions, the Foreign Office personnel recognized the gravity of the situation and realized the need for instructions from London. However, Volkov warned that Soviet intelligence had broken British diplomatic ciphers, and thus any communications about him should be sent via diplomatic pouch rather than by radio or teletype.[xv] The consulate officers complied, which meant that it took over two weeks for the information to reach London.
When he met with British diplomats, Volkov promised what Philby later described as a “shopping list” of information about Soviet intelligence operations that would be of interest to the British.[xvi] He claimed to have stored a suitcase in his empty flat in Moscow that was full of documents about Soviet intelligence activities. He offered to make it possible for someone to go and collect the suitcase.[xvii]
Volkov left the British Consulate, but returned again on 13 September to deliver a letter describing his terms: In total Volkov described the following information that he could provide the British in exchange for “at least £50,000 sterling” and political asylum:
· The identities of 314 Soviet agents in the UK, including active and reserve.
· A list of approximately 250 military and civilian Soviet intelligence officers along with their agent networks
· A list of materials that NKGB agents in the UK Foreign Office had provided, including from two in the British Foreign Office; seven “inside the British intelligence system,” one of which was “fulfilling the function” of head of a section of counterespionage in London-- likely a reference to Philby—and one in the British consulate in Istanbul.
· Copies of dossiers and agent forms from British intelligence
· Copies of materials sent by British intelligence, including correspondence between London and Iran and NKGB headquarters analysis of it
· A claim that Soviet Union had broken British diplomatic ciphers and had been listening to correspondence with London for the previous two and a half years.
· A complete list of NKGB staff in Moscow along with their addresses and work phone numbers
· The addresses of several safe houses in Moscow
· Materials about an NKGB counterintelligence officer’s recruitment of the secretary of the head of the People’s Commissariat of Oil Industry and an assistant
· A list of Soviet agents in Turkey.
· Information about Soviet intelligence agents in Palestine, the Balkan countries, and Iran.
· Soviet official seals, rubber stamps, and identity documents, including two genuine identity cards that provide access to NKVD and NKGB spaces in Moscow[xviii]
When the initial message arrived in London on 19 September, it was forwarded to Philby, who was head of the SIS Russia section. He informed his own NKVD handler the following day, and Moscow immediately launched an operation to remove Volkov from Istanbul.[xix] However, while Philby’s action to inform the Soviets was immediate, he delayed his handling of the case for the SIS to allow time for the NKVD operatives to get to Turkey and capture Volkov. He waited several days before leaving London and arrived in Istanbul via Cairo on 26 September.[xx] By that time, NKVD counterintelligence had already taken Volkov into custody and transported him back to the Soviet Union. A British diplomat who knew Volkov reported recognizing Volkov and his wife being carried sedated on stretchers to a Soviet airplane on 24 September.[xxi] No further documented information is known of Volkov’s fate, although Karavashkin surmises that he was executed for treason.[xxii]
Volkov claimed that he offered to defect because he had quarreled with the Soviet Ambassador and other members of the Embassy staff and could not stand it any more.[xxiii] However, he had only been in Istanbul for three months, and he had evidently planned his escape even before his trip abroad, as shown by his claim to have stored a suitcase full of documents in his Moscow flat. He had been an NKVD officer during the Yezhovschina era, and thus, like other defectors of his time, he was probably personally acquainted with purge victims.
Possibly referring to the Volkov case, the British Foreign Office sent a letter to British diplomatic missions around the world in October 1946 giving instructions for how to react to “renegade members of Soviet missions abroad offering secret information in exchange for asylum in British territory.” It described the cases that had occurred up to that time as involving individuals who “appear to have reached a state of depression in which their life and work seem intolerable, and the possibility of escape, at whatever cost, became the only prospect of relief.” Probably learning from Volkov’s failed defection, the memo instructed “it will be necessary in each case to reach a rapid decision regarding the action to be taken,” and that any such “renegades” should be handed over to “’C’s’ representatives,” meaning the SIS, for handling and interrogation.[xxiv]
Volkov’s attempted defection sent waves through British counterintelligence for years after. While most people involved, including Philby himself, eventually concluded that the agent Volkov described as “fulfilling the function” of head of a section of counterespionage was Philby, not all British counterintelligence officers were so certain. As late as 1965, MI5 counterintelligence investigator Peter Wright was convinced that the agent was Sir Roger Hollis, who served as the Director of MI5 from 1956 to 1965. Wright never uncovered conclusive evidence of Hollis’ guilt, but kept the investigation alive for over two decades after Volkov’s disappearance.[xxv]
Konstantin Volkov left no traces: no photograph, no file in the Russian archives, no evidence about whether his motives were mercenary, personal, or ideological. Neither his family nor that of his wife, Zoya, have ever emerged from the darkness of Stalin's state. He had been right to assume that his relatives were doomed. Volkov was not merely liquidated; he was expunged.[i]
That is an exaggeration. A file on Volkov undoubtedly does exist. Volkov was a clandestine case officer operating under diplomatic cover, and consequently the name by which he was known in Turkey is almost certainly a pseudonym. His fate and that of his family will likely not be known until his real name is revealed.
Even this name is unsure: Brook-Shepherd lists his patronymic as Petrovich, while Andrew and Mitrokhin list it as Dmitrievich. A history of Soviet intelligence published by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service in 2003 refers to him simply as Volkov.[ii]
The first publically available information about Volkov came from Philby himself, who handled the case for the SIS and described it after his own defection in his 1968 autobiography, My Secret War.[iii] His account is riddled with self-congratulating and disingenuous material. Since 1968, other authors have referenced this initial story, but few have shed additional details about Volkov himself. Two subsequent accounts offer some new insights, although still sparse: Gordon Brook-Shepherd in his 1989 book The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors,[iv] and Andrew and Mitrokhin in their 1999 book The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB.[v] Andrew refers to Brook-Shepherd’s account as being the most reliable.[vi] In addition to these published accounts, Volkov’s case is included in a study of intelligence officer defectors compiled by the British Joint Intelligence Committee in 1948, which provides some additional details about Volkov’s background.[vii] In 2015, the British Archives opened his file that contains discussions within the Foreign Office about how to handle him and the decision to dispatch Philby to Istanbul.[viii]
Volkov was in his early 30s in 1945, placing his birth date between 1910 and 1915; Prokhorov claims he was born 1915.[ix] He joined the NKVD in autumn of 1936,[x] and prior to his assignment to Istanbul he was assigned to the British Desk at NKGB Headquarters in Moscow, giving him access to files involving Soviet agents operating against the UK. He joined the Communist Party in 1942[xi] and Brook-Shepherd indicates that he was a lieutenant colonel when he and his wife arrived in Istanbul on his first foreign assignment in May 1945.[xii]
Volkov was operating in Istanbul under the cover of a vice consul at the Soviet Consulate General when, on 24 August 1945, he sent a note to his counterpart at the British Consulate asking for a meeting to discuss “important and urgent business.”[xiii] The British consul ignored the request, thinking it was prank using Volkov’s name. Philby wrote that he “was pretty certain that we had never heard of Volkov” before that date[xiv]; however, Volkov was actually well known to the British consulate in Istanbul in his cover position at that Soviet Consulate.
Volkov waited over a week without a reply. On 4 September, he walked into the British Consulate, identified himself as the Deputy Chief of the NKGB office in Istanbul and asked for political asylum. Once he began to reveal his intentions, the Foreign Office personnel recognized the gravity of the situation and realized the need for instructions from London. However, Volkov warned that Soviet intelligence had broken British diplomatic ciphers, and thus any communications about him should be sent via diplomatic pouch rather than by radio or teletype.[xv] The consulate officers complied, which meant that it took over two weeks for the information to reach London.
When he met with British diplomats, Volkov promised what Philby later described as a “shopping list” of information about Soviet intelligence operations that would be of interest to the British.[xvi] He claimed to have stored a suitcase in his empty flat in Moscow that was full of documents about Soviet intelligence activities. He offered to make it possible for someone to go and collect the suitcase.[xvii]
Volkov left the British Consulate, but returned again on 13 September to deliver a letter describing his terms: In total Volkov described the following information that he could provide the British in exchange for “at least £50,000 sterling” and political asylum:
· The identities of 314 Soviet agents in the UK, including active and reserve.
· A list of approximately 250 military and civilian Soviet intelligence officers along with their agent networks
· A list of materials that NKGB agents in the UK Foreign Office had provided, including from two in the British Foreign Office; seven “inside the British intelligence system,” one of which was “fulfilling the function” of head of a section of counterespionage in London-- likely a reference to Philby—and one in the British consulate in Istanbul.
· Copies of dossiers and agent forms from British intelligence
· Copies of materials sent by British intelligence, including correspondence between London and Iran and NKGB headquarters analysis of it
· A claim that Soviet Union had broken British diplomatic ciphers and had been listening to correspondence with London for the previous two and a half years.
· A complete list of NKGB staff in Moscow along with their addresses and work phone numbers
· The addresses of several safe houses in Moscow
· Materials about an NKGB counterintelligence officer’s recruitment of the secretary of the head of the People’s Commissariat of Oil Industry and an assistant
· A list of Soviet agents in Turkey.
· Information about Soviet intelligence agents in Palestine, the Balkan countries, and Iran.
· Soviet official seals, rubber stamps, and identity documents, including two genuine identity cards that provide access to NKVD and NKGB spaces in Moscow[xviii]
When the initial message arrived in London on 19 September, it was forwarded to Philby, who was head of the SIS Russia section. He informed his own NKVD handler the following day, and Moscow immediately launched an operation to remove Volkov from Istanbul.[xix] However, while Philby’s action to inform the Soviets was immediate, he delayed his handling of the case for the SIS to allow time for the NKVD operatives to get to Turkey and capture Volkov. He waited several days before leaving London and arrived in Istanbul via Cairo on 26 September.[xx] By that time, NKVD counterintelligence had already taken Volkov into custody and transported him back to the Soviet Union. A British diplomat who knew Volkov reported recognizing Volkov and his wife being carried sedated on stretchers to a Soviet airplane on 24 September.[xxi] No further documented information is known of Volkov’s fate, although Karavashkin surmises that he was executed for treason.[xxii]
Volkov claimed that he offered to defect because he had quarreled with the Soviet Ambassador and other members of the Embassy staff and could not stand it any more.[xxiii] However, he had only been in Istanbul for three months, and he had evidently planned his escape even before his trip abroad, as shown by his claim to have stored a suitcase full of documents in his Moscow flat. He had been an NKVD officer during the Yezhovschina era, and thus, like other defectors of his time, he was probably personally acquainted with purge victims.
Possibly referring to the Volkov case, the British Foreign Office sent a letter to British diplomatic missions around the world in October 1946 giving instructions for how to react to “renegade members of Soviet missions abroad offering secret information in exchange for asylum in British territory.” It described the cases that had occurred up to that time as involving individuals who “appear to have reached a state of depression in which their life and work seem intolerable, and the possibility of escape, at whatever cost, became the only prospect of relief.” Probably learning from Volkov’s failed defection, the memo instructed “it will be necessary in each case to reach a rapid decision regarding the action to be taken,” and that any such “renegades” should be handed over to “’C’s’ representatives,” meaning the SIS, for handling and interrogation.[xxiv]
Volkov’s attempted defection sent waves through British counterintelligence for years after. While most people involved, including Philby himself, eventually concluded that the agent Volkov described as “fulfilling the function” of head of a section of counterespionage was Philby, not all British counterintelligence officers were so certain. As late as 1965, MI5 counterintelligence investigator Peter Wright was convinced that the agent was Sir Roger Hollis, who served as the Director of MI5 from 1956 to 1965. Wright never uncovered conclusive evidence of Hollis’ guilt, but kept the investigation alive for over two decades after Volkov’s disappearance.[xxv]
Notes
- [i] Ben Macintyre, A Spy Among Friends (New York: Crown Archetype, 2014), p. 100.
- [ii] S. I. Lebedev, managing ed., Очерки Истории Российской Внешней Разведки (Essay on the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence), Vol. 5 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 2003), pp. 69-72.
- [iii] Harold Adrian Russell Philby, My Secret War (New York: Grove Press, 1968), pp. 147-160.
- [iv] Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), pp. 48-56.
- [v] Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999), pp. 138-140.
- [vi] Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p. 600 n7.
- [vii] Joint Intelligence Committee, A Study of Defectors from the U.S.S.R., dated August 1948, pp. 22-23; TNA, FO 1093/551.
- [viii] UK Foreign Office, Constantin Volkov File, TNA, FCO 158/193.
- [ix] Dmitriy Prokhorov, Сколько стоит продать Родину? (What is the Cost of Betraying One's Homeland?) (Moscow: OLMA-Press, 2005), p. 176.
- [x] UK Foreign Office, Constantin Volkov File, TNA, FCO 158/193.
- [xi] Prokhorov, What is the Cost of Betraying One's Homeland?, p. 176.
- [xii] Joint Intelligence Committee, A Study of Defectors from the U.S.S.R., p. 22. Other sources place the date as 27 August 1945; see, for example, Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 48; and Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p. 138.
- [xiii] Unsigned letter dated 24 August 1945, UK Foreign Office, Constantin Volkov File, TNA, FCO 158/193.
- [xiv] Philby, My Secret War, p. 149.
- [xv] Minute, 5 September 1945, UK Foreign Office, Constantin Volkov File, TNA, FCO 158/193.
- [xvi] Philby, My Secret War, p. 148.
- [xvii] Minute, 5 September 1945, UK Foreign Office, Constantin Volkov File, TNA, FCO 158/193.
- [xviii] Typed letter from Volkov, UK Foreign Office, Constantin Volkov File, TNA, FCO 158/193.
- [xix] Lebedev, Essay on the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence, p. 69.
- [xx] For a description of Philby’s delay tactics, see William Stevenson, Intrepid’s Last Case (New York: Willard Books, 1983), pp. 203-209.
- [xxi] Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 54.
- [xxii] Vitaliy Karavashkin, Кто Предал Россию (Who Betrayed Russia) (Moscow: AST, 2008), p. 190.
- [xxiii] Minute, 5 September 1945, UK Foreign Office, Constantin Volkov File, TNA, FCO 158/193; also Joint Intelligence Committee, A Study of Defectors from the U.S.S.R., p. 22.
- [xxiv] Foreign Office memo to Chiefs of Mission, dated 26 October 1946, TNA, FO 1904/424.
- [xxv] Peter Wright, Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer (New York: Viking Penguin, 1987), pp. 290-291.