Biography
Ivan Georgiyevich Bessonov had enjoyed a successful career in the NKVD border and internal troops and survived through the Great Purge, but was captured only a few months into the war. He made a name for himself while in German captivity for planning and leading a Nazi-sponsored but ultimately unsuccessful covert action against the Soviet Union, but he was then forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union, arrested, and executed.
Bessonov was born in 1904 in Perm near the Ural Mountains. He enlisted in the Red Army during the civil war in 1920 and worked as a clerk. His superiors rated him highly and recommended him in 1926 for officer’s training at the Tver Comintern Cavalry School, and he served as a junior cavalry officer after graduation. His career in the OGPU began in 1930, when he was transferred to be a platoon leader of the OGPU troops in Kazakhstan. His career continued on the ascent and he participated in action against the Chinese Muslim warlord Ma Zhongying in 1936, for which he was awarded an honorary weapon.[i]
In March 1936, he was transferred to the NKVD troops in the Leningrad military district. He attended the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow in 1938, and after graduation was assigned as commander of the Third Leningrad Regiment of NKVD troops, where he was responsible for VIP security during public events in Leningrad.[ii] He earned an Order of the Red Banner during this assignment.
Until 1939, Bessonov’s career benefitted from his personal association with Mikhail Petrovich Frinovskiy, who served as Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs under Yezhov from 1936 to 1938. In September 1938, Stalin unexpectedly assigned Frinovskiy as People’s Commissar of the Navy, although he had no navy experience, and he brought Bessonov with him to the position of deputy chief of staff of he Baltic Fleet. Russian researcher Aleksandr Petrushin asserts that Frinovskiy’s Navy assignment was not as incongruous as it seemed on the surface, because he was tasked with extending Stalin’s purge to the Navy, which had been largely spared because of the heavy focus on the Army. Bessonov was similarly responsible for conducting a purge of the Baltic Fleet staff.[iii]
Frinovskiy fell victim to the purge himself and was arrested in April 1939, placing Bessonov in jeopardy by association. Bessonov initially avoided Frinovskiy’s fate, proving his loyalty by denouncing his associates and members of his family.[iv] In 1939, he was returned to the NKVD, was promoted to kombrig, and assigned as Chief of Training for the NKVD Border and Internal Troops.[v]
Bessonov’s career took a sudden turn for the worse in early 1940. According to one theory, his career stalled when he was deployed during the Russo-Finnish War; the unsuccessful Soviet campaign in Finland damaged his career like it did for many Soviet military officers.[vi] Another variant of his story indicates that he was sent to the Ukhto-Pechorsk prison camps in northern Russia after Frinovskiy’s execution in February 1940, but was released along with other military officers who had been imprisoned during the purges.[vii] Either way, he was demoted and assigned not to NKVD troops, but as chief of staff of the 102nd Division of the 21st Army, which was hastily formed immediately after the Nazi German attack in June 1941. The division deployed along the front near the Dnepr River and was assigned to recapture the Belarusian city of Bobruisk from German control.
In August 1941, Bessonov’s division commander, Colonel Porfiriy Martynovich Gudz, was the subject of an anonymous denunciation accusing Gudz of being a defeatist who was considering surrendering his division to the Germans. The denunciation led to Gudz’s arrest and Bessonov was named acting division commander. The NKVD investigated the denunciation against Gudz and later determined it to be groundless; it was rumored that Bessonov himself originated the denunciation to make way for his own promotion. However, his new command was short-lived because Nazi troops soon surrounded his unit and captured him near Gomel.[viii]
Bessonov offered his services to the Nazis during his first interrogation in German captivity, although he was not fully open about his NKVD affiliation. His willingness to cooperate with the Nazis against the Soviet Union was likely a mix of disgruntlement about his demotion, the purge of his patron Frinovskiy and consequential suspicion directed against Bessonov, and his hopeless situation as a POW.
He became a member of a group called the Military History Office at the German POW camp at Buchenwald, which was made up of senior Soviet POW officer who provided German intelligence with information about Soviet society, industry, and the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet military.[ix]
Bessonov became one of the leading anti-Soviet voices in German POW camps, vying for preeminence with former Soviet general Andrey Andreyevich Vlasov. He refused to cooperate with Vlasov, viewing himself as senior militarily and politically. Bessonov established an organization called the Political Center for the Struggle with Bolshevism (Политический центр борьбы с большевизмом; PTsB), to unite anti-Stalinist formations and organizations and prepare for the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime. Bessonov viewed himself as a leader in a new Russia freed from Bolshevik rule. His stated goal was to make an agreement by which Germany would recognize Russia’s borders as they existed on 1 September 1939, with Bessonov in a leadership role in the post-Bolshevik Russia. Vlasov similarly created the Committee for the Liberation of the People of Russia (Комитет Освобождения Народов России; KONR) and published a Prague Manifesto in November 1944 espousing the principles of removing Stalin and the Bolsheviks from power in Russia, returning to the precepts of the February 1917 revolution (as opposed to the October Revolution), and reaching an honorable peace with Germany.[x]
The similarity of Vlasov’s goals with those of Bessonov’s PTsB created competition between them for primacy among Soviet POWs. Vlasov eventually prevailed in that competition, but only after Bessonov was disgraced in the German’s eyes and stripped of his power.
Before that, however, Bessonov wrote about his view of a future Russia:
“Heavy industry, transport, post and telegraph will be run by the government. Kolkhozes will be dissolved, personal ownership of land will be introduced and personal initiative permitted: in those circumstances, foreign trade will also be under government control. Russia should retain its full territorial, economic and political independence. After the overthrow of Soviet power, military dictatorship will be introduced until the end of the war, established by leaders of the Liberation forces, and then general elections.”[xi]
Other Soviet officers in Germany captivity shared Bessonov’s hope for replacing Bolshevism with a socialist state. Among these was Colonel Viktor Viktorovich Brodnikov, the former chief of staff of the 18th Cavalry Division and one of Bessonov’s staff in the PTsB. According the account of a Soviet Army officer who was recruited into Bessonov’s organization in Germany, but later escaped, Brodnikov “dreamed of the throne of the Chief of Staff of ‘New Russia’.”[xii]
The Germans encouraged senior Soviet POWs to develop and propose anti-Soviet operations that could be conducted under German sponsorship. Based on his knowledge of the locations and security measures of NKVD prison camps, Bessonov proposed a plan that envisioned airdropping Soviet POWs near prison camps in the far reaches of northern Russia, overpowering the camp guards and liberating and arming the prisoners, turning them against the Soviet Union.[xiii] Ultimately, the force was envisioned to gather over 25,000 ex-prisoners who would open a new front in the Soviet rear.
This plan was proposed within the framework of the German Operation Zeppelin, through which the Reich Main Security Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt; RSHA) would select Soviet soldiers in German POW camps, train them for operations behind the lines and send them into the Soviet Union. According to Walter Schellenberg, Chief of the RSHA,
The purpose of this organization [Zeppelin] was to choose from a selection of Russian prisoners intelligent and suitable men to be deployed on the eastern front behind the Russian lines. This work was done by our own Commandos of the operation Zeppelin. The PW's thus selected were turned over to Commandos in the rear, who trained the prisoners. They were trained in assignments of the secret messenger service and in wireless communications. In order to furnish these prisoners with a motive for work, they were treated extremely well. They were shown the best possible kind of Germany. This was accomplished by trips around Germany where they were shown industry and farms, and super-highways.[xiv]
Bessonov’s plan, which was labeled Десант на ГУЛАГ (“Airdrop on the GULAG”), was tested initially in June 1943, when 12 Russian POWs dropped into the Komi Republic in northern Russia. The group was dressed as NKVD officers and planned to conduct operations against several prison camps in the area. After only a week, however, real NKVD troops found the group, killed two outright and took the rest prisoner. Based on a declassified report of the incident in the files of the Komi Republic Communist Party office, Petrushin indicates that the operation could have inflicted significant damage on the NKVD structure in the Komi Republic if the airdropped soldiers had fought hard instead of surrendering.[xv]
The Germans knew little of the group’s prospects for success; they only knew that the group had disappeared, and the failure spelled the demise of Bessonov’s role as an anti-Soviet insurgent leader. His organization was dissolved and he was transferred to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp north of Berlin. Several of the officers who played prominent roles in Bessonov’s RTsB transferred to Vlasov’s Russian Liberation Army (Российская Освободительная Армия; ROA).
While Bessonov was at Sachsenhausen, he met two other POWs, the Russian anti-Soviet partisan Nikolay Rutych and British Special Operations Executive officer Peter Churchill, both of whom had been captured in 1944. Rudych, who later became an expatriate Russian historian, asserted that part of the reason the Germans arrested Bessonov and sent him the Sachsenhausen was because Hitler was afraid of a Russian force operating beyond the Urals out of German control.[xvi] Bessonov’s nationalist sentiments and grandiose plans for a post-Bolshevik Russia probably reinforced that fear. However, the failure of the “Airdrop on the GULAG” contributed greatly to the German’s loss of faith in him. Churchill also later wrote about his experiences in Sachsenhausen, remembering his conversations with Bessonov, stating that he had learned much from him about Soviet politics.[xvii]
Bessonov remained in Sachsenhausen until the April 1945, when the approach of Soviet forces from the east prompted Nazi guards to evacuate the camp and march the inmates north toward Schwerin, Germany. U.S. forces captured them there and took control of the captives. Bessonov fell into U.S. custody and was transferred to Austria for holding, but in accordance with the Yalta Accords, he was repatriated to the Soviet Union in May 1945, despite his pleas not to be forced to return. He was arrested upon arrival in the Soviet Union, and remained in Soviet prison until he was executed in 1950.[xviii]
Bessonov was born in 1904 in Perm near the Ural Mountains. He enlisted in the Red Army during the civil war in 1920 and worked as a clerk. His superiors rated him highly and recommended him in 1926 for officer’s training at the Tver Comintern Cavalry School, and he served as a junior cavalry officer after graduation. His career in the OGPU began in 1930, when he was transferred to be a platoon leader of the OGPU troops in Kazakhstan. His career continued on the ascent and he participated in action against the Chinese Muslim warlord Ma Zhongying in 1936, for which he was awarded an honorary weapon.[i]
In March 1936, he was transferred to the NKVD troops in the Leningrad military district. He attended the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow in 1938, and after graduation was assigned as commander of the Third Leningrad Regiment of NKVD troops, where he was responsible for VIP security during public events in Leningrad.[ii] He earned an Order of the Red Banner during this assignment.
Until 1939, Bessonov’s career benefitted from his personal association with Mikhail Petrovich Frinovskiy, who served as Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs under Yezhov from 1936 to 1938. In September 1938, Stalin unexpectedly assigned Frinovskiy as People’s Commissar of the Navy, although he had no navy experience, and he brought Bessonov with him to the position of deputy chief of staff of he Baltic Fleet. Russian researcher Aleksandr Petrushin asserts that Frinovskiy’s Navy assignment was not as incongruous as it seemed on the surface, because he was tasked with extending Stalin’s purge to the Navy, which had been largely spared because of the heavy focus on the Army. Bessonov was similarly responsible for conducting a purge of the Baltic Fleet staff.[iii]
Frinovskiy fell victim to the purge himself and was arrested in April 1939, placing Bessonov in jeopardy by association. Bessonov initially avoided Frinovskiy’s fate, proving his loyalty by denouncing his associates and members of his family.[iv] In 1939, he was returned to the NKVD, was promoted to kombrig, and assigned as Chief of Training for the NKVD Border and Internal Troops.[v]
Bessonov’s career took a sudden turn for the worse in early 1940. According to one theory, his career stalled when he was deployed during the Russo-Finnish War; the unsuccessful Soviet campaign in Finland damaged his career like it did for many Soviet military officers.[vi] Another variant of his story indicates that he was sent to the Ukhto-Pechorsk prison camps in northern Russia after Frinovskiy’s execution in February 1940, but was released along with other military officers who had been imprisoned during the purges.[vii] Either way, he was demoted and assigned not to NKVD troops, but as chief of staff of the 102nd Division of the 21st Army, which was hastily formed immediately after the Nazi German attack in June 1941. The division deployed along the front near the Dnepr River and was assigned to recapture the Belarusian city of Bobruisk from German control.
In August 1941, Bessonov’s division commander, Colonel Porfiriy Martynovich Gudz, was the subject of an anonymous denunciation accusing Gudz of being a defeatist who was considering surrendering his division to the Germans. The denunciation led to Gudz’s arrest and Bessonov was named acting division commander. The NKVD investigated the denunciation against Gudz and later determined it to be groundless; it was rumored that Bessonov himself originated the denunciation to make way for his own promotion. However, his new command was short-lived because Nazi troops soon surrounded his unit and captured him near Gomel.[viii]
Bessonov offered his services to the Nazis during his first interrogation in German captivity, although he was not fully open about his NKVD affiliation. His willingness to cooperate with the Nazis against the Soviet Union was likely a mix of disgruntlement about his demotion, the purge of his patron Frinovskiy and consequential suspicion directed against Bessonov, and his hopeless situation as a POW.
He became a member of a group called the Military History Office at the German POW camp at Buchenwald, which was made up of senior Soviet POW officer who provided German intelligence with information about Soviet society, industry, and the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet military.[ix]
Bessonov became one of the leading anti-Soviet voices in German POW camps, vying for preeminence with former Soviet general Andrey Andreyevich Vlasov. He refused to cooperate with Vlasov, viewing himself as senior militarily and politically. Bessonov established an organization called the Political Center for the Struggle with Bolshevism (Политический центр борьбы с большевизмом; PTsB), to unite anti-Stalinist formations and organizations and prepare for the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime. Bessonov viewed himself as a leader in a new Russia freed from Bolshevik rule. His stated goal was to make an agreement by which Germany would recognize Russia’s borders as they existed on 1 September 1939, with Bessonov in a leadership role in the post-Bolshevik Russia. Vlasov similarly created the Committee for the Liberation of the People of Russia (Комитет Освобождения Народов России; KONR) and published a Prague Manifesto in November 1944 espousing the principles of removing Stalin and the Bolsheviks from power in Russia, returning to the precepts of the February 1917 revolution (as opposed to the October Revolution), and reaching an honorable peace with Germany.[x]
The similarity of Vlasov’s goals with those of Bessonov’s PTsB created competition between them for primacy among Soviet POWs. Vlasov eventually prevailed in that competition, but only after Bessonov was disgraced in the German’s eyes and stripped of his power.
Before that, however, Bessonov wrote about his view of a future Russia:
“Heavy industry, transport, post and telegraph will be run by the government. Kolkhozes will be dissolved, personal ownership of land will be introduced and personal initiative permitted: in those circumstances, foreign trade will also be under government control. Russia should retain its full territorial, economic and political independence. After the overthrow of Soviet power, military dictatorship will be introduced until the end of the war, established by leaders of the Liberation forces, and then general elections.”[xi]
Other Soviet officers in Germany captivity shared Bessonov’s hope for replacing Bolshevism with a socialist state. Among these was Colonel Viktor Viktorovich Brodnikov, the former chief of staff of the 18th Cavalry Division and one of Bessonov’s staff in the PTsB. According the account of a Soviet Army officer who was recruited into Bessonov’s organization in Germany, but later escaped, Brodnikov “dreamed of the throne of the Chief of Staff of ‘New Russia’.”[xii]
The Germans encouraged senior Soviet POWs to develop and propose anti-Soviet operations that could be conducted under German sponsorship. Based on his knowledge of the locations and security measures of NKVD prison camps, Bessonov proposed a plan that envisioned airdropping Soviet POWs near prison camps in the far reaches of northern Russia, overpowering the camp guards and liberating and arming the prisoners, turning them against the Soviet Union.[xiii] Ultimately, the force was envisioned to gather over 25,000 ex-prisoners who would open a new front in the Soviet rear.
This plan was proposed within the framework of the German Operation Zeppelin, through which the Reich Main Security Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt; RSHA) would select Soviet soldiers in German POW camps, train them for operations behind the lines and send them into the Soviet Union. According to Walter Schellenberg, Chief of the RSHA,
The purpose of this organization [Zeppelin] was to choose from a selection of Russian prisoners intelligent and suitable men to be deployed on the eastern front behind the Russian lines. This work was done by our own Commandos of the operation Zeppelin. The PW's thus selected were turned over to Commandos in the rear, who trained the prisoners. They were trained in assignments of the secret messenger service and in wireless communications. In order to furnish these prisoners with a motive for work, they were treated extremely well. They were shown the best possible kind of Germany. This was accomplished by trips around Germany where they were shown industry and farms, and super-highways.[xiv]
Bessonov’s plan, which was labeled Десант на ГУЛАГ (“Airdrop on the GULAG”), was tested initially in June 1943, when 12 Russian POWs dropped into the Komi Republic in northern Russia. The group was dressed as NKVD officers and planned to conduct operations against several prison camps in the area. After only a week, however, real NKVD troops found the group, killed two outright and took the rest prisoner. Based on a declassified report of the incident in the files of the Komi Republic Communist Party office, Petrushin indicates that the operation could have inflicted significant damage on the NKVD structure in the Komi Republic if the airdropped soldiers had fought hard instead of surrendering.[xv]
The Germans knew little of the group’s prospects for success; they only knew that the group had disappeared, and the failure spelled the demise of Bessonov’s role as an anti-Soviet insurgent leader. His organization was dissolved and he was transferred to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp north of Berlin. Several of the officers who played prominent roles in Bessonov’s RTsB transferred to Vlasov’s Russian Liberation Army (Российская Освободительная Армия; ROA).
While Bessonov was at Sachsenhausen, he met two other POWs, the Russian anti-Soviet partisan Nikolay Rutych and British Special Operations Executive officer Peter Churchill, both of whom had been captured in 1944. Rudych, who later became an expatriate Russian historian, asserted that part of the reason the Germans arrested Bessonov and sent him the Sachsenhausen was because Hitler was afraid of a Russian force operating beyond the Urals out of German control.[xvi] Bessonov’s nationalist sentiments and grandiose plans for a post-Bolshevik Russia probably reinforced that fear. However, the failure of the “Airdrop on the GULAG” contributed greatly to the German’s loss of faith in him. Churchill also later wrote about his experiences in Sachsenhausen, remembering his conversations with Bessonov, stating that he had learned much from him about Soviet politics.[xvii]
Bessonov remained in Sachsenhausen until the April 1945, when the approach of Soviet forces from the east prompted Nazi guards to evacuate the camp and march the inmates north toward Schwerin, Germany. U.S. forces captured them there and took control of the captives. Bessonov fell into U.S. custody and was transferred to Austria for holding, but in accordance with the Yalta Accords, he was repatriated to the Soviet Union in May 1945, despite his pleas not to be forced to return. He was arrested upon arrival in the Soviet Union, and remained in Soviet prison until he was executed in 1950.[xviii]
Notes
- [i] Sergey Chuev, Проклятые Солдаты: Предатели на Сторону ІІІ Рейха (Cursed Soldiers: Traitors to the III Reich) (Moscow: Yauza-Eksmo, 2004).
- [ii] Aleksandr Anatolyevich Sidorov, Великие битвы уголовного мира. История профессиональной преступности Советской России. Книга вторая (1941-1991 г.г.) (Great Battles of the Criminal World: The History of the Professional Crimes of Soviet Russia, Book 2 (1941-1991)) (Moscow: EKSMO, 1999).
- [iii] Aleksandr Antonovich Petrushin, “Призраки Приполярного Урала” (“Ghosts of the Polar Urals”), Тюменский курьер (Tyumen Courier), No. 104-107 (16-21 June 2011), http://a-pesni.org/grvojna/kr/a-prizraki.php.
- [iv] Dmitriy Aleksandorvich Zhukov and Ivan Ivanovich Kovtun, 1-я Русская Бригада СС “Дружина” (First Russian SS Brigade, “Druzhina”) (Moscow: Veche, 2010), p. 47.
- [v] “Приказ НКВД СССР № 2062,” 13.11.1939 (“Order of the USSR NKVD No. 2062,” 13 November 1939), Кадровый Состав Органов Государственной Безопасности СССР, 1935-1939 (Staff Personnel of the Organs of USSR State Security, 1935-1939), https://nkvd.memo.ru/index.php/Документ:Приказ_НКВД_СССР_№_2062_от_13.11.1939.
- [vi] Sidorov, Great Battles of the Criminal World.
- [vii] Petrushin, “Ghosts of the Polar Urals,” http://a-pesni.org/grvojna/kr/a-prizraki.php.
- [viii] Zhukov and Kovtun, First Russian SS Brigade, “Druzhina,” p. 47; Nikolay Sergeyevich Borisenko, Днепровский Рубеж: Трагическое Лето 1941-го (The Dnepr Frontier: The Tragic Summer of 1941) (Mogilev, Belarus: Spiridon Sobol Memorial Mogilev Oblast Typography, 2005), p. 333.
- [ix] Chuev, Cursed Soldiers.
- [x] Kirill Mikhailovich Aleksandrov, Aрмия Генерала Власова 1944-1945 (General Vlasov’s Army 1944-1945) (Moscow: Yauza EKSMO, 2006), pp. 38-39.
- [xi] “Десант на ГУЛАГ” (“Airborne Assault on the GULAG”) Новая Газета (New Journal), 1 March 2004.
- [xii] Yakov Abramovich Chugunov, “Объяснительная Записка о Пребывании в Плену Немецко-Фашистской Армии Батальонного Комиссара Чугунова Якова Абрамовича” (“Explanatory Note About Battalion Commissar Yakov Abramovich Chugunov’s Time in German-Fascist Captivity”), dated 29 July 1943, Yaroslavl Historical and Genealogical Society, http://forum.yar-genealogy.ru/index.php?showtopic=9248.
- [xiii] Chuev, Cursed Soldiers. See also Counter Intelligence War Room London, Amt VI of the RSHA, Situation Report No. 8, dated 28 February 1946, p. 17 (NARA, RG 263, Box 36, folder 1, German Intelligence Service WWII Volume 2)
- [xiv] Lt. Col. Smith W. Brookhart, Jr., “Excerpts from Testimony of Walter Schellenberg, taken at Nurnberg, Germany, 13 November 1945,” p. 1623, https://books.google.com/books?id=ipwTBh_EVvAC.
- [xv] Petrushin, “Ghosts of the Polar Urals.”
- [xvi] Nikolay Rutych, “Между Двумя Диктатурами” (“Between Two Dictatorships”), Родина (Motherland), No. 2, 1991.
- [xvii] Peter Churchill, The Spirit in the Cage (London: Hodder, 1954), p. 213.
- [xviii] Parrish, Michael, The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939-1953 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996), pp. 160-161.