Biography
Among the early NKVD officers who fell into German custody was Aleksandr Zhigunov, an NKVD counterintelligence officer who got swept up in the German advance into Soviet territory in August 1941. He was interrogated over the course of several months, during which he wrote a series of short articles on Soviet military, intelligence, and political topics, often parroting Soviet propaganda or obsequiously toadying up to his Nazi captors. His German captors viewed him as a valuable consultant on propaganda themes, and his articles showed a strong tendency to ingratiate himself with the Nazis. German interrogators suspected that Zhigunov did not always clearly distinguish between his first-hand knowledge, hearsay, and Soviet propaganda, and that he would “tell our agencies anything just to be allowed to live.”[i]
Zhigunov’s interrogation reports and articles were among Nazi records captured by U.S. troops after World War II, and were translated into English in March 1951. The requestor of the translation has been redacted from the copy, but it was likely done for U.S. intelligence purposes. An excerpt covering mostly Zhigunov’s description of his NKVD training was separately translated at another unknown date and is contained in U.S. State Department files. Photocopies of the original German documents are also available in British Archives in German Foreign Ministry archives captured after the war.[ii]
Zhigunov was born in about 1913—he was listed as 28 years old when he was interrogated in Berlin in September 1941. He was raised in the village of Sidorovka near Ryazan. He described his father as a middle-class peasant who owned cattle, but whose possessions were collectivized in 1934. Although his father became the kolkhoz manager, he expressed disagreement with forced collectivization,[iii] and Zhigunov described his father as being completely impoverished by 1941.[iv] However, he admitted that, even though the Soviet system was oppressive, it did provide opportunities for education. Zhigunov benefited from those opportunities, graduating from an agricultural technical school. After working in Siberia for several years, he completed studies at an institute in Kazan in 1938, where he claimed to have earned a Ph.D. in mathematics.[v]
Zhigunov told German interrogators that he was drafted into the NKVD in 1938, following a pattern of recruiting that had been set in 1934. Prior to 1934, the NKVD and its predecessor organizations recruited new officers either from among recruited agents or by patronage. After Kirov was assassinated in 1934, NKVD recruitment drew primarily from Komsomol and Party members. Party and Komsomol organizations would identify promising young students and professionals and draft them for NKVD duty, from which there was no refusal. Zhigunov was among these draftees, of which he estimated there were about 10,000 per year during his time in the NKVD.[vi]
Zhigunov entered the Central School of the NKVD in Moscow in April 1938, where one of his classmates was Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin, whom Zhigunov described, likely with some jealousy, as a mediocre officer without a deep knowledge of his work.[vii] Fitin rose quickly in Soviet intelligence ranks to become the Chief of Foreign Intelligence in 1939, while Zhigunov was assigned to counterintelligence duties in Moscow. Zhigunov may be the Aleksandr Yakovlevich Zhigunov who was working in Moscow center and promoted to lieutenant of state security in 17 January 1939.[viii]
Zhigunov’s training included classroom instruction from April to August, followed by practical instruction until 15 November 1938. The NKVD school provided special training in intelligence and clandestine operations for individuals who already held a higher degree, and consequently it only lasted six months rather than the typical three years.
Zhigunov provided a detailed description of topics covered in his training.[ix]
Political and military courses
· History of the Communist Party
· International politics
· Military affairs and tactics, marksmanship
Intelligence Threat entities
· German
· Japanese
· Polish
· British
· White Russian Émigrés
· Trotskyites, Bukharinites, Nationalists, and Deviationists
· Clergy
Operational topics
· Introduction to Chekist studies
· Agent Handling
· Intelligence Work—Because Zhigunov’s training was for officers who would operate inside the Soviet Union, the training on foreign intelligence collection was only an introduction to the topic.
· Investigations
· Operational records
· Protection of Industry, Railroads, and Agriculture
· Field Observation and Shadowing
· Operative Techniques, including technical collection methods
· Agent work in Concentration Camps and Prisons
· Scientific Technical work
The capstone of the course was a written exercise that presented students with a scenario about a Polish diplomat in Moscow who had suspicious connections. The students were given potential investigative leads and instructed to write how they would respond. In some cases the correct response was to arrest someone, in other cases to recruit them as a source, and in other cases to intercept and exploit letters sent through the post. The exercise tested the students’ knowledge of many of the concepts covered in the operational portion of the course.[x]
An NKVD order announcing promotions for NKVD personnel assigned to the Center in Moscow, dated 17 January 1939, includes an individual named Aleksandr Yakovlevich Zhigunov, who received the rank of lieutenant of state security.[xi] Although it cannot be stated conclusively, this is plausibly the same Aleksandr Zhigunov, placing his commissioning date soon after graduation from the NKVD school.
Zhigunov’s first assignment after graduation was to run counterintelligence operations against the Slovak and Hungarian embassies in Moscow. He also claimed to have second-hand knowledge of operations against the German and British embassies, and he provided details of the German diplomats in Moscow that the NKVD had investigated for espionage.[xii] He told his German interrogators that Soviet policy was directed against Germany even after the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop, and that Soviet leaders viewed the pact as marriage of convenience, not of love. The Soviet Union concluded the pact to drive Germany into war, particularly with Britain, and to profit from the consequent weakening of Germany.[xiii] Zhigunov clamed that if Germany had not attacked the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would eventually have attacked Germany, although it was not ready to do that in 1941.[xiv] This presented an unalloyed repetition of Soviet propaganda narratives, which tried to explain the Soviet-German pact to the Soviet population after Operation Barbarossa.
Zhigunov also discussed the September 1939 visit by Turkish Foreign Minister Sukru Saracoğlu to Moscow to negotiate a mutual assistance treaty. Zhigunov noted that Saracoğlu was under NKVD observation during his entire visit, particularly taking note of a long car ride he took with a British embassy official through the streets of Moscow, during which he claimed the British persuaded Saracoğlu to refuse the Soviet demands. Saracoğlu did, in fact, reject the Soviet Union demands, including Turkish consent to Soviet troops being stationed in the Dardanelles, which Turkey was unwilling to accept regardless of British or French influence. Saracoğlu left Moscow after a few days with no agreement.[xv]
Zhigunov also discussed Soviet policy in the Balkans, in which he claimed that the Soviet Union was attempting to instigate a war between Hungary and Romania so that Soviet troops would have a pretext for entering the conflict and occupying the oil fields at Ploesti, Rumania, to keep them out of German hands. The Hungarian ambassador to Moscow, Jozsef Kristoffy, wrote a report about this scenario and naively threw a draft of it in the rubbish. The NKVD recovered the draft.[xvi]
Zhigunov was transferred to Riga, Latvia, in December 1940, for what he claimed was the position of Chief of Counterintelligence for the Baltic Military District. During this time, he conducted operations among German resettlees, whom the Soviet Union agreed to repatriate to Germany after the USSR had annexed the Baltic republics in June 1940. Ismail Guseynovich Akhmedov, a Razvedupr officer who defected less than a year after Zhigunov, also reported about this same operation, in which the Razvedupr and NKVD competed to find recruits among the Baltic Germans before they departed.[xvii] Zhigunov claimed some success during his time in Latvia: he reported having recruited an agent in the German embassy in Riga, although he could not recall the agent’s name.
When Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Zhigunov was assigned as the OO chief of the 128th Rifle Division, which retreated first to Valmiera (Volmar in German), Latvia, and then to Pskov in the face of advancing German troops. According to Russian historians Mikhail Krysin and Mikhail Litvinov, Zhigunov was the chief of the Second Section (Counterintelligence) of the Latvia NKGB in August 1941, when he was captured.[xviii] One of the articles that Zhigunov wrote for his German interrogators distinguished the mission of OOs, which recruited informants within the military for counterintelligence purposes, from political commissars within the Soviet military, which were responsible for political agitation and combating desertion and cowardice and anti-Soviet propaganda within military units. His article went on to describe the organization of political commissars in detail. He provided this information to his German captors to explain to them how to effectively target propaganda against Soviet troops.[xix]
Zhigunov was captured on 16 August 1941 among a group of stragglers from his unit. He claimed to have deserted his position at the earliest possible moment because he was disenchanted with the Soviet system and looked forward to its replacement with a German protectorate.[xx] In a later interrogation he added that, because he had been cut off from his unit by the German advance, he made no effort to return to his unit because he would have been shot for losing his section in battle.
He immediately offered his services as a propaganda consultant, and his German captors were enthusiastic about his potential in that role. He also offered information about two German Foreign Office officials who had disappeared from the German Embassy in Moscow at the same time as Soviet citizens were interned in Berlin in June 1941. Zhigunov indicated that the two German officials were executed.[xxi] This particularly piqued the interest of the German Foreign office, and he was transported by special arrangement to Berlin soon after being captured and given special debriefings.[xxii]
The Germans asked him questions about Soviet politics and international relations, and Zhigunov expressed opinions on a number of topics. In a discussion of senior NKVD officers, he predicted that each would be liquidated eventually. He expressed a firm belief that the purge allegations against officials such as Yezhov, who was accused of being a British agent, and that Nikolay Nikolayevich Krestinskiy, a prominent old Bolshevik who had served as the Soviet ambassador in Berlin during the 1920s and was executed as a German spy, were legitimate. Zhigunov seemed to sincerely believe that Yezhov had been recruited as a British spy in 1930 when he was Communist Party official in Kazakhstan, and that he had worked for the SIS from that time until his arrest, although he admitted that his knowledge of British intelligence was hearsay, based on “information which was discussed in the corridors between NKVD officials.”[xxiii] Even when his interrogators confronted him with the fact that the Germans themselves knew that Krestinskiy not a German spy, Zhigunov stuck to the Soviet party line in relation to the purge convictions. He claimed to have behind-the-scenes knowledge about the cases, although he later admitted that his information about cases prior to his entry into the NKVD came second-hand from others who were involved in investigations during the purge.[xxiv]
One of the articles Zhigunov wrote for the Germans was a description of the NKVD leadership and organization, emphasizing the prominent position that Jews, who were “especially enterprising in skullduggery,” held in Soviet state security leadership. He wrote, “The whole period, i.e., the period of VChK-OGPU-NKVD, can be regarded as one of Jewish predominance,” and “The period of Yagoda was one of Jewish predominance in the NKVD.” During this period of Jews being in charge, the NKVD used “perverted methods” and arrested innocent people and forced them to testify against their friends and family.[xxv] He indicates that one million people were arrested during the time of Yezhov, among whom half were innocent (implying that the other half was guilty). He estimated that Yagoda’s arrest was followed by the arrest of 60 percent of the NKVD staff, and the Yezhov’s arrest prompted another 40 percent of the staff being arrested. Jews suffered particularly greatly in these arrests because “they occupied all of the leading posts in the NKVD.”[xxvi]
Zhigunov further blamed Yezhov for the Soviet Army’s failure to repel a German invasion. Although Zhigunov fully believed allegations of foreign espionage leveled against Tukhachevskiy and other senior Red Army leadership, he blamed Yezhov for taking the conspiracy too far and arresting many for no reason, thus wiping out the Red Army cadre. He concluded, “Yezhov and his supporters inflicted more harm on the Soviet power than did all the conspiracies taken together.[xxvii]
Zhigunov’s implication that Jews were behind “perverted methods” and false arrests may have partially been an attempt to ingratiate himself with his Nazi captors. But it also likely represented the propaganda themes prevalent in Soviet society after the purges. Zhigunov noted that he could write only a little about the NKVD prior to his entry into the NKVD in 1938, implying that anything that came before 1938 was second-hand information. Consequently, the emphasis on Jews and the effort to blame them for the purge may have been a narrative inculcated into new NKVD officers in the post-purge period. Inasmuch as Zhigunov tended to repeat Soviet propaganda themes, it is probable that the views he expressed during interrogations were simply a reflection of what he was hearing in NKVD circles.
The propaganda themes that Zhigunov parroted probably were intended to shield Stalin from responsibility for the purge. Zhigunov claimed that Yezhov was removed from his position because he had tried to place the NKVD over the Party rather than supporting it. Stalin visited NKVD headquarters to name Beriya as Yezhov’s deputy, and then replaced Yezhov with Beriya in 1938. By this time, the NKVD had become a hated institution because of the millions of people who had been arrested and executed, including kulaks (of which his father was one, but somehow escaped arrest) and other people accused of political crimes. These arrests weakened the Soviet power, rather than strengthening or protecting it, as the Party hoped, because of the negative attitude it created within the population. Consequently, Stalin distanced himself from these negative effects by removing Yezhov and placing a Georgian, Beriya, in his place.[xxviii]
Zhigunov stated that when Beriya was made chief of the NKVD, Armenians and Georgians, which he also called “Semites,” replaced the Jews in senior positions, while Jews remained as many of the section chiefs’ deputies and subsection chiefs. Nevertheless, Zhigunov accredited Beriya for establishing order in the NKVD and stopping the practice of beating prisoners except under direct authorization. The state security organs retained the power to arrest and sentence people to up to eight years in a prison camp. But Zhigunov claimed that the NKVD was forbidden from establishing agent networks in Party organizations and in the Comintern, and that the NKVD files of Party Central Committee members were destroyed. The salaries of NKVD personnel were doubled to disincentivize them from committing espionage.[xxix] However, Zhigunov still recommended to German interrogators that the Soviet people would be susceptible to anti-Soviet propaganda because of the hatred they felt toward the NKVD apparatus.
Zhigunov described his views on why Soviet forces collapsed so quickly in the face of a German invasion. He indicated that German forces were better trained, had better equipment, and had made better plans. The only point of comparison where he held Soviet forces up as equal to German forces was in their heroism and resilience. He advised the Germans that the best propaganda to persuade Soviets that resistance was futile would be continuing to use better German weapons and strategy.[xxx]
In October 1941, Zhigunov wrote a propaganda pamphlet titled “The Collapse of Bolshevism,” in which he criticized collectivization as hypocritical of the Bolshevik claims of giving land to the peasants. He labeled the Bolshevik Party a “Masonic lodge” that, once eliminating factory owners, landed gentry, and kulaks, it turned on the very classes, the workers and peasants, that looked to the Party with hope. He wrote that workers and peasants in the Soviet Union are once against made serfs. He compared that to the prosperity of workers under National Socialism. Zhigunov’s pamphlet lays the blame for World War II on the USSR, which failed to fulfill the conditions of the friendship treaty with Germany and was making plans to attack Germany, but that Germany was able to strike before the Soviet Union finished its preparations. He encouraged Germany to use the propaganda narrative that Germany was not fighting against the Soviet people, but against the Bolsheviks who were oppressing the Soviet people. His pamphlet, which was a Nazi apology, was intended to be airdropped onto Soviet military units. His Nazi captors were pleased by his articulateness and eagerness to propagandize against the Soviet Union.[xxxi]
The latest date on Zhigunov’s writings in his file is December 1941 and no further information is available about his whereabouts or fate after that date. However, his willingness to produce pro-Nazi, anti-Bolshevik propaganda material likely made him a continuing asset to the Nazis.
Zhigunov’s interrogation reports and articles were among Nazi records captured by U.S. troops after World War II, and were translated into English in March 1951. The requestor of the translation has been redacted from the copy, but it was likely done for U.S. intelligence purposes. An excerpt covering mostly Zhigunov’s description of his NKVD training was separately translated at another unknown date and is contained in U.S. State Department files. Photocopies of the original German documents are also available in British Archives in German Foreign Ministry archives captured after the war.[ii]
Zhigunov was born in about 1913—he was listed as 28 years old when he was interrogated in Berlin in September 1941. He was raised in the village of Sidorovka near Ryazan. He described his father as a middle-class peasant who owned cattle, but whose possessions were collectivized in 1934. Although his father became the kolkhoz manager, he expressed disagreement with forced collectivization,[iii] and Zhigunov described his father as being completely impoverished by 1941.[iv] However, he admitted that, even though the Soviet system was oppressive, it did provide opportunities for education. Zhigunov benefited from those opportunities, graduating from an agricultural technical school. After working in Siberia for several years, he completed studies at an institute in Kazan in 1938, where he claimed to have earned a Ph.D. in mathematics.[v]
Zhigunov told German interrogators that he was drafted into the NKVD in 1938, following a pattern of recruiting that had been set in 1934. Prior to 1934, the NKVD and its predecessor organizations recruited new officers either from among recruited agents or by patronage. After Kirov was assassinated in 1934, NKVD recruitment drew primarily from Komsomol and Party members. Party and Komsomol organizations would identify promising young students and professionals and draft them for NKVD duty, from which there was no refusal. Zhigunov was among these draftees, of which he estimated there were about 10,000 per year during his time in the NKVD.[vi]
Zhigunov entered the Central School of the NKVD in Moscow in April 1938, where one of his classmates was Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin, whom Zhigunov described, likely with some jealousy, as a mediocre officer without a deep knowledge of his work.[vii] Fitin rose quickly in Soviet intelligence ranks to become the Chief of Foreign Intelligence in 1939, while Zhigunov was assigned to counterintelligence duties in Moscow. Zhigunov may be the Aleksandr Yakovlevich Zhigunov who was working in Moscow center and promoted to lieutenant of state security in 17 January 1939.[viii]
Zhigunov’s training included classroom instruction from April to August, followed by practical instruction until 15 November 1938. The NKVD school provided special training in intelligence and clandestine operations for individuals who already held a higher degree, and consequently it only lasted six months rather than the typical three years.
Zhigunov provided a detailed description of topics covered in his training.[ix]
Political and military courses
· History of the Communist Party
· International politics
· Military affairs and tactics, marksmanship
Intelligence Threat entities
· German
· Japanese
· Polish
· British
· White Russian Émigrés
· Trotskyites, Bukharinites, Nationalists, and Deviationists
· Clergy
Operational topics
· Introduction to Chekist studies
· Agent Handling
· Intelligence Work—Because Zhigunov’s training was for officers who would operate inside the Soviet Union, the training on foreign intelligence collection was only an introduction to the topic.
· Investigations
· Operational records
· Protection of Industry, Railroads, and Agriculture
· Field Observation and Shadowing
· Operative Techniques, including technical collection methods
· Agent work in Concentration Camps and Prisons
· Scientific Technical work
The capstone of the course was a written exercise that presented students with a scenario about a Polish diplomat in Moscow who had suspicious connections. The students were given potential investigative leads and instructed to write how they would respond. In some cases the correct response was to arrest someone, in other cases to recruit them as a source, and in other cases to intercept and exploit letters sent through the post. The exercise tested the students’ knowledge of many of the concepts covered in the operational portion of the course.[x]
An NKVD order announcing promotions for NKVD personnel assigned to the Center in Moscow, dated 17 January 1939, includes an individual named Aleksandr Yakovlevich Zhigunov, who received the rank of lieutenant of state security.[xi] Although it cannot be stated conclusively, this is plausibly the same Aleksandr Zhigunov, placing his commissioning date soon after graduation from the NKVD school.
Zhigunov’s first assignment after graduation was to run counterintelligence operations against the Slovak and Hungarian embassies in Moscow. He also claimed to have second-hand knowledge of operations against the German and British embassies, and he provided details of the German diplomats in Moscow that the NKVD had investigated for espionage.[xii] He told his German interrogators that Soviet policy was directed against Germany even after the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop, and that Soviet leaders viewed the pact as marriage of convenience, not of love. The Soviet Union concluded the pact to drive Germany into war, particularly with Britain, and to profit from the consequent weakening of Germany.[xiii] Zhigunov clamed that if Germany had not attacked the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would eventually have attacked Germany, although it was not ready to do that in 1941.[xiv] This presented an unalloyed repetition of Soviet propaganda narratives, which tried to explain the Soviet-German pact to the Soviet population after Operation Barbarossa.
Zhigunov also discussed the September 1939 visit by Turkish Foreign Minister Sukru Saracoğlu to Moscow to negotiate a mutual assistance treaty. Zhigunov noted that Saracoğlu was under NKVD observation during his entire visit, particularly taking note of a long car ride he took with a British embassy official through the streets of Moscow, during which he claimed the British persuaded Saracoğlu to refuse the Soviet demands. Saracoğlu did, in fact, reject the Soviet Union demands, including Turkish consent to Soviet troops being stationed in the Dardanelles, which Turkey was unwilling to accept regardless of British or French influence. Saracoğlu left Moscow after a few days with no agreement.[xv]
Zhigunov also discussed Soviet policy in the Balkans, in which he claimed that the Soviet Union was attempting to instigate a war between Hungary and Romania so that Soviet troops would have a pretext for entering the conflict and occupying the oil fields at Ploesti, Rumania, to keep them out of German hands. The Hungarian ambassador to Moscow, Jozsef Kristoffy, wrote a report about this scenario and naively threw a draft of it in the rubbish. The NKVD recovered the draft.[xvi]
Zhigunov was transferred to Riga, Latvia, in December 1940, for what he claimed was the position of Chief of Counterintelligence for the Baltic Military District. During this time, he conducted operations among German resettlees, whom the Soviet Union agreed to repatriate to Germany after the USSR had annexed the Baltic republics in June 1940. Ismail Guseynovich Akhmedov, a Razvedupr officer who defected less than a year after Zhigunov, also reported about this same operation, in which the Razvedupr and NKVD competed to find recruits among the Baltic Germans before they departed.[xvii] Zhigunov claimed some success during his time in Latvia: he reported having recruited an agent in the German embassy in Riga, although he could not recall the agent’s name.
When Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Zhigunov was assigned as the OO chief of the 128th Rifle Division, which retreated first to Valmiera (Volmar in German), Latvia, and then to Pskov in the face of advancing German troops. According to Russian historians Mikhail Krysin and Mikhail Litvinov, Zhigunov was the chief of the Second Section (Counterintelligence) of the Latvia NKGB in August 1941, when he was captured.[xviii] One of the articles that Zhigunov wrote for his German interrogators distinguished the mission of OOs, which recruited informants within the military for counterintelligence purposes, from political commissars within the Soviet military, which were responsible for political agitation and combating desertion and cowardice and anti-Soviet propaganda within military units. His article went on to describe the organization of political commissars in detail. He provided this information to his German captors to explain to them how to effectively target propaganda against Soviet troops.[xix]
Zhigunov was captured on 16 August 1941 among a group of stragglers from his unit. He claimed to have deserted his position at the earliest possible moment because he was disenchanted with the Soviet system and looked forward to its replacement with a German protectorate.[xx] In a later interrogation he added that, because he had been cut off from his unit by the German advance, he made no effort to return to his unit because he would have been shot for losing his section in battle.
He immediately offered his services as a propaganda consultant, and his German captors were enthusiastic about his potential in that role. He also offered information about two German Foreign Office officials who had disappeared from the German Embassy in Moscow at the same time as Soviet citizens were interned in Berlin in June 1941. Zhigunov indicated that the two German officials were executed.[xxi] This particularly piqued the interest of the German Foreign office, and he was transported by special arrangement to Berlin soon after being captured and given special debriefings.[xxii]
The Germans asked him questions about Soviet politics and international relations, and Zhigunov expressed opinions on a number of topics. In a discussion of senior NKVD officers, he predicted that each would be liquidated eventually. He expressed a firm belief that the purge allegations against officials such as Yezhov, who was accused of being a British agent, and that Nikolay Nikolayevich Krestinskiy, a prominent old Bolshevik who had served as the Soviet ambassador in Berlin during the 1920s and was executed as a German spy, were legitimate. Zhigunov seemed to sincerely believe that Yezhov had been recruited as a British spy in 1930 when he was Communist Party official in Kazakhstan, and that he had worked for the SIS from that time until his arrest, although he admitted that his knowledge of British intelligence was hearsay, based on “information which was discussed in the corridors between NKVD officials.”[xxiii] Even when his interrogators confronted him with the fact that the Germans themselves knew that Krestinskiy not a German spy, Zhigunov stuck to the Soviet party line in relation to the purge convictions. He claimed to have behind-the-scenes knowledge about the cases, although he later admitted that his information about cases prior to his entry into the NKVD came second-hand from others who were involved in investigations during the purge.[xxiv]
One of the articles Zhigunov wrote for the Germans was a description of the NKVD leadership and organization, emphasizing the prominent position that Jews, who were “especially enterprising in skullduggery,” held in Soviet state security leadership. He wrote, “The whole period, i.e., the period of VChK-OGPU-NKVD, can be regarded as one of Jewish predominance,” and “The period of Yagoda was one of Jewish predominance in the NKVD.” During this period of Jews being in charge, the NKVD used “perverted methods” and arrested innocent people and forced them to testify against their friends and family.[xxv] He indicates that one million people were arrested during the time of Yezhov, among whom half were innocent (implying that the other half was guilty). He estimated that Yagoda’s arrest was followed by the arrest of 60 percent of the NKVD staff, and the Yezhov’s arrest prompted another 40 percent of the staff being arrested. Jews suffered particularly greatly in these arrests because “they occupied all of the leading posts in the NKVD.”[xxvi]
Zhigunov further blamed Yezhov for the Soviet Army’s failure to repel a German invasion. Although Zhigunov fully believed allegations of foreign espionage leveled against Tukhachevskiy and other senior Red Army leadership, he blamed Yezhov for taking the conspiracy too far and arresting many for no reason, thus wiping out the Red Army cadre. He concluded, “Yezhov and his supporters inflicted more harm on the Soviet power than did all the conspiracies taken together.[xxvii]
Zhigunov’s implication that Jews were behind “perverted methods” and false arrests may have partially been an attempt to ingratiate himself with his Nazi captors. But it also likely represented the propaganda themes prevalent in Soviet society after the purges. Zhigunov noted that he could write only a little about the NKVD prior to his entry into the NKVD in 1938, implying that anything that came before 1938 was second-hand information. Consequently, the emphasis on Jews and the effort to blame them for the purge may have been a narrative inculcated into new NKVD officers in the post-purge period. Inasmuch as Zhigunov tended to repeat Soviet propaganda themes, it is probable that the views he expressed during interrogations were simply a reflection of what he was hearing in NKVD circles.
The propaganda themes that Zhigunov parroted probably were intended to shield Stalin from responsibility for the purge. Zhigunov claimed that Yezhov was removed from his position because he had tried to place the NKVD over the Party rather than supporting it. Stalin visited NKVD headquarters to name Beriya as Yezhov’s deputy, and then replaced Yezhov with Beriya in 1938. By this time, the NKVD had become a hated institution because of the millions of people who had been arrested and executed, including kulaks (of which his father was one, but somehow escaped arrest) and other people accused of political crimes. These arrests weakened the Soviet power, rather than strengthening or protecting it, as the Party hoped, because of the negative attitude it created within the population. Consequently, Stalin distanced himself from these negative effects by removing Yezhov and placing a Georgian, Beriya, in his place.[xxviii]
Zhigunov stated that when Beriya was made chief of the NKVD, Armenians and Georgians, which he also called “Semites,” replaced the Jews in senior positions, while Jews remained as many of the section chiefs’ deputies and subsection chiefs. Nevertheless, Zhigunov accredited Beriya for establishing order in the NKVD and stopping the practice of beating prisoners except under direct authorization. The state security organs retained the power to arrest and sentence people to up to eight years in a prison camp. But Zhigunov claimed that the NKVD was forbidden from establishing agent networks in Party organizations and in the Comintern, and that the NKVD files of Party Central Committee members were destroyed. The salaries of NKVD personnel were doubled to disincentivize them from committing espionage.[xxix] However, Zhigunov still recommended to German interrogators that the Soviet people would be susceptible to anti-Soviet propaganda because of the hatred they felt toward the NKVD apparatus.
Zhigunov described his views on why Soviet forces collapsed so quickly in the face of a German invasion. He indicated that German forces were better trained, had better equipment, and had made better plans. The only point of comparison where he held Soviet forces up as equal to German forces was in their heroism and resilience. He advised the Germans that the best propaganda to persuade Soviets that resistance was futile would be continuing to use better German weapons and strategy.[xxx]
In October 1941, Zhigunov wrote a propaganda pamphlet titled “The Collapse of Bolshevism,” in which he criticized collectivization as hypocritical of the Bolshevik claims of giving land to the peasants. He labeled the Bolshevik Party a “Masonic lodge” that, once eliminating factory owners, landed gentry, and kulaks, it turned on the very classes, the workers and peasants, that looked to the Party with hope. He wrote that workers and peasants in the Soviet Union are once against made serfs. He compared that to the prosperity of workers under National Socialism. Zhigunov’s pamphlet lays the blame for World War II on the USSR, which failed to fulfill the conditions of the friendship treaty with Germany and was making plans to attack Germany, but that Germany was able to strike before the Soviet Union finished its preparations. He encouraged Germany to use the propaganda narrative that Germany was not fighting against the Soviet people, but against the Bolsheviks who were oppressing the Soviet people. His pamphlet, which was a Nazi apology, was intended to be airdropped onto Soviet military units. His Nazi captors were pleased by his articulateness and eagerness to propagandize against the Soviet Union.[xxxi]
The latest date on Zhigunov’s writings in his file is December 1941 and no further information is available about his whereabouts or fate after that date. However, his willingness to produce pro-Nazi, anti-Bolshevik propaganda material likely made him a continuing asset to the Nazis.
Notes
- [i] Initial interrogation report of Zhigunov, A.O.K. (Armeeoberkommando) 16, dated 18 August 1941; in “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” p. 6; German file number EAP 3-a-11/2; NARA, RG 242, Entry UD 282AV, Box 18
- [ii] “Extracts from the Interrogation of GPU Official Sigunov,” NARA, RG 59, Entry A1 1446, Box 6. Photocopies of the original German documents are also located in the British Archives, Kew, London, GFM 33/259.
- [iii] “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” p. 22.
- [iv] Zhigunov article, “Collective Farms and State Farms in the USSR,” in “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” p. 96.
- [v] “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” pp. 8, 15, 20.
- [vi] Zhigunov article, “NKVD-VChK-OGPU-NKVD-NKBG-NKVD,” in “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” pp. 64, 65.
- [vii] “NKVD-VChK-OGPU-NKVD-NKBG-NKVD,” p. 70.
- [viii] “Приказ НКВД СССР № 132 от 17.01.1939” (“NKVD of the USSR Order No. 132,” 17 January 1939, Кадровый Состав Органов Государственной Безопасности СССР, 1935-1939 (Staff Personnel of the Organs of USSR State Security, 1935-1939), https://nkvd.memo.ru/index.php/Жигунов,_Александр_Яковлевич.
- [ix] Zhigunov article, “My Studies in the Central School of the NKVD,” in “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” pp. 28-44.
- [x] “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” pp. 44-51.
- [xi] “Приказ Народного комиссара внутренних дел Союза ССР,” № 132, 17 января 1939 года (“Order of the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of SSR,” number 132, 17 January 1939), http://nkvd.memo.ru/index.php/Документ:Приказ_НКВД_СССР_№_132_от_17.01.1939.
- [xii] “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” p. 17.
- [xiii] “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” p. 15.
- [xiv] “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” p. 17.
- [xv] “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” p. 15-16; see also Zhigunov article, “English Intelligence in the USSR and the Activity of the English Embassy in Moscow,” in “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” p. 129-130.
- [xvi] “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” p. 16.
- [xvii] Ismail Akhmedov, In and Out of Stalin’s GRU: A Tatar’s Escape from Red Army Intelligence (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984), p. 135.
- [xviii] Mikhail Krysin and Mikhail Litvinov, Латышские «лесные братья» и немецкие спецслужбы. 1941-1956 (Latvian ‘Forest Brothers’ and German Special Services, 1941-1956 (Moscow: Veche, 2016), http://loveread.ec/view_global.php?id=92325.
- [xix] Zhigunov article, “The Political Directorate of the RKKA,” in “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” pp. 73-84. See also Zhigunov article, “What a German Officer Should Know About the Work of Commissars and Political Directors in the Red Army,” in “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” pp. 11-117.
- [xx] “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” p. 25.
- [xxi] Cable to Foreign Office reporting initial interrogation of Aleksandr Zhigunov, dated 27 August 1942, in “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” p. 8.
- [xxii] “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” p. 13.
- [xxiii] “English Intelligence in the USSR and the Activity of the English Embassy in Moscow,” p. 124, 127.
- [xxiv] “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” p. 16; “NKVD-VChK-OGPU-NKVD-NKBG-NKVD,” p. 59.
- [xxv] “NKVD-VChK-OGPU-NKVD-NKBG-NKVD,” pp. 57, 59, 64.
- [xxvi] “NKVD-VChK-OGPU-NKVD-NKBG-NKVD,” p 61.
- [xxvii] Zhigunov article, “Reasons for the Defeat of the Red Army,” in “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” p. 105-106. See also “Fragment of a Political Article,” in “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” p. 109. Only the last three of 17 pages were available to the translators, resulting in a fragment. But the article continued Zhigunov’s recommendations for developing propaganda themes, particularly recommending against relying on the theme that it is of no use to fight to defend Jews and communists, because it would not resonate with the Soviet military audience.
- [xxviii] “NKVD-VChK-OGPU-NKVD-NKBG-NKVD,” p 67-68.
- [xxix] “NKVD-VChK-OGPU-NKVD-NKBG-NKVD,” p 61-62, 68-69.
- [xxx] “Reasons for the Defeat of the Red Army,” p. 104.
- [xxxi] Zhigunov article, “The Collapse of Bolshevism,” in “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” pp. 133-141. See also Zhigunov article, “The USSR – The Actual Instigator of the War and the Aggressor,” in “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” pp. 194-197.