Intelligence and state security officers who left Soviet serviceCompiled by Kevin Riehle

Entry 110 of 121 · revised 2026-11-22

Grigoriy Stepanovich Burlutskiy

Григорий Степанович Бурлуцкий

Biography

Grigoriy Stepanovich Burlutskiy[i] was an MVD Border Guard lieutenant colonel when he defected in June 1953. His career was spent entirely in internal security and border guard forces, and he provided information about the priorities and operations of those state security units. He was extensively debriefed in Germany after his defection, and he published several articles and essays from 1954 to 1957 giving much of the same information he provided during debriefings, which the West used to propaganda advantage.

Burlutskiy was born in January 1918 in the Sol-Iletsk District of Orenburg Oblast on the Russian border with Kazakhstan. He was the youngest of seven children and he described his father as a “poor Cossack peasant.”[ii] He recalled as a young boy receiving food and candy from the American Relief Administration, which provided food aid to Russia during the post-civil war famine of 1921-1922. He attended a local school and worked on a collective farm until 1934, when he began studying animal husbandry at an agricultural institute. But he decided against a career on a collective farm because “the pay was infinitesimal, the housing was abominable, and every time an animal dies of hunger or lack of proper shelter, the technician was held accountable.”[iii]

Burlutskiy joined the Komsomol in 1936, and through his Komsomol contacts he was offered a seat in the Border Guard officers’ school, which he attend from 1937 to 1940. As he approached graduation in March 1940, his class was designated for mobilization to the Finnish Front. But the war ended just before his deployment, and he was assigned instead to the 23rd Border Guard Detachment, headquartered in Kamenets-Podolskiy, Ukraine, and he served along the Prut River, which formed the border with Romania after the Soviet Union’s annexation of Bukovina and Bessarabia in July 1940. He was there when Germans launched Operation Barbarosa in June 1941.

In 1942, Burlutskiy transferred to the 95th Border Guard Regiment, headquartered in Kuban in the North Caucasus. It was in this unit where he was involved in the missions for which he became best known publicly, and which became a major propaganda theme for the Allies: the NKVD’s forced resettlement of entire ethnic populations from the North Caucasus and Crimea to Central Asia. Burlutskiy offered the first eyewitness accounts of four such operations, which had been suspected in the West but not previously confirmed. Burlutskiy’s participation in these operations sewed the seeds of doubt in his mind that eventually led to his defection over ten years later.

During the fall of 1942, German forces advanced into the North Caucasus and the peoples of the region found themselves under German control until the summer of 1943. North Caucasus populations had chafed under Russian rule for many years, and Stalin claimed they collaborated with German occupiers against the Soviet government. Whether Stalin’s accusations are true is a matter of debate even today, but when German forces retreated and Soviet forces reoccupied the region, Stalin used the claim as a pretext for punishing entire ethnic groups.

NKVD and NKGB officers organized the mass resettlement operations, and Burlutskiy’s unit, the 95th Border Guard Regiment, served as the manpower behind them. The unit first deployed to the Karachaevskaya Autonomous Oblast in October 1943 and spread out among the mountainous territory, digging machine gun emplacements and trenches, documenting the locations of all villages and settlements, and identifying all roads that led out of the area. The NKVD conducted meticulous deception operations to prevent the local populations from recognizing the real reason for the maneuvers, which both the unit’s soldiers and the local population believed were for routine military training.

After a month of preparations, the operation began in early November. Detachments of the regiment surrounded villages and an NKVD officer, backed by teams of armed soldiers, entered each house, and gathered the family into a room. The NKVD officer read a prepared statement informing the family that, because the Karachay people had collaborated with the Nazis and had sabotaged Soviet war operations during the Nazi occupation, the entire Karachay people was being expelled from its land to a distant location in the Soviet Union. The family was given one hour to pack 100 kg of belongings and prepare for transport to a collection point. Initially, many of the families did not understand the statement, partly because many did not speak Russian, and partly because it was such an outrageous order. But as the reality of the order sank in, women and children began to cry and to scurry around looking for places to hide. An hour later, a truck rolled up to the village, loaded all of the people and their belongings and took them the Cherkessk for transfer onto rail cars.[iv]

As soon as the operation in the Karachaevskaya Autonomous Oblast was completed, the 95th Border Guard Regiment relocated to the Kalmyk Autonomous Oblast and was put at the disposal of an NKVD officer for another identical operation. The unit moved to the town of Troitskoe and performed the same actions, identifying roads and settlements and documenting the population. Just before Christmas 1943 the unit received the order to execute the operation in the same manner as was done in the Karachaevskaya Autonomous Oblast. The unit loaded 4,000 to 5,000 Kalmyks onto trains for resettlement.[v]

After completing this operation, the 95th Border Guard Regiment was ordered to the town of Novoselskoe in the Checheno-Ingushskaya Autonomous Region for a similar mission. Unlike in the Karachaevskaya Autonomous Oblast, the Soviet forces expected resistance from the Chechens and prepared fighting positions in nearby mountains for such a possibility. The maneuvers were again explained publicly as military training maneuvers dictated by military reorganizations.

The operation was executed under the command of Deputy NKVD commissar Ivan Alexandrovich Serov, who later became the first Chairman of the KGB. On 23 February 1944, much of the town’s population was gathered in the town square to celebrate Red Army Day and to show the ”unbreakable spiritual link between the Red Army and the freedom-loving peoples of the USSR.” The people were supplied with banners, portraits of Stalin and Lenin, and Party slogans to carry in a parade, the 95th Border Guard Regiment band played in the square, and the entire town was in a holiday spirit. While the celebration was going on in the town, the regiment was taking up combat positions and blocking all exits from the square. The population was unaware of the unit’s plan until an intelligence officer stood to give a speech:

For its treacherous attitude…the entire population of the Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR is to be resettled to remote regions of the Soviet Union. Any resistance is senseless. The village is surrounded and arms will be used without warning. You will proceed now in an orderly way to the northern exit of the marketplace, passing between two lines of soldiers placed there and disposing of all weapons you have on your persons before you reach the formation of soldiers. Whoever tries to conceal arms will be shot on the spot.

The population was marched to a collection point and loaded onto rail cars destined for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.[vi] Identical operations were executed simultaneously in all major towns of the Checheno-Ingushskaya Autonomous Region.

Burlutskiy noted that he had joined the Communist Party during the summer of 1943, only a few months before the resettlement operations began. Although he described himself as a “fanatical, 100% devoted communist,” he began to consider defection after the operation in Novoselskoe. Burlutskiy received a wristwatch as a reward after the Novoselskoe operation that was inscribed, “For the successful accomplishment of a mission of the NKVD, USSR, 1944.”[vii] But he later wrote, “MVD troops are in fact no different from any other troops in the Soviet army except that by decree of the government our principal enemy is not a foreign army but our own countrymen.”[viii]

From the North Caucasus, the 95th Border Guard Regiment moved to Crimea to participate in its fourth mass resettlement operation, this time of the Crimean Tatars in June 1944. Then, in July, the 95th deployed to Lithuania to participate in NKVD-led operations against Lithuanian partisans. Burlutskiy was on the opposite side of the Lithuanian partisan conflict from Simas Pečiulionis, who fought in a partisan unit until he was wounded. Pečiulionis was released from the hospital about the time Burlutskiy arrived in Lithuania (see entry on Pečiulionis above). Burlutskiy claimed, similarly to Pečiulionis, that the Lithuanian partisans put up relentless resistance and the NKVD struggled to suppress them. The NKVD was unsuccessful in recruiting sources among the partisans, because no method—neither inducements nor coercion—worked. Partisans committed suicide rather than be taken prisoner. In September 1944, NKVD Deputy Commissar Sergey Nikiforovich Kruglov, who led the resettlement operation of Chechens and Ingush along with Serov, was sent to Lithuania to lead a ruthless operation to clear out partisans and establish Soviet rule. Kruglov criticized the NKVD leadership for “coddling” the Lithuanian population,[ix] and Burlutskiy quoted him as saying, “The time has come for action. We must clean out each and every bandit base.” NKVD units were ordered to perform a search of all forests for partisans, not sparing anyone they found. Anyone who ran away from the searches was to be shot, and any time a person ran into a building, the building was to be burned to the ground. However, even severe methods did not yield a single partisan.[x] The counter-partisan campaign continued in Lithuania into the 1950s.

The new Lithuania Border District was established in July 1944, which included the borders and coasts of Lithuania, Latvia, and East Prussia, later renamed the Kaliningrad Oblast.[xi] After his deployment, Burlutskiy received a more permanent assignment to a border post in East Prussia. He considered defecting at that time, but he realized that the Polish border guards through which he would have to pass were actually NKVD personnel wearing Polish uniforms, and he was afraid that they might recognize him if they encountered him.[xii]

Burlutskiy wrote that border guard soldiers were recruited in the normal annual Soviet military draft, but that they were chosen from among the most politically reliable draftees and mostly among ethnic Russian. Preference was given to Komsomol members, Stakhanovites, and outstanding industry and farm workers who came from politically reliable families.[xiii] However, despite these precautions and screenings for reliability, serving as a border guard provided tempting access to a foreign power, and it was not unusual for young border guard soldiers to defect. Russian émigré press ran a story about a Russian border guard named Nikolay Ivanovich Ivanenko who defected in China in 1939.[xiv] Border guards were among the first to feel the full power Operation Barbarosa, and thousands of border guards were captured during the summer of 1941; some chose to collaborate with Germany. Burlutskiy himself was serving as a border guard lieutenant on the border between Ukraine and Romania in June 1941, although a regular army unit replaced his border guard unit not long after the German attack and his unit was not captured.[xv] Between 1947 and 1964, at least nine border guard soldiers defected across the Iranian and Turkish borders. All were between 19 and 24 years old and five had been Komsomol members.[xvi] Additionally, U.S. intelligence learned that three border guards had defected to Afghanistan near the time of Burlutskiy’s defection, but were repatriated.[xvii]

Burlutskiy wrote at length about the training of border guard soldiers and officers. Both soldiers and officers received tactics and weapons training, physical training, political instruction, and instruction on the specific requirements of their border sector. Officers’ training differed in the greater amount of political knowledge officers were expected to have, and only officers received operational intelligence and agent handling training.[xviii] He noted that the priority language taught in MVD Border Guard training was English, with some students taking German or French.[xix] The operational intelligence training focused primarily on U.S. intelligence as the target, followed by British intelligence.[xx]

Burlutskiy remained in the Lithuania Border District until 1949 and continued to rise in ranks until he was promoted to lieutenant colonel in November 1950. His location from 1949 to 1951 is unclear, but he continued to play the role of a loyal Border Guard officer, and in November 1951 he was sent to the Higher Border Guard School in Babushkin, a suburb of Moscow. According to Burlutskiy, officers selected for this school must be Communist Party members in good standing, be cleared by the OKR, be physically fit, and be considered to have a promising future in the Border Guards. Each candidate for the school was examined by a committee made up of OKR, MVD officers, and Party and school officials, who “sift out” any officer who could possibly turn out to be anti-Soviet.[xxi] Burlutskiy passed this committee’s review and was assigned as a class leader during his time at the school, and thus had given no indication of his dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union up to that time.[xxii]

Burlutskiy graduated from the school not long before Stalin’s death and the reorganization of Soviet state security organs that Beriya undertook soon thereafter, which was called Бериевское Обновление Аппарата (Beriya’s Renewal of the Apparatus). In Burlutskiy’s estimation, the reorganization “dealt an extraordinarily heavy and damaging blow to Soviet intelligence. In two years it destroyed what the punitive and intelligence organs had built up by two decades of painstaking and extremely difficult work.”[xxiii]

If a student graduated from the Higher Border Guard School with an excellent rating he chose his next assignment. Burkutskiy later wrote that he chose Turkmenistan specifically because it bordered on a “Western-oriented” country and he thought he could escape across the border there.[xxiv] He arrived in Turkmenistan in late 1952 to command a border sector of the 68th Border Guard Detachment, and in June 1953 he drove his vehicle across the border and surrendered Afghan border officials. He was quickly handed over to the CIA, which flew him to Germany for debriefings, where he was assigned serial number DS-580.[xxv]

Burlutskiy underwent a year of CIA debriefings, in which he provided large amounts of information about MVD organization, training, personnel, and operations. Then in July 1954, he collaborated in the publication of his personal story in Life magazine, which included photos of him living in Germany. The author of his biography was former OSS/CIA official Charles W. Thayer, who had also led the U.S. State Department’s International Broadcasting Division (later renamed the Voice of America) in 1948-1949. In May 1953, Thayer was forced out of the State Department in the face of McCarthy-era allegations of communist sympathies and sexual improprieties.[xxvi] However, he apparently retained his connections to the CIA, because his article about Burlutskiy reflects some of the same material that Burlutskiy revealed to the CIA during debriefings. Thayer also included a self-congratulatory reference to the Voice of America, purportedly quoting Burlutskiy as saying, “Your radio is a good beginning. The Voice of American is doing a good job.” He also went on to quote Burlutskiy saying that Radio Liberation (Radio Liberty) could be more effective than the Voice of America or BBC because it is run by Russian exiles whose voice would have a greater impact in Russia than the Western-run stations.[xxvii]

After Burlutskiy revealed himself publicly in the 1954 Life magazine article, he affiliated with the Research Program on the USSR and became acquainted with Vycheslav Artemyev (see separate entry in this database). The two former NKVD officers co-authored an article in about 1955 for the Research Program, which provided information about mission and activities of Soviet state security organs and reorganizations that had occurred in the MVD and the newly formed KGB. Although both Artemyev’s and Burlutskiy’s names were on the document, Burlutskiy’s more recent experience with the MVD probably provided the foundation for the essay. The essay provided a comprehensive explanation of the Soviet state security mission:

Inside the country, their task is to unmask and liquidate the active politically-oriented elements of the populations and their organizations, and to prevent espionage and other subversive activities on the territory of the USSR. Yet another task is to unmask and render innocuous those elements, which, without being active, are politically unreliable and thus represent a potential threat to the Soviet regime and Communism.

Abroad, their task is to organize espionage in foreign countries, and all types of lawful and unlawful political and economic subversive activities aimed at weakening regimes that are hostile to Communism; to create the premises for the advent to power of Communism; and to create the bases for revolution and civil war in time of peace, and for a partisan movement in time of war; to enquire into the life and activities of Soviet citizens on mission in foreign countries or visiting those countries for other purposes; and also to investigate and render harmless various anti-Soviet and anti-Communist organizations, activities, and persons, both foreign and émigré.[xxviii]

Burlutskiy and Artemyev also co-authored a series of essays in Simon Wolin and Robert Slusser’s edited volume, The Soviet Secret Police, published in 1957, which presented details about the history and activities of Soviet state security organs. Following Burlutskiy’s earlier theme that state security troops viewed the Soviet people as the enemy, Burlutskiy and Artemyev wrote that the aim of Soviet state security organs in the first decade after the war was to identify and eliminate whole categories of people. Wartime collaboration with, or even association with, Germans also continued to be a state security threat during Burlutskiy’s time as an NKVD/MVD officer. Threatening behavior divided into two broad categories:[xxix]

Active or tacit support to Germans during the war:

· Those who actively collaborated with and helped the Germans, as well as persons loyal to the Germans.
· Persons disloyal to the Soviet regime and Communism under German occupation.
· Those who had revealed, either to the Germans or to the population, a past they had hitherto concealed from the Soviet authorities.
· Those who had engaged in private economic, commercial and other enterprises and activities, thus falling into the category of private owners and traders who used the opportunity afforded by the German occupation to seek profit and personal well-being.
· Former Communists, officers, and soldiers of the Soviet armed forces who had found themselves in enemy-occupied territory and who did nothing to help the Soviet side, becoming mere apolitical residents.
· Those who had been voluntarily or forcibly deported to Germany and other countries.
· Those who had established any relations whatever, even by correspondence, with individuals in foreign countries, or personal relations with foreigners and émigrés in the occupied territories.

Other anti-Soviet behavior:

· Those who had showed an anti-Soviet attitude and hostility to Communism.
· Those who had manifested any sign of corruption in their morals or way of life, or who had committed criminal acts.
· Persons formerly arrested and imprisoned by the Soviet authorities who had fled from arrest and detention during the Soviet retreat.
· Deserters from the Soviet armed forces, persons who had shirked mobilization, and persons who avoided carrying out special assignments behind enemy lines.
· Members of the population who had refused to carry out assignments and to comply with the demands of Soviet agents and partisans active behind enemy lines.

In 1958, John Rondeau, a CIA officer, wrote a book review of Wolin and Slusser’s book The Soviet Secret Police. Rondeau gave a highly negative appraisal of Burlutskiy and Artemyev’s work, stating, “I am not certain that either man is equipped to discuss the higher echelons of [the Border Guard] directorate.”[xxx] Ironically, Rondeau apparently did not have access to Burlutskiy’s CIA debriefings, which on a number of topics—MVD organization,[xxxi] salary and benefits of MVD officers and soldiers,[xxxii] and details of the Higher Border Guard School[xxxiii]—likely served as the source material for the essays.

Burlutskiy settled in Germany. He was listed in the KGB Wanted List, which indicates that he worked as a translator for U.S. intelligence in Germany. He was sentence in absentia by a Soviet military tribunal to execution in September 1953, an unusually fast sentence for a defector.[xxxiv] Nothing further is available about his whereabouts, although he probably remained in Germany for at least several years after his defection while he collaborated with Artemyev.

Notes

  1. [i] Photograph from Charles W. Thayer, “MVD Man’s Declaration of Independence,” Life, 5 July 1954, p. 69.
  2. [ii] Frank J. Rafalko, ed., CI Reader: American Revolution Into the New Millennium (Washington, DC: Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2004), p. 71.
  3. [iii] Thayer, “MVD Man’s Declaration of Independence,” p. 70.
  4. [iv] CIA Report, “Resettlement of Population of Karachayevskaya Autonomous Oblast,” 23 February 1954, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
  5. [v] CIA Report, “Resettlement of Population of Kalmyk ASSR,” 24 February 1954, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
  6. [vi] CIA Report, “Resettlement of Population of Checheno-Ingushkaya ASSR,” 26 February 1954, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
  7. [vii] Thayer, “MVD Man’s Declaration of Independence,” pp. 72-73.
  8. [viii] Thayer, “MVD Man’s Declaration of Independence,” p. 70.
  9. [ix] Thayer, “MVD Man’s Declaration of Independence,” p. 75.
  10. [x] CIA Report, “Lithuanian Partisan Movement,” 20 July 1954, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
  11. [xi] CIA Report, “Organization of the Lithuanian Border District,” 7 January 1954, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
  12. [xii] Thayer, “MVD Man’s Declaration of Independence,” p. 76.
  13. [xiii] Artemyev and Burlutskiy, “Personnel, Conditions of Service, and Training in the Border Troops,” in Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser, eds., The Soviet Secret Police (New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 280-283.
  14. [xiv] “Разсказ Беглеца из СССР” (“Story of an Escapee from the USSR”), Vozrozhdenie, 9 June 1939, p. 2.
  15. [xv] Thayer, “MVD Man’s Declaration of Independence,” p. 70.
  16. [xvi] KGB Wanted List numbers 66, 69, 121, 123, 257, 269, 315, 346, and a border guard soldier assigned U.S. defector serial number DS-617 (see NARA, RG 466, Peripheral Reporting Unit, DS-617). KGB Wanted List number 257 was also assigned the U.S. defector serial number DS-609.
  17. [xvii] Department of State Post Instruction, “Interrogation of Soviet Defector, DS-580,” 17 February 1954, NARA, RG 59, 761.00/2-1754.
  18. [xviii] Artemyev and Burlutskiy, “Personnel, Conditions of Service, and Training in the Border Troops,” pp. 292, 294.
  19. [xix] Artemyev and Burlutskiy, “Personnel, Conditions of Service, and Training in the Border Troops,” p. 306.
  20. [xx] Artemyev and Burlutskiy, “Personnel, Conditions of Service, and Training in the Border Troops,” p. 317.
  21. [xxi] Artemyev and Burlutskiy, “Personnel, Conditions of Service, and Training in the Border Troops,” p. 310.
  22. [xxii] CIA Report, “Higher Border Troops Officer School at Babushkin,” 8 January 1954, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
  23. [xxiii] V. P. Artemiev and G. S. Burlutsky,“Structure and Condition of the Soviet Organs of State Security After World War,” in Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser, eds., The Soviet Secret Police (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 172.
  24. [xxiv] Thayer, “MVD Man’s Declaration of Independence,” p. 76.
  25. [xxv] Department of State Post Instruction, “Interrogation of Soviet Defector, DS-580,” 17 February 1954, NARA, RG 59, 760.00/2-1754.
  26. [xxvi] Robert Dean, “Charles W. Thayer: Purged from the State Department,” in David L. Anderson, ed., The Human Tradition in America Since 1945 (Lanhan, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 227-245.
  27. [xxvii] Thayer, “MVD Man’s Declaration of Independence,” p. 80.
  28. [xxviii] Vyacheslav P. Artem’yev and Grigori S. Burlutski, “Postwar Organization and Activities of Soviet State Security Organs,” undated typescript, p. 1, Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Research Program on the USSR, box 8.
  29. [xxix] V. P. Artemiev and G. S. Burlutsky, “Internal Activities of the Soviet Organs of State Security After World War II,” in Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser, eds., The Soviet Secret Police (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 323.
  30. [xxx] John Rondeau, “Book Review of The Soviet Secret Police, by Simon Wolin and Robert Slusser,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 2, Winter 1958, pp. 123-129.
  31. [xxxi] CIA Report, “Chief Directorate of Border Troops (GUPV),” 6 January 1954, CIA FOIA Reading Room; CIA Report, “Soviet Interior Troops,” 24 March 1054, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
  32. [xxxii] CIA Report, “Pay of Soviet Border Troop Personnel,” 6 January 1954, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
  33. [xxxiii] CIA Report, “Higher Border Troops Officer School at Babushkin,” 8 January 1954, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
  34. [xxxiv] “KGB Wanted List," Entry number 163, HIA, Vladislav Krasnov Writings file.

Cite this entry

Kevin Riehle, “Burlutskiy, Grigoriy Stepanovich,” Soviet Defectors Database, revised 2026-11-22, https://sovietdefectors.com/defector/burlutskiy-grigoriy-stepanovich/