Biography
Aleksandr Fedorovich Chikalov became a German POW in 1943, later joining the KONR as an intelligence officer. After the war he cooperated with U.S. intelligence; however, the uncoordinated nature of post-war U.S. intelligence activities resulted with his arrest by the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) because of suspicions raised by the tasks he fulfilled for U.S. European Command intelligence.
Chikalov provided his personal biography in two different settings: once during CIC interrogations in December 1947,[i] and another time in a letter to Boris Nikolaevsky in about March 1949.[ii] The two tellings contain different levels of detail, but agree with each other on all major points, and Chikalov wrote additional focused essays for Nikolaevsky providing detailed accounts to illustrate certain aspects of his career. The Research Program on the USSR at Columbia University expressed interest in his writings, and Boris Nikolaevsky offered a glimmer of hope that Chikalov might be able to emigrate to the United States to pursue writing there. However, Chikalov disappeared, probably kidnapped and forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union in October 1949 before the plan came to fruition.
Chikalov used a series of pseudonyms during and after the war. His pseudonyms included Aleksandr Fedorovich Shubar, Aleksandr Fedorovich Alekseyev, Yuriy Krasnovskiy, Aleksandr Fedorovich Repin, and Igor Fedorovich Almazov.[iii] He used the Almazov pseudonym in his correspondence with Nikolaevsky until the beginning of 1949, when he returned to his real name, Chikalov.[iv] However, when Nikolaevsky asked him what name he should use when referring to him in publications, Chikalov advised him to use the name Repin (his mother’s maiden name) for security purposes, because no one in the United States knew him by that name.[v] In April 1949, Carmel Offie, at the time a CIA official involved in recruiting former Nazi officers and Nazi collaborators as agents in what was known as Operation Bloodstone, contacted Nikolaevsky and asked for Chikalov’s contact information. Offie did not explain his interest in “Almazov, otherwise known as Chekalov” or how he knew to contact Nikolaevsky, but Nikolaevsky sent him Chikalov’s address, using the name Igor Almazov.[vi]
Chikalov was suspected of continued cooperation with the Soviet Union both while he served in the KONR and while he was in Germany after World War II. While there is no clear evidence of him being a Soviet agent, he did relate several stories to Nikolaevsky that followed a clear Soviet propaganda line, particularly in relation to the purge trials of 1936-1938. It is unclear whether he told these propaganda-inspired stories on instructions from a Soviet handler, as some believed, or, what appears more likely, he related what he had heard during the time of the Yezhovshchina that he honestly believed to be true.
Chikalov was born in December 1902 near the town of Kovrov, northeast of Moscow. In his written biography he indicated that he was born two weeks premature while his mother returning home by train from Vilnius, where his father worked as an assistant manager of a retail business. Chikalov lived as a boy and attended school in Kovrov. When his family moved to a small railway station near Kurgan in Siberia in 1915, Chikalov remained in Kovrov to continue secondary school. He lived with his uncle, who was an active Socialist Revolutionary and Chikalov remembered hearing revolutionary discussions in his uncle’s home.
In August 1917 his uncle could no longer feed him, so he was forced to travel to live with his family. He and his father had never gotten along, so he was not looking forward to reuniting with his family, and when he arrived he found his mother crying over the injured body of his younger brother. When Chikalov learned that his father had beaten the child, he lost control of his anger and fought with his father, resulting his father evicting him from the house.
He went as a teenager to nearby Kurgan and was accepted into a gymnasium. He paid for his lodging by helping the school’s security watchman and by working odd jobs in the local city soviet. Chikalov got his first exposure to bolshevism from a teacher at the school. However, when White forces overran Kurgan in May 1918, his Bolshevik acquaintances either were arrested or escaped beyond the Urals. Chikalov remained in Kurgan and continued working for the local city administration until autumn 1919, when Red forces recaptured the city.
In December 1919, Chikalov’s mother and older sister died of typhoid. That same month, just as he turned 17, Chikalov joined the Komsomol and volunteered for the Red Army. He served as a messenger and secretary to the unit commissar, Dubkov, whom he came to respect as an example of a good Bolshevik. His unit’s assignments represented the troubles of the time: his unit was sent in January 1920 to Novosibirsk to gather and dispose of tens of thousands of bodies of people who had died of famine and typhoid. His unit was subsequently assigned the duty of requisitioning food from affluent residents, and later, in February 1921, to put down a revolt. He later wrote his impressions of the “red terror,” which included “crusades” made up of communist and Komsomol members who traveled around “dekulakifying” the region, confiscating property and food, and expelling or executing the owners, resulting in the deaths of over a million people.[vii]
Chikalov’s father and second sister died in 1921, and in May of that year he was released from military duty to take care of his younger brother, who was 10 years old. He initially returned to Kovrov, but then traveled to Moscow in March 1922 hoping to attend college; however, the Komsomol organization instead assigned him to work as a criminal investigator. He formally joined the Communist party in March 1923, and in April began a six-month course to be a political commissar.
Chikalov’s 18-year career in the OGPU began in early 1924, when he graduated from the political commissar course and was assigned to a border guard unit in Belarus. He recalled hearing Feliks Dzershinsky’s “chekist” principles as part of the new OGPU employee indoctrination: trust no one, see everyone as a potential enemy; know no mercy and force the soft-hearted out of the VChK; be more courageous and clever than the enemy; listen more than speak; and forget personal life—serve the revolution.[viii]
From February 1924 to February 1933, he served in various assignments of increasing rank and authority in the OGPU borders guards along the Soviet-Polish border. In May 1929, he was promoted to captain, and his main assignment was to guard against British, French, German, and Polish spies crossing the western Soviet border. He never mentioned having caught any.
During this time, Chikalov was sent on several short temporary duty assignments to participate in operations to strengthen Soviet power. NKVD officers sought these temporary trips because of the extra pay they provided.[ix] In 1930, he spent a month in the Belarusian town of Borisov enforcing the collectivization of the local population. He recalled the violence, coercion, and unemployment that accompanied collectivization, and he was dismayed by some of the tactics that he was ordered to use, which led him to write a letter to the Party Central Committee criticizing the actions. He was called into the Party Control Commission, accused of “Bukharinist” opportunism, and given a reprimand, but no further punishment. At about the same time, Stalin gave a speech about the excesses and mistakes of collectivization, and in March 1930, Stalin published as letter in Pravda blaming local leaders for being “dizzy with success” in their efforts to collectivize the population.[x] Chikalov’s letter mirrored many of the points that Stalin made, and consequently Chikalov was fully rehabilitated and even gained influence. However, his faith in Stalinism began to waver from that moment.[xi]
In 1932, Chikalov served a two-month assignment in Xinjiang, China, helping to establish Soviet control over the region, and later in 1932, he spent four months in the Caucasus fighting against kulak sabotage and oppositionist activity. Chikalov was promoted to major in 1934 and assigned to Minsk. A year later, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and assigned as an investigator in purge investigations. Then, from April 1936 to September 1937, he was assigned to Timkovichi, Belarus, to command a border guard sector. He was once again sent on a temporary duty assignment for three months in 1936, this time to Mongolia to teach border guard troops about Japanese espionage.
Nikolaevsky described Chikalov as the deputy chief of Belorussian Republic NKVD during this latter time. Chikalov never claimed that title himself; however, he did have direct interaction with the Belarusian Republic People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs, Boris Davydovich Berman. He even claimed to have personally known Nikolay Ivanovich Yezhov as early as 1933, and he claimed that Yezhov was initially a decent person who lost his mind because the horrors that he witnessed. The level of detail in his writings about the organization and management of republic NKVDs and their relationship with the republic leadership is greater than any other topic, suggesting an intimate knowledge gained from experience.[xii]
Chikalov was in Belarus during the height of the Yezhovshchina, and he estimates that ninety percent of the millions of people arrested and executed during this period were not guilty of anything except having a foreign familial connection, having worked in a small business before the revolution, having expressed a thought that was out of unison with the Stalinist line, or having a personal connection to anyone in those categories. The NKVD worked day and night without rest during the Yezhovshchina period, while at the same time Chikalov estimated that as many as 20,000 NKVD personnel were arrested.[xiii]
Chikalov tells some stories about the purges and their origin that appear to have originated from Stalinist propaganda, and it is unclear whether these were myths circulating among the NKVD faithful at the time or if Chikalov manufactured them for Nikolaevsky. They seem to indicate that the purges of senior Soviet officials were not the product of Stalin’s paranoia, as others claimed, but based on real threats to Stalin and his regime.
One story involved an NKVD informant codenamed Maks who in 1933 reported the presence of oppositionists in the Communist Party and the NKVD, including NKVD Chief Genrikh Georgyevich Yagoda himself. Oppositionists initially suppressed Maks’s reports and arrest him, but he escaped, was caught again, and escaped again. Then, in 1935, Maks’s handler, an NKVD officer named Mironov, succeeded in gaining the ear of Yezhov, then serving as Chairman of the Party Control Commission, through whom he was reportedly granted an audience with Stalin. Stalin took the report seriously and ordered an investigation, leading to Yagoda’s removal. The investigation reportedly uncovered connections between the oppositionists and Mensheviks, SRs, and Trotskyists abroad, although it did not reveal any connections to foreign intelligence services.[xiv] This, Chikalov claims, was the spark that ignited the purges.
Chikalov also wrote about the June 1937 arrest and execution of Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhschevskiy and other senior Soviet military officers, citing three sources for his information: a secret letter that circulated among NKVD officers; an NKVD case summary; and a personal conversation with Komkor Ivan Panfilovich Belov, a Belarusian military officer who participated in the Tukhachevskiy trial in Moscow. Chikalov was a delegate to the Sixteenth Congress of the Belarusian Communist Party in July 1937 and spoke to Belov during the congress.[xv]
Chikalov indicated that the case against Tukhachevskiy was based on bona fide information about a coup plot being planned by military officers who were disgruntled by the Soviet system and angered by collectivization. The plot was widespread and involved a plan to assassinate Stalin and surround Moscow with military forces.[xvi] Chikalov seemed to honestly believe that the executed officers had made contact with German, Polish, and British intelligence services to provide information about Soviet border defenses in preparation for a planned overthrow of the Stalinist regime, which he claimed was planned for May or June 1937. He wrote that Tukhachevsiy had been under the influence of the German General Staff since 1924. It was rumored that Tukhachevskiy lived in luxury and kept what amounted to a harem of women, among whom were reportedly Japanese, Polish, and German spies.[xvii]
Among the officers arrested during this time was also Chief of the Moscow Region NKVD, Stanislav Frantsevich Redens. According to Chikalov, senior party official Leonid Mikhailovich Zakovskiy called a meeting of the NKVD and Rezvedupr staff in the Moscow region in early 1938 and informed them that he was now in charge. Zakovskiy reportedly told the assembled officers that he had presided over the arrests of more than 3,000 spies in the Leningrad Region, compared to only 60 spies that the Moscow NKVD office had uncovered. He accused those present of being soft on spies, and he ordered Redens arrested immediately.[xviii] Just a few months later, Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov, who defected in July 1938, reportedly introduced himself similarly in August 1936 when he took charge of the Azov-Black Sea Region NKVD.[xix] However it is unclear how Chikalov could quote Zakovskiy’s speech in Moscow, as Chikalov was in prison himself at the time. His information is at best second-hand, similarly to the story about Lyushkov.
Although Chikalov implied that the arrests of senior military and NKVD leaders were justified, he distinguished these from the nearly 30,000 arrestees in the resulting purge, the vast majority of whom knew nothing about the supposed plots. He questioned the purge methods and the extent to which they reached. As thousands of NKVD personnel were arrested in 1937, including many of Chikalov’s associates for whose innocence he could vouch personally, he sent another letter to the Party Central Committee, signed by six officers,[xx] criticizing the methods being used in the purge. In September 1937, Chikalov was called before Yezhov and arrested, and he spent six months in Lubyanka. He wrote that he was only saved from execution by the fact that the situation in the country had become so intolerable that the Party began to investigate denouncers, and many who had been denounced were released from prison and replaced with the those whose denunciations had placed them there. The problem grew to such an extreme that Stalin announced in January 1938 a war on libel, blaming the problem on foreign intelligence services.[xxi]
Chikalov was released from Lubyanka in March 1938; however, he had been demoted to major and was forced to wait in a reserve status until December. He found that many of the purged military and NKVD officers had been replaced with young, inexperienced recruits who were fiercely loyal to Stalin.[xxii] The Tukhachevskiy trial also led to the reestablishment of military commissars to reestablish Party control over the military.
He was eventually assigned to Vladikavkaz in the Caucasus to teach at the NKVD military school, but he wrote that 1939 and 1940 were hardest years of his life. He felt that he was living under a constant cloud of suspicion leading him to consider suicide and to volunteer for service on the front line of the Russo-Finnish war, specifically looking for a dangerous assignment. [xxiii] He was gradually rehabilitated again, and from May 1941 until the German attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June, he completed courses at the Frunze Military Academy that he had begun prior to his imprisonment.
After the German attack, Chikalov requested to be transferred to the regular army, but his request was denied. He was assigned instead to go to Batumi, Georgia, to participate in forming a special NKVD division to prepare for an invasion of Turkey in case Turkey joined the war on the German side. However, after only two weeks of this assignment, the Soviet Union learned that Turkey intended to remain neutral, and thus the formation of the division was postponed. He was then sent briefly to Iran, but was subsequently sent to Moscow to assist in forming a special division to defend Moscow, which was assembled in October 1941.[xxiv]
In early 1942, Chikalov again submitted a request for transfer to the regular army, and this time it was approved. He was assigned as chief of staff in a tank division on the Southern Front, headquartered in Rostov. He also served as a battalion commissar during this time.[xxv] However, this assignment lasted only until June 1942, when he was transferred to the GRU. When German troops surrounded Kharkov in July 1942, Chikalov was ordered to stay behind and establish intelligence and partisan operations, which he indicated inflicted great losses on the Germans, for which Chikalov was decorated multiple times. He reported developing a hatred for Germans and their methods when he saw atrocities committed in Ukraine and Belarus. His orders were to destroy anyone who showed sympathy for the Germans; however, despite his antipathy for the Germans, Chikalov was also dismayed when NKVD personnel sometimes took these orders to the extreme and killed just for the sake of killing. Chikalov claimed to have resisted the brutality and even killed one of his own subordinates as punishment for executing an innocent family. Nevertheless, Moscow wanted more, not less, violence, and Chikalov’s resistance was noticed in Moscow.[xxvi]
He conducted operations behind German lines until November 1943, when a message arrived for the local SMERSH detachment ordering Chikalov’s arrest and immediate transport to Moscow. The radio operator who received the message was supposed to give it to the SMERSH detachment, but passed it to Chikalov instead. Chikalov recalled that the information shocked him to the point that he let down his guard, allowing German counterintelligence to locate him. Several days after the message arrived, he was captured near Nikopol, Ukraine.
Chikalov reported that the Soviet government considered Soviet troops captured as Germans POWs to be traitors and German spies. Even POWs who escaped German camps and made their way back to Soviet-held territory were arrested and sentenced to 10 years in a prison camp. As an alternative to prison, these former POWs were given the choice of joining a punitive battalion to be sent to the most dangerous sectors of the front. Few soldiers survived these battalions, and those who did considered themselves lucky to be captured again by the Germans. These soldiers were ripe for recruitment into German-sponsored anti-Soviet units, and thus the Soviet policies regarding the treatment of returning POWs created a group of people passionate about fighting against Stalin.[xxvii]
Chikalov was moved around several German POW camps in the months after his capture. In December 1943, he was taken to Königsberg, where he claimed that the Abwehr tried to recruit him into German service, but he refused. In July 1944, he was moved to Lukenwald near Berlin, and in February 1945, he became major in the KONR, where he was initially the assistant chief of the security section, and later the chief of counterintelligence, working directly under former Soviet intelligence officer Ivan Matveyevich Grachev.
Chikalov’s associates in the KONR gave different accounts of his service. Boris Alekseyevich Morozov (writing as Boris Aleksandrovich Gai) wrote after the war that KONR counterintelligence “worked, but was badly led.” He implied that Chikalov was disloyal and that he did not have the skills to be a good counterintelligence officer. Grachev was also uncomplimentary and went so far as to suspect that Chikalov was a Soviet agent posing as a defector. Nevertheless, Chikalov’s section operated well enough to create a sense of insecurity in those who expressed pro-Soviet views or disenchantment with the KONR.[xxviii] Others who knew Chikalov expressed a more positive assessment; one associate wrote that he was “moderate, calm. It was easy to work with him. He was courteous but restrained, and sometimes humorous when dealing with his subordinates.”[xxix]
Another KONR officer, Petr Nikiforovich Shishikevich, KONR Chief Supply and Maintenance, later recalled that he became aware that men associated with Chikalov’s KONR counterintelligence staff were monitoring his activities. Later, Chikalov investigated a theft of 32 kilograms of sausages that had occurred in a warehouse run by Shishkevich. Chikalov reportedly recommended that all of the warehouse workers should be fired and Shishkevich should be held accountable. However, only one employee was fired and Shishkevich retained his position.[xxx]
Chikalov became a U.S. POW along with other KONR officers in May 1945, first in Landau, then in Regensburg, and then at the Plattling POW camp near Munich. He indicated that he became acquainted with a U.S. Army major at the Plattling camp who was interested in the Soviet Union.[xxxi] He ran away from Plattling in April 1946 to avoid forced repatriation, probably with the assistance of a U.S. military member, and took up residence in Munich.
In 1946, CIC received information that Chikalov was running a Soviet intelligence network, called the “Chikalov Ring,” in the U.S Occupation Zone of Germany. CIC suspected that the “Chikalov Ring“ was made up of former KONR officers who were operating as Soviet “penetration or confusion agents.”[xxxii] As of October 1946, a CIC source reported that Chikalov “frequented pubs where Russians gathered; he had no apparent gainful employment but had plenty of money.”[xxxiii]
The CIC had heard a number of derogatory rumors about Chikalov that floated around the Russian refugee community, including reports that Chikalov had been a high-ranking NKVD officer and that he had frequently been seen in the company of Stalin and Voroshilov. The rumors claimed further that he had expressed disagreement with Soviet policies in NKVD meetings, but that he had escaped punishment by falling into German captivity. He joined Vlasov’s Army, and ended up in U.S. custody after the war, but he escaped a U.S. POW camp by bribing a guard with a wristwatch and 4,000 marks. He purportedly was planning his escape with former KONR officer Nikolay Ivanovich Sadovnikov; however, when Chikalov escaped he left Sadovnikov behind, and the next day Sadovnikov was repatriated to the Soviet Union.[xxxiv] Those rumors, in connection with reports of his observed intelligence activities, provided CIC with the predicate for an investigation.
Unbeknownst to CIC, Chikalov and his “ring” were actually working for a U.S. intelligence operation called Operation RUSTY, which was run by the G-2 U.S. Forces European Theater (G-2 USFET) in Frankfurt. As early as April 1946, while Chikalov was a POW in the Plattling Camp, he was recruited as an Operation RUSTY agent to report on Soviet forces in Germany. He further recruited several subagents, primarily from among his former KONR comrades, including Vladislav Panteleimonovich Tukholnikov, with whom Chikalov had worked in KONR counterintelligence. Chikalov and Tukholnikov were separated at the end of the war, but they met by chance in Munich in 1946, and in July 1946 Chikalov invited Tukholnikov to join his Operation RUSTY network.[xxxv]
Collecting intelligence on Soviet forces was not a natural outgrowth of World War II. On the contrary, many CIC officers held pro-Soviet views based upon four years of anti-Nazi alliance and the CIC was focused in 1946 on apprehending former Nazi intelligence officers. Consequently, while there were many intelligence officers in the U.S. military who had developed expertise in Nazi military forces, there were few experts on Soviet forces.[xxxvi] This gap led a few G-2 USFET officers to establish Operation RUSTY, based on the philosophy that former Nazis and collaborating Soviet officers were valuable sources of information about Soviet activities.
Along with Operation RUSTY, G-2 USFET was also exploiting another German asset known as the Bolero Group, which consisted of former Nazi General Richard Gehlen and his staff, whom G-2 USFET had removed from POW camps to a secret location soon after the war to keep them out of the hands of the CIC. In August 1945, the Bolero Group flew to the United States for further exploitation, but in July 1946, G-2 USFET transported them back to Germany “to increase the efficiency and value of the work carried on at the present time.”[xxxvii] The Bolero Group was merged with Operation RUSTY, combining the Soviet expertise of Gehlen and his staff with the contacts of former Soviet officers like Chikalov. By October 1946, G-2 USFET described Operation RUSTY, which had grown to include over 500 agents, as a prolific and dependable source.[xxxviii]
Near the end of 1946, Chikalov and Tukholnikov approached former KONR officer Petr Nikiforovich Shishkevich, who had known Chikalov during the war, and asked him to join them in a farming venture in Bavaria, the proceeds of which would be used in an organization to “help people come over from the other side,” implying an effort to incite defections. The farm venture never materialized because Chikalov and Tukholnikov never obtained a Bavarian government license. However, two to three months later, Chikalov mentioned to Shishkevich that he was planning to publish his memoirs, which would discuss the bad treatment that Soviet people received in the Soviet Union.[xxxix]
However, because of the G-2 USFET’s lack of coordination of Operation RUSTY, CIC’s sources reported Chikalov’s ring as suspicious, and CIC initiated Operation HAGBERRY in 1946 to investigate his apparent espionage activities. Although the CIC learned that Chikalov was an Operation RUSTY agent in September 1947,[xl] it arrested and interrogated him, along with Tukholnikov, in December 1947. CIC held Chikalov until October 1948, while never obtaining evidence showing that Chikalov’s ring was working for the Soviet Union.
Chikalov willingly provided information during CIC interrogations, identifying over 100 of his associates, one of which was Boris Nikolaevsky.[xli] Boris Nikolaevsky had visited Germany during the summer of 1947, before Chikalov’s arrest, and a former KONR officer, Aleksandr Semenovich Svetov (alias Aleksandr Parfenov), who had become the chief editor of the Possev publishing house, introduced Chikalov to Nikolaevsky in August. Nikolavesky asked Chikalov for information about NKVD history, structure, and methods; NKVD pursuit of Mensheviks; and the purge trials. Nikolaevsky later asked for details of the structure and subordination of republic and oblast NKVD offices, and he promised to publish Chikalov’s information and send him the royalties.[xlii] Chikalov responded by writing several manuscripts for Nikolaevsky describing NKVD activities, structure, interrogation methods, and investigations. He proposed a longer work of biographical essays, to be titled “Seen and Experienced: 25 Years of Life Given to Bolshevism,” although it appears he never finished it.[xliii] He did, however, provide significant detail about the workings of the NKVD at the national, republic, and lower levels.
Chikalov had named Nikolaevsky as one of his associates during CIC interrogations, and the CIC contacted Nikolaevsky in New York to follow up on the relationship. Nikolaevsky provided a positive reference, and Chikalov wrote him a letter just after his release from prison to thank him for speaking on his behalf, even though Nikolaevsky did not know him well. Chikalov proceeded to speculate to Nikolaevsky about where CIC had received the information that led to his arrest. He first blamed Vladimir Pozdnyakov, a former KONR colonel, who Chikalov claimed “would strangle his own mother if it benefitted his career.” Chikalov claimed that Poznyakov had tried to persuade him to join forces after the war, but Chikalov had refused, and Pozdnyakov retaliated by providing false information to his American intelligence contacts. Chikalov named several other former Soviet officers then living in Germany who he thought might have denounced him to the CIC.[xliv]
The discord between Chikalov and Pozdnyakov was well known in Russian refugee circles in Germany and was reported with U.S. intelligence channels in April 1947. The U.S. constabulary in Germany believed that, while Pozdnyakov was a proven anti-Soviet, “the position of Chikalov is rather unclear.” The suspicions against Chikalov were based partially on his career as a NKVD officer, but also on a report that he had spoken negatively about U.S. repatriation policy, claiming that the Americans continued to plan forcible repatriations of White Russians to the Soviet Union. Rumors even circulated about Chikalov working as a Soviet double agent inside CIC.[xlv]
After his release from prison, Chikalov moved to Goddelau, near Frankfurt, where he proceeded to write answers to Nikolaevsky’s continual questions about Soviet intelligence procedures. However, he was no longer a U.S. intelligence agent, so he was forced to work long hours to earn enough money to live, leaving only evenings and Sundays to write. In March 1949, Nikolaevsky offered to pay 25-30 dollars per month for Chikalov’s living expenses if Chikalov would devote his entire time to writing.[xlvi] Then, to further entice Chikalov to write his memoirs, Nikolaevsky informed Chikalov in April 1949 that the Research Program on the USSR at Columbia University was interested in his material, and that it was willing to pay him well to write about his experiences. Nikolaevsky particularly requested, on behalf of the Program, that Chikalov write about Soviet activities in China, describing how the Soviet Union operated in a newly occupied country; however, Chikalov declined to write such an article because he stated that he was in China only a short time for a narrowly specialized mission, and was not qualified to write on Soviet policy in China overall.[xlvii]
He did, however, write about an incident that he claims occurred in China in the late 1920s. He recounted that the Soviet Union was actively working to establish communist dominance in Xinjiang and in the provinces along the border with Mongolia, and Soviet enterprises were launching commercial ventures to extract lumber and silver deposits in the region. These commercial opportunities attracted shady business schemes, including one initiated by a Soviet diplomat in China named Tairov, with the supposed cooperation of the Chief of the OGPU Near East Section, Agabekov (referring to Georgiy Sergeyevich Arutyunov [Agabekov], who defected in June 1930). Tairov is a likely reference to Vladimir Khristiforovich Tairov (real name Ruben Artemyevich Ter-Grigoryan), a military commissar and Razvedupr officer who served in the group of Soviet advisors in China from 1924 to 1927. According to Chikalov, the scheme was uncovered in 1929 or 1930 and Tairov was recalled to Moscow and expelled from the Party—he was later reinstated, recruited into the OGPU, and sent back to China as an intelligence officer. Tairov then returned to Moscow to work in the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, where Chikalov claims to have been recommended as his deputy in 1936. However, Chikalov’s assignment was changed before he took the position.[xlviii] Agabekov, according to Chikalov, avoided punishment by defecting.[xlix]
A brief biography of Tairov confirms some of Chikalov’s account, but differs on other points. Tairov departed China in 1927 and no details are available about his whereabouts between 1927 and June 1929, raising the possibility that he was under arrest during that period. In June 1929, he returned to service, not to the OGPU, but to the Razvedupr, and in 1935 he was assigned not to China, but as Soviet ambassador to Mongolia.[l] The intermixing of civilian and military intelligence activities that was occurring in the mid-1930s in the Soviet Union makes it plausible that Chikalov, an experienced intelligence officer, could have been considered for duty alongside Tairov. Chikalov ends his account by saying that Tairov was later arrested and executed, which did in fact occur in 1938.
During Nikolaevsky’s first meeting with Chikalov, the latter noted a number of topics about which he could write more detailed accounts, among which was NKVD interrogation methods. In 1949, Nikolaevsky told Chikalov that an influential journalist, whom he did not name, wanted Chikalov to provide details about the NKVD’s use of hypnosis, injections, and powders to weaken prisoners’ will to resist interrogations.
The question was likely prompted by an article by an N. Bondar in the February 1949 issue of the Russian émigré journal Народная Правда (Narodnaya Pravda) titled “Рассказ бывшего преподавателя школы НКВД” (“Story of a Former NKVD School Instructor”), which mentioned the NKVD use of hypnosis in interrogations.[li] Nikolaevsky introduced Chikalov to the journal because Nikolaevsky himself had published articles and letters in it. Chikalov commented on a number of articles in his correspondence with Nikolaevsky, including Bondar’s article and claimed that the author knew little about the NKVD. While he may have been an NKVD employee, wrote Chikalov, he served far away from operations and did not know anything about NKVD schools.[lii] Bondar notes in the article that he was a teacher in a special primary school for NKVD employees’ children.[liii]
Bondar also mentioned an NKVD facility called the Krasnushkin Institute, where experiments in the use of hypnosis in interrogations were conducted.[liv] Despite his critique of the article, Chikalov noted that in 1937, while a student in the Higher NKVD School, he had visited the NKVD-sponsored scientific institute known as the Doctor Krasnushkin Institute, named after forensic psychiatrist Dr. Yevgeniy Konstantinovich Krasnushkin, which was dedicated to experimenting with various psychological and medical methods of breaking interrogation subjects. The institute used prisoners as live test subjects, experimenting with a variety of drugs and techniques that sometimes left them incapacitated for life. Chikalov quoted a political investigator in the Belarusian NKVD as saying, “with the help of scientific knowledge we can break the resistance of an accused, even if he is cast out of iron.”[lv] Chikalov further described the use of a polygraph machine in Soviet interrogations, and claimed that Soviet researchers were also attempting to develop methods for reading minds, but that the research had not gotten far.[lvi] Nikolaevsky promised large sums of money for an article describing these experiments, and possibly help from the journalist in other areas—implying assistance with immigration.[lvii]
Chikalov himself had studied ways to perfect interrogation methods during his time at the Higher NKVD School, and he witnessed Soviet interrogators using injections that acted on prisoners like alcohol, reducing their inhibitions and loosening their tongue.[lviii] He wrote specifically about the interrogation of actor and stage director Vladislav Iosifovich Golubok, who had been arrested for alleged association with the Polish intelligence. Chikalov witnessed Golubok’s interrogation during the spring of 1937, and while Golubok disclaimed espionage on behalf of Poland, he received an injection that induced him talk openly about his Belarusian nationalist sentiments and to admit contacts with Belarusian nationalists in Poland. His openness led to a sentence in a prison camp, where he eventually died.[lix]
ChK/OGPU/NKVD history was taught at two main schools: the Higher School of the NKVD Forces and the Central School of the NKVD, both on Moscow. Old operational specialists with long experience taught at the school, and were careful to avoid crossing the boundary of providing too much sensitive information in their lectures. Curricula were developed through panels of specialists, under the supervision of a senior NKVD official. Teaching materials provided only general information about historical cases and did not delve deeply into details. The NKVD also maintained two museums, one for ChK/OGPU/NKVD history in general, in which a large amount of space was devoted to Feliks Dzerzhinsky, and another for NKVD forces specifically. The history museum also displayed equipment and chemicals used for clandestine communication, famous acts committed by foreign intelligence services, and the awards earned by past chekists. Chikalov wrote that he had visited the history museum once in 1928. The museum of the NKVD forces displayed material from cases in which the border guard forces had successfully prevented anti-Soviet organizations from penetrating the Soviet Union.[lx]
Nikolaevsky suggested openly for the first time in May 1949 the possibility of bringing Chikalov to the United States to allow him to write more easily and have access to a Russian library.[lxi] Chikalov reacted enthusiastically to the prospect. He complained that life in Germany was very hard; he did not even have a room to himself, and he viewed a move to the United States as a way to escape his uncomfortable life in Germany.[lxii] Nikolaevsky responded that he had two workable plans, one to emigrate to the United States and a back-up plan to move to France. He mentioned that Chikalov’s material so far had made a good impression in Washington. He never mentioned who in Washington was reading it,[lxiii] although Nikolaevky’s papers contain an English translation of one of Chikalov’s papers, titled System of Investigation in the MGB, translated by the U.S. Department of State Division of Language Services.[lxiv] Nikolaevsky promised that if his plan to bring Chikalov to the United States did not succeed, he also had good friends in France who would help Chikalov get settled there.
In July 1949, Nikolaevsky tried to connect Chikalov with Roman Borisovich Gul, a Paris-based Russian writer and publisher and friend of Nikolaevsky; the meeting never took place. However, besides him, Nikolaevsky advised Chikalov against associating with Russians in Germany. Chikalov responded that he had little association with other Russians, except those with whom he had served in the KONR, but was surprised by the Nikolaevsky’s warning.[lxv]
Beginning in July 1949, Chikalov recommended that letters to him be sent to the address of his girlfriend and future wife, Gertrude Pischek in Offenbach near Frankfurt.[lxvi] Chikalov’s last letter to Nikolaevsky was dated 31 August 1949, in which he mentioned that he planned to go to the French Zone of Germany for a job picking grapes.[lxvii] Nikolaevsky wrote letter to Chikalov dated 24 September 1949, and on 27 September Chikalov left for Saarbrücken to connect with an acquaintance of Nicolaevaky’s from Paris, possibly Gul. However, on 20 October, Pischek wrote an anxious letter to Nikolaevsky saying that she had not heard from him, and that they were to be married on 22 October.[lxviii]
Aleksandrov cites a story that the CIA had obtained intelligence that Chikalov traveled to Athens, Greece, at some unspecified time in 1948 or 1949, and the CIA sent Grachev, Chikalov’s former KONR superior officer, to Athens to identify him. Grachev supposedly spotted him, but Chikalov sensed the surveillance and disappeared again.[lxix] Aleksandrov uses this reported incident as evidence that Chikalov was a Soviet agent dispatched as a defector. However, inasmuch as Chikalov was openly writing letters to Nikolaevsky from Germany until late August 1949, there is no support for the CIA’s suspicion that Chikalov had traveled to Greece at all.
It appears instead that Soviet forces had kidnapped Chikalov in Germany and forcibly repatriated him to the Soviet Union. Chikalov is listed as “Almazov, aka Chekalov Aleksandr Fedorovich” in a list of repatriated individuals.[lxx] His repatriation date is listed as 1 October 1949, less than a week after he left Frankfurt to meet Nikolaevsky’s friend from France. By the time Gertrude Pischek wrote he heart wrenching letter, Chikalov had been in the Soviet Union for three weeks. He was convicted of treason in a Minsk military tribunal in August 1950 and presumably executed.[lxxi]
U.S. intelligence agencies probably were not aware of his repatriation. The confusion about his status as a U.S. agent from 1946-1947 caused by the uncoordinated actions of Operation RUSTY continued to resonate in U.S. intelligence channels years later. A file review of a CIA asset named Gleb Umnov, whom the CIA was deciding whether to retain as an asset in 1965, cites a CIC report indicating that Umnov was associated with Chikalov in 1947, and that Chikalov was a suspected Soviet agent. The CIC’s suspicion of Chikalov being a Soviet agent followed him into the grave.[lxxii]
Chikalov provided his personal biography in two different settings: once during CIC interrogations in December 1947,[i] and another time in a letter to Boris Nikolaevsky in about March 1949.[ii] The two tellings contain different levels of detail, but agree with each other on all major points, and Chikalov wrote additional focused essays for Nikolaevsky providing detailed accounts to illustrate certain aspects of his career. The Research Program on the USSR at Columbia University expressed interest in his writings, and Boris Nikolaevsky offered a glimmer of hope that Chikalov might be able to emigrate to the United States to pursue writing there. However, Chikalov disappeared, probably kidnapped and forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union in October 1949 before the plan came to fruition.
Chikalov used a series of pseudonyms during and after the war. His pseudonyms included Aleksandr Fedorovich Shubar, Aleksandr Fedorovich Alekseyev, Yuriy Krasnovskiy, Aleksandr Fedorovich Repin, and Igor Fedorovich Almazov.[iii] He used the Almazov pseudonym in his correspondence with Nikolaevsky until the beginning of 1949, when he returned to his real name, Chikalov.[iv] However, when Nikolaevsky asked him what name he should use when referring to him in publications, Chikalov advised him to use the name Repin (his mother’s maiden name) for security purposes, because no one in the United States knew him by that name.[v] In April 1949, Carmel Offie, at the time a CIA official involved in recruiting former Nazi officers and Nazi collaborators as agents in what was known as Operation Bloodstone, contacted Nikolaevsky and asked for Chikalov’s contact information. Offie did not explain his interest in “Almazov, otherwise known as Chekalov” or how he knew to contact Nikolaevsky, but Nikolaevsky sent him Chikalov’s address, using the name Igor Almazov.[vi]
Chikalov was suspected of continued cooperation with the Soviet Union both while he served in the KONR and while he was in Germany after World War II. While there is no clear evidence of him being a Soviet agent, he did relate several stories to Nikolaevsky that followed a clear Soviet propaganda line, particularly in relation to the purge trials of 1936-1938. It is unclear whether he told these propaganda-inspired stories on instructions from a Soviet handler, as some believed, or, what appears more likely, he related what he had heard during the time of the Yezhovshchina that he honestly believed to be true.
Chikalov was born in December 1902 near the town of Kovrov, northeast of Moscow. In his written biography he indicated that he was born two weeks premature while his mother returning home by train from Vilnius, where his father worked as an assistant manager of a retail business. Chikalov lived as a boy and attended school in Kovrov. When his family moved to a small railway station near Kurgan in Siberia in 1915, Chikalov remained in Kovrov to continue secondary school. He lived with his uncle, who was an active Socialist Revolutionary and Chikalov remembered hearing revolutionary discussions in his uncle’s home.
In August 1917 his uncle could no longer feed him, so he was forced to travel to live with his family. He and his father had never gotten along, so he was not looking forward to reuniting with his family, and when he arrived he found his mother crying over the injured body of his younger brother. When Chikalov learned that his father had beaten the child, he lost control of his anger and fought with his father, resulting his father evicting him from the house.
He went as a teenager to nearby Kurgan and was accepted into a gymnasium. He paid for his lodging by helping the school’s security watchman and by working odd jobs in the local city soviet. Chikalov got his first exposure to bolshevism from a teacher at the school. However, when White forces overran Kurgan in May 1918, his Bolshevik acquaintances either were arrested or escaped beyond the Urals. Chikalov remained in Kurgan and continued working for the local city administration until autumn 1919, when Red forces recaptured the city.
In December 1919, Chikalov’s mother and older sister died of typhoid. That same month, just as he turned 17, Chikalov joined the Komsomol and volunteered for the Red Army. He served as a messenger and secretary to the unit commissar, Dubkov, whom he came to respect as an example of a good Bolshevik. His unit’s assignments represented the troubles of the time: his unit was sent in January 1920 to Novosibirsk to gather and dispose of tens of thousands of bodies of people who had died of famine and typhoid. His unit was subsequently assigned the duty of requisitioning food from affluent residents, and later, in February 1921, to put down a revolt. He later wrote his impressions of the “red terror,” which included “crusades” made up of communist and Komsomol members who traveled around “dekulakifying” the region, confiscating property and food, and expelling or executing the owners, resulting in the deaths of over a million people.[vii]
Chikalov’s father and second sister died in 1921, and in May of that year he was released from military duty to take care of his younger brother, who was 10 years old. He initially returned to Kovrov, but then traveled to Moscow in March 1922 hoping to attend college; however, the Komsomol organization instead assigned him to work as a criminal investigator. He formally joined the Communist party in March 1923, and in April began a six-month course to be a political commissar.
Chikalov’s 18-year career in the OGPU began in early 1924, when he graduated from the political commissar course and was assigned to a border guard unit in Belarus. He recalled hearing Feliks Dzershinsky’s “chekist” principles as part of the new OGPU employee indoctrination: trust no one, see everyone as a potential enemy; know no mercy and force the soft-hearted out of the VChK; be more courageous and clever than the enemy; listen more than speak; and forget personal life—serve the revolution.[viii]
From February 1924 to February 1933, he served in various assignments of increasing rank and authority in the OGPU borders guards along the Soviet-Polish border. In May 1929, he was promoted to captain, and his main assignment was to guard against British, French, German, and Polish spies crossing the western Soviet border. He never mentioned having caught any.
During this time, Chikalov was sent on several short temporary duty assignments to participate in operations to strengthen Soviet power. NKVD officers sought these temporary trips because of the extra pay they provided.[ix] In 1930, he spent a month in the Belarusian town of Borisov enforcing the collectivization of the local population. He recalled the violence, coercion, and unemployment that accompanied collectivization, and he was dismayed by some of the tactics that he was ordered to use, which led him to write a letter to the Party Central Committee criticizing the actions. He was called into the Party Control Commission, accused of “Bukharinist” opportunism, and given a reprimand, but no further punishment. At about the same time, Stalin gave a speech about the excesses and mistakes of collectivization, and in March 1930, Stalin published as letter in Pravda blaming local leaders for being “dizzy with success” in their efforts to collectivize the population.[x] Chikalov’s letter mirrored many of the points that Stalin made, and consequently Chikalov was fully rehabilitated and even gained influence. However, his faith in Stalinism began to waver from that moment.[xi]
In 1932, Chikalov served a two-month assignment in Xinjiang, China, helping to establish Soviet control over the region, and later in 1932, he spent four months in the Caucasus fighting against kulak sabotage and oppositionist activity. Chikalov was promoted to major in 1934 and assigned to Minsk. A year later, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and assigned as an investigator in purge investigations. Then, from April 1936 to September 1937, he was assigned to Timkovichi, Belarus, to command a border guard sector. He was once again sent on a temporary duty assignment for three months in 1936, this time to Mongolia to teach border guard troops about Japanese espionage.
Nikolaevsky described Chikalov as the deputy chief of Belorussian Republic NKVD during this latter time. Chikalov never claimed that title himself; however, he did have direct interaction with the Belarusian Republic People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs, Boris Davydovich Berman. He even claimed to have personally known Nikolay Ivanovich Yezhov as early as 1933, and he claimed that Yezhov was initially a decent person who lost his mind because the horrors that he witnessed. The level of detail in his writings about the organization and management of republic NKVDs and their relationship with the republic leadership is greater than any other topic, suggesting an intimate knowledge gained from experience.[xii]
Chikalov was in Belarus during the height of the Yezhovshchina, and he estimates that ninety percent of the millions of people arrested and executed during this period were not guilty of anything except having a foreign familial connection, having worked in a small business before the revolution, having expressed a thought that was out of unison with the Stalinist line, or having a personal connection to anyone in those categories. The NKVD worked day and night without rest during the Yezhovshchina period, while at the same time Chikalov estimated that as many as 20,000 NKVD personnel were arrested.[xiii]
Chikalov tells some stories about the purges and their origin that appear to have originated from Stalinist propaganda, and it is unclear whether these were myths circulating among the NKVD faithful at the time or if Chikalov manufactured them for Nikolaevsky. They seem to indicate that the purges of senior Soviet officials were not the product of Stalin’s paranoia, as others claimed, but based on real threats to Stalin and his regime.
One story involved an NKVD informant codenamed Maks who in 1933 reported the presence of oppositionists in the Communist Party and the NKVD, including NKVD Chief Genrikh Georgyevich Yagoda himself. Oppositionists initially suppressed Maks’s reports and arrest him, but he escaped, was caught again, and escaped again. Then, in 1935, Maks’s handler, an NKVD officer named Mironov, succeeded in gaining the ear of Yezhov, then serving as Chairman of the Party Control Commission, through whom he was reportedly granted an audience with Stalin. Stalin took the report seriously and ordered an investigation, leading to Yagoda’s removal. The investigation reportedly uncovered connections between the oppositionists and Mensheviks, SRs, and Trotskyists abroad, although it did not reveal any connections to foreign intelligence services.[xiv] This, Chikalov claims, was the spark that ignited the purges.
Chikalov also wrote about the June 1937 arrest and execution of Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhschevskiy and other senior Soviet military officers, citing three sources for his information: a secret letter that circulated among NKVD officers; an NKVD case summary; and a personal conversation with Komkor Ivan Panfilovich Belov, a Belarusian military officer who participated in the Tukhachevskiy trial in Moscow. Chikalov was a delegate to the Sixteenth Congress of the Belarusian Communist Party in July 1937 and spoke to Belov during the congress.[xv]
Chikalov indicated that the case against Tukhachevskiy was based on bona fide information about a coup plot being planned by military officers who were disgruntled by the Soviet system and angered by collectivization. The plot was widespread and involved a plan to assassinate Stalin and surround Moscow with military forces.[xvi] Chikalov seemed to honestly believe that the executed officers had made contact with German, Polish, and British intelligence services to provide information about Soviet border defenses in preparation for a planned overthrow of the Stalinist regime, which he claimed was planned for May or June 1937. He wrote that Tukhachevsiy had been under the influence of the German General Staff since 1924. It was rumored that Tukhachevskiy lived in luxury and kept what amounted to a harem of women, among whom were reportedly Japanese, Polish, and German spies.[xvii]
Among the officers arrested during this time was also Chief of the Moscow Region NKVD, Stanislav Frantsevich Redens. According to Chikalov, senior party official Leonid Mikhailovich Zakovskiy called a meeting of the NKVD and Rezvedupr staff in the Moscow region in early 1938 and informed them that he was now in charge. Zakovskiy reportedly told the assembled officers that he had presided over the arrests of more than 3,000 spies in the Leningrad Region, compared to only 60 spies that the Moscow NKVD office had uncovered. He accused those present of being soft on spies, and he ordered Redens arrested immediately.[xviii] Just a few months later, Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov, who defected in July 1938, reportedly introduced himself similarly in August 1936 when he took charge of the Azov-Black Sea Region NKVD.[xix] However it is unclear how Chikalov could quote Zakovskiy’s speech in Moscow, as Chikalov was in prison himself at the time. His information is at best second-hand, similarly to the story about Lyushkov.
Although Chikalov implied that the arrests of senior military and NKVD leaders were justified, he distinguished these from the nearly 30,000 arrestees in the resulting purge, the vast majority of whom knew nothing about the supposed plots. He questioned the purge methods and the extent to which they reached. As thousands of NKVD personnel were arrested in 1937, including many of Chikalov’s associates for whose innocence he could vouch personally, he sent another letter to the Party Central Committee, signed by six officers,[xx] criticizing the methods being used in the purge. In September 1937, Chikalov was called before Yezhov and arrested, and he spent six months in Lubyanka. He wrote that he was only saved from execution by the fact that the situation in the country had become so intolerable that the Party began to investigate denouncers, and many who had been denounced were released from prison and replaced with the those whose denunciations had placed them there. The problem grew to such an extreme that Stalin announced in January 1938 a war on libel, blaming the problem on foreign intelligence services.[xxi]
Chikalov was released from Lubyanka in March 1938; however, he had been demoted to major and was forced to wait in a reserve status until December. He found that many of the purged military and NKVD officers had been replaced with young, inexperienced recruits who were fiercely loyal to Stalin.[xxii] The Tukhachevskiy trial also led to the reestablishment of military commissars to reestablish Party control over the military.
He was eventually assigned to Vladikavkaz in the Caucasus to teach at the NKVD military school, but he wrote that 1939 and 1940 were hardest years of his life. He felt that he was living under a constant cloud of suspicion leading him to consider suicide and to volunteer for service on the front line of the Russo-Finnish war, specifically looking for a dangerous assignment. [xxiii] He was gradually rehabilitated again, and from May 1941 until the German attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June, he completed courses at the Frunze Military Academy that he had begun prior to his imprisonment.
After the German attack, Chikalov requested to be transferred to the regular army, but his request was denied. He was assigned instead to go to Batumi, Georgia, to participate in forming a special NKVD division to prepare for an invasion of Turkey in case Turkey joined the war on the German side. However, after only two weeks of this assignment, the Soviet Union learned that Turkey intended to remain neutral, and thus the formation of the division was postponed. He was then sent briefly to Iran, but was subsequently sent to Moscow to assist in forming a special division to defend Moscow, which was assembled in October 1941.[xxiv]
In early 1942, Chikalov again submitted a request for transfer to the regular army, and this time it was approved. He was assigned as chief of staff in a tank division on the Southern Front, headquartered in Rostov. He also served as a battalion commissar during this time.[xxv] However, this assignment lasted only until June 1942, when he was transferred to the GRU. When German troops surrounded Kharkov in July 1942, Chikalov was ordered to stay behind and establish intelligence and partisan operations, which he indicated inflicted great losses on the Germans, for which Chikalov was decorated multiple times. He reported developing a hatred for Germans and their methods when he saw atrocities committed in Ukraine and Belarus. His orders were to destroy anyone who showed sympathy for the Germans; however, despite his antipathy for the Germans, Chikalov was also dismayed when NKVD personnel sometimes took these orders to the extreme and killed just for the sake of killing. Chikalov claimed to have resisted the brutality and even killed one of his own subordinates as punishment for executing an innocent family. Nevertheless, Moscow wanted more, not less, violence, and Chikalov’s resistance was noticed in Moscow.[xxvi]
He conducted operations behind German lines until November 1943, when a message arrived for the local SMERSH detachment ordering Chikalov’s arrest and immediate transport to Moscow. The radio operator who received the message was supposed to give it to the SMERSH detachment, but passed it to Chikalov instead. Chikalov recalled that the information shocked him to the point that he let down his guard, allowing German counterintelligence to locate him. Several days after the message arrived, he was captured near Nikopol, Ukraine.
Chikalov reported that the Soviet government considered Soviet troops captured as Germans POWs to be traitors and German spies. Even POWs who escaped German camps and made their way back to Soviet-held territory were arrested and sentenced to 10 years in a prison camp. As an alternative to prison, these former POWs were given the choice of joining a punitive battalion to be sent to the most dangerous sectors of the front. Few soldiers survived these battalions, and those who did considered themselves lucky to be captured again by the Germans. These soldiers were ripe for recruitment into German-sponsored anti-Soviet units, and thus the Soviet policies regarding the treatment of returning POWs created a group of people passionate about fighting against Stalin.[xxvii]
Chikalov was moved around several German POW camps in the months after his capture. In December 1943, he was taken to Königsberg, where he claimed that the Abwehr tried to recruit him into German service, but he refused. In July 1944, he was moved to Lukenwald near Berlin, and in February 1945, he became major in the KONR, where he was initially the assistant chief of the security section, and later the chief of counterintelligence, working directly under former Soviet intelligence officer Ivan Matveyevich Grachev.
Chikalov’s associates in the KONR gave different accounts of his service. Boris Alekseyevich Morozov (writing as Boris Aleksandrovich Gai) wrote after the war that KONR counterintelligence “worked, but was badly led.” He implied that Chikalov was disloyal and that he did not have the skills to be a good counterintelligence officer. Grachev was also uncomplimentary and went so far as to suspect that Chikalov was a Soviet agent posing as a defector. Nevertheless, Chikalov’s section operated well enough to create a sense of insecurity in those who expressed pro-Soviet views or disenchantment with the KONR.[xxviii] Others who knew Chikalov expressed a more positive assessment; one associate wrote that he was “moderate, calm. It was easy to work with him. He was courteous but restrained, and sometimes humorous when dealing with his subordinates.”[xxix]
Another KONR officer, Petr Nikiforovich Shishikevich, KONR Chief Supply and Maintenance, later recalled that he became aware that men associated with Chikalov’s KONR counterintelligence staff were monitoring his activities. Later, Chikalov investigated a theft of 32 kilograms of sausages that had occurred in a warehouse run by Shishkevich. Chikalov reportedly recommended that all of the warehouse workers should be fired and Shishkevich should be held accountable. However, only one employee was fired and Shishkevich retained his position.[xxx]
Chikalov became a U.S. POW along with other KONR officers in May 1945, first in Landau, then in Regensburg, and then at the Plattling POW camp near Munich. He indicated that he became acquainted with a U.S. Army major at the Plattling camp who was interested in the Soviet Union.[xxxi] He ran away from Plattling in April 1946 to avoid forced repatriation, probably with the assistance of a U.S. military member, and took up residence in Munich.
In 1946, CIC received information that Chikalov was running a Soviet intelligence network, called the “Chikalov Ring,” in the U.S Occupation Zone of Germany. CIC suspected that the “Chikalov Ring“ was made up of former KONR officers who were operating as Soviet “penetration or confusion agents.”[xxxii] As of October 1946, a CIC source reported that Chikalov “frequented pubs where Russians gathered; he had no apparent gainful employment but had plenty of money.”[xxxiii]
The CIC had heard a number of derogatory rumors about Chikalov that floated around the Russian refugee community, including reports that Chikalov had been a high-ranking NKVD officer and that he had frequently been seen in the company of Stalin and Voroshilov. The rumors claimed further that he had expressed disagreement with Soviet policies in NKVD meetings, but that he had escaped punishment by falling into German captivity. He joined Vlasov’s Army, and ended up in U.S. custody after the war, but he escaped a U.S. POW camp by bribing a guard with a wristwatch and 4,000 marks. He purportedly was planning his escape with former KONR officer Nikolay Ivanovich Sadovnikov; however, when Chikalov escaped he left Sadovnikov behind, and the next day Sadovnikov was repatriated to the Soviet Union.[xxxiv] Those rumors, in connection with reports of his observed intelligence activities, provided CIC with the predicate for an investigation.
Unbeknownst to CIC, Chikalov and his “ring” were actually working for a U.S. intelligence operation called Operation RUSTY, which was run by the G-2 U.S. Forces European Theater (G-2 USFET) in Frankfurt. As early as April 1946, while Chikalov was a POW in the Plattling Camp, he was recruited as an Operation RUSTY agent to report on Soviet forces in Germany. He further recruited several subagents, primarily from among his former KONR comrades, including Vladislav Panteleimonovich Tukholnikov, with whom Chikalov had worked in KONR counterintelligence. Chikalov and Tukholnikov were separated at the end of the war, but they met by chance in Munich in 1946, and in July 1946 Chikalov invited Tukholnikov to join his Operation RUSTY network.[xxxv]
Collecting intelligence on Soviet forces was not a natural outgrowth of World War II. On the contrary, many CIC officers held pro-Soviet views based upon four years of anti-Nazi alliance and the CIC was focused in 1946 on apprehending former Nazi intelligence officers. Consequently, while there were many intelligence officers in the U.S. military who had developed expertise in Nazi military forces, there were few experts on Soviet forces.[xxxvi] This gap led a few G-2 USFET officers to establish Operation RUSTY, based on the philosophy that former Nazis and collaborating Soviet officers were valuable sources of information about Soviet activities.
Along with Operation RUSTY, G-2 USFET was also exploiting another German asset known as the Bolero Group, which consisted of former Nazi General Richard Gehlen and his staff, whom G-2 USFET had removed from POW camps to a secret location soon after the war to keep them out of the hands of the CIC. In August 1945, the Bolero Group flew to the United States for further exploitation, but in July 1946, G-2 USFET transported them back to Germany “to increase the efficiency and value of the work carried on at the present time.”[xxxvii] The Bolero Group was merged with Operation RUSTY, combining the Soviet expertise of Gehlen and his staff with the contacts of former Soviet officers like Chikalov. By October 1946, G-2 USFET described Operation RUSTY, which had grown to include over 500 agents, as a prolific and dependable source.[xxxviii]
Near the end of 1946, Chikalov and Tukholnikov approached former KONR officer Petr Nikiforovich Shishkevich, who had known Chikalov during the war, and asked him to join them in a farming venture in Bavaria, the proceeds of which would be used in an organization to “help people come over from the other side,” implying an effort to incite defections. The farm venture never materialized because Chikalov and Tukholnikov never obtained a Bavarian government license. However, two to three months later, Chikalov mentioned to Shishkevich that he was planning to publish his memoirs, which would discuss the bad treatment that Soviet people received in the Soviet Union.[xxxix]
However, because of the G-2 USFET’s lack of coordination of Operation RUSTY, CIC’s sources reported Chikalov’s ring as suspicious, and CIC initiated Operation HAGBERRY in 1946 to investigate his apparent espionage activities. Although the CIC learned that Chikalov was an Operation RUSTY agent in September 1947,[xl] it arrested and interrogated him, along with Tukholnikov, in December 1947. CIC held Chikalov until October 1948, while never obtaining evidence showing that Chikalov’s ring was working for the Soviet Union.
Chikalov willingly provided information during CIC interrogations, identifying over 100 of his associates, one of which was Boris Nikolaevsky.[xli] Boris Nikolaevsky had visited Germany during the summer of 1947, before Chikalov’s arrest, and a former KONR officer, Aleksandr Semenovich Svetov (alias Aleksandr Parfenov), who had become the chief editor of the Possev publishing house, introduced Chikalov to Nikolaevsky in August. Nikolavesky asked Chikalov for information about NKVD history, structure, and methods; NKVD pursuit of Mensheviks; and the purge trials. Nikolaevsky later asked for details of the structure and subordination of republic and oblast NKVD offices, and he promised to publish Chikalov’s information and send him the royalties.[xlii] Chikalov responded by writing several manuscripts for Nikolaevsky describing NKVD activities, structure, interrogation methods, and investigations. He proposed a longer work of biographical essays, to be titled “Seen and Experienced: 25 Years of Life Given to Bolshevism,” although it appears he never finished it.[xliii] He did, however, provide significant detail about the workings of the NKVD at the national, republic, and lower levels.
Chikalov had named Nikolaevsky as one of his associates during CIC interrogations, and the CIC contacted Nikolaevsky in New York to follow up on the relationship. Nikolaevsky provided a positive reference, and Chikalov wrote him a letter just after his release from prison to thank him for speaking on his behalf, even though Nikolaevsky did not know him well. Chikalov proceeded to speculate to Nikolaevsky about where CIC had received the information that led to his arrest. He first blamed Vladimir Pozdnyakov, a former KONR colonel, who Chikalov claimed “would strangle his own mother if it benefitted his career.” Chikalov claimed that Poznyakov had tried to persuade him to join forces after the war, but Chikalov had refused, and Pozdnyakov retaliated by providing false information to his American intelligence contacts. Chikalov named several other former Soviet officers then living in Germany who he thought might have denounced him to the CIC.[xliv]
The discord between Chikalov and Pozdnyakov was well known in Russian refugee circles in Germany and was reported with U.S. intelligence channels in April 1947. The U.S. constabulary in Germany believed that, while Pozdnyakov was a proven anti-Soviet, “the position of Chikalov is rather unclear.” The suspicions against Chikalov were based partially on his career as a NKVD officer, but also on a report that he had spoken negatively about U.S. repatriation policy, claiming that the Americans continued to plan forcible repatriations of White Russians to the Soviet Union. Rumors even circulated about Chikalov working as a Soviet double agent inside CIC.[xlv]
After his release from prison, Chikalov moved to Goddelau, near Frankfurt, where he proceeded to write answers to Nikolaevsky’s continual questions about Soviet intelligence procedures. However, he was no longer a U.S. intelligence agent, so he was forced to work long hours to earn enough money to live, leaving only evenings and Sundays to write. In March 1949, Nikolaevsky offered to pay 25-30 dollars per month for Chikalov’s living expenses if Chikalov would devote his entire time to writing.[xlvi] Then, to further entice Chikalov to write his memoirs, Nikolaevsky informed Chikalov in April 1949 that the Research Program on the USSR at Columbia University was interested in his material, and that it was willing to pay him well to write about his experiences. Nikolaevsky particularly requested, on behalf of the Program, that Chikalov write about Soviet activities in China, describing how the Soviet Union operated in a newly occupied country; however, Chikalov declined to write such an article because he stated that he was in China only a short time for a narrowly specialized mission, and was not qualified to write on Soviet policy in China overall.[xlvii]
He did, however, write about an incident that he claims occurred in China in the late 1920s. He recounted that the Soviet Union was actively working to establish communist dominance in Xinjiang and in the provinces along the border with Mongolia, and Soviet enterprises were launching commercial ventures to extract lumber and silver deposits in the region. These commercial opportunities attracted shady business schemes, including one initiated by a Soviet diplomat in China named Tairov, with the supposed cooperation of the Chief of the OGPU Near East Section, Agabekov (referring to Georgiy Sergeyevich Arutyunov [Agabekov], who defected in June 1930). Tairov is a likely reference to Vladimir Khristiforovich Tairov (real name Ruben Artemyevich Ter-Grigoryan), a military commissar and Razvedupr officer who served in the group of Soviet advisors in China from 1924 to 1927. According to Chikalov, the scheme was uncovered in 1929 or 1930 and Tairov was recalled to Moscow and expelled from the Party—he was later reinstated, recruited into the OGPU, and sent back to China as an intelligence officer. Tairov then returned to Moscow to work in the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, where Chikalov claims to have been recommended as his deputy in 1936. However, Chikalov’s assignment was changed before he took the position.[xlviii] Agabekov, according to Chikalov, avoided punishment by defecting.[xlix]
A brief biography of Tairov confirms some of Chikalov’s account, but differs on other points. Tairov departed China in 1927 and no details are available about his whereabouts between 1927 and June 1929, raising the possibility that he was under arrest during that period. In June 1929, he returned to service, not to the OGPU, but to the Razvedupr, and in 1935 he was assigned not to China, but as Soviet ambassador to Mongolia.[l] The intermixing of civilian and military intelligence activities that was occurring in the mid-1930s in the Soviet Union makes it plausible that Chikalov, an experienced intelligence officer, could have been considered for duty alongside Tairov. Chikalov ends his account by saying that Tairov was later arrested and executed, which did in fact occur in 1938.
During Nikolaevsky’s first meeting with Chikalov, the latter noted a number of topics about which he could write more detailed accounts, among which was NKVD interrogation methods. In 1949, Nikolaevsky told Chikalov that an influential journalist, whom he did not name, wanted Chikalov to provide details about the NKVD’s use of hypnosis, injections, and powders to weaken prisoners’ will to resist interrogations.
The question was likely prompted by an article by an N. Bondar in the February 1949 issue of the Russian émigré journal Народная Правда (Narodnaya Pravda) titled “Рассказ бывшего преподавателя школы НКВД” (“Story of a Former NKVD School Instructor”), which mentioned the NKVD use of hypnosis in interrogations.[li] Nikolaevsky introduced Chikalov to the journal because Nikolaevsky himself had published articles and letters in it. Chikalov commented on a number of articles in his correspondence with Nikolaevsky, including Bondar’s article and claimed that the author knew little about the NKVD. While he may have been an NKVD employee, wrote Chikalov, he served far away from operations and did not know anything about NKVD schools.[lii] Bondar notes in the article that he was a teacher in a special primary school for NKVD employees’ children.[liii]
Bondar also mentioned an NKVD facility called the Krasnushkin Institute, where experiments in the use of hypnosis in interrogations were conducted.[liv] Despite his critique of the article, Chikalov noted that in 1937, while a student in the Higher NKVD School, he had visited the NKVD-sponsored scientific institute known as the Doctor Krasnushkin Institute, named after forensic psychiatrist Dr. Yevgeniy Konstantinovich Krasnushkin, which was dedicated to experimenting with various psychological and medical methods of breaking interrogation subjects. The institute used prisoners as live test subjects, experimenting with a variety of drugs and techniques that sometimes left them incapacitated for life. Chikalov quoted a political investigator in the Belarusian NKVD as saying, “with the help of scientific knowledge we can break the resistance of an accused, even if he is cast out of iron.”[lv] Chikalov further described the use of a polygraph machine in Soviet interrogations, and claimed that Soviet researchers were also attempting to develop methods for reading minds, but that the research had not gotten far.[lvi] Nikolaevsky promised large sums of money for an article describing these experiments, and possibly help from the journalist in other areas—implying assistance with immigration.[lvii]
Chikalov himself had studied ways to perfect interrogation methods during his time at the Higher NKVD School, and he witnessed Soviet interrogators using injections that acted on prisoners like alcohol, reducing their inhibitions and loosening their tongue.[lviii] He wrote specifically about the interrogation of actor and stage director Vladislav Iosifovich Golubok, who had been arrested for alleged association with the Polish intelligence. Chikalov witnessed Golubok’s interrogation during the spring of 1937, and while Golubok disclaimed espionage on behalf of Poland, he received an injection that induced him talk openly about his Belarusian nationalist sentiments and to admit contacts with Belarusian nationalists in Poland. His openness led to a sentence in a prison camp, where he eventually died.[lix]
ChK/OGPU/NKVD history was taught at two main schools: the Higher School of the NKVD Forces and the Central School of the NKVD, both on Moscow. Old operational specialists with long experience taught at the school, and were careful to avoid crossing the boundary of providing too much sensitive information in their lectures. Curricula were developed through panels of specialists, under the supervision of a senior NKVD official. Teaching materials provided only general information about historical cases and did not delve deeply into details. The NKVD also maintained two museums, one for ChK/OGPU/NKVD history in general, in which a large amount of space was devoted to Feliks Dzerzhinsky, and another for NKVD forces specifically. The history museum also displayed equipment and chemicals used for clandestine communication, famous acts committed by foreign intelligence services, and the awards earned by past chekists. Chikalov wrote that he had visited the history museum once in 1928. The museum of the NKVD forces displayed material from cases in which the border guard forces had successfully prevented anti-Soviet organizations from penetrating the Soviet Union.[lx]
Nikolaevsky suggested openly for the first time in May 1949 the possibility of bringing Chikalov to the United States to allow him to write more easily and have access to a Russian library.[lxi] Chikalov reacted enthusiastically to the prospect. He complained that life in Germany was very hard; he did not even have a room to himself, and he viewed a move to the United States as a way to escape his uncomfortable life in Germany.[lxii] Nikolaevsky responded that he had two workable plans, one to emigrate to the United States and a back-up plan to move to France. He mentioned that Chikalov’s material so far had made a good impression in Washington. He never mentioned who in Washington was reading it,[lxiii] although Nikolaevky’s papers contain an English translation of one of Chikalov’s papers, titled System of Investigation in the MGB, translated by the U.S. Department of State Division of Language Services.[lxiv] Nikolaevsky promised that if his plan to bring Chikalov to the United States did not succeed, he also had good friends in France who would help Chikalov get settled there.
In July 1949, Nikolaevsky tried to connect Chikalov with Roman Borisovich Gul, a Paris-based Russian writer and publisher and friend of Nikolaevsky; the meeting never took place. However, besides him, Nikolaevsky advised Chikalov against associating with Russians in Germany. Chikalov responded that he had little association with other Russians, except those with whom he had served in the KONR, but was surprised by the Nikolaevsky’s warning.[lxv]
Beginning in July 1949, Chikalov recommended that letters to him be sent to the address of his girlfriend and future wife, Gertrude Pischek in Offenbach near Frankfurt.[lxvi] Chikalov’s last letter to Nikolaevsky was dated 31 August 1949, in which he mentioned that he planned to go to the French Zone of Germany for a job picking grapes.[lxvii] Nikolaevsky wrote letter to Chikalov dated 24 September 1949, and on 27 September Chikalov left for Saarbrücken to connect with an acquaintance of Nicolaevaky’s from Paris, possibly Gul. However, on 20 October, Pischek wrote an anxious letter to Nikolaevsky saying that she had not heard from him, and that they were to be married on 22 October.[lxviii]
Aleksandrov cites a story that the CIA had obtained intelligence that Chikalov traveled to Athens, Greece, at some unspecified time in 1948 or 1949, and the CIA sent Grachev, Chikalov’s former KONR superior officer, to Athens to identify him. Grachev supposedly spotted him, but Chikalov sensed the surveillance and disappeared again.[lxix] Aleksandrov uses this reported incident as evidence that Chikalov was a Soviet agent dispatched as a defector. However, inasmuch as Chikalov was openly writing letters to Nikolaevsky from Germany until late August 1949, there is no support for the CIA’s suspicion that Chikalov had traveled to Greece at all.
It appears instead that Soviet forces had kidnapped Chikalov in Germany and forcibly repatriated him to the Soviet Union. Chikalov is listed as “Almazov, aka Chekalov Aleksandr Fedorovich” in a list of repatriated individuals.[lxx] His repatriation date is listed as 1 October 1949, less than a week after he left Frankfurt to meet Nikolaevsky’s friend from France. By the time Gertrude Pischek wrote he heart wrenching letter, Chikalov had been in the Soviet Union for three weeks. He was convicted of treason in a Minsk military tribunal in August 1950 and presumably executed.[lxxi]
U.S. intelligence agencies probably were not aware of his repatriation. The confusion about his status as a U.S. agent from 1946-1947 caused by the uncoordinated actions of Operation RUSTY continued to resonate in U.S. intelligence channels years later. A file review of a CIA asset named Gleb Umnov, whom the CIA was deciding whether to retain as an asset in 1965, cites a CIC report indicating that Umnov was associated with Chikalov in 1947, and that Chikalov was a suspected Soviet agent. The CIC’s suspicion of Chikalov being a Soviet agent followed him into the grave.[lxxii]
Notes
- [i] CIC memo, “Operation HAGBERRY,” dated 24 December 1947, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 810.
- [ii] Manuscript biography of Almazov (A. Repin; pseudonyms of Chikalov), HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386). Chikalov mentions the biography in a letter dated 30 March 1949.
- [iii] Operation HAGBERRY” memo, pp. 1-2.
- [iv] He reverted to signing his name as Chikalov for the first time in a letter to Nikolaevsky, dated 13 January 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [v] Letter from Chikalov to Nikolaevsky, dated 26 April 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [vi] Letter from Carmel Offie to Nikolaevsky, dated 29 April 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [vii] Almazov (Chikalov), “Красный Террор” (“The Red Terror”), in Грозная Лубянка (Terrible Lubyanka), HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 4 (microfilm reel 199).
- [viii] Almazov (Chikalov), “Железный Феликс и его Преемники” (“Iron Feliks and His Successors”), in Грозная Лубянка (Terrible Lubyanka), HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 4 (microfilm reel 199).
- [ix] Almazov (Chikalov), “Материальное Положение Чинов НКВД” (“The Financial Status of NKVD Employees”), in Грозная Лубянка (Terrible Lubyanka), HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 4 (microfilm reel 199). The same essay is also listed as essay number VIII in an undated collection of essays in HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 8 (microfilm reel 199).
- [x] Iosif Stalin, "Головокружение от успехов" (“Dizzy with Success”), Pravda, 2 March 1930.
- [xi] Manuscript biography of Almazov, pp. 4-5.
- [xii] Almazov (Chikalov), “Схема Организации МВД-МГБ на Местах” (“Organization Scheme of the Local MVD-MGB”), in Грозная Лубянка (Terrible Lubyanka), HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 4 (microfilm reel 199); and Boris Nikolaevsky’s notes from his first encounter with Chikalov, “Из Записной Книжки” (“From a Notebook”), dated 17 August 1947; HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 9 (microfilm reel 199).
- [xiii] Almazov (Chikalov), “The Red Terror.”
- [xiv] Almazov (Chikalov) “О Процессах 1936-1938” (“On the Trials of 1936-1938”), essay number II in an undated collection of essays contained in HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 8 (microfilm reel 199).
- [xv] Almazov (Chikalov), “The Red Terror.”
- [xvi] Almazov (Chikalov) “По Делу Тухачевского” (“The Tukhachevsky Affair”), essay number III in an undated collection of essays contained in HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 8 (microfilm reel 199).
- [xvii] Letter from Chikalov to Nikolaevsky, dated 30 March 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [xviii] Almazov (Chikalov) “О Заковском и Реденсе” (“On Zakovskiy and Redens”), essay number IV in an undated collection of essays contained in HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 8 (microfilm reel 199).
- [xix] Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, Empire of Fear (London: Andre Deutsch, 1956), pp. 74-75.
- [xx] In another place he mentioned that gathered the signatures of 30 officers, in Boris Nikolaevsky’s notes from his first encounter with Chikalov, “Из Записной Книжки” (“From a Notebook”), dated 17 August 1947, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 9 (microfilm reel 199).
- [xxi] Almazov (Chikalov), “The Red Terror.”
- [xxii] Almazov (Chikalov), “The Red Terror.”
- [xxiii] Manuscript biography of Almazov/Repin, p. 7;
- [xxiv] Letter from Chikalov to Nikolaevsky, dated 16 June 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [xxv] Kirill Mikhailovich Aleksandrov, Генералитет и Офицерские Кадры Вооруженных Формирований Комитета Освобождения Народов России 1943–1946 гг. (General and Officer Corps of the Armed Formations of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia 1943-1946), dissertation for the Russian Academy of Sciences, Saint Petersburg History Institute, 2015, p. 939. See also NKVD document titled “Список изменников Родины и военных преступников из числа советских граждан, скрывающихся в американской и английской зонах оккупации Германии” (“List of Traitors to the Homeland and Military Criminals from among Soviet Citizens Hiding in the American and English Occupations Zones of Germany”), dated 21 November 1946; posted to blog entry by Igor Petrov, Один агент и три разведки: автобиография А.Ф.Кикалова и комментарии к ней (One Agent and Three Intelligence Services: Autobiography of A. F. Chikalov and Commentary), http://labas.livejournal.com/1052599.html. The provenance of this document cannot be verified.
- [xxvi] Boris Nikolaevsky’s notes from his first encounter with Chikalov, “Из Записной Книжки” (“From a Notebook”), dated 17 August 1947, pp. 8-9; HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 9 (microfilm reel 199).
- [xxvii] Almazov (Chikalov), “The Red Terror.”
- [xxviii] Aleksandrov, General and Officer Corps of the Armed Formations of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia 1943-1946, pp. 633-634; Kirill Mikhailovich Aleksandrov, Aрмия Генерала Власова 1944-1945 (General Vlasov’s Army 1944-1945) (Moscow: Yauza EKSMO, 2006), pp. 47, 49.
- [xxix] Aleksandrov, General and Officer Corps of the Armed Formations of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia 1943-1946, p. 636.
- [xxx] CIC memo titled “Alexej Chikalow Re: Contacts with Peter Shishkevich,” dated 14 July 1948, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 722, Shishkevich File.
- [xxxi] CIC Interrogation report, Wjatscheslav TUKHOLNIKOW, alias SOKOLOW, dated 25 December 1947, p. 2, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 810-811.
- [xxxii] CIC Case summary, titled “TUKHOLNIKOV, Wjatcsheslav, aka TUKHLNIKOV, Byatscheslaw (Slavko), SOKOLOW, Walentin and other Variations,” undated, but written between mid-1953 and mid-1954, p. 1, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 810-811.
- [xxxiii] CIC Case summary, titled “TUKHOLNIKOV, Wjatcsheslav, aka TUKHLNIKOV, Byatscheslaw (Slavko), SOKOLOW, Walentin and other Variations,” undated, but written between mid-1953 and mid-1954, p. 6, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 810-811.
- [xxxiv] CIC memo titled “Operation TOBACCO,” dated 13 September 1946, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 379, Kasatkin file.
- [xxxv] CIC Interrogation report, Wjatscheslav TUKHOLNIKOW, alias SOKOLOW, dated 25 December 1947, p. 2, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 810-811.
- [xxxvi] Geoffrey E. Duin, “Operation Rusty: The Gehlen-U.S. Army Connection,” MilitaryHistoryOnline.com, 15 July 2007, http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/operationrusty.aspx# (this link appears to have been removed).
- [xxxvii] G-2 USFET memo titled “Plan for Inclusion of the Bolero Group in Operation Rusty,” dated 2 July 1946, The National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB146/doc17.pdf. See also Kevin C Ruffner, “American Intelligence and the Gehlen Organization, 1945-1949: A Controversial Liaison Relationship,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 41 (1997), pp. 69-84, NARA, RG 263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 61.
- [xxxviii] G-2 USFET memo to Lt Gen Hoyt Vandenberg, titled “Operation RUSTY – Use of Eastern Branch of the Former German Intelligence Service, The National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB146/doc19.pdf.
- [xxxix] CIC memo titled “Alexej Chikalow Re: Contacts with Peter Shishkevich,” dated 14 July 1948, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 722, Shishkevich File.
- [xl] CIC Case summary, titled “TUKHOLNIKOV, Wjatcsheslav, aka TUKHLNIKOV, Byatscheslaw (Slavko), SOKOLOW, Walentin and other Variations,” undated, but written between mid-1953 and mid-1954, pp. 1-2, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 810-811.
- [xli] “Operation HAGBERRY” memo, p. 5.
- [xlii] Letter from Nikolaevsky to Chikalov, dated 24 October 1947, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [xliii] Outline for Biographical Essays, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386). The outline is undated, but Chikalov mentioned it in a letter to Nikolaevsky dated 30 March 1949.
- [xliv] Letter from Chikalov to Nikolaevsky, undated but written on 25 October 1948, after his release from prison, per Nikolaevsky’s response; HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386). Pozdnyakov gained a reputation for providing self-serving personal opinions about former KONR associates; Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule B, Vol. 1, Case 147 (interviewer S.H.), p. 2, in which the interviewer asserts that Poznyakov is “inclined to run people down.” See also Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule A, Vol. 22, Case 433 (interviewer S.H., type A4), p. 2a, for Poznyakov’s negative assessments of other subjects of this thesis: Vadim Andreyevich Denisov (interview subject 105), Vladislav Pavlovich Artemyev (interview subject 136), and Aleksandr Vladimirovich Anokhin (interview subject 147).
- [xlv] Letter from U.S. Constabulary School to Colonel C. F. Fritsche, Assistant Deputy Director of Intelligence, Headquarters European Command, 23 April 1947, CIA FOIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/MENDE%2C%20GERHARD%20VON_0015.pdf.
- [xlvi] Letter from Nikolaevsky to Chikalov, dated 24 March 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [xlvii] Letter from Chikalov to Nikolaevsky, dated 26 April 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [xlviii] Boris Nikolaevsky’s notes from his first encounter with Chikalov, “Из Записной Книжки” (“From a Notebook”), dated 17 August 1947, p. 8; HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 9 (microfilm reel 199).
- [xlix] Almazov (Chikalov), “О Таирове” (“On Tairov”), essay number I in an undated collection of essays contained in HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 8 (microfilm reel 199). There is no other evidence that Agabekov was involved with operations in China—he was supervising operations in the Near East at the time.
- [l] Viktor Nikolaevich Usov, Советская разведка в Китае. 20-е годы XX века (Soviet Intelligence in China, the Twenties of the XX Century) (Moscow: OLMA Media Group, 2002), p. 374, n775.
- [li] N. Bondar, “Рассказ бывшего преподавателя школы НКВД” (“Story of a Former NKVD School Instructor”), Народная Правда (Narodnaya Pravda), February 1949, pp. 17-19.
- [lii] Letter from Nikolaevsky to Chikalov, dated 30 March 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386). He continued to critique the article in his letter 26 April 1949 to Nikolaevsky.
- [liii] Bondar, “Story of a Former NKVD School Instructor,” p. 19.
- [liv] Bondar, “Story of a Former NKVD School Instructor,” p. 18.
- [lv] Almazov (Chikalov), “На Службе в Советской Разведке” (“In the Service of Soviet Intelligence”), undated typescrypt, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 7 (microfilm reel 199).
- [lvi] Letter from Chikalov to Nikolaevsky, dated 31 August 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 6 (microfilm reel 199).
- [lvii] Letter from Nikolaevsky to Chikalov, dated 14 April 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [lviii] Letter from Chikalov to Nikolaevsky, dated 5 June 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [lix] Almazov (Chikalov), Голубок (Golubok), undated manuscript and typescript, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386); see also Almazov, “In the Service of Soviet Intelligence,” pp. 8-12.
- [lx] Almazov (Chikalov), “Об Исторических Материалах НКВД” (“On Historical Materials of the NKVD”), essay number VI in an undated collection of essays contained in HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 8 (microfilm reel 199).
- [lxi] Letter from Nikolaevsky to Chikalov, dated 10 May 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [lxii] Letters from Chikalov to Nikolaevsky, dated 5 and 16 June 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [lxiii] Letter from Nikolaevsky to Chikalov, dated 8 June 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [lxiv] Almazov (Chikalov), System of Investigation in the MGB, undated HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 233, Folder 5 (microfilm reel 199).
- [lxv] Letter from Chikalov to Nikolaevsky, dated 24 July 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [lxvi] Letter from Chikalov to Nikolaevsky, dated 11 July 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [lxvii] Letter from Chikalov to Nikolaevsky, dated 31 August 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [lxviii] Letter from Gertrude Pischek to Nikolaevsky, dated 20 October 1949, HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).
- [lxix] Aleksandrov, General Vlasov’s Army 1944-1945, p. 47, 48.
- [lxx] “Список репатриированных сов. граждан прибывших в лагерь 226 из Западных зон оккупации Германии с 25.9.49 по 10.10.49г.” (“List of Repatriated Soviet Citizens Arriving at Camp 226 from the Western Occupation Zones of Germany from 25.9.49 through 10.10.49”), posted to blog entry by Igor Petrov, Один агент и три разведки: автобиография А.Ф.Кикалова и комментарии к ней (One Agent and Three Intelligence Services: Autobiography of A. F. Chikalov and Commentary), http://labas.livejournal.com/1052599.html. The provenance of this document cannot be verified.
- [lxxi] “Приказ Главного Управления Кадров Советской Армии” (“Order of the Main Administration of Personnel of the Soviet Army”), dated 10 January 1952, posted to blog entry by Igor Petrov, Один агент и три разведки: автобиография А.Ф.Кикалова и комментарии к ней (One Agent and Three Intelligence Services: Autobiography of A. F. Chikalov and Commentary), http://labas.livejournal.com/1052599.html. The provenance of this document cannot be verified.
- [lxxii] CIA memo to COS Germany, “Gleb UMNOV,” dated 8 December 1965, CIA FOIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/EMIL%2C%20AUGSBURG_0091.pdf.
Published works
- Written works in Hoover Institute Archives
- Nikolaevskiy Collection.