Biography
Lev Borisovich Helfand’s[i] status as a Soviet intelligence officer is not as firmly established as it is for others among the Yezhovshchina era defectors. Helfand identified himself as a diplomat when he defected and denied affiliation with a Soviet intelligence or security service. He never published revelations about his career and he quickly disappeared when he arrived in the United States. The conclusion that Helfand was an intelligence officer is based on a number of circumstantial but plausible reports, including information he provided during U.S. and British debriefings and multiple accounts from his early career that he had been involved in a variety of intelligence activities.
Not all who have analyzed Helfand’s career reached the same conclusion, and Helfand himself denied having been an OGPU officer. Paul W. Blackstock’s book, The Secret Road to World War Two: Soviet Versus Western Intelligence, 1921-1939, identified Helfand as the OGPU rezident in France in 1930 under cover as Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Paris, with Vladimir Borisovich Yanovich (real name Zakhar Ilyich Volovich) as his assistant.[ii] However, a review of Blackstock’s that appeared in Studies in Intelligence in 1970 pointed out a number of perceived inaccuracies in the book, and concluded that Helfand was a regular Soviet foreign service employee who “never had anything to do with the OGPU.”[iii] This statement may have originated with Helfand himself, who wrote in October 1955, “I was never connected with OGPU activities in any way either in Moscow or in Paris or elsewhere.”[iv] The asserts that Yanovich/Volovich was the actual rezident instead of Helfand, although the reviewer provided no further support for disassociating Helfand from the OGPU altogether.
Despite Helfand’s protestations to the contrary and some analysts’ denials, Helfand is included among the list of Soviet intelligence officer defectors based on multiple reports of his status.
Helfand was born in December 1900 in the town of Artemovka in the Poltava Governorate of Ukraine, the son of an estate steward. He attended school in Pereyaslavl and joined the Red Army in 1918. He soon became a unit commissar, following the path that many future Soviet intelligence officers followed. He was the chief of the political department of the Moscow Armored Brigade before he turned 20, and the Commissar of Red Army armored forces in 1921.[v] He was rumored to have been involved in repressive actions in the early years of the Soviet Union.[vi]
After the civil war, Helfand began a brief but quick-rising career as a political commissar in the Soviet transportation industry. He was named the chief of the political directorate for Lev Trotsky’s personal train, while also studying economics by correspondence at Moscow State University. Trotsky was undoubtedly aware that Helfand was the nephew of Israel Lazarevich Helfand, also known as Aleksandr Lvovich Parvus, a socialist theoretician who had significant influence on Trotsky’s thinking on the topic of permanent revolution, for which Trotsky became the primary proponent after Lenin’s death.[vii] Trotsky and Parvus had been close associates in the early 20th century, but they parted ways at the beginning of World War I due to a divergence of views on how socialists should react to the war.[viii] Trotsky probably still maintained some respect for his former friend, paving the way for Helfand’s position of trust on Trotsky’s staff.
Helfand was apparently noticed in this position, and after less than a year he became the assistant chief of the political secretariat of the People’s Commissariat of Transportation, led by none other than Feliks Dzerzhinskiy, who served simultaneously as chief of the OGPU. Helfand moved in 1923 to be the assistant director of TransPechat, the printing arm of the People’s Commissariat of Transportation, possibly in connection with the disbanding of political commissars. In 1924 he applied his expertise in managing transportation personnel in a book titled Командный Состав Транспорта СССР (Command Staff of USSR Transportation), published by TransPechat. The book, which may have been the culmination of Helfand’s university studies, begins with the following note to the reader:
This work of L. Helfand may appear at first glance to be somewhat dry. But that impression would be mistaken, because an analysis of the accounting and assignment of our transportation command staff personnel in the 7 years that have passed since the October Revolution and further perspectives in that regard have serious significance and could not but deeply interest those who want to see the very important sector of USSR economic life that is transportation set on a true course.[ix]
Helfand fell victim later in 1924 to one of the periodic Communist Party purges and was expelled from the party. He was probably caught up in Stalin’s effort to rid the party of Trotsky devotees, launched after the 13th Party Congress in May 1924. He was reinstated into the Party in 1925, and in September 1925 began a new career in the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, where worked for the next 15 years.
He received his first foreign assignment to Paris in March 1926, and reports soon began to circulate that he was an OGPU officer. He arrived as a clerk at the Soviet embassy in Paris, and was soon promoted to the rank of second secretary. He lived at the embassy and was feared by other embassy staff, who nicknamed him the “Eye of Moscow.”[x] Helfand may have had a security role at the embassy, as he was the embassy official who spoke to the press about the case in August 1927 of a Russian émigré woman who had come to the Soviet consulate requesting permission to return to the Soviet Union. She had visited the consulate several times over the previous several weeks, and the last time she came with a revolver saying “I wanted to kill someone, anyone,” and she shot an embassy guard.[xi]
A number of reports arose about Helfand’s intelligence and influence operations during his Paris assignment. In July 1929 he was reported to be in close contact with leaders of the French Communist Party and French trade unions, and he was suspected of running operations to distribute communist propaganda in Syria and Morocco. Soviet diplomatic defector Boris Bessedovsky claimed that, when a British man walked into the Soviet embassy in Paris in 1929 offering to sell Foreign Office cypher materials, Helfand met him and interviewed him.[xii]
Much of the basis for assessing that Helfand is an intelligence officer rests on the public response to and investigation of the kidnapping of tsarist General Aleksandr Pavlovich Kutepov, who disappeared from a Paris street on 26 January 1930. Kutepov’s kidnapping dealt a serious blow to the Russian émigré community in Paris and Russian-language newspapers devoted space for several months to following the details of the investigation. The Paris-based Russian émigré newspaper Vozrozhdenie first associated Helfand with the kidnapping and labeled him a chekist a week after the incident. Vozrozhdenie identified Helfand as one of the OGPU leaders in Paris,[xiii] who, as an assistant to Ivan Lvovich Arens (original name Iosif Izrailevich Arens), helped to organize the kidnapping.[xiv] Sudoplatov later claimed that the assassination was conducted by Yakov Serebryanskiy, assisted by his wife and a recruited agent inside the French police. He does not mention Arens or Helfand.[xv] However, there would plausibly have been embassy-based support for the operation.
Vozrozhdenie drew its conclusion from three pieces of evidence. The first was purported interviews with staff members of the Soviet embassy in Paris who admitted to a Soviet hand in Kutepev’s disappearance and claimed Helfand was involved.[xvi] The second was Helfand’s precipitous departure from Paris just two days after Kutepov’s disappearance, which the newspaper asserted proved his guilt.[xvii] Vozrozhdenie further identified Helfand’s replacement in Paris as Meshcheryakov, who arrived on 31 January 1930,[xviii] and who, according to SIS information was the new OGPU chief in Paris.[xix]
Vozrozhdenie was the primary source of these allegations, and Helfand’s name does not appear in the other émigré newspapers, such as in the extensive coverage of the kidnapping in the weekly newspaper Russia Illustrated, although that newspaper, as well as most others, quickly tied to the incident to the OGPU. However, the anti-Bolshevik activist Vladimir Burtsev also concluded that Helfand was a member of the OGPU rezidentura in Paris, and OGPU officer Meshcheryakov replaced him.[xx] Burtsev further asserted that when Helfand urgently left Paris he traveled to Berlin, where, using the name Hoffman, he met with two Swiss and a Hungarian to discuss setting up a new OGPU network there.[xxi] SIS also received reporting that corroborated Helfand’s status as an OGPU officer, although it is possible that the SIS’s source was either Burtsev or one of the same sources on which Vozrozhdenie based it reports.[xxii]
Helfand returned to Moscow to take up a position in the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. As of late 1932, he was chief of the Third Western Section, which was responsible for diplomatic affairs regarding Britain, USA, France, Spain, and Italy. A document in the Yakovlev Archive indicates that he was involved with the All-Union Society for Cultural Contacts Abroad (Всесоюзное общество культурной связи с заграницей; VOKS), which organized international exhibits and book showings in Moscow, and Soviet participation in international cultural events abroad.[xxiii] VOKS was a fertile hunting ground for OGPU influence operations targeting foreign countries.
He later claimed to have conceived of the idea to invite former French Prime Minster Edouard Herriot to visit the Soviet Union in September 1933. Helfand wrote that he was the designated People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs official who formally welcomed Herriot when he arrived at Odessa and accompanied him to all conferences and meetings during the trip, including to a meeting with Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov. Helfand then escorted Herriot to the Polish border for his departure from the USSR.[xxiv] Herriot had traveled to the USSR to strengthen the French-Soviet partnership against Germany, but the Soviet Union used the trip to show Herriot carefully selected and cleaned up sites in Odessa and Kiev to convince him that reports of famine and poverty in Ukraine were unfounded.[xxv] Such a trip would certainly have been organized and supported by either the OGPU or Ukrainian GPU.
Helfand’s next foreign assignment was at the Soviet embassy in Rome. He presented his diplomatic credentials to the Italian government on 2 December 1933,[xxvi] and remained in Italy for the next seven years until his defection. He was counselor to Soviet ambassador Boris Yefimovich Shtein from 1934 to 1939 both in his role as ambassador and as the Soviet Union’s representative to the League of Nations. As a diplomat in Rome Helfand was involved in diplomatic affairs leading up to the initiation of World War II, including explaining Soviet support to Spanish Republicans, reporting on negotiations related to the Munich Accords in September 1938 and reactions to Nazi Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, and reporting Italy’s reaction to the Soviet invasion of Finland in December 1939.
An April 1936 article in the Nazi Party newspaper Volkischer Beobachter reported on Soviet communist activities in Spain and stated that “the Jew Leo Helphand” was considered for the post of ambassador to Spain in 1936. The veracity of the report is unknown, and Marcel Izrailovich Rozenberg, another Jew, eventually became the Soviet ambassador to Spain in August 1936. The article repeated allegations that Helfand was an OGPU officer connected with Kutepov’s murder, but added that in his position in Rome he directed Soviet connections with a Slovakian terrorist named Ziga, which the article associated with the October 1934 assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia.[xxvii] No further information is available about Helfand’s association with King Alexander’s assassination, and the allegation could have been Nazi propaganda.
In May 1937, Helfand requested a visa to travel to Britain, and the British Consulate in Rome sought advice from London about whether to issue the visa.[xxviii] The Foreign Office solicited the views of British diplomats who had had contact with Helfand to determine whether his admission to Britain would be a threat. One Foreign Office official responded
I know Mr. Helfand (or Guelfand as he is called in Russia) well personally, as he was employed at the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow when I was at the [British] Embassy [in Moscow] between 1930 and 1932. He is the nephew, as he told me himself, of a formerly well-known Jewish Communist author who wrote in the 19th century under the name ‘Parvus.’ He had the reputation of being a GPU stalwart, and was said not only to have been concerned in the kidnapping of General Kutepov, but also to have been responsible in the early years of the revolution for a number of particularly brutal murders. It is, of course, in the nature of things impossible to state whether Guelfand is still a GPU man, but in my experience reputations of this sort in Russia are usually founded on fact. He always gave me the impression of being anti-British.[xxix]
Another Foreign Office official wrote,
I knew him slightly, but Mr. [Edward Maurice Berkeley] Ingram, our Counsellor in Rome, knows him pretty well, and used I believe to get a good deal of information of various kinds out of him. Other things being equal I think our embassy in Rome would prefer that he should not be excluded from this country. He is a very intelligent Jew; how far his activities are extra-diplomatic I can’t say.[xxx]
After soliciting advice, the Foreign Office cleared him for a visa on 7 June 1937.[xxxi] He did not attempt to make the trip, however.
As Nazi Germany’s aggressiveness intensified in the late 1930s, Helfand was in a position to view and report to Moscow Germany’s plans and Italy’s reactions. Helfand wrote a dispatch to Moscow dated 14 September 1938 summarizing the Italian views of the Nazi Anschluss of Austria, claiming that Italy was torn between its political obligations to Germany and its desire to avoid entering into a war in Germany’s favor. Helfand expressed confidence that Britain and France would not go to war over Czechoslovakia, but that Italy would use the Sudetenland crisis as a public propaganda opportunity, declaring for the benefit of foreign journalists that French military interference in Czechoslovakia would attach ideological significance to the crisis and force Italy to join on Germany’s side.[xxxii]
The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in August 1939 surprised not only Germany’s potential adversaries, but its allies as well. It is unclear whether Helfand had foreknowledge of the pact, but he told the British diplomat Neville Butler after his defection that “Stalin had been nibbling for an agreement with Hitler since 1933.” According to Helfand, only Hitler’s continued rejection of Soviet feelers caused Moscow to negotiate seriously with the Western powers.[xxxiii]
Italian security officials suspected Helfand of being involved in more than purely diplomatic activities.[xxxiv] Helfand cultivated Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano, Benito Mussolini’s son-in-law, becoming a close friend and meeting him informally for social activities. This relationship placed Helfand in a position to learn much about internal Italian political thinking and to influence Ciano in a Soviet direction. The Italian government maintained that the Soviet Union was a communist threat, especially after its involvement in Spain directly opposite German and Italian troops. When the Soviet Union invaded Finland on 30 November 1939 with Germany’s tacit acceptance, Italy was inclined to view Germany in the same negative light as it did the Soviet Union. Pro-Finnish demonstrations broke out in Italy and Italian press was critical of both the Soviet Union and Germany.[xxxv]
A new Soviet ambassador, Nikolay Vasiliyevich Gorelkin, arrived in Rome in October 1939 and was scheduled to present his diplomatic credentials to the Italian government on 12 December. However, Mussolini demanded that Gorelkin’s accreditation letter address the Italian King, Victor Emanuel III, as King of Italy and Albania, sending a clear message about Italy’s intentions toward the Balkans. This, along with Italy’s reaction to the Soviet-Finnish War, which included demonstrations in front of the Soviet embassy, prompted Moscow to recall Gorelkin even before the scheduled accreditation date. That left Helfand as charge d’affaires to represent the Soviet government in Rome until Gorelkin finally took his posting in June 1940, just before Helfand’s defection.
In March 1940, Ribbentrop met with Mussolini and Italian Foreign Minister Ciano to explain German policy toward the Soviet Union. He tried to pacify Italy, stating that the Soviet Union posed no danger as it had become nationalistic, had thrown the Jews out of office—apparently a reference to Stalin’s purges—and was no longer interfering in internal German affairs. However, as a Jew, Helfand was unfavorable to the Germans on multiple fronts. Helfand had gained an anti-German reputation in Rome, and the German government attempted as early as April to persuade Molotov to recall him in order to remove what they saw as an obstacle to Italian-Soviet, and hence Italian-German relations. The Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs eventually came to Germany’s side and sent Helfand a recall notice in June 1940.[xxxvi] His motivation to defect was thus aligned with those of other Yezhovshchina-era defectors—to avoid what he feared was a death sentence. His wife Sonia later claimed that his flight was motivated by fear that his recall was a preface to being purged, as was the case with many of his associates.[xxxvii] In Helfand’s curriculum vitae written in the early 1950s he also claimed that his emigration to the United States was in lieu of accepting a nomination to be ambassador to the newly established Vichy government, although that claim is not substantiated.[xxxviii]
Based on several indicators, Helfand’s assignment as a diplomat in Rome was probably cover for intelligence activities. The 1936 Nazi newspaper allegation noted above claiming that he was involved in Soviet support to communist agitation gives an uncorroborated indicator. More persuasive is the assessment that Soviet intelligence activities aimed against the Italian Fascist regime intensified soon after Helfand’s arrival in Rome.[xxxix] Assigning intelligence officers to senior diplomatic and commercial posts abroad was common in Soviet history, and Helfand may have been among those assignees. Although some of these officials formally transferred their employment to the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs or Foreign Trade, their allegiance remained with their more powerful intelligence employer. Arutyunov noted, for example, that the Soviet trade representative in Mashhad, Persia, in 1929 was a former OGPU officer who was “obliged to assist OGPU work.”[xl] According to Ginzberg, the NKVD suspected that British spies had penetrated the upper levels of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and the NKVD took steps to identify the penetrations.[xli] As the purge gained intensity in the late 1930s, it struck the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs particularly hard, and the ranks of purged diplomats were often replenished with NVKD and Razvedupr officers, who took greater control over Soviet foreign policy.[xlii]
Rather than accept a recall to Moscow, Helfand appealed to Ciano for assistance in fleeing Italy. Helfand also approached the U.S. ambassador, William Phillips, who assisted him and his wife to receive diplomatic visas on 15 July 1940.[xliii] Ciano helped him travel to Portugal, and from there to the United States.
Soon after defecting, Helfand sent Molotov a letter explaining his actions. He objected to the Soviet alliance with Nazi Germany, predicting that it would lead to the downfall of the Soviet Union and the destruction of the revolutionary movement for which Helfand and other old Bolsheviks, who had nearly all been liquidated, had fought so hard. Nevertheless, he promised to take no subversive actions against the Soviet Union and to simply emigrate with his wife and child to the safety of the United States.[xliv]
The NKVD pursued him after he arrived in the United States, but lost track of him. Elizabeth Bentley reported that Jacob Golos and Joseph Katz, both NKVD agents in New York, met the boat on which Helfand arrived in the United States. They tried to follow him but confused the license number of the vehicle in which he was riding and lost him. They later identified the car as belonging to a dentist in Brooklyn, and Golos took Bentley to the dentist’s office hoping to find Helfand. They also identified the apartment on Manhattan where Helfand was staying, but they lost him again.[xlv]
Soon after Helfand’s defection, Neville Butler, counselor in the British Embassy Washington, arrainged through the U.S. Department of State to interview Helfand. The State representative told Butler that Helfand was very apprehensive and was trying to conceal his presence in the United States out of fear of possible assassination. But Helfand agreed to an interview in September 1940. He talked to Butler about Soviet politics and economic policy, especially in relation to Germany. In particular, he discussed the steps that preceded the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the Soviets’ objectives in signing it. Helfand claimed that it would have been possible for the British to have come to an agreement with Stalin before the Soviet-German pact, despite Stalin’s suspicions of the British. But Stalin believed that the British were the ones that did not want an agreement, a belief partially based on comments by the British Ambassador in Berlin, which were passed, Stalin had been nibbling for an agreement with Hitler since 1933. Helfand also claimed to have predicted the collapse of France to the German onslaught six weeks before it occurred, but Stalin and Molotov did not believe him. He also decried the purge of military officers, which he claimed left the army crippled.[xlvi] A British Embassy economics expert interviewed Halfand again on 20 September 1940, and Helfand discussed in detail Soviet economic relations with Germany and Italy, especially in relation to oil.[xlvii]
After these interviews, Helfand traveled to Canada briefly so he could reenter the United States on a non-diplomatic visa. He told Butler that he as hoping to obtain a teaching position at Harvard University, but he needed a non-diplomatic immigration status to do that. He also requested assistance from the British Embassy to make contact with the British Petroleum Council, which the embassy did when Helafand returned from Canada.[xlviii]
Wilfred H. Gallienne, who was posted to the British Consulate General in New York City, interviewed Helfand in April 1941 about Soviet penetration of the British embassy in Rome. Helfand told Gallienne that he had had access to all British diplomatic telegrams from Rome, as well as internal communications and minutes of meetings between the ambassador and the commercial counselor. He claimed that the Soviet Union initially paid an employee of the British embassy in Rome $10,000 per month for the embassy communications, which was later reduced to $4,000. The source brought the materials to a Soviet official who photographed them and returned them a few hours later. Helfand stated that the embassy-based rezidentura in Rome ran the operation for about seven years, which allowed Helfand to see the materials in his diplomatically-covered position. During Helfand’s final year in Rome, the operation was transferred to an illegal rezidentura run by a businessman not affiliated with the embassy, after which Helfand no longer saw them. He stated that the Soviets had also penetrated other missions in Rome, notably the Japanese and Romanian.[xlix] Helfand related a similar account to the FBI, stating that, from conversations he had with Italian officials it appears that the Italians likely also had access to the same information.[l]
MI5 took issue with Helfand’s allegations, casting doubt on their credibility and asking that an MI5 Soviet specialist be allowed to “properly interrogate” him.[li] There is no record of a further debriefing. However, his detailed knowledge of a Soviet intelligence operation gives some reason to believe that he had some direct knowledge about it.
His intelligence status is further supported by his FBI debriefings, in which the FBI used Helfand as a source of information about Soviet intelligence activities. Helfand described to the FBI the construction of code rooms inside Soviet establishments.[lii] He described the profile of an NKVD officer under diplomatic cover, which the FBI used to confirm the NKVD status of Anatoliy Antonovich Yatskov (cover name Anatoliy Antonovoch Yakovlev), an NKVD officer who was involved in handling Soviet atomic spies Klaus Fuchs and Julius Rosenburg.[liii]
SIS, working through the FBI, introduced an officer to Helfand in 1947 to asking a series of questions that had vexed the SIS ad MI5 for years, such as the details of Soviet interceptions of British diplomatic communications from Rome during the 1930s. Helfand described himself as a close associate of OGPU and NKVD leaders, including Dzerzhinskiy, Trilliser, and Artuzov, but he continued to deny having been an intelligence officer himself. The SIS officer in contact with Helfand was very cautious about approaching the question of Helfand’s intelligence status hoping to draw from him as much information as possible without offending him.[liv]
For over a decade after Helfand’s defection the FBI continued to debrief him and use his information to support Soviet espionage investigations, displaying his photo to espionage suspects,[lv] and photos of Soviet espionage suspects to him for identification.[lvi] MI5 also operated under the assumption that Helfand was an OGPU officer and submitted a question about Theodore Mayl/Paul Hardt for the FBI to put to Helfand in a 1947 debriefing; Helfand claimed no knowledge of Maly/Hardt, which is plausible since Helfand was a diplomatically-covered officer, never an illegal.[lvii]
The CIA also had contact with Helfand. On 28 December 1953, Allan Dulles, Director of the CIA, sent a copy of Helfand’s curriculum vitae to Philippe de Vosjoli, the representative of the French intelligence service, the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE), in the United States. Dulles identified Helfand as “my friend,” saying that Helfand had sent Dulles a copy of the CV, which he said was the same one that Helfand had sent to Édouard Herriot the previous year. Dulles indicated that the CV might be of interest to de Vosjoli and the French ambassador.[lviii]
He changed him name to Leon Moore when he arrived in the United States and disappeared from public view as a Soviet official. He never made any public revelations about Soviet intelligence or denunciations of Stalin. He entered the import-export and shipping businesses and over the following ten years he became the President of Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., and President of Tampimex Oil Products, Inc. He was granted U.S. citizenship by special act of Congress on 29 December 1949.
Not all who have analyzed Helfand’s career reached the same conclusion, and Helfand himself denied having been an OGPU officer. Paul W. Blackstock’s book, The Secret Road to World War Two: Soviet Versus Western Intelligence, 1921-1939, identified Helfand as the OGPU rezident in France in 1930 under cover as Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Paris, with Vladimir Borisovich Yanovich (real name Zakhar Ilyich Volovich) as his assistant.[ii] However, a review of Blackstock’s that appeared in Studies in Intelligence in 1970 pointed out a number of perceived inaccuracies in the book, and concluded that Helfand was a regular Soviet foreign service employee who “never had anything to do with the OGPU.”[iii] This statement may have originated with Helfand himself, who wrote in October 1955, “I was never connected with OGPU activities in any way either in Moscow or in Paris or elsewhere.”[iv] The asserts that Yanovich/Volovich was the actual rezident instead of Helfand, although the reviewer provided no further support for disassociating Helfand from the OGPU altogether.
Despite Helfand’s protestations to the contrary and some analysts’ denials, Helfand is included among the list of Soviet intelligence officer defectors based on multiple reports of his status.
Helfand was born in December 1900 in the town of Artemovka in the Poltava Governorate of Ukraine, the son of an estate steward. He attended school in Pereyaslavl and joined the Red Army in 1918. He soon became a unit commissar, following the path that many future Soviet intelligence officers followed. He was the chief of the political department of the Moscow Armored Brigade before he turned 20, and the Commissar of Red Army armored forces in 1921.[v] He was rumored to have been involved in repressive actions in the early years of the Soviet Union.[vi]
After the civil war, Helfand began a brief but quick-rising career as a political commissar in the Soviet transportation industry. He was named the chief of the political directorate for Lev Trotsky’s personal train, while also studying economics by correspondence at Moscow State University. Trotsky was undoubtedly aware that Helfand was the nephew of Israel Lazarevich Helfand, also known as Aleksandr Lvovich Parvus, a socialist theoretician who had significant influence on Trotsky’s thinking on the topic of permanent revolution, for which Trotsky became the primary proponent after Lenin’s death.[vii] Trotsky and Parvus had been close associates in the early 20th century, but they parted ways at the beginning of World War I due to a divergence of views on how socialists should react to the war.[viii] Trotsky probably still maintained some respect for his former friend, paving the way for Helfand’s position of trust on Trotsky’s staff.
Helfand was apparently noticed in this position, and after less than a year he became the assistant chief of the political secretariat of the People’s Commissariat of Transportation, led by none other than Feliks Dzerzhinskiy, who served simultaneously as chief of the OGPU. Helfand moved in 1923 to be the assistant director of TransPechat, the printing arm of the People’s Commissariat of Transportation, possibly in connection with the disbanding of political commissars. In 1924 he applied his expertise in managing transportation personnel in a book titled Командный Состав Транспорта СССР (Command Staff of USSR Transportation), published by TransPechat. The book, which may have been the culmination of Helfand’s university studies, begins with the following note to the reader:
This work of L. Helfand may appear at first glance to be somewhat dry. But that impression would be mistaken, because an analysis of the accounting and assignment of our transportation command staff personnel in the 7 years that have passed since the October Revolution and further perspectives in that regard have serious significance and could not but deeply interest those who want to see the very important sector of USSR economic life that is transportation set on a true course.[ix]
Helfand fell victim later in 1924 to one of the periodic Communist Party purges and was expelled from the party. He was probably caught up in Stalin’s effort to rid the party of Trotsky devotees, launched after the 13th Party Congress in May 1924. He was reinstated into the Party in 1925, and in September 1925 began a new career in the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, where worked for the next 15 years.
He received his first foreign assignment to Paris in March 1926, and reports soon began to circulate that he was an OGPU officer. He arrived as a clerk at the Soviet embassy in Paris, and was soon promoted to the rank of second secretary. He lived at the embassy and was feared by other embassy staff, who nicknamed him the “Eye of Moscow.”[x] Helfand may have had a security role at the embassy, as he was the embassy official who spoke to the press about the case in August 1927 of a Russian émigré woman who had come to the Soviet consulate requesting permission to return to the Soviet Union. She had visited the consulate several times over the previous several weeks, and the last time she came with a revolver saying “I wanted to kill someone, anyone,” and she shot an embassy guard.[xi]
A number of reports arose about Helfand’s intelligence and influence operations during his Paris assignment. In July 1929 he was reported to be in close contact with leaders of the French Communist Party and French trade unions, and he was suspected of running operations to distribute communist propaganda in Syria and Morocco. Soviet diplomatic defector Boris Bessedovsky claimed that, when a British man walked into the Soviet embassy in Paris in 1929 offering to sell Foreign Office cypher materials, Helfand met him and interviewed him.[xii]
Much of the basis for assessing that Helfand is an intelligence officer rests on the public response to and investigation of the kidnapping of tsarist General Aleksandr Pavlovich Kutepov, who disappeared from a Paris street on 26 January 1930. Kutepov’s kidnapping dealt a serious blow to the Russian émigré community in Paris and Russian-language newspapers devoted space for several months to following the details of the investigation. The Paris-based Russian émigré newspaper Vozrozhdenie first associated Helfand with the kidnapping and labeled him a chekist a week after the incident. Vozrozhdenie identified Helfand as one of the OGPU leaders in Paris,[xiii] who, as an assistant to Ivan Lvovich Arens (original name Iosif Izrailevich Arens), helped to organize the kidnapping.[xiv] Sudoplatov later claimed that the assassination was conducted by Yakov Serebryanskiy, assisted by his wife and a recruited agent inside the French police. He does not mention Arens or Helfand.[xv] However, there would plausibly have been embassy-based support for the operation.
Vozrozhdenie drew its conclusion from three pieces of evidence. The first was purported interviews with staff members of the Soviet embassy in Paris who admitted to a Soviet hand in Kutepev’s disappearance and claimed Helfand was involved.[xvi] The second was Helfand’s precipitous departure from Paris just two days after Kutepov’s disappearance, which the newspaper asserted proved his guilt.[xvii] Vozrozhdenie further identified Helfand’s replacement in Paris as Meshcheryakov, who arrived on 31 January 1930,[xviii] and who, according to SIS information was the new OGPU chief in Paris.[xix]
Vozrozhdenie was the primary source of these allegations, and Helfand’s name does not appear in the other émigré newspapers, such as in the extensive coverage of the kidnapping in the weekly newspaper Russia Illustrated, although that newspaper, as well as most others, quickly tied to the incident to the OGPU. However, the anti-Bolshevik activist Vladimir Burtsev also concluded that Helfand was a member of the OGPU rezidentura in Paris, and OGPU officer Meshcheryakov replaced him.[xx] Burtsev further asserted that when Helfand urgently left Paris he traveled to Berlin, where, using the name Hoffman, he met with two Swiss and a Hungarian to discuss setting up a new OGPU network there.[xxi] SIS also received reporting that corroborated Helfand’s status as an OGPU officer, although it is possible that the SIS’s source was either Burtsev or one of the same sources on which Vozrozhdenie based it reports.[xxii]
Helfand returned to Moscow to take up a position in the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. As of late 1932, he was chief of the Third Western Section, which was responsible for diplomatic affairs regarding Britain, USA, France, Spain, and Italy. A document in the Yakovlev Archive indicates that he was involved with the All-Union Society for Cultural Contacts Abroad (Всесоюзное общество культурной связи с заграницей; VOKS), which organized international exhibits and book showings in Moscow, and Soviet participation in international cultural events abroad.[xxiii] VOKS was a fertile hunting ground for OGPU influence operations targeting foreign countries.
He later claimed to have conceived of the idea to invite former French Prime Minster Edouard Herriot to visit the Soviet Union in September 1933. Helfand wrote that he was the designated People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs official who formally welcomed Herriot when he arrived at Odessa and accompanied him to all conferences and meetings during the trip, including to a meeting with Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov. Helfand then escorted Herriot to the Polish border for his departure from the USSR.[xxiv] Herriot had traveled to the USSR to strengthen the French-Soviet partnership against Germany, but the Soviet Union used the trip to show Herriot carefully selected and cleaned up sites in Odessa and Kiev to convince him that reports of famine and poverty in Ukraine were unfounded.[xxv] Such a trip would certainly have been organized and supported by either the OGPU or Ukrainian GPU.
Helfand’s next foreign assignment was at the Soviet embassy in Rome. He presented his diplomatic credentials to the Italian government on 2 December 1933,[xxvi] and remained in Italy for the next seven years until his defection. He was counselor to Soviet ambassador Boris Yefimovich Shtein from 1934 to 1939 both in his role as ambassador and as the Soviet Union’s representative to the League of Nations. As a diplomat in Rome Helfand was involved in diplomatic affairs leading up to the initiation of World War II, including explaining Soviet support to Spanish Republicans, reporting on negotiations related to the Munich Accords in September 1938 and reactions to Nazi Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, and reporting Italy’s reaction to the Soviet invasion of Finland in December 1939.
An April 1936 article in the Nazi Party newspaper Volkischer Beobachter reported on Soviet communist activities in Spain and stated that “the Jew Leo Helphand” was considered for the post of ambassador to Spain in 1936. The veracity of the report is unknown, and Marcel Izrailovich Rozenberg, another Jew, eventually became the Soviet ambassador to Spain in August 1936. The article repeated allegations that Helfand was an OGPU officer connected with Kutepov’s murder, but added that in his position in Rome he directed Soviet connections with a Slovakian terrorist named Ziga, which the article associated with the October 1934 assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia.[xxvii] No further information is available about Helfand’s association with King Alexander’s assassination, and the allegation could have been Nazi propaganda.
In May 1937, Helfand requested a visa to travel to Britain, and the British Consulate in Rome sought advice from London about whether to issue the visa.[xxviii] The Foreign Office solicited the views of British diplomats who had had contact with Helfand to determine whether his admission to Britain would be a threat. One Foreign Office official responded
I know Mr. Helfand (or Guelfand as he is called in Russia) well personally, as he was employed at the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow when I was at the [British] Embassy [in Moscow] between 1930 and 1932. He is the nephew, as he told me himself, of a formerly well-known Jewish Communist author who wrote in the 19th century under the name ‘Parvus.’ He had the reputation of being a GPU stalwart, and was said not only to have been concerned in the kidnapping of General Kutepov, but also to have been responsible in the early years of the revolution for a number of particularly brutal murders. It is, of course, in the nature of things impossible to state whether Guelfand is still a GPU man, but in my experience reputations of this sort in Russia are usually founded on fact. He always gave me the impression of being anti-British.[xxix]
Another Foreign Office official wrote,
I knew him slightly, but Mr. [Edward Maurice Berkeley] Ingram, our Counsellor in Rome, knows him pretty well, and used I believe to get a good deal of information of various kinds out of him. Other things being equal I think our embassy in Rome would prefer that he should not be excluded from this country. He is a very intelligent Jew; how far his activities are extra-diplomatic I can’t say.[xxx]
After soliciting advice, the Foreign Office cleared him for a visa on 7 June 1937.[xxxi] He did not attempt to make the trip, however.
As Nazi Germany’s aggressiveness intensified in the late 1930s, Helfand was in a position to view and report to Moscow Germany’s plans and Italy’s reactions. Helfand wrote a dispatch to Moscow dated 14 September 1938 summarizing the Italian views of the Nazi Anschluss of Austria, claiming that Italy was torn between its political obligations to Germany and its desire to avoid entering into a war in Germany’s favor. Helfand expressed confidence that Britain and France would not go to war over Czechoslovakia, but that Italy would use the Sudetenland crisis as a public propaganda opportunity, declaring for the benefit of foreign journalists that French military interference in Czechoslovakia would attach ideological significance to the crisis and force Italy to join on Germany’s side.[xxxii]
The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in August 1939 surprised not only Germany’s potential adversaries, but its allies as well. It is unclear whether Helfand had foreknowledge of the pact, but he told the British diplomat Neville Butler after his defection that “Stalin had been nibbling for an agreement with Hitler since 1933.” According to Helfand, only Hitler’s continued rejection of Soviet feelers caused Moscow to negotiate seriously with the Western powers.[xxxiii]
Italian security officials suspected Helfand of being involved in more than purely diplomatic activities.[xxxiv] Helfand cultivated Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano, Benito Mussolini’s son-in-law, becoming a close friend and meeting him informally for social activities. This relationship placed Helfand in a position to learn much about internal Italian political thinking and to influence Ciano in a Soviet direction. The Italian government maintained that the Soviet Union was a communist threat, especially after its involvement in Spain directly opposite German and Italian troops. When the Soviet Union invaded Finland on 30 November 1939 with Germany’s tacit acceptance, Italy was inclined to view Germany in the same negative light as it did the Soviet Union. Pro-Finnish demonstrations broke out in Italy and Italian press was critical of both the Soviet Union and Germany.[xxxv]
A new Soviet ambassador, Nikolay Vasiliyevich Gorelkin, arrived in Rome in October 1939 and was scheduled to present his diplomatic credentials to the Italian government on 12 December. However, Mussolini demanded that Gorelkin’s accreditation letter address the Italian King, Victor Emanuel III, as King of Italy and Albania, sending a clear message about Italy’s intentions toward the Balkans. This, along with Italy’s reaction to the Soviet-Finnish War, which included demonstrations in front of the Soviet embassy, prompted Moscow to recall Gorelkin even before the scheduled accreditation date. That left Helfand as charge d’affaires to represent the Soviet government in Rome until Gorelkin finally took his posting in June 1940, just before Helfand’s defection.
In March 1940, Ribbentrop met with Mussolini and Italian Foreign Minister Ciano to explain German policy toward the Soviet Union. He tried to pacify Italy, stating that the Soviet Union posed no danger as it had become nationalistic, had thrown the Jews out of office—apparently a reference to Stalin’s purges—and was no longer interfering in internal German affairs. However, as a Jew, Helfand was unfavorable to the Germans on multiple fronts. Helfand had gained an anti-German reputation in Rome, and the German government attempted as early as April to persuade Molotov to recall him in order to remove what they saw as an obstacle to Italian-Soviet, and hence Italian-German relations. The Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs eventually came to Germany’s side and sent Helfand a recall notice in June 1940.[xxxvi] His motivation to defect was thus aligned with those of other Yezhovshchina-era defectors—to avoid what he feared was a death sentence. His wife Sonia later claimed that his flight was motivated by fear that his recall was a preface to being purged, as was the case with many of his associates.[xxxvii] In Helfand’s curriculum vitae written in the early 1950s he also claimed that his emigration to the United States was in lieu of accepting a nomination to be ambassador to the newly established Vichy government, although that claim is not substantiated.[xxxviii]
Based on several indicators, Helfand’s assignment as a diplomat in Rome was probably cover for intelligence activities. The 1936 Nazi newspaper allegation noted above claiming that he was involved in Soviet support to communist agitation gives an uncorroborated indicator. More persuasive is the assessment that Soviet intelligence activities aimed against the Italian Fascist regime intensified soon after Helfand’s arrival in Rome.[xxxix] Assigning intelligence officers to senior diplomatic and commercial posts abroad was common in Soviet history, and Helfand may have been among those assignees. Although some of these officials formally transferred their employment to the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs or Foreign Trade, their allegiance remained with their more powerful intelligence employer. Arutyunov noted, for example, that the Soviet trade representative in Mashhad, Persia, in 1929 was a former OGPU officer who was “obliged to assist OGPU work.”[xl] According to Ginzberg, the NKVD suspected that British spies had penetrated the upper levels of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and the NKVD took steps to identify the penetrations.[xli] As the purge gained intensity in the late 1930s, it struck the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs particularly hard, and the ranks of purged diplomats were often replenished with NVKD and Razvedupr officers, who took greater control over Soviet foreign policy.[xlii]
Rather than accept a recall to Moscow, Helfand appealed to Ciano for assistance in fleeing Italy. Helfand also approached the U.S. ambassador, William Phillips, who assisted him and his wife to receive diplomatic visas on 15 July 1940.[xliii] Ciano helped him travel to Portugal, and from there to the United States.
Soon after defecting, Helfand sent Molotov a letter explaining his actions. He objected to the Soviet alliance with Nazi Germany, predicting that it would lead to the downfall of the Soviet Union and the destruction of the revolutionary movement for which Helfand and other old Bolsheviks, who had nearly all been liquidated, had fought so hard. Nevertheless, he promised to take no subversive actions against the Soviet Union and to simply emigrate with his wife and child to the safety of the United States.[xliv]
The NKVD pursued him after he arrived in the United States, but lost track of him. Elizabeth Bentley reported that Jacob Golos and Joseph Katz, both NKVD agents in New York, met the boat on which Helfand arrived in the United States. They tried to follow him but confused the license number of the vehicle in which he was riding and lost him. They later identified the car as belonging to a dentist in Brooklyn, and Golos took Bentley to the dentist’s office hoping to find Helfand. They also identified the apartment on Manhattan where Helfand was staying, but they lost him again.[xlv]
Soon after Helfand’s defection, Neville Butler, counselor in the British Embassy Washington, arrainged through the U.S. Department of State to interview Helfand. The State representative told Butler that Helfand was very apprehensive and was trying to conceal his presence in the United States out of fear of possible assassination. But Helfand agreed to an interview in September 1940. He talked to Butler about Soviet politics and economic policy, especially in relation to Germany. In particular, he discussed the steps that preceded the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the Soviets’ objectives in signing it. Helfand claimed that it would have been possible for the British to have come to an agreement with Stalin before the Soviet-German pact, despite Stalin’s suspicions of the British. But Stalin believed that the British were the ones that did not want an agreement, a belief partially based on comments by the British Ambassador in Berlin, which were passed, Stalin had been nibbling for an agreement with Hitler since 1933. Helfand also claimed to have predicted the collapse of France to the German onslaught six weeks before it occurred, but Stalin and Molotov did not believe him. He also decried the purge of military officers, which he claimed left the army crippled.[xlvi] A British Embassy economics expert interviewed Halfand again on 20 September 1940, and Helfand discussed in detail Soviet economic relations with Germany and Italy, especially in relation to oil.[xlvii]
After these interviews, Helfand traveled to Canada briefly so he could reenter the United States on a non-diplomatic visa. He told Butler that he as hoping to obtain a teaching position at Harvard University, but he needed a non-diplomatic immigration status to do that. He also requested assistance from the British Embassy to make contact with the British Petroleum Council, which the embassy did when Helafand returned from Canada.[xlviii]
Wilfred H. Gallienne, who was posted to the British Consulate General in New York City, interviewed Helfand in April 1941 about Soviet penetration of the British embassy in Rome. Helfand told Gallienne that he had had access to all British diplomatic telegrams from Rome, as well as internal communications and minutes of meetings between the ambassador and the commercial counselor. He claimed that the Soviet Union initially paid an employee of the British embassy in Rome $10,000 per month for the embassy communications, which was later reduced to $4,000. The source brought the materials to a Soviet official who photographed them and returned them a few hours later. Helfand stated that the embassy-based rezidentura in Rome ran the operation for about seven years, which allowed Helfand to see the materials in his diplomatically-covered position. During Helfand’s final year in Rome, the operation was transferred to an illegal rezidentura run by a businessman not affiliated with the embassy, after which Helfand no longer saw them. He stated that the Soviets had also penetrated other missions in Rome, notably the Japanese and Romanian.[xlix] Helfand related a similar account to the FBI, stating that, from conversations he had with Italian officials it appears that the Italians likely also had access to the same information.[l]
MI5 took issue with Helfand’s allegations, casting doubt on their credibility and asking that an MI5 Soviet specialist be allowed to “properly interrogate” him.[li] There is no record of a further debriefing. However, his detailed knowledge of a Soviet intelligence operation gives some reason to believe that he had some direct knowledge about it.
His intelligence status is further supported by his FBI debriefings, in which the FBI used Helfand as a source of information about Soviet intelligence activities. Helfand described to the FBI the construction of code rooms inside Soviet establishments.[lii] He described the profile of an NKVD officer under diplomatic cover, which the FBI used to confirm the NKVD status of Anatoliy Antonovich Yatskov (cover name Anatoliy Antonovoch Yakovlev), an NKVD officer who was involved in handling Soviet atomic spies Klaus Fuchs and Julius Rosenburg.[liii]
SIS, working through the FBI, introduced an officer to Helfand in 1947 to asking a series of questions that had vexed the SIS ad MI5 for years, such as the details of Soviet interceptions of British diplomatic communications from Rome during the 1930s. Helfand described himself as a close associate of OGPU and NKVD leaders, including Dzerzhinskiy, Trilliser, and Artuzov, but he continued to deny having been an intelligence officer himself. The SIS officer in contact with Helfand was very cautious about approaching the question of Helfand’s intelligence status hoping to draw from him as much information as possible without offending him.[liv]
For over a decade after Helfand’s defection the FBI continued to debrief him and use his information to support Soviet espionage investigations, displaying his photo to espionage suspects,[lv] and photos of Soviet espionage suspects to him for identification.[lvi] MI5 also operated under the assumption that Helfand was an OGPU officer and submitted a question about Theodore Mayl/Paul Hardt for the FBI to put to Helfand in a 1947 debriefing; Helfand claimed no knowledge of Maly/Hardt, which is plausible since Helfand was a diplomatically-covered officer, never an illegal.[lvii]
The CIA also had contact with Helfand. On 28 December 1953, Allan Dulles, Director of the CIA, sent a copy of Helfand’s curriculum vitae to Philippe de Vosjoli, the representative of the French intelligence service, the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE), in the United States. Dulles identified Helfand as “my friend,” saying that Helfand had sent Dulles a copy of the CV, which he said was the same one that Helfand had sent to Édouard Herriot the previous year. Dulles indicated that the CV might be of interest to de Vosjoli and the French ambassador.[lviii]
He changed him name to Leon Moore when he arrived in the United States and disappeared from public view as a Soviet official. He never made any public revelations about Soviet intelligence or denunciations of Stalin. He entered the import-export and shipping businesses and over the following ten years he became the President of Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., and President of Tampimex Oil Products, Inc. He was granted U.S. citizenship by special act of Congress on 29 December 1949.
Notes
- [i] Photo from U.S. naturalization application for Leon Helfand Moore, New York, NY, 23 July 1941, Familysearch.org.
- [ii] Paul W. Blackstock, The Secret Road to World War Two: Soviet Versus Western Intelligence, 1921-1939 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), pp. 212, 224.
- [iii] “Book Reviews: The Secret Road to World War Two: Soviet versus Western Intelligence, 1921-1939, by Paul W. Blackstock,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 1970), pp. 113-125.
- [iv] Letter from Helfand to Lord Strang discussing the purported journal of Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov, dated 4 October 1955, CIA FOIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001165784.pdf.
- [v] Aleksandr Yakovlev Database http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/almanah/almanah-dict-bio/1010543/3. See also Helfand’s curriculum vitae prepared in about 1952, in which he describes his final position in the Red Army as Vice Commander of Armored Troops, CIA FOIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001165778.pdf.
- [vi] Minute dated 2 June 1937, NARA, KV 2/2681, serial 10a.
- [vii] Donald F. Busky, Communism in History and Theory: From Utopian Socialism to the Fall of the Soviet Union, Vol. 3 (Greenwood Publishing Co., 2002), p. 171.
- [viii] Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed: Trotsky 1879-1921 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), 219-220.
- [ix] L. B. Helfand, Командный Состав Транспорта СССР (Command Staff of USSR Transportation) (Moscow: TransPechat NKPS, 1924), p. 3, https://www.prlib.ru/item/718601.
- [x] Joint Intelligence Committee, “A Study of Defectors from the U.S.S.R.,” TNA, FO 1903/551, p. 11.
- [xi] “Покушение в Советском Консульстве в Париже” (“Attack at the Soviet Consulate in Paris”), Vozrozhdenie, 11 August 1927, p. 1.
- [xii] Joint Intelligence Committee, “A Study of Defectors from the U.S.S.R.,” TNA, FO 1903/551, pp. 11-12.
- [xiii] “Блоха” (“Blokha”), Vozrozhdenie, 18 February 1930, p. 1.
- [xiv] “Экстратерриториальные Преступники” (“Extraterritorial Criminals”), Vozrozhdenie, 8 February 1930, p. 1.
- [xv] Pavel Sudoplatov, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness, a Soviet Spymaster (Boston: Little, Brown,1994), page 91.
- [xvi] “Паника в Полпредстве” (“Panic at the Embassy”), Vozrozhdenie, 7 February 1930, p. 1
- [xvii] “Два Месяца” (“Two Months”), Vozrozhdenie, 25 March 1930, p. 1.
- [xviii] “Протест Литвинова” (Litvinov’s Protest), Vozrozhdenie, 14 February 1930, p. 1.
- [xix] Cross-reference note dated 15 February 1930, NARA, KV 2/2681, serial 3a.
- [xx] Vladimir Burtsev, “Парижская сеть ГПУ с 1925 г. с сетками коминтернa” (“The Paris GPU Network from 1925 with the Comintern Nets”), Hoover Institution Archive, Boris Nicolaevsky collection, Box 800, Folder 16 (Microfilm reel 744).
- [xxi] Cross-reference note dated 1 May 1930, NARA, KV 2/2681, serial 5a.
- [xxii] Cross-reference note dated 28 February 1930, NARA, KV 2/2681, serial 4a.
- [xxiii] “Заведующий Третьим западным отделом НКИД Гельфанд — Поскребышеву об изъятии записи беседы Барбюса со Сталиным” (“Chief of the Third Western Department of NKID Helfand to Poskrebyshev about removing the notes of Barbusse’s conversation with Stalin”), dated 17 October 1932, Document Database, Aleksandr N. Yakovlev Foundation, https://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1014988.
- [xxiv] Letter from Dulles to de Vosjoli, dated 28 December 1953, obtained from CIA FOIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001165778.pdf.
- [xxv] Nicolas Werth, Karel Bartošek, Jean-Louis Panné, Jean-Louis Margolin, Andrzej Paczkowski, Stéphane Courtois, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 159-160.
- [xxvi] Ricardo Maffei, “Il ‘Caso Helfand: La Defezione nel 1940 del Diplomatico Sovietico a Roma nei Documenti Americani” (“The ‘Helfand Case’: The Defection in 1940 of a Soviet Diplomat to Rome from American Documents”), Nuova Storia Contemporanea, Vol. 18, No. 5 (September-October 2014), pp. 49-74.
- [xxvii] Cross-reference note dated 22 April 1936, NARA, KV 2/2681, serial 7a.
- [xxviii] Telegram from British Consulate Rome, date 28 May 1937, NARA, KV 2/2681, serial 9a.
- [xxix] Minute dated 2 June 1937, NARA, KV 2/2681, serial 10a.
- [xxx] Minute dated 3 June 1937, NARA, KV 2/2681, serial 10a.
- [xxxi] Telegram dated 7 June 1937, NARA, KV 2/2681, serial 10a.
- [xxxii] USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Документы и Материалы Кануна Второй Мировой Воины 1937-1938 (Documents and Material on the Eve of the Second World War), Vol. 1 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981), pp. 153-154.
- [xxxiii] British Embassy Washington, DC, Report of interview with Helfand, 13 September 1940, TNA, FO 371/24845.
- [xxxiv] Ricardo Maffei, “Il ‘Caso Helfand, pp. 52-53.
- [xxxv] Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1954), p. 91.
- [xxxvi] Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1954), pp. 92-96.
- [xxxvii] Biography of Helfand’s wife titled “Sonia Moore: A Dedicated Life In Art,” The Bennett TheaterLab and Conservatory, https://www.bennetttheatrelab.com/history#biographies.
- [xxxviii] Letter from Dulles to de Vosjoli, dated 28 December 1953, obtained from CIA FOIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001165778.pdf.
- [xxxix] Brian R. Sullivan, “Soviet Penetration of the Italian Intelligence Services in the 1930s,” in Tomaso Vialardi di Sandigliano and Virgilio Ilari, eds., The History of Espionage: Italian Military Intelligence, Electronic Intelligence, Chinese Intelligence (Biella, Italy: Associazione Europea degli Amici degli Archivi Storici, 2005), p. 90.
- [xl] Georges Agabekov, ЧК за работой (The Cheka at Work) (Berlin: Strela, 1931), p. 79.
- [xli] Preliminary MI5 summary of Krivitsky’s information, dated 26 January 1940, TNA KV 2/804, serial 9a; MI5 Debriefing Notes, dated 5 February 1940, TNA, KV 2/804, serial 33a.
- [xlii] Barton Whaley, Soviet Clandestine Communication Nets: Notes for a History of the Structures of the Intelligence Services of the USSR, Research Program on Problems of International Communication and Security, Center for International Studies (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 1969), p. 138.
- [xliii] NARA, RG 59, General Visa Correspondence 1940-1945, 811.111/Diplomatic/15931.
- [xliv] MI5 Report sent to the British Consulate General in New York, dated 12 August 1940, NARA, KV 2/2681, serial 22a.
- [xlv] Signed statement by Elizabeth Bentley to the FBI, dated 30 November 1945, FBI file number 65-56402, serial 220, pp. 9-10.
- [xlvi] British Embassy Washington memo, 13 September 1940, TNA, FO 371/24845.
- [xlvii] British Embassy Washington memo, 25 September 1940, TNA, FO 371/24845.
- [xlviii] British Embassy Washington memo, 25 September 1940, TNA, FO 371/24845.
- [xlix] “Record of a Conversation with Mr. H.,” dated 14 April 1941, NARA, KV 2/2681, serial 17a.
- [l] Maffei, “Il ‘Caso Helfand,” p. 54.
- [li] MI5 memo, dated 23 June 1941, NARA, KV 2/2681, serial 22a.
- [lii] FBI New York memo, “Soviet War Plans, Amtorg Trading Corp., Internal Security – R,” dated 9 August 1946, file number 100-343044, serial 109.
- [liii] Case summary of Investigation of Harry Gold as contact of Klaus Fuchs, “FOOCASE, Espionage – R,” dated 25 May 1950, p. 260, FBI file number 65-58805, serial 1245.
- [liv] SIS memo titled “Answers to Your Questions in Enclosure “C” of your S/Y/1033 of January 28th,” undated, but forwarded to MI5 on 28 February 1947, TNA, KV 2/2681, serial 40a.
- [lv] FBI New York memo, [subject redacted], dated 3 July 1950, FBI file number 65-14778, serial 23.
- [lvi] FBI New York memo, “Julius Rosenberg, Espionage – R,” dated 18 September 1950, FBI file number 65-15348, serial 791.
- [lvii] Extract from FBI interrogation report, dated 28 February 1947, TNA, KV 2/1009, serial 68z.
- [lviii] Letter from Dulles to de Vosjoli, dated 28 December 1953, CIA FOIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001165778.pdf.
- [lix] Letter from Elizabeth Kelly, assistant to George Merck, to Allen Dulles, dated 17 June 1953, CIA FOIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001165769.pdf.
- [lx] Letter from Helfand to Dulles, dated 29 June 1955, CIA FOIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001165783.pdf.
- [lxi] Letter from Henry R. Luce to Helfand dated 26 April 1956; letter from Helfand to Dulles dated 1 May 1956, CIA FOIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001165232.pdf.
- [lxii] Letter from Helfand to Dulles dated 15 October 1953, and return letter from Dulles to Helfand dated 17 October 1953, CIA FOIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001165775.pdf.
- [lxiii] “Sonia Moore: A Dedicated Life In Art,” The Bennett TheaterLab and Conservatory, https://www.bennetttheatrelab.com/history#biographies. Sonia died in 1995 at the age of 93.