Biography
Leyba (Lev) Lazarevich Feldbin[i] was born 21 August 1895 in Bobruysk, in the Minsk governorate in the western Russian Empire. At the time, over half of the population of Bobruysk was Jewish, and Feldbin grew up in a Jewish family where his father was employed in the lumber industry. He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1917, and like many of his Party colleagues, he changed his Jewish-sounding name, taking the name Lev Lazerevich Nikolskiy. He used this along with many other names during his career, but is best known by the last pseudonym he used before his defection, and under which he published his revelations: Aleksandr Mikhailovich Orlov.
Feldbin’s story is one of fear and missed opportunities. Although Feldbin could have provided significant insights into Soviet priorities in the mid- to late-1930s, he waited 15 years to reveal anything, and then withheld large portions of what he knew and covered for it with fabrications and by contradicting and denigrating other defectors—particularly Samuel Ginzberg/Walter Krivitsky—who revealed aspects of Feldbin’s career that Feldbin had decided to keep secret. Feldbin did provide some insights into Soviet priorities and methods, and he shed light on the purge trials in 1936 through 1938. But he evaded questions about specifics and denied having knowledge of operations about which he should have been able to give significant details.
More published material has appeared by and about Fedlbin than about almost any other Soviet intelligence officer defector. Nevertheless, there continue to be strong disagreements about his career and about the credibility of his revelations. These disagreements spring from Feldbin’s own reluctance to open up about himself and his perpetuation of large gaps in his own story. His first revelations came to light in a four-part series in Life magazine in April 1953, in which Feldbin wrote about the inner workings of Stalin’s government and the purge trials.[ii] Later that year he published a fifth article in Life in which he described Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beriya.[iii] It is not a coincidence that both Stalin and Beriya were already dead when these unflattering articles appeared. The Life articles were collected and expanded into a book, The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes, published later in 1953, focusing primarily on Stalin’s approach to his opponents inside the Soviet government and his use of the NKVD to pursue and eventually eliminate opposition. Feldbin provides a brief autobiographic summary in this book, which, characteristic of his writings and debriefings, leaves many large holes.[iv] He also embedded some autobiographical glimpses in his later book Handbook of Intelligence and Guerilla Warfare, published in 1963.[v]
He tried in the 1950s to publish a more detailed autobiography in which he filled in some of the holes. But pre-publication reviewers emphasized the uneven reliability of the material and the lack of documentation for its assertions.[vi] The book was not published until 2004 long after Feldbin’s death, with the help of the executor of his papers, FBI special agent Edward Gazur.[vii]
Feldbin’s most glaring omissions in his story involve his operations directed against Great Britain. When he initially provided his career history he said nothing about having been the involved in British operations in 1926-1928 or his time as the illegal rezident in London in 1934-1935.[viii] Later, based upon questions supplied by MI5 to the FBI, Feldbin expressly denied working in Britain initially led both MI5 and the FBI to the incorrect conclusion that Orlov being debriefed in the United States was not identical to the Nikolsky/Orlov/Shwed about whom Ginzberg had reported during his 1940 MI5 debriefings.[ix] His denials are indicative of the fear that he continued to experience and the deal he made with Stalin when he defected 15 years earlier.
Several other authors have also published competing biographies of Feldbin. In 1977, Gordon Brook-Shepherd published Feldbin’s story in his book Storm Petrels, focusing, as is typical of Brook-Shepherd, on Feldbin’s life after defection.[x] In 1993, British historian John Costello and former KGB officer Oleg Tsarev published Deadly Illusions: The KGB Orlov Dossier Reveals Stalin's Master Spy, relying on material released by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) from Feldbin’s NKVD personnel file.[xi] While the SVR released only selective data and withheld much, the book filled many holes in Feldbin’s life history. That book prompted Edward Gazur, an FBI special agent who was assigned to handle Feldbin for the final two years of Feldbin’s life, to publish an adulatory book in 2002 that extolled Feldbin’s career and corrected what Gazur saw as Costello’s and Tsarev’s misrepresentations. Gazur admits that Feldbin became more than a professional contact, becoming part of the family; he noted that Deadly Illusions sent his blood pressure “somewhere into the infinity range.”[xii] Finally, in late 2014, former Russian intelligence officer Boris Volodarsky published a deeply flawed book on Feldbin’s life specifically intending to correct all of the lies that Volodarsky perceived had been told by and about Feldbin.[xiii] Unfortunately, his attempt to disabuse the world of the lies about Feldbin is itself filled with inaccuracies and undocumented assumptions.
In addition to these uneven biographic treatments are Feldbin’s debriefings in the United States and follow-on investigations in the United States and Great Britain, Feldbin’s 1955 and 1957 testimonies before the U.S. Senate, and other writings by Feldbin in which he provides information about Soviet intelligence activities in general. Between these various forums are insights into Soviet thinking derived from Feldbin’s 18-year career as an intelligence officer.
Fedlbin is unique among defectors because he made none of these insights known until 15 years after his defection. He succeeded where Ginzberg had failed; Feldbin lived in the United States quietly and unnoticed until after Stalin’s death, when he published his story for the first time. Some in the United States interpreted this lack of candor as evidence that he “remained a professional to the end of his days.”[xiv] For others, he was a frustrating source who took information to the grave that could have been used to avert grave damage to Western interests.
Brook-Shepherd and Gazur claim that Feldbin was the highest-ranking Soviet intelligence officer ever to defect to the free world. Conversely, one of Volodarsky’s main contentions against Feldbin is that ”[Orlov] could never be ‘the NKVD General’, because there were no such ranks there until long after he had disappeared from his post to surface in the United States.”[xv] The reality lies between Gazur’s overestimation of Feldbin’s rank—which was possibly encouraged by Feldbin himself—and Volodarsky’s underestimation based upon his fixation on discrediting Feldbin.
Feldbin held the rank of major of state security.[xvi] NKVD instituted a system of officer ranks in 1935 that corresponded with Army ranks for protocol purposes. A major of state security was the equivalent of kombrig, or in modern terms, a brigadier general. Feldbin also claimed to have held the rank of kombrig of Border Guards while he was in Tbilisi.[xvii] Poretskiy, Ginzberg, and Graff were all also kombrigs. Lyushkov, by comparison, held the rank of commissar of state security third rank, equivalent to a 3-star general—the rank equivalent that Brook-Shepherd mistakenly ascribed to Feldbin.[xviii] State security officers did not hesitate to flaunt their military rank equivalency to emphasize their importance; Feldbin was probably no different when he told an American audience that he was a general. Consequently, Feldbin was neither the highest-ranking Soviet intelligence defector, nor was his claim to being a general completely false.
Feldbin lived as a young boy in Bobruysk, in what is now Belarus, but when World War I began Feldbin’s father moved the family to Moscow where Feldbin studied at the Lazerevsky Institute of Oriental Languages. He then enrolled in the Moscow University School of Law in 1915. But his time at law school was short, because he was enlisted in the Russian Imperial Army in 1916 and served in the Urals. After the February Revolution, he enrolled in an officer training course and was commissioned as a junior officer in March 1917.
Feldbin’s early career benefited from his relationship with his cousin Zinoviy Borisovich Katsnelson, who was three years his senior. Katsnelson joined the ChK in 1918 and was assigned during the civil war as an investigator in a ChK Special Section (OO), responsible fore counterintelligence in the military forces.[xix] Feldbin was also a junior counterintelligence investigator at that time, and he claimed to have participated in the investigation of Xenophon Dmitriyevich Kalamatiano, an American émigré who ran a U.S. intelligence network in Russia soon after the revolution. Kalamatiano was arrested on 18 September 1918, and Feldbin described a scene in his memoirs when ChK investigators noticed that he was carrying a cane. When investigators inspected the cane, "Kalamatiano turned pale and lost his composure. The investigation soon discovered that the cane contained an inner tube and he extracted it. In it were hidden a secret cipher, spy reports, a coded list of thirty-two spies and money receipts from some of them."[xx]
In January 1920, Katsnelson was promoted to be the chief of the OO for the 12th Army, operating along the western Ukrainian border in the Polish-Russian War. In September of that year, Feldbin was also assigned to the 12th Army OO running counterintelligence and counter-guerilla operations,[xxi] likely working under his cousin. Feldbin describes an incident in which he captured a Polish colonel named Senkowski, who happened to be a boyhood friend of Feliks Dzerzhinskiy. Feldbin notified Dzerzhinskiy of the capture and in the process made a positive name with Dzerzhinskiy.[xxii]
In January 1921, Katsnelson transferred to be chairman of the Archangel Governorate ChK, and in early 1921 Feldbin followed him to Archangel as a counterintelligence officer in the ChK border guard detachment. While in Archangel, Feldbin married Maria Vladislavovna Rozhnetskaya, to whom he remained married for over 50 years. They were to have one child, Vera, who lived to only 16 years and died in the United States two years after Feldbin’s defection.
Feldbin and Katsnelson’s careers diverged for several years when Feldbin moved to Moscow in late 1921 to return to law school part-time while working as an assistant prosecutor in the Court of Appeals of the Soviet Supreme Court. During this time Feldbin participated in drafting the first Soviet criminal code and publishing articles in the journal Soviet Justice Weekly (Еженедельник Советской Юстиции).[xxiii] Feldbin claimed to have used the name Lev Lazerevich Nikolskiy during this time.[xxiv] But an SIS source described him as a jurisconsult using the name Leon (Lev) Nikolaev,[xxv] The SIS source’s information appears to be corroborated by two articles published in Soviet Justice Weekly in 1923 under the name L. Nikolayev: an article on 19 April 1923 about corruption among judges and prosecuting attorneys; and an article on 17 May 1923 discussing a corrupt prosecutor who demanded a bribe to release a group of suspected economic criminals.[xxvi] Another article on 26 April 1923, signed only L. N., described a 1922 case of corruption by employees of the state trade firm, Gostorg, who bought and sold cooking lard for personal profit.[xxvii]
Feldbin portrayed his own role as a public corruption investigator, aligning closely with the content of the Soviet Justice Weekly articles. He told his debriefers that in 1924, Dzerzhinskiy had assigned him to analyze a public corruption investigation involving government employees who had converted state property to their own use. He reported his results to a session of the Politburo, assessing that accused were not guilty of witting fraud or speculation. He claimed, however, that Stalin overruled his conclusion and ordered that the accused be executed anyway to make an example of them.[xxviii]
After finishing law school in 1924, Feldbin’s career rejoined Katsnelson, who had become the chief of the OGPU Economic Directorate in September 1922. Feldbin followed him in April 1924, re-entering Soviet state security as an employee in the Economic Directorate.[xxix] Feldbin never mentions Katsnelson as his supervisor, but did name Georgiy Ivanovich Blagonravov, who replaced Katsnelson as the chief at the Economic Directorate.[xxx] The Economic Directorate was particularly important in the OGPU in 1924, as it was the element responsible for investigating economic crimes and corruption, including tracking down businessmen who profited from the New Economic Policy. Feldbin’s legal background, especially his focus on public corruption, was valuable in those investigations, and Feldbin was promoted to lead the Financial Section in May 1924.[xxxi] This section was also responsible for intelligence activities run from Soviet trade missions abroad, such as Arcos in London and Amtorg in New York.[xxxii]
In April 1925, the OGPU sent Katsnelson to Tbilisi as Soviet Political Representative to the Transcaucasus Soviet Socialist Republic and Chief of the Transcaucasus OGPU as an interim replacement for Solomon Grigoryevich Mogilevskiy, who died in a plane crash on 22 March.[xxxiii] Later that year Feldbin also moved to Tbilisi to command a brigade of 11,000 OGPU border guard troops, wearing a rank of kombrig.[xxxiv] Georgia was a hot spot for the OGPU following a Menshevik August Uprising in 1924, which the OGPU violently suppressed with the active participation of the future chief of Soviet state security, Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria.[xxxv] Historian Amy Knight asserts that, although the August Uprising was defeated and the direct participants eliminated, the OGPU continued to cite "Menshevik danger" as an excuse for repressing Socialists in Georgia, killing at least 500 over the following two years.[xxxvi] It was in that context that Feldbin worked for a year in Tbilisi.
Feldbin’s career finally diverged from Katsnelson’s in early 1926 when Feldbin transferred to the INO in Moscow, where he worked in a section that oversaw and controlled foreign trade and equipment purchasing operations.[xxxvii] He was subsequently assigned to Paris in mid-1926 using the name Leon Nikolaev. Not long before Feldbin left Tbilisi, his wife Maria took their three-year-old daughter Vera on a boating trip and Vera fell ill. She contracted rheumatic fever that developed into rheumatic heart disease, a sickness that eventually took her life at age 16.[xxxviii] Volodarsky claims that Feldbin requested a foreign assignment specifically to obtain medical care for his daughter[xxxix]; Costello and Tsarev similarly speculate that Feldbin’s move to the INO may have been motivated by his desire to go abroad.[xl] Neither provides evidence for this assertion, although family was always a major factor in Feldbin’s decisions.
SIS information from the mid-1920s indicates that Feldbin (identified as Nikolaev) arrived in Paris in June 1926 under cover as Director of the Inspection Section of the Soviet Trade Mission. SIS identified him at that time as the OGPU chief in Paris responsible for monitoring the activities of the Trade Mission employees and running foreign intelligence collection operations.[xli] His operations also included penetrating Paris-based Russian and Georgian émigré organizations and monitoring foreign trade to prevent Western countries from overcharging Soviet purchasing agents.
The SIS’s information is similar to an undated study produced by the prominent Russian émigré journalist Vladimir Burtsev in about 1931, which similarly identified L. L. Nikolaev (Feldbin) as the OGPU chief in France from August 1926 to February 1928. Burtsev described him as an intelligent man who understood the value of recruiting specialists into OGPU work, and that Nikolaev/Feldbin handled several valuable sources in Paris.[xlii] One of these sources was Vladimir Petrovich Baggovut-Kolomiytsev,[xliii] a Russian émigré businessman in Paris. Baggovut-Kolomiytsev served as the general secretary of the Union of Return to the Homeland, a Soviet-sponsored group that encouraged tsarist-era Russian military officers to return to Russia. He had close ties with British businessmen, and he assisted the OGPU in financial operations particularly targeting anti-Soviet Russian émigrés in Europe. He became a business partner of Ivar Krueger, a successful Swedish businessman known as the “match king” because he ran a large company that manufactured matches. Baggovut-Kolomiytsev facilitated a large investment in Kreuger’s business by the monarchist military organization Russian All-Military Union (Русский Обще-Воинский Союз, ROVS). When Kreuger suddenly committed suicide in March 1932, the ROVS money disappeared, inflicting a devastating financial blow on the organization.[xliv]
Although Feldbin resided in Paris, his operations were at least partially focused toward Britain, especially after the May 1927 raid on the Arcos office in London, which resulted in the closure of the London rezidentura and transfer of what remained to Paris.[xlv] Feldbin denied ever having visited or operated against the UK.[xlvi] However, a letter intercepted by Scotland Yard in 1928 stated that Feldbin was involved in discussions about staffing at the London-based Arcos prior to its closure, and that he was in a position to approve the transfer of a Soviet agent to Amtorg in New York.[xlvii] His involvement in British operations was further indicated when Feldbin told U.S. authorities that he recognized a photograph of Soviet illegal William Fisher/Rudolf Abel during Fisher/Abel’s famous 1957 espionage trial. Feldbin told U.S. authorities that he remembered meeting him briefly at OGPU headquarters.[xlviii] Further details of Feldbin’s relationship with Fisher/Abel were noted in an August 1958 Studies in Intelligence article, which indicated that Feldbin was involved in handling Fisher/Abel when Fisher/Abel was first assigned to London in 1927 for training as a future illegal.[xlix]
Feldbin was in Paris until early 1928, when he was transferred to Berlin, where he served in the Soviet Trade Delegation until April 1931. His operations particularly focused on collecting science and technology information, including manufacturing processes to advance the Soviet Union’s armaments industry and to bolster the industrial base. The trade delegation also recruited German experts to travel to the Soviet Union because of a lack of expertise in the Soviet Union to apply the technology. Feldbin later wrote, “the fees paid by the Russian for such trips ran sometimes as high as $10,000,” but “the savings amounted to millions.”[l]
Feldbin may have also used his position in Germany to target Japan. Costello and Tsarev assess that Feldbin was speaking of his own operation when wrote about an approach to a Russian-born German manufacturing expert who had fallen on hard times to woo him to the Soviet Union to supervise the construction of a pencil-making plant. Pencils were not the main objective, as the man’s daughter worked in the Japanese embassy in Berlin and had access to the chargé d’affaires and the ambassador. The OGPU eventually informed the man that his employment was contingent on his ability to convince his daughter to supply information from inside the Japanese embassy. The man’s wife found about the deal and halted it at once, reportedly saying that the daughter “would never be a spy.”[li]
Feldbin was in Germany when the story broke about counterfeit U.S. banknotes being deposited in a Germany bank, about which Ginzberg later gave details. That incident, along with an increasingly hostile counterintelligence environment in Germany, in which industrial espionage was being more energetically investigated, led to Feldbin’s eventual withdrawal from Berlin in April 1931 and return to OGPU headquarters in Moscow.[lii]
Although Feldbin covered up the period of his career after his return to Moscow with a fictitious title as an employee in the export flax trust of the Soviet Union, his actual position was section chief in the OGPU Economic Department. Costello and Tsarev suggest that in this position Feldbin would have been aware of a German delegation that traveled to the Soviet Union in August 1932 ostensibly for trade negotiations under an organization called the Society for a Planned Economy, led by a leftist German political activist named Arvid Harnack. Harnack was recruited as a Soviet source and formed the nucleus of the Rote Kapella (“Red Orchestra”) Soviet intelligence network, which later became famous for operating inside Nazi Germany during World War II.[liii] Feldbin may have been involved in cultivating Harnack during his 1932 trip to Moscow, and Feldbin’s later assistant in Spain, Naum Markovich Belkin, was Harnack’s initial handler.[liv]
While assigned to Moscow, Feldbin traveled to the United States from September to November 1932 under the cover of a Soviet import specialist invited to by the General Motors Corporation, which hoped he would open the Soviet market to American-made cars. He denied conducting any intelligence activities in the United States during this trip, which he claimed was primarily for vacation.[lv] But his real missions were to study the English language and obtain a false U.S. passport for future operational use. He enrolled in an English language program at Columbia University and simultaneously at a Berlitz School of Languages in New York City.[lvi] Although he never mentioned it himself, he obtained, with OGPU assistance, a U.S passport in the name William Goldin, under which name he later worked as the illegal rezident in London.[lvii] The passport was facilitated by OGPU agent Jacob Golos, whose travel agency called World Tourists specialized in facilitating international travel to and from the United States by Soviet agents and Communist Party of the USA members. World Tourists was also deeply involved in passport fraud.[lviii]
Although Feldbin could have never predicted it, this brief trip to the United States caused complications with his immigration status in the United States over 20 years later. When INS agents realized in 1954 that the man calling himself Aleхandеr Orlov was the same man who visited the United States in 1932 under the name Leon Nikolaev, they questioned his legal status. He had denied membership in the Communist Party when he was traveling in an operational capacity in 1932, when his cover required that he draw no attention to himself. But when the INS was considering his legal residency in the United States in 1954, he admitted having been a member of the Communist Party and a senior Soviet government official.[lix] The discrepancy in his stories caused suspicion sufficient for the INS to initiate deportation proceedings. His debriefings were put on hold while he faced deportation,[lx] but on 25 July 1956 the U.S. Congress passed Public Law 810, giving Alexander and Maria Orlov legal residency in the United States.[lxi] Although he enjoyed legal residency in the United States from that point on, this experience left him suspicious and bitter.
Feldbin first employed his newly obtained passport as an illegal in 1933. But before that, he needed to improve his English further; his English language ability needed to be at a level sufficient for him to pose plausibly as an American businessman. He traveled to Vienna in early 1933 and enrolled in an English language course as a Russian using the name Leo Nikolaev, completing the course in July 1933—his open residence in Vienna under a Russian identity would come back to haunt him several years later. He then traveled to Geneva, Switzerland, to establish a persona as the American businessman William Goldin, who was recuperating from an illness. Once settled in Geneva as an illegal, much of his time was spent in Paris where he cultivated a source who claimed to have information about potentially recruitable French officers, and he pursued leads to recruit an officer in the French General Staff. However, his status as an illegal operating in France was abruptly cut short when he accidentally encountered a person named Vernik who had worked at the Soviet Trade Delegation in Paris while Feldbin, then known as Nikolaev, had worked there in the 1920s. The encounter damaged Feldbin’s cover as the American William Goldin, forcing him to abandon Paris in May 1934.[lxii]
The most glaring gap in Feldbin’s debriefings was his repudiation of any notion that he had ever worked in or against Great Britain. Ginzberg, in his 1940 MI5 debriefings, identified an individual named Nikolsky who preceded Maly as the OGPU illegal rezident in Britain under cover as an American businessman.[lxiii] Ginzberg later identified Nikolsky as using the names Shved (Swede), Lyova (the diminutive of the name Lev), and Orlov, all names used by Feldbin.[lxiv] Although Feldbin vigorously denied it,[lxv] Ginzberg’s description was clear; Feldbin operated as an OGPU illegal in England from mid-1934 to 1935.
After leaving Paris, Feldbin was initially posted to Copenhagen, from which he planned to run the Britain-based network, with Arnold Deutsch, another OGPU illegal living in London, as his assistant. Feldbin later established himself in London using his William Goldin passport under the cover of a representative of the American Refrigerator Company. Feldbin’s wife Maria was also involved in operational activity in London under the name Maria Feldbin, acting as a liaison officer for the rezidentura.[lxvi]
Maria was directly involved in Feldbin’s operations in most of his assignments. No sources clarify whether she was an intelligence officer herself or if she simply supported her husband's operations. She served as an NKVD courier in England, as well as in Feldbin’s other assignments in France and Spain. Although Feldbin never referred to his wife as an NKVD employee, he did assert during FBI debriefings that NKVD officers’ wives were usually used as couriers for NVKD operations.[lxvii] Feldbin’s later reluctance to admit any connection to the UK during his debriefings may have been not only to protect himself from Soviet retribution, but also to protect his wife. This scenario is further bolstered by Feldbin’s claim after his defection that his long delay in revealing himself in the West was to protect both his mother and his wife’s mother who both remained in the Soviet Union.[lxviii]
Feldbin’s time in the UK was distinguished by his handling of several of the most prominent spies ever to penetrate the British government: Kim Philby, Donald MacLean, and Guy Burgess. Feldbin never directly mentioned his involvement in the running of these Soviet sources, and Volodarsky insists that Feldbin did not originally recruit the “Three Musketeers,” as Philby, MacLean, and Burgess referred to themselves.[lxix] However, Costello and Tsarev’s analysis of oblique, possibly autobiographical references in Feldbin’s book, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare, in conjunction with Philby’s own writings and Soviet debriefing, shows that Feldbin was personally involved in their handling.[lxx]
Feldbin’s unwillingness to provide information about this period of his career, even though MacLean and Burgess had already defected to the Soviet Union and Philby had already left his position at the SIS when Feldbin revealed himself publicly in 1953, incurred more damage to his usefulness as a source than any other of his omissions. Feldbin’s information about Philby would have added substance to MI5’s investigation and could have led to Philby’s arrest, rather than his defection in 1963. It also could have given insights into the Soviet Union’s priorities in the mid-1930s, particularly the effort and expense that the OGPU put into developing young men who would eventually occupy positions of importance in the British foreign affairs and intelligence establishment. For example, the OGPU files on which Oleg Tsarev bases his research reportedly indicate that Feldbin proposed avenues for Philby to gain SIS employment as early as 1935. Philby gave the NKVD vital information gleaned from friends in the Foreign Office about British policy toward Germany.[lxxi]
Feldbin was also directly involved in Donald Maclean’s early espionage career, according to the information made available Tsarev. Feldbin took over control of MacLean in February 1935.[lxxii] The NKVD cultivated MacLean hoping that he would eventually be accepted in the Foreign Office, and Feldbin learned that Maclean achieved that goal just before Feldbin left Britain.[lxxiii]
Finally, he directed Arnold Deutsch to recruit Guy Burgess, first raising him as a potential recruit as early as August 1934.[lxxiv] Feldbin viewed Burgess’s flamboyant homosexuality as a hook that Soviet intelligence could use to entrap others into working as sources. Feldbin later wrote, “[Homosexuals] who agreed to work for the Russian network were instructed to approach other homosexual members of the diplomatic corps, a strategy which was remarkably successful.”[lxxv] Correspondingly, Feldbin used Burgess initially to identify other potential recruits who shared both Burgess’s left-wing political views and sexual perversion. Like Philby, Burgess’s primary target during Fedlbin’s time was the SIS.[lxxvi]
In October 1935, Feldbin’s cover as an American businessman was once again put in jeopardy when he inadvertently bumped into the man who had been his English teacher in Vienna in early 1933. As he had been living in Vienna as a Soviet citizen, his persona as an American businessman in London was destroyed.[lxxvii] He quickly abandoned his affairs in London, handing over responsibility for Philby and Maclean to Arnold Deutsch until Theodore Maly/Paul Hardt arrived as illegal rezident in London.[lxxviii] While Feldbin never personally admitted having been involved in such an incident, he wrote obliquely about a similar incident, describing it as a “…case which occurred with a friend and subordinate of mine…”, changing the city, but including many of the same details. He concluded that the incident was caused by a “blunder of policy on the part of the NKVD intelligence which allowed officers who had previously served in an official capacity in Soviet embassies and trade delegations abroad to be assigned to underground positions with false papers.” This described Feldbin himself. However, he further asserted, with some self-congratulations, that “work in the underground [as an illegal] is surrounded in Moscow with such an aura of heroism” that many officers try to get assigned as illegals out of a sense of pride.[lxxix] His adulation of illegals contrasts with Arutyunov’s account, however, which claimed that, from 1928 when Soviet intelligence officers began illegal operations abroad, few INO officers wanted to be assigned as illegals because such assignments lacked the diplomatic immunity and material benefits that diplomatically covered officers enjoyed.[lxxx]
The period between October 1935 and September 1936, after his return to Moscow, is the only time during which Feldbin admitted in debriefings to have had knowledge of intelligence reporting collected from British sources, although he denied knowing the identities of the sources. He explained his access to the British reporting claiming that reorganization of the INO was being considered in the fall of 1935, and he was tapped to lead several divisions, including those that handled British and U.S. matters.[lxxxi] However, Costello and Tsarev, citing Feldbin’s personnel file, assert that he continued to be directly involved in handling the promising young British sources, including presenting recommendations about how to most effectively target MacLean. Similar to Ginzberg, Feldbin recounted seeing a report in Moscow in fall 1935 that contained minutes of a meeting of the British Committee of Imperial Defence. The report discussed British perceptions about German rearmament, stating that Winston Churchill was in possession of information showing that Germany’s rearmament had progressed further than other sources had indicated.[lxxxii] This information likely originated from MacLean, whose reporting Feldbin read during this period. MacLean’s reporting also included minutes of British-German diplomatic exchanges and information about British decryption capabilities. At the same time that MacLean was providing photos of plain text Foreign Office cables, King was providing cipher office copies, which when put together would have enabled Soviet decryption operations targeting British communications.[lxxxiii]
Feldbin also provided a lead about an incident that occurred in early 1936 relating to Sir Anthony Eden, then serving as Foreign Secretary. According to Feldbin, Eden read a report over lunch or dinner about the Soviet Union and Uruguay breaking diplomatic relations, which occurred on 27 December 1935. Feldbin remembered that Eden had written a derogatory note about Stalin in the margin of the report. Eden’s dining companion mentioned the note to a friend who was a Soviet source, who reported the incident to his handler, who reported it to Moscow.[lxxxiv] MI5 investigated the incident in 1954-1955 and determined that it corresponded with an actual event that occurred in early January 1936, in which the Foreign Office received information about Comintern money financing a communist uprising in Brazil leading to Uruguay’s decision to sever diplomatic relations with Moscow. Eden did in fact write a note on the dispatch.[lxxxv] Feldbin’s knowledge of this rather obscure event initially bolstered his credibility in the eyes of MI5.[lxxxvi] However, the investigation was never able to trace the event to a specific person, especially 18 years after the event, although circumstantial suspicion was cast on MacLean.[lxxxvii]
Feldbin remembered seeing other reports from the same source bound in a loose-leaf binder,[lxxxviii] likely referring to the same binder that Ginzberg had mentioned in his MI5 debriefings in 1940.[lxxxix] Costello and Tsarev corroborate the assertion that MacLean was the source of these reports, stating that the information was voluminous and highly valued, providing Soviet leadership with important insights into British and German military planning.[xc] Unfortunately, Feldbin’s incomplete revelations during debriefings were too little, too late. MI5 had received Ginzberg’s information 13 years earlier and had already reached the conclusion that the source of these reports was MacLean, who was, by the time Feldbin talked, safely in the Soviet Union.[xci] As questions about Feldbin’s candor mounted, MI5 began to doubt whether Feldbin had learned about these events first hard, or if he had simply picked up rumors through association with other sources, like Hede Massing or Isaac Don Levine.[xcii]
It was also during Feldbin’s time in Moscow that he began to accumulate information that formed the basis for the four Life magazine articles that first brought him into the public eye in April 1953 and later formed the basis of his best-known book, The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes. In contrast to his reticence about revealing information about operations in Britain, Feldbin’s main contributions to the West’s understanding of the Soviet Union was his description of how Stalin systematically eliminated potential rivals within the Soviet government, leading to the purge trials in 1936 and 1937. Feldbin’s information gave a view on the trials that contrasted with Soviet-originated propaganda on which many in the West relied. Although he reveals few sources for his information and many of the events occurred after Feldbin had already transferred from to Spain, it substantially agrees with Ginzberg’s and Graff’s writings.[xciii]
Ginzberg described four methods that the NKVD used to persuade purge victims to confess to crimes that, in many cases, they could not have committed. Feldbin elaborated on these same methods.
1- The NKVD employed conveyer belt interrogations that physically and mentally wore down captives.
2- The NKVD drew from Stalin’s “private espionage service,” which gathered information about the public and private lives of Stalin’s rivals, offering a pool of incriminating information when Stalin chose to act against them.
3- The NKVD planted agents-provocateurs in prisons adjacent to the intended victims to act as incriminating “witnesses” and “accomplices.”
4- Stalin offered deals and promises of safety for victims’ family members and friends.[xciv]
Ginzberg described Abram Slutskiy’s interrogation of Sergey Vitalyevich Mrachkovskiy, an old Bolshevik and civil war military commander, in which Slutskiy wore down his resistance with emotional arguments, appealing to Mrachkovskiy’s Bolshevik roots and belief that only the Party could save the Soviet people.[xcv] Feldbin similarly described Mrachkovskiy as being emotionally broken, and thence persuaded to provide testimony against his former colleague Ivan Nikitich Smirnov, another old Bolshevik who had been arrested as an oppositionist to Stalin.[xcvi] Stalin valued the demoralizing impact that testimony of a friend, colleague, or family member had on a defendant, and the NKVD used Mrachkovskiy’s testimony this way to break Smirnov.[xcvii]
Stalin’s used the NKVD as a personal resource to gather compromising information about potential rivals. In addition to running an internal security service and a foreign intelligence service, NKVD Chief Genrikh Georgiyevich Yagoda collected potentially compromising information that Stalin could use as leverage over Soviet officials. The information might involve an indiscretion at home, a sexual scandal, or any expression of religious belief. Most damning was any history of Tsarist employment prior to the revolution, a lukewarm revolutionary past, or even the absence of Tsarist persecution. The NKVD, under Yagoda’s leadership, was Stalin’s eyes and ears within the ruling circles, and any conversation or insufficient zeal in extolling Stalin’s greatness could place a Soviet official in danger.[xcviii]
The NKVD chose pliant people as agents-provocateurs to serve as defendants during the trial of the Sixteen to give incriminating testimony about the most prominent of the defendants, Zinoviev and Kamenev, and against Stalin’s archenemy, Trotsky. One of these, Valentin Pavlovich Oldberg, had been an OGPU seksot in the early 1930s in Germany targeting Trotsky and had endeavored to develop contacts among Trotsky supporters. Later the OGPU engineered his assignment as a teacher at the Marxist-Leninist School of the Pedagogical Institute in Gorkiy where the OGPU suspected a cell of Trotsky supporters was forming. According to Feldbin, the NKVD manufactured a Trotskyist plot to assassinate Stalin and ordered Oldberg to testify about it at the trial. Feldbin describes similar roles for other defendants, including Isak Isayevich Reingold, who was chosen because of his personal acquaintance with Kamenev; and Richard Vitoldovich Pickel, who had worked in Zinoviev’s secretariat.[xcix] They acted their roles and gave their falsified testimony against Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev as ordered. But, rather than being rewarded for their obedience, they were executed along with the rest of the Sixteen.[c]
Feldbin described instances during the purge trials when children were used as leverage to coerce defendants or their close associates to give the testimony that Stalin demanded. Feldbin was in London on 7 April 1935 when the Soviet government announced a new law that treated children aged 12 and above the same as adults in criminal matters. Soviet diplomats abroad were placed in the awkward position of explaining the law to an incredulous West.[ci] Feldbin writes that the law was initially designed to clear away the thousands of children left parentless by the deaths and imprisonments resulting from forced collectivization. But this law also proved to be valuable as an interrogation tool during purge trial investigations. The children of defendants in the trial of the Sixteen disappeared after their fathers’ executions, either sent to prison camps or executed as enemies of the people. The following year, when Yuriy Leonidovich Pyatakov was in custody for an alleged Trotskyist plot, the NKVD coerced his wife to testify against him. According to Feldbin, she agreed to give falsified testimony to save her children, knowing what had happen to defendants’ children the previous year.[cii] Feldbin further states that Nikolay Nikolayevich Krestinskiy, a co-defendant of Pyatakov in the second purge trial, was dedicated to his only daughter, making him vulnerable to threats against his family.[ciii]
While the existence of these methods during the purge trials was not completely unknown in the West, Feldbin’s extensive exposition in The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes shed new light on Stalin’s brutality to opposition several years before Nikita Khrushchev unveiled Stalin’s cult of personality in his “Secret Speech” in February 1956.
Feldbin’s most prominent, and final, Soviet position was as NKVD chief in Spain beginning in September 1936. As with all of Feldbin’s information, his reports about his time in Spain contain large gaps through which run veins of fact. He claimed to have been the senior Soviet advisor to the Spanish Republican government, meeting frequently with Spanish leaders, such as Premier Juan Negrin and Defense Minister Indalecio Prieto. He obtained from these officials reports of how well Soviet supplied equipment was performing on the battlefield, indicating that Stalin personally preferred his reports over those provided by the Razvedupr. He further claimed to have established counterintelligence and sabotage schools and to organize attacks on Franco’s forces behind enemy lines.[civ] He vehemently denied Ginzberg’s reports about political purges in Spain similar to those occurring in the Soviet Union in 1936 and 1937, claiming that such allegations must have originated with Trotskyist newspapers.[cv] However, Costello and Tsarev, citing Fedlbin/Orlov’s NKVD files, identified networks of agents that penetrated Spanish political parties to identify Fascist spies and Trotskyists, leading to numerous arrests.[cvi]
Feldbin’s dismissal of Ginzberg’s information related to Spain laid the foundation for his denials of other details given by Ginzberg that were clearly accurate, particularly about Feldbin’s activities in Britain. Ginzberg writes that he learned from Abram Slutskiy about a meeting held on 14 September 1936 at which Nikolsky/Feldbin was assigned to Spain to establish an NKVD presence.[cvii] Feldbin uses that assertion as evidence of Ginzberg’s ignorance, claiming the date is clearly wrong because Feldbin had already left for Spain before 14 September, and that the decision to send him was made in July.[cviii] It is fully possible, however, that such a meeting did occur on the date Ginzberg cited at which Feldbin’s assignment to Spain was discussed. Feldbin also contradicted Ginzberg’s claim of supplying arms to Spanish Republicans, stating that “not a single gun” arrived in Spain via networks noted by Ginzberg and that that no Soviet aircraft ever arrived in Spain.[cix] If Feldbin could paint Ginzberg as an unreliable source, he could plausibly contradict Ginzberg in relation to other matters that Feldbin had taken great care to keep hidden.
While in Spain, Feldbin once again handled Philby when the NKVD paid for his travel in February 1937 as a freelance journalist to report on the civil war. Philby’s NKVD assignment was to gather information about the Francoist military and about German and Italian troops supporting Franco. Additionally, in April, Maly instructed Philby to “discover the system of guards, primarily of Franco and then of other leaders.” He was to identify vulnerabilities in Franco’s security measures, Franco’s routines, and places where he stayed. In short, he was to get close enough to Franco to develop information that could be used in an eventual assassination plot.[cx] Ginzberg provided a similar account in his 1940 MI5 debriefing, stating that Yezhov instructed Maly to recruit an English source to arrange for Franco’s assassination. Although Ginzberg did not know the name of the individual that Maly chose, he described him as “a young Englishman, a journalist of a good family, an idealist and fanatical anti-Nazi,” which MI5 over 20 years later realized was Philby.[cxi] Maly and Deutsch, however, questioned whether Philby possessed the internal fortitude to perform such a risky mission.[cxii] Maly’s and Deutsch’s concerns about Philby’s suitability for an assassination mission proved accurate, and no assassination operation was ever attempted.
Philby’s intelligence from inside Franco’s headquarters was valuable in informing the Soviet leadership about the plans and strategies of Nationalist troops, even if the assassination plot never materialized. Feldbin never mentioned Philby, and denied knowledge of any Englishman being sent to Spain to assassinate Franco. However, he did admit that the Soviets had a source with almost daily access to Franco.[cxiii] Soviet archival information cited by Tsarev indicates that the Soviet source was likely Philby, with whom Feldbin arranged to meet twice a month in France across the border from Spain to receive his reports.
One of the operations in Spain for which Feldbin is best known is the transport of Spanish gold reserves to the Soviet Union. In September 1936, the Republican government moved the Spanish treasury from Madrid to near Cartagena to protect it from advancing Francoist troops. The move was not a secret, and the Francoist government protested publicly.[cxiv] But in October, Feldbin reported receiving a classified telegram from Yezhov providing further instructions about what to do with the gold:
“Together with Rosenberg [Soviet ambassador in Spain], arrange with the head of the Spanish government, Caballero, for the shipment of the gold reserves of Spain to the Soviet Union. Use for that purpose a Soviet steamer. This operation must be carried out with the utmost secrecy. If the Spaniards demand from you a receipt for the cargo, refuse. I repeat, refuse to sign anything, and say that a formal receipt will be issued in Moscow by the State Bank. I hold you personally responsible for the operation. Rosenberg has been instructed accordingly.”[cxv]
This telegram set off an NKVD operation that resulted in an estimated $600 million dollars of Spanish gold being shipped to Moscow, ostensibly for safe keeping. But Feldbin claimed to have learned from Slutskiy that Stalin had no intention of ever returning the gold.[cxvi] Stalin viewed it as payment for the military manpower and hardware that the Soviet Union was supplying the Spanish Republican government. The gold transfer became sore point between the Spanish and Soviet governments, and Khrushchev was forced to justify it in 1957—over 20 years after the event—claiming that it did not even fully cover the cost of Soviet military support to Spain during the civil war.[cxvii]
Feldbin’s responsibilities in Spain also included setting up intelligence and sabotage schools for Spanish communists to operate behind enemy lines.[cxviii] He wrote about NKVD support to Spanish Republican guerillas, although he never mentioned his own role in setting up schools for International Brigade volunteers who displayed special loyalty to the Soviet Union and aptitude for clandestine operations.[cxix] These efforts had long-ranging implications that yielded fruit for the NKVD well past the Spanish Civil War. A number of Soviet intelligence agents later investigated in the United States began their careers in the Abraham Lincoln Battalion, including Morris Cohen, William Weisband, Amadeo Sabatini, Zalmond David Franklin, and Michael Sidorovich. Additionally, several U.S. Army officers who ran anti-Fascist operations for the Office of Strategic Services during World War II were International Brigade volunteers in the late 1930s.[cxx] After WWII, the FBI began to recognize the connections between Americans who had served in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain and communist activities in the United States. Fedlbin could have provided illuminating details to assist FBI investigations of former Abraham Lincoln Brigade members, but never did.
In early 1954, Feldbin provided a point-by-point critique of Ginzberg/Krivitsky’s book, In Stalin’s Secret Service.[cxxi] Then, in 1955, the FBI provided MI5’s monograph of Ginzberg’s debriefings to Feldbin and asked him to comment.[cxxii] Feldbin agreed substantially with Ginzberg’s information that was unrelated to Soviet activities in Spain or Britain. However, Feldbin denigrated Ginzberg as a low-level OGPU non-commissioned officer who was in Holland only as a stay-behind agent in case of war with Germany. He claims that Ginzberg was never a Razvedupr general, and that Ginzberg himself never claimed to be one. Feldbin deflected all questions that would have indicated any involvement in OGPU operations in or against Britain. He may have been directing a disparaging glance at Ginzberg when he wrote “some ambitious careerists among the Soviet intelligence officers prod their informants to steal documents marked ‘top secret,’ with high-sounding letterheads such as ‘Office of the Foreign Minister’ or ‘Committee of Imperial Defense’ with the sole purpose of impressing Moscow with their ability to rummage freely in the secret files of foreign governments.”[cxxiii] MI5 assessed that, compared to Ginzberg, Feldbin knew little of interest to the British and that “Orlov’s evident jealousy and dislike of Krivitsky tends to distort the value of what little information he has to give.”[cxxiv]
With regard to Spain, Feldbin claimed that Ginzberg’s comments were fictional and inspired by Trotskyist propaganda. The competing stories of Soviet activities in Spain need to be read within their separate contexts. Ginzberg was a support player in Spanish events, not at the center. Nevertheless, while Ginzberg may have made some misstatements or spoken beyond his own experience, there are no known occasions when Ginzberg intentionally provided inaccurate information. Feldbin, on the other hand, was at the very center of the events in Spain so should have had more reliable first-hand knowledge, but he also is known to have omitted many pertinent details and even lied in regards to his own role and mission. His information about people and events separate from himself tended to be accurate, but whenever a story touched on Feldbin himself he prevaricated.
Feldbin claimed that he began to have doubts about his service to the Soviet Union as early as 1936 when he had a first-hand view of Stalin’s pursuit of old Bolsheviks. Then, in July 1937, Feldbin’s cousin Zinoviy Katsnelson, who by 1937 was a senior NKVD officer with the rank commissar of state security second rank, was arrested and became one of thousands of NKVD officers swallowed up in purges. He was executed in March 1938.[cxxv] Simultaneous with Katsnelson’s arrest, Feldbin received a cable from Moscow warning him that the NKVD has learned of a plot to kidnap Feldbin in Spain. NKVD headquarters informed him that 10 bodyguards from Moscow would be coming to Spain to protect his life. Feldbin, already frightened by the arrest of his cousin and many other colleagues, suspected that the bodyguards themselves were the real plot against his life, and cabled back informing Moscow that he already had a bodyguard made up of Spanish communists. But he decided to reinforce his security detail with a dozen “tough” German communists who he felt he could trust more than local Spanish guards or an NVKD-supplied security detail.[cxxvi]
Then in June 1938, Feldbin received a message summoning him to a meeting on board a Soviet ship in port at Antwerp, Belgium. He was convinced that the invitation was a trap—he may have even used similar invitations himself, as in the case of British International Brigade Volunteer Brian Goold-Vershoyle. He decided that his time had come to escape. He began to travel to France as if he would continue to Belgium, collected his wife and daughter, who were already staying in France away from the war zone, and went to the U.S. embassy in Paris to request asylum. The U.S. embassy was closed for the eve of the Bastille Day holiday, so he went from there to the Canadian legation and requested a visa to enter Canada as a tourist. The family boarded a ship later that same night, and arrived in Canada on 21 July 1938.[cxxvii]
Just after his defection Feldbin sent a letter to Yezhov promising to maintain secrecy, but appealing to him for his own and his mother’s safety: “If you leave me alone, I will never embark on anything harmful to the Party or the Soviet Union. I have not committed, nor will I commit, anything damaging to the Party and our country. I solemnly swear to the end of my days not to utter a word that may harm the Party that brought me up or the country in which I grew up.” He added, “I ask you to issue an order not to disturb my old mother. She is now 70; she is innocent. I am the last of her four children to survive and she is a sick and unhappy creature.” His letter referred to his daughter, stating that his “sole purpose now is to survive to bring up my child until she comes of age.”[cxxviii] She was to survive for only two years after his defection. Of note, however, the letter does not mention his mother-in-law, although he later included his mother-in-law’s safety in his justification for why waited until 1953 to reveal himself.
The NKVD may have kept its side of the bargain by officially declaring him dead. On 3 October 1940, the NKVD issued an order removing Feldbin from the ranks of the NKVD by cause of death.[cxxix] The NKVD new he was still alive once he revealed himself in 1953, but the order may have been an administrative device to cut off pursuit of him to prevent him from fulfilling his threat.
In the same letter he wrote multiple pages of sensitive operational details covering operations in France, Britain, and Spain, including information about Donald Maclean and Kim Philby. He included code names of officers who had participated in Poretskiy’s assassination and who had penetrated Trotsky’s organization in France. He included information about the purge trials, as well as assassination operations in Spain. His inclusion of these details was a clear threat to Yezhov that he had the capability to harm Soviet interests if he, his immediate family in the United States, or his mother who remained in the Soviet Union were ever harmed. He already suspected that the NKVD had tried to lure him back. He was well aware of Poretskiy’s fate and had probably personally dispatched International Brigade volunteers, such as Goold-Vershcoyle, from Spain to Russia to face their destruction. Thus he knew what the NKVD was capable and willing to do.
The details in his letter belied many of the denials that he gave U.S. officials after he made his presence known 15 years later. Costello and Tsarev applauded Feldbin's "ingenuity and audacity [that] were typical of [his] carefully contrived operations...," particularly in relation to his work in Spain.[cxxx] He appears to have applied this same ingenuity and audacity to his personal history. Feldbin had fifteen years to develop, perfect, and memorize a version of his personal history that highlighted certain parts and eliminated others. He read the writings of other defectors and contrived explanations for the inconsistencies between his story and theirs. By the time the FBI interviewed him beginning in 1953, a time of his choosing, he was ready to give them only what he intended and nothing else.
U.S. authorities had an opportunity to talk to Feldbin soon after his arrival but did not pursue it. In September 1938, John F. Finerty, a lawyer who Feldbin had contacted for immigration help, introduced Feldbin to James A. Houghteling, the Commissioner for Immigration and Naturalization. Houghteling’s assistant sympathized with Fedlbin’s concerns for his safety, and paved the way for him and his family to stay in the United States in secret. It appears that Houghteling did not consider introducing Feldbin to anyone in the U.S. government that might be interested in an NKVD officer.[cxxxi] Then, in December 1940, Finerty introduced Feldbin to Attorney General Francis Biddle when the Alien Registration Act placed Feldbin in a situation that would potentially require him to expose himself. Biddle’s direct involvement in the case paved the way for Fedlbin to be allowed to register without identifying his whereabouts.[cxxxii] Biddle, however, never informed the FBI of this arrangement.
Feldbin came to the United States hoping to hide from the NKVD’s long arm. Ginzberg’s suspicious death in the United States in 1940—whether perpetrated by a Soviet hand or his own—occurred only two years after Fedlbin had arrived, and cemented Feldbin’s resolve to stay hidden and to keep his mouth shut.[cxxxiii] Only Stalin’s death in 1953, and the expectation that his mother had died sometime previous to that, gave him sufficient confidence to make his presence pubic. Even so, Feldbin wrote, “the death of Stalin has not diminished the threat to my life.”[cxxxiv]
The FBI began its debriefings in May 1953 from the embarrassing position of only just having learning that a Soviet intelligence officer had been living in the United States for 15 years without the FBI knowing about it. J. Edgar Hoover wrote in anger, “Just who is this NKVD general writing for Life magazine?”[cxxxv] As early as October 1953, the FBI began sharing the results of its debriefings with MI5, but MI5 quickly became frustrated because of the FBI’s slowness in answering MI5’s inquiries about leads in Feldbin’s material, assuming that the FBI was loath to admit that a senior NKVD officer had lived in the United States unnoticed.[cxxxvi] But the FBI’s slowness was based not on the FBI’s unwillingness to share, but on Feldbin’s reticence.
MI5’s suspicion was fueled by an FBI stipulation at the outset that the MI5 could not share Feldbin’s debriefings with the SIS.[cxxxvii] In January 1954 MI5 considered asking the FBI to lift that restriction so MI5 could get SIS’s views of Feldbin’s material.[cxxxviii] No response is recorded. It is unclear on whose initiative the FBI instructed MI5 to boycott the SIS. It might have been on Feldbin’s insistence, based on his knowledge of Soviet penetrations of the SIS through which his information could have made its way into Soviet hands in violation of the agreement he had offered Soviet authorities in return for his safety. However, the FBI also had reason to suspect that the British government was penetrated, especially after Burgess and MacLean defected to the Soviet Union in 1951.
Although Feldin’s information was out of date and incomplete by the time he began speaking to the FBI, it was not completely without value. The CIA distributed an excerpt from Feldbin/Orlov’s Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare in the spring 1963 issue of Studies in Intelligence. The article was accompanied by the header: “a thoughtful former insider examines in depth Soviet (and Western) intelligence services.” It was recommended as warranting special presentation to the intelligence community.[cxxxix]
Feldbin contrasted the Western and Soviet intelligence mindset in his article: “Both Soviet and Western intelligence strive to learn the secret intentions, capabilities, and strategic plansof other states, but they don't go about it in the same way. The Russians believe that such important secrets can and should be procured directly from the classified files in offices ofthe government in question and from informants among its civil servants.” Soviet intelligence organizations viewed the Western method of gathering large amounts of information and hiring educated specialists to make sense of it as being “one step removed from mysticism and metaphysics.” The Soviet method was to provide insider information to leaders, Stalin in particular, and let them draw their own conclusions.[cxl]
Feldbin described eight Soviet intelligence emphases that showed the Soviet mindset of merging intelligence and covert action into a unified state security enterprise. While Feldbin’s information about these emphases was over 25 years old when his writings appeared, they nevertheless gave insights into the Soviet intelligence activities that had not changed significantly in the intervening years.
1. Diplomatic intelligence: Learn the true intentions of capitalist countries toward the Soviet Union, operating under the assumption that capitalist countries’ intentions were harmful to Soviet interests.
2. Military intelligence: Learn the military posture of Western and other countries;the quality and strength of their armies, navies, and air forces;their degree of mechanization, mobility, fire power, technological advancement, and modernization; and the productive capacity of the armament industries and the mobilization plansof the major powers.
3. Economic warfare: Soviet leaders assumed that Western trade partners colluded to overcharge and bilk the Soviet Union of its money. Consequently, Soviet state security was charged with controlling Soviet export and import operations and protecting Soviet foreign trade from perceived pressures and abuses of international cartels and other organizations of monopolistic capital.
4. Misinformation: The Soviet government was not only interested in obtaining information from other countries’ inner decision making circles but also in inserting misinforming and misleading information into those circles concerning Soviet position and intentions.
5. Infiltrating foreign intelligence and security services: Soviet intelligence services sought to penetrate foreign intelligence counterparts both to counter foreign intelligence threats directed against the Soviet Union, and to take advantage of the special accesses to information the intelligence employees enjoyed. The Soviet Union wanted to know how others perceived the Soviet Union and on what information they based those perceptions.
6. Political action: Similar to misinformation, the Soviet government sought to recruit sympathetic, high-level foreign decision makers, through which the Soviet Union could “tip the scales of policy in favor of the Soviet Union.” Targets included government leaders and politicians who influenced their country’s policymaking processes.
7. Industrial intelligence: Soviet intelligence sought to steal production secrets from the advanced countries of Europe and America, including industrial production processes, new inventions, and secret technological breakthroughs, to assist in the industrializing the Soviet Union.[cxli] In the 1920s and early 1930s, the OGPU focused much of its industrial collection on Germany and France. But in subsequent years, the OGPU viewed the United States as a “storehouse of industrial know-how.”[cxlii]
8. Guerilla Warfare: Soviet intelligence officers conducted guerilla warfare and trained foreign guerillas in tactics and techniques, including sabotage and covert penetrations.[cxliii]
These Soviet intelligence missions reflected an ever-present assumption that Western countries were dangerous enemies bent on destroying the Soviet Union. Although in the 1963 context this was not a startling revelation, Feldbin’s information, combined with reporting from other defectors, like Ginzberg, Graff, and Volodarsky, showed a Soviet perception in the 1930s that differed little from the Cold War adversarial approach to the West.
But this material was the exception. He attempted various other publications over the following decades with uneven results. In April 1956, Feldbin published another article in Life magazine claiming the Stalin arrested and executed Tukhachevskiy and his military colleagues in 1937 because they had learned of a secret that Stalin had long suppressed—that Stalin himself was an intelligence source of the Tsarist Okhrana. The article appeared two months after Nikita Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech,” in which Khrushchev criticized Stalin’s cult of personality. Feldbin wrote that, “Happily the current turn of events in the Soviet Union has made it possible for me to publish the facts myself. Khrushchev now no doubt knows them; there is no longer a reason for me to keep silent.”[cxliv] Feldbin‘s Life article was followed by an expose by Isaac Don Levine that claims to have located an Okhrana document proving the story was true.[cxlv] Rumors of Stalin’s Okhrana collaboration had circulated for many years but had never been proven. Levine’s purported evidence, however, was later shown to be a forgery, and the allegation was never taken seriously.
In June 1965, Feldbin wrote a letter to Henry Luce, the owner of Life magazine, promising a new story “no less sensational” than his book The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes. He asked for Luce’s help to publish materials based on “genuine documents and photostats, the authenticity of which will be so evident that the Kremlin itself won’t even try to contest it.” He did not detail the substance of the new spectacular revelations, but warned that the “plan would seriously endanger my life if my former associates get wind of it prematurely.” An assistant to Henry Luce wrote a courteous letter in return, but there is not further indication that the magazine pursued the story.
For the rest of his life, he continued to write and consult with U.S. officials on Soviet intelligence topics. Near the end of his life he reviewed several books about Soviet intelligence, such as Paul Blackstock’s book, The Secret Road to World War II (probably 1970), Elizabeth Poretsky’s book, Our Own People: A Memoir of Ignace Reiss and His Friends (March 1970), and a chapter titled “The Case of the British Engineers” in Lord William Strang’s book Home and Abroad (June 1971).[cxlvi] In these reviews he compares his personal memories with the details in these works, often overlaying the cover stories that he had been telling his debriefers for years. There is no indication that these reviews were ever published.
Feldbin died nearly 20 years after he revealed himself publicly. He continued to frustrate FBI and CIA debriefers, especially as it became increasingly apparent that his information was incomplete. Costello and Tsarev’s book, published 20 years after Feldbin’s death—and 55 years after his defection—provided the first glimpse into the areas that Feldbin refused to reveal. Subsequent biographies, particularly those by Gazur and Volodarsky, as well as Feldbin’s own autobiography, portrayed competing images of Feldbin, shedding only a little additional light. All of these sources, combined with materials that the FBI and MI5 have made public, give a reasonably complete picture of Feldbin’s career. While the long delays limited the impact that his information could have and meant that his insights into Soviet decision making were primarily historical, his detailed information about the purge trials and Soviet intelligence mindsets in general are still read today.
Feldbin’s story is one of fear and missed opportunities. Although Feldbin could have provided significant insights into Soviet priorities in the mid- to late-1930s, he waited 15 years to reveal anything, and then withheld large portions of what he knew and covered for it with fabrications and by contradicting and denigrating other defectors—particularly Samuel Ginzberg/Walter Krivitsky—who revealed aspects of Feldbin’s career that Feldbin had decided to keep secret. Feldbin did provide some insights into Soviet priorities and methods, and he shed light on the purge trials in 1936 through 1938. But he evaded questions about specifics and denied having knowledge of operations about which he should have been able to give significant details.
More published material has appeared by and about Fedlbin than about almost any other Soviet intelligence officer defector. Nevertheless, there continue to be strong disagreements about his career and about the credibility of his revelations. These disagreements spring from Feldbin’s own reluctance to open up about himself and his perpetuation of large gaps in his own story. His first revelations came to light in a four-part series in Life magazine in April 1953, in which Feldbin wrote about the inner workings of Stalin’s government and the purge trials.[ii] Later that year he published a fifth article in Life in which he described Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beriya.[iii] It is not a coincidence that both Stalin and Beriya were already dead when these unflattering articles appeared. The Life articles were collected and expanded into a book, The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes, published later in 1953, focusing primarily on Stalin’s approach to his opponents inside the Soviet government and his use of the NKVD to pursue and eventually eliminate opposition. Feldbin provides a brief autobiographic summary in this book, which, characteristic of his writings and debriefings, leaves many large holes.[iv] He also embedded some autobiographical glimpses in his later book Handbook of Intelligence and Guerilla Warfare, published in 1963.[v]
He tried in the 1950s to publish a more detailed autobiography in which he filled in some of the holes. But pre-publication reviewers emphasized the uneven reliability of the material and the lack of documentation for its assertions.[vi] The book was not published until 2004 long after Feldbin’s death, with the help of the executor of his papers, FBI special agent Edward Gazur.[vii]
Feldbin’s most glaring omissions in his story involve his operations directed against Great Britain. When he initially provided his career history he said nothing about having been the involved in British operations in 1926-1928 or his time as the illegal rezident in London in 1934-1935.[viii] Later, based upon questions supplied by MI5 to the FBI, Feldbin expressly denied working in Britain initially led both MI5 and the FBI to the incorrect conclusion that Orlov being debriefed in the United States was not identical to the Nikolsky/Orlov/Shwed about whom Ginzberg had reported during his 1940 MI5 debriefings.[ix] His denials are indicative of the fear that he continued to experience and the deal he made with Stalin when he defected 15 years earlier.
Several other authors have also published competing biographies of Feldbin. In 1977, Gordon Brook-Shepherd published Feldbin’s story in his book Storm Petrels, focusing, as is typical of Brook-Shepherd, on Feldbin’s life after defection.[x] In 1993, British historian John Costello and former KGB officer Oleg Tsarev published Deadly Illusions: The KGB Orlov Dossier Reveals Stalin's Master Spy, relying on material released by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) from Feldbin’s NKVD personnel file.[xi] While the SVR released only selective data and withheld much, the book filled many holes in Feldbin’s life history. That book prompted Edward Gazur, an FBI special agent who was assigned to handle Feldbin for the final two years of Feldbin’s life, to publish an adulatory book in 2002 that extolled Feldbin’s career and corrected what Gazur saw as Costello’s and Tsarev’s misrepresentations. Gazur admits that Feldbin became more than a professional contact, becoming part of the family; he noted that Deadly Illusions sent his blood pressure “somewhere into the infinity range.”[xii] Finally, in late 2014, former Russian intelligence officer Boris Volodarsky published a deeply flawed book on Feldbin’s life specifically intending to correct all of the lies that Volodarsky perceived had been told by and about Feldbin.[xiii] Unfortunately, his attempt to disabuse the world of the lies about Feldbin is itself filled with inaccuracies and undocumented assumptions.
In addition to these uneven biographic treatments are Feldbin’s debriefings in the United States and follow-on investigations in the United States and Great Britain, Feldbin’s 1955 and 1957 testimonies before the U.S. Senate, and other writings by Feldbin in which he provides information about Soviet intelligence activities in general. Between these various forums are insights into Soviet thinking derived from Feldbin’s 18-year career as an intelligence officer.
Fedlbin is unique among defectors because he made none of these insights known until 15 years after his defection. He succeeded where Ginzberg had failed; Feldbin lived in the United States quietly and unnoticed until after Stalin’s death, when he published his story for the first time. Some in the United States interpreted this lack of candor as evidence that he “remained a professional to the end of his days.”[xiv] For others, he was a frustrating source who took information to the grave that could have been used to avert grave damage to Western interests.
Brook-Shepherd and Gazur claim that Feldbin was the highest-ranking Soviet intelligence officer ever to defect to the free world. Conversely, one of Volodarsky’s main contentions against Feldbin is that ”[Orlov] could never be ‘the NKVD General’, because there were no such ranks there until long after he had disappeared from his post to surface in the United States.”[xv] The reality lies between Gazur’s overestimation of Feldbin’s rank—which was possibly encouraged by Feldbin himself—and Volodarsky’s underestimation based upon his fixation on discrediting Feldbin.
Feldbin held the rank of major of state security.[xvi] NKVD instituted a system of officer ranks in 1935 that corresponded with Army ranks for protocol purposes. A major of state security was the equivalent of kombrig, or in modern terms, a brigadier general. Feldbin also claimed to have held the rank of kombrig of Border Guards while he was in Tbilisi.[xvii] Poretskiy, Ginzberg, and Graff were all also kombrigs. Lyushkov, by comparison, held the rank of commissar of state security third rank, equivalent to a 3-star general—the rank equivalent that Brook-Shepherd mistakenly ascribed to Feldbin.[xviii] State security officers did not hesitate to flaunt their military rank equivalency to emphasize their importance; Feldbin was probably no different when he told an American audience that he was a general. Consequently, Feldbin was neither the highest-ranking Soviet intelligence defector, nor was his claim to being a general completely false.
Feldbin lived as a young boy in Bobruysk, in what is now Belarus, but when World War I began Feldbin’s father moved the family to Moscow where Feldbin studied at the Lazerevsky Institute of Oriental Languages. He then enrolled in the Moscow University School of Law in 1915. But his time at law school was short, because he was enlisted in the Russian Imperial Army in 1916 and served in the Urals. After the February Revolution, he enrolled in an officer training course and was commissioned as a junior officer in March 1917.
Feldbin’s early career benefited from his relationship with his cousin Zinoviy Borisovich Katsnelson, who was three years his senior. Katsnelson joined the ChK in 1918 and was assigned during the civil war as an investigator in a ChK Special Section (OO), responsible fore counterintelligence in the military forces.[xix] Feldbin was also a junior counterintelligence investigator at that time, and he claimed to have participated in the investigation of Xenophon Dmitriyevich Kalamatiano, an American émigré who ran a U.S. intelligence network in Russia soon after the revolution. Kalamatiano was arrested on 18 September 1918, and Feldbin described a scene in his memoirs when ChK investigators noticed that he was carrying a cane. When investigators inspected the cane, "Kalamatiano turned pale and lost his composure. The investigation soon discovered that the cane contained an inner tube and he extracted it. In it were hidden a secret cipher, spy reports, a coded list of thirty-two spies and money receipts from some of them."[xx]
In January 1920, Katsnelson was promoted to be the chief of the OO for the 12th Army, operating along the western Ukrainian border in the Polish-Russian War. In September of that year, Feldbin was also assigned to the 12th Army OO running counterintelligence and counter-guerilla operations,[xxi] likely working under his cousin. Feldbin describes an incident in which he captured a Polish colonel named Senkowski, who happened to be a boyhood friend of Feliks Dzerzhinskiy. Feldbin notified Dzerzhinskiy of the capture and in the process made a positive name with Dzerzhinskiy.[xxii]
In January 1921, Katsnelson transferred to be chairman of the Archangel Governorate ChK, and in early 1921 Feldbin followed him to Archangel as a counterintelligence officer in the ChK border guard detachment. While in Archangel, Feldbin married Maria Vladislavovna Rozhnetskaya, to whom he remained married for over 50 years. They were to have one child, Vera, who lived to only 16 years and died in the United States two years after Feldbin’s defection.
Feldbin and Katsnelson’s careers diverged for several years when Feldbin moved to Moscow in late 1921 to return to law school part-time while working as an assistant prosecutor in the Court of Appeals of the Soviet Supreme Court. During this time Feldbin participated in drafting the first Soviet criminal code and publishing articles in the journal Soviet Justice Weekly (Еженедельник Советской Юстиции).[xxiii] Feldbin claimed to have used the name Lev Lazerevich Nikolskiy during this time.[xxiv] But an SIS source described him as a jurisconsult using the name Leon (Lev) Nikolaev,[xxv] The SIS source’s information appears to be corroborated by two articles published in Soviet Justice Weekly in 1923 under the name L. Nikolayev: an article on 19 April 1923 about corruption among judges and prosecuting attorneys; and an article on 17 May 1923 discussing a corrupt prosecutor who demanded a bribe to release a group of suspected economic criminals.[xxvi] Another article on 26 April 1923, signed only L. N., described a 1922 case of corruption by employees of the state trade firm, Gostorg, who bought and sold cooking lard for personal profit.[xxvii]
Feldbin portrayed his own role as a public corruption investigator, aligning closely with the content of the Soviet Justice Weekly articles. He told his debriefers that in 1924, Dzerzhinskiy had assigned him to analyze a public corruption investigation involving government employees who had converted state property to their own use. He reported his results to a session of the Politburo, assessing that accused were not guilty of witting fraud or speculation. He claimed, however, that Stalin overruled his conclusion and ordered that the accused be executed anyway to make an example of them.[xxviii]
After finishing law school in 1924, Feldbin’s career rejoined Katsnelson, who had become the chief of the OGPU Economic Directorate in September 1922. Feldbin followed him in April 1924, re-entering Soviet state security as an employee in the Economic Directorate.[xxix] Feldbin never mentions Katsnelson as his supervisor, but did name Georgiy Ivanovich Blagonravov, who replaced Katsnelson as the chief at the Economic Directorate.[xxx] The Economic Directorate was particularly important in the OGPU in 1924, as it was the element responsible for investigating economic crimes and corruption, including tracking down businessmen who profited from the New Economic Policy. Feldbin’s legal background, especially his focus on public corruption, was valuable in those investigations, and Feldbin was promoted to lead the Financial Section in May 1924.[xxxi] This section was also responsible for intelligence activities run from Soviet trade missions abroad, such as Arcos in London and Amtorg in New York.[xxxii]
In April 1925, the OGPU sent Katsnelson to Tbilisi as Soviet Political Representative to the Transcaucasus Soviet Socialist Republic and Chief of the Transcaucasus OGPU as an interim replacement for Solomon Grigoryevich Mogilevskiy, who died in a plane crash on 22 March.[xxxiii] Later that year Feldbin also moved to Tbilisi to command a brigade of 11,000 OGPU border guard troops, wearing a rank of kombrig.[xxxiv] Georgia was a hot spot for the OGPU following a Menshevik August Uprising in 1924, which the OGPU violently suppressed with the active participation of the future chief of Soviet state security, Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria.[xxxv] Historian Amy Knight asserts that, although the August Uprising was defeated and the direct participants eliminated, the OGPU continued to cite "Menshevik danger" as an excuse for repressing Socialists in Georgia, killing at least 500 over the following two years.[xxxvi] It was in that context that Feldbin worked for a year in Tbilisi.
Feldbin’s career finally diverged from Katsnelson’s in early 1926 when Feldbin transferred to the INO in Moscow, where he worked in a section that oversaw and controlled foreign trade and equipment purchasing operations.[xxxvii] He was subsequently assigned to Paris in mid-1926 using the name Leon Nikolaev. Not long before Feldbin left Tbilisi, his wife Maria took their three-year-old daughter Vera on a boating trip and Vera fell ill. She contracted rheumatic fever that developed into rheumatic heart disease, a sickness that eventually took her life at age 16.[xxxviii] Volodarsky claims that Feldbin requested a foreign assignment specifically to obtain medical care for his daughter[xxxix]; Costello and Tsarev similarly speculate that Feldbin’s move to the INO may have been motivated by his desire to go abroad.[xl] Neither provides evidence for this assertion, although family was always a major factor in Feldbin’s decisions.
SIS information from the mid-1920s indicates that Feldbin (identified as Nikolaev) arrived in Paris in June 1926 under cover as Director of the Inspection Section of the Soviet Trade Mission. SIS identified him at that time as the OGPU chief in Paris responsible for monitoring the activities of the Trade Mission employees and running foreign intelligence collection operations.[xli] His operations also included penetrating Paris-based Russian and Georgian émigré organizations and monitoring foreign trade to prevent Western countries from overcharging Soviet purchasing agents.
The SIS’s information is similar to an undated study produced by the prominent Russian émigré journalist Vladimir Burtsev in about 1931, which similarly identified L. L. Nikolaev (Feldbin) as the OGPU chief in France from August 1926 to February 1928. Burtsev described him as an intelligent man who understood the value of recruiting specialists into OGPU work, and that Nikolaev/Feldbin handled several valuable sources in Paris.[xlii] One of these sources was Vladimir Petrovich Baggovut-Kolomiytsev,[xliii] a Russian émigré businessman in Paris. Baggovut-Kolomiytsev served as the general secretary of the Union of Return to the Homeland, a Soviet-sponsored group that encouraged tsarist-era Russian military officers to return to Russia. He had close ties with British businessmen, and he assisted the OGPU in financial operations particularly targeting anti-Soviet Russian émigrés in Europe. He became a business partner of Ivar Krueger, a successful Swedish businessman known as the “match king” because he ran a large company that manufactured matches. Baggovut-Kolomiytsev facilitated a large investment in Kreuger’s business by the monarchist military organization Russian All-Military Union (Русский Обще-Воинский Союз, ROVS). When Kreuger suddenly committed suicide in March 1932, the ROVS money disappeared, inflicting a devastating financial blow on the organization.[xliv]
Although Feldbin resided in Paris, his operations were at least partially focused toward Britain, especially after the May 1927 raid on the Arcos office in London, which resulted in the closure of the London rezidentura and transfer of what remained to Paris.[xlv] Feldbin denied ever having visited or operated against the UK.[xlvi] However, a letter intercepted by Scotland Yard in 1928 stated that Feldbin was involved in discussions about staffing at the London-based Arcos prior to its closure, and that he was in a position to approve the transfer of a Soviet agent to Amtorg in New York.[xlvii] His involvement in British operations was further indicated when Feldbin told U.S. authorities that he recognized a photograph of Soviet illegal William Fisher/Rudolf Abel during Fisher/Abel’s famous 1957 espionage trial. Feldbin told U.S. authorities that he remembered meeting him briefly at OGPU headquarters.[xlviii] Further details of Feldbin’s relationship with Fisher/Abel were noted in an August 1958 Studies in Intelligence article, which indicated that Feldbin was involved in handling Fisher/Abel when Fisher/Abel was first assigned to London in 1927 for training as a future illegal.[xlix]
Feldbin was in Paris until early 1928, when he was transferred to Berlin, where he served in the Soviet Trade Delegation until April 1931. His operations particularly focused on collecting science and technology information, including manufacturing processes to advance the Soviet Union’s armaments industry and to bolster the industrial base. The trade delegation also recruited German experts to travel to the Soviet Union because of a lack of expertise in the Soviet Union to apply the technology. Feldbin later wrote, “the fees paid by the Russian for such trips ran sometimes as high as $10,000,” but “the savings amounted to millions.”[l]
Feldbin may have also used his position in Germany to target Japan. Costello and Tsarev assess that Feldbin was speaking of his own operation when wrote about an approach to a Russian-born German manufacturing expert who had fallen on hard times to woo him to the Soviet Union to supervise the construction of a pencil-making plant. Pencils were not the main objective, as the man’s daughter worked in the Japanese embassy in Berlin and had access to the chargé d’affaires and the ambassador. The OGPU eventually informed the man that his employment was contingent on his ability to convince his daughter to supply information from inside the Japanese embassy. The man’s wife found about the deal and halted it at once, reportedly saying that the daughter “would never be a spy.”[li]
Feldbin was in Germany when the story broke about counterfeit U.S. banknotes being deposited in a Germany bank, about which Ginzberg later gave details. That incident, along with an increasingly hostile counterintelligence environment in Germany, in which industrial espionage was being more energetically investigated, led to Feldbin’s eventual withdrawal from Berlin in April 1931 and return to OGPU headquarters in Moscow.[lii]
Although Feldbin covered up the period of his career after his return to Moscow with a fictitious title as an employee in the export flax trust of the Soviet Union, his actual position was section chief in the OGPU Economic Department. Costello and Tsarev suggest that in this position Feldbin would have been aware of a German delegation that traveled to the Soviet Union in August 1932 ostensibly for trade negotiations under an organization called the Society for a Planned Economy, led by a leftist German political activist named Arvid Harnack. Harnack was recruited as a Soviet source and formed the nucleus of the Rote Kapella (“Red Orchestra”) Soviet intelligence network, which later became famous for operating inside Nazi Germany during World War II.[liii] Feldbin may have been involved in cultivating Harnack during his 1932 trip to Moscow, and Feldbin’s later assistant in Spain, Naum Markovich Belkin, was Harnack’s initial handler.[liv]
While assigned to Moscow, Feldbin traveled to the United States from September to November 1932 under the cover of a Soviet import specialist invited to by the General Motors Corporation, which hoped he would open the Soviet market to American-made cars. He denied conducting any intelligence activities in the United States during this trip, which he claimed was primarily for vacation.[lv] But his real missions were to study the English language and obtain a false U.S. passport for future operational use. He enrolled in an English language program at Columbia University and simultaneously at a Berlitz School of Languages in New York City.[lvi] Although he never mentioned it himself, he obtained, with OGPU assistance, a U.S passport in the name William Goldin, under which name he later worked as the illegal rezident in London.[lvii] The passport was facilitated by OGPU agent Jacob Golos, whose travel agency called World Tourists specialized in facilitating international travel to and from the United States by Soviet agents and Communist Party of the USA members. World Tourists was also deeply involved in passport fraud.[lviii]
Although Feldbin could have never predicted it, this brief trip to the United States caused complications with his immigration status in the United States over 20 years later. When INS agents realized in 1954 that the man calling himself Aleхandеr Orlov was the same man who visited the United States in 1932 under the name Leon Nikolaev, they questioned his legal status. He had denied membership in the Communist Party when he was traveling in an operational capacity in 1932, when his cover required that he draw no attention to himself. But when the INS was considering his legal residency in the United States in 1954, he admitted having been a member of the Communist Party and a senior Soviet government official.[lix] The discrepancy in his stories caused suspicion sufficient for the INS to initiate deportation proceedings. His debriefings were put on hold while he faced deportation,[lx] but on 25 July 1956 the U.S. Congress passed Public Law 810, giving Alexander and Maria Orlov legal residency in the United States.[lxi] Although he enjoyed legal residency in the United States from that point on, this experience left him suspicious and bitter.
Feldbin first employed his newly obtained passport as an illegal in 1933. But before that, he needed to improve his English further; his English language ability needed to be at a level sufficient for him to pose plausibly as an American businessman. He traveled to Vienna in early 1933 and enrolled in an English language course as a Russian using the name Leo Nikolaev, completing the course in July 1933—his open residence in Vienna under a Russian identity would come back to haunt him several years later. He then traveled to Geneva, Switzerland, to establish a persona as the American businessman William Goldin, who was recuperating from an illness. Once settled in Geneva as an illegal, much of his time was spent in Paris where he cultivated a source who claimed to have information about potentially recruitable French officers, and he pursued leads to recruit an officer in the French General Staff. However, his status as an illegal operating in France was abruptly cut short when he accidentally encountered a person named Vernik who had worked at the Soviet Trade Delegation in Paris while Feldbin, then known as Nikolaev, had worked there in the 1920s. The encounter damaged Feldbin’s cover as the American William Goldin, forcing him to abandon Paris in May 1934.[lxii]
The most glaring gap in Feldbin’s debriefings was his repudiation of any notion that he had ever worked in or against Great Britain. Ginzberg, in his 1940 MI5 debriefings, identified an individual named Nikolsky who preceded Maly as the OGPU illegal rezident in Britain under cover as an American businessman.[lxiii] Ginzberg later identified Nikolsky as using the names Shved (Swede), Lyova (the diminutive of the name Lev), and Orlov, all names used by Feldbin.[lxiv] Although Feldbin vigorously denied it,[lxv] Ginzberg’s description was clear; Feldbin operated as an OGPU illegal in England from mid-1934 to 1935.
After leaving Paris, Feldbin was initially posted to Copenhagen, from which he planned to run the Britain-based network, with Arnold Deutsch, another OGPU illegal living in London, as his assistant. Feldbin later established himself in London using his William Goldin passport under the cover of a representative of the American Refrigerator Company. Feldbin’s wife Maria was also involved in operational activity in London under the name Maria Feldbin, acting as a liaison officer for the rezidentura.[lxvi]
Maria was directly involved in Feldbin’s operations in most of his assignments. No sources clarify whether she was an intelligence officer herself or if she simply supported her husband's operations. She served as an NKVD courier in England, as well as in Feldbin’s other assignments in France and Spain. Although Feldbin never referred to his wife as an NKVD employee, he did assert during FBI debriefings that NKVD officers’ wives were usually used as couriers for NVKD operations.[lxvii] Feldbin’s later reluctance to admit any connection to the UK during his debriefings may have been not only to protect himself from Soviet retribution, but also to protect his wife. This scenario is further bolstered by Feldbin’s claim after his defection that his long delay in revealing himself in the West was to protect both his mother and his wife’s mother who both remained in the Soviet Union.[lxviii]
Feldbin’s time in the UK was distinguished by his handling of several of the most prominent spies ever to penetrate the British government: Kim Philby, Donald MacLean, and Guy Burgess. Feldbin never directly mentioned his involvement in the running of these Soviet sources, and Volodarsky insists that Feldbin did not originally recruit the “Three Musketeers,” as Philby, MacLean, and Burgess referred to themselves.[lxix] However, Costello and Tsarev’s analysis of oblique, possibly autobiographical references in Feldbin’s book, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare, in conjunction with Philby’s own writings and Soviet debriefing, shows that Feldbin was personally involved in their handling.[lxx]
Feldbin’s unwillingness to provide information about this period of his career, even though MacLean and Burgess had already defected to the Soviet Union and Philby had already left his position at the SIS when Feldbin revealed himself publicly in 1953, incurred more damage to his usefulness as a source than any other of his omissions. Feldbin’s information about Philby would have added substance to MI5’s investigation and could have led to Philby’s arrest, rather than his defection in 1963. It also could have given insights into the Soviet Union’s priorities in the mid-1930s, particularly the effort and expense that the OGPU put into developing young men who would eventually occupy positions of importance in the British foreign affairs and intelligence establishment. For example, the OGPU files on which Oleg Tsarev bases his research reportedly indicate that Feldbin proposed avenues for Philby to gain SIS employment as early as 1935. Philby gave the NKVD vital information gleaned from friends in the Foreign Office about British policy toward Germany.[lxxi]
Feldbin was also directly involved in Donald Maclean’s early espionage career, according to the information made available Tsarev. Feldbin took over control of MacLean in February 1935.[lxxii] The NKVD cultivated MacLean hoping that he would eventually be accepted in the Foreign Office, and Feldbin learned that Maclean achieved that goal just before Feldbin left Britain.[lxxiii]
Finally, he directed Arnold Deutsch to recruit Guy Burgess, first raising him as a potential recruit as early as August 1934.[lxxiv] Feldbin viewed Burgess’s flamboyant homosexuality as a hook that Soviet intelligence could use to entrap others into working as sources. Feldbin later wrote, “[Homosexuals] who agreed to work for the Russian network were instructed to approach other homosexual members of the diplomatic corps, a strategy which was remarkably successful.”[lxxv] Correspondingly, Feldbin used Burgess initially to identify other potential recruits who shared both Burgess’s left-wing political views and sexual perversion. Like Philby, Burgess’s primary target during Fedlbin’s time was the SIS.[lxxvi]
In October 1935, Feldbin’s cover as an American businessman was once again put in jeopardy when he inadvertently bumped into the man who had been his English teacher in Vienna in early 1933. As he had been living in Vienna as a Soviet citizen, his persona as an American businessman in London was destroyed.[lxxvii] He quickly abandoned his affairs in London, handing over responsibility for Philby and Maclean to Arnold Deutsch until Theodore Maly/Paul Hardt arrived as illegal rezident in London.[lxxviii] While Feldbin never personally admitted having been involved in such an incident, he wrote obliquely about a similar incident, describing it as a “…case which occurred with a friend and subordinate of mine…”, changing the city, but including many of the same details. He concluded that the incident was caused by a “blunder of policy on the part of the NKVD intelligence which allowed officers who had previously served in an official capacity in Soviet embassies and trade delegations abroad to be assigned to underground positions with false papers.” This described Feldbin himself. However, he further asserted, with some self-congratulations, that “work in the underground [as an illegal] is surrounded in Moscow with such an aura of heroism” that many officers try to get assigned as illegals out of a sense of pride.[lxxix] His adulation of illegals contrasts with Arutyunov’s account, however, which claimed that, from 1928 when Soviet intelligence officers began illegal operations abroad, few INO officers wanted to be assigned as illegals because such assignments lacked the diplomatic immunity and material benefits that diplomatically covered officers enjoyed.[lxxx]
The period between October 1935 and September 1936, after his return to Moscow, is the only time during which Feldbin admitted in debriefings to have had knowledge of intelligence reporting collected from British sources, although he denied knowing the identities of the sources. He explained his access to the British reporting claiming that reorganization of the INO was being considered in the fall of 1935, and he was tapped to lead several divisions, including those that handled British and U.S. matters.[lxxxi] However, Costello and Tsarev, citing Feldbin’s personnel file, assert that he continued to be directly involved in handling the promising young British sources, including presenting recommendations about how to most effectively target MacLean. Similar to Ginzberg, Feldbin recounted seeing a report in Moscow in fall 1935 that contained minutes of a meeting of the British Committee of Imperial Defence. The report discussed British perceptions about German rearmament, stating that Winston Churchill was in possession of information showing that Germany’s rearmament had progressed further than other sources had indicated.[lxxxii] This information likely originated from MacLean, whose reporting Feldbin read during this period. MacLean’s reporting also included minutes of British-German diplomatic exchanges and information about British decryption capabilities. At the same time that MacLean was providing photos of plain text Foreign Office cables, King was providing cipher office copies, which when put together would have enabled Soviet decryption operations targeting British communications.[lxxxiii]
Feldbin also provided a lead about an incident that occurred in early 1936 relating to Sir Anthony Eden, then serving as Foreign Secretary. According to Feldbin, Eden read a report over lunch or dinner about the Soviet Union and Uruguay breaking diplomatic relations, which occurred on 27 December 1935. Feldbin remembered that Eden had written a derogatory note about Stalin in the margin of the report. Eden’s dining companion mentioned the note to a friend who was a Soviet source, who reported the incident to his handler, who reported it to Moscow.[lxxxiv] MI5 investigated the incident in 1954-1955 and determined that it corresponded with an actual event that occurred in early January 1936, in which the Foreign Office received information about Comintern money financing a communist uprising in Brazil leading to Uruguay’s decision to sever diplomatic relations with Moscow. Eden did in fact write a note on the dispatch.[lxxxv] Feldbin’s knowledge of this rather obscure event initially bolstered his credibility in the eyes of MI5.[lxxxvi] However, the investigation was never able to trace the event to a specific person, especially 18 years after the event, although circumstantial suspicion was cast on MacLean.[lxxxvii]
Feldbin remembered seeing other reports from the same source bound in a loose-leaf binder,[lxxxviii] likely referring to the same binder that Ginzberg had mentioned in his MI5 debriefings in 1940.[lxxxix] Costello and Tsarev corroborate the assertion that MacLean was the source of these reports, stating that the information was voluminous and highly valued, providing Soviet leadership with important insights into British and German military planning.[xc] Unfortunately, Feldbin’s incomplete revelations during debriefings were too little, too late. MI5 had received Ginzberg’s information 13 years earlier and had already reached the conclusion that the source of these reports was MacLean, who was, by the time Feldbin talked, safely in the Soviet Union.[xci] As questions about Feldbin’s candor mounted, MI5 began to doubt whether Feldbin had learned about these events first hard, or if he had simply picked up rumors through association with other sources, like Hede Massing or Isaac Don Levine.[xcii]
It was also during Feldbin’s time in Moscow that he began to accumulate information that formed the basis for the four Life magazine articles that first brought him into the public eye in April 1953 and later formed the basis of his best-known book, The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes. In contrast to his reticence about revealing information about operations in Britain, Feldbin’s main contributions to the West’s understanding of the Soviet Union was his description of how Stalin systematically eliminated potential rivals within the Soviet government, leading to the purge trials in 1936 and 1937. Feldbin’s information gave a view on the trials that contrasted with Soviet-originated propaganda on which many in the West relied. Although he reveals few sources for his information and many of the events occurred after Feldbin had already transferred from to Spain, it substantially agrees with Ginzberg’s and Graff’s writings.[xciii]
Ginzberg described four methods that the NKVD used to persuade purge victims to confess to crimes that, in many cases, they could not have committed. Feldbin elaborated on these same methods.
1- The NKVD employed conveyer belt interrogations that physically and mentally wore down captives.
2- The NKVD drew from Stalin’s “private espionage service,” which gathered information about the public and private lives of Stalin’s rivals, offering a pool of incriminating information when Stalin chose to act against them.
3- The NKVD planted agents-provocateurs in prisons adjacent to the intended victims to act as incriminating “witnesses” and “accomplices.”
4- Stalin offered deals and promises of safety for victims’ family members and friends.[xciv]
Ginzberg described Abram Slutskiy’s interrogation of Sergey Vitalyevich Mrachkovskiy, an old Bolshevik and civil war military commander, in which Slutskiy wore down his resistance with emotional arguments, appealing to Mrachkovskiy’s Bolshevik roots and belief that only the Party could save the Soviet people.[xcv] Feldbin similarly described Mrachkovskiy as being emotionally broken, and thence persuaded to provide testimony against his former colleague Ivan Nikitich Smirnov, another old Bolshevik who had been arrested as an oppositionist to Stalin.[xcvi] Stalin valued the demoralizing impact that testimony of a friend, colleague, or family member had on a defendant, and the NKVD used Mrachkovskiy’s testimony this way to break Smirnov.[xcvii]
Stalin’s used the NKVD as a personal resource to gather compromising information about potential rivals. In addition to running an internal security service and a foreign intelligence service, NKVD Chief Genrikh Georgiyevich Yagoda collected potentially compromising information that Stalin could use as leverage over Soviet officials. The information might involve an indiscretion at home, a sexual scandal, or any expression of religious belief. Most damning was any history of Tsarist employment prior to the revolution, a lukewarm revolutionary past, or even the absence of Tsarist persecution. The NKVD, under Yagoda’s leadership, was Stalin’s eyes and ears within the ruling circles, and any conversation or insufficient zeal in extolling Stalin’s greatness could place a Soviet official in danger.[xcviii]
The NKVD chose pliant people as agents-provocateurs to serve as defendants during the trial of the Sixteen to give incriminating testimony about the most prominent of the defendants, Zinoviev and Kamenev, and against Stalin’s archenemy, Trotsky. One of these, Valentin Pavlovich Oldberg, had been an OGPU seksot in the early 1930s in Germany targeting Trotsky and had endeavored to develop contacts among Trotsky supporters. Later the OGPU engineered his assignment as a teacher at the Marxist-Leninist School of the Pedagogical Institute in Gorkiy where the OGPU suspected a cell of Trotsky supporters was forming. According to Feldbin, the NKVD manufactured a Trotskyist plot to assassinate Stalin and ordered Oldberg to testify about it at the trial. Feldbin describes similar roles for other defendants, including Isak Isayevich Reingold, who was chosen because of his personal acquaintance with Kamenev; and Richard Vitoldovich Pickel, who had worked in Zinoviev’s secretariat.[xcix] They acted their roles and gave their falsified testimony against Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev as ordered. But, rather than being rewarded for their obedience, they were executed along with the rest of the Sixteen.[c]
Feldbin described instances during the purge trials when children were used as leverage to coerce defendants or their close associates to give the testimony that Stalin demanded. Feldbin was in London on 7 April 1935 when the Soviet government announced a new law that treated children aged 12 and above the same as adults in criminal matters. Soviet diplomats abroad were placed in the awkward position of explaining the law to an incredulous West.[ci] Feldbin writes that the law was initially designed to clear away the thousands of children left parentless by the deaths and imprisonments resulting from forced collectivization. But this law also proved to be valuable as an interrogation tool during purge trial investigations. The children of defendants in the trial of the Sixteen disappeared after their fathers’ executions, either sent to prison camps or executed as enemies of the people. The following year, when Yuriy Leonidovich Pyatakov was in custody for an alleged Trotskyist plot, the NKVD coerced his wife to testify against him. According to Feldbin, she agreed to give falsified testimony to save her children, knowing what had happen to defendants’ children the previous year.[cii] Feldbin further states that Nikolay Nikolayevich Krestinskiy, a co-defendant of Pyatakov in the second purge trial, was dedicated to his only daughter, making him vulnerable to threats against his family.[ciii]
While the existence of these methods during the purge trials was not completely unknown in the West, Feldbin’s extensive exposition in The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes shed new light on Stalin’s brutality to opposition several years before Nikita Khrushchev unveiled Stalin’s cult of personality in his “Secret Speech” in February 1956.
Feldbin’s most prominent, and final, Soviet position was as NKVD chief in Spain beginning in September 1936. As with all of Feldbin’s information, his reports about his time in Spain contain large gaps through which run veins of fact. He claimed to have been the senior Soviet advisor to the Spanish Republican government, meeting frequently with Spanish leaders, such as Premier Juan Negrin and Defense Minister Indalecio Prieto. He obtained from these officials reports of how well Soviet supplied equipment was performing on the battlefield, indicating that Stalin personally preferred his reports over those provided by the Razvedupr. He further claimed to have established counterintelligence and sabotage schools and to organize attacks on Franco’s forces behind enemy lines.[civ] He vehemently denied Ginzberg’s reports about political purges in Spain similar to those occurring in the Soviet Union in 1936 and 1937, claiming that such allegations must have originated with Trotskyist newspapers.[cv] However, Costello and Tsarev, citing Fedlbin/Orlov’s NKVD files, identified networks of agents that penetrated Spanish political parties to identify Fascist spies and Trotskyists, leading to numerous arrests.[cvi]
Feldbin’s dismissal of Ginzberg’s information related to Spain laid the foundation for his denials of other details given by Ginzberg that were clearly accurate, particularly about Feldbin’s activities in Britain. Ginzberg writes that he learned from Abram Slutskiy about a meeting held on 14 September 1936 at which Nikolsky/Feldbin was assigned to Spain to establish an NKVD presence.[cvii] Feldbin uses that assertion as evidence of Ginzberg’s ignorance, claiming the date is clearly wrong because Feldbin had already left for Spain before 14 September, and that the decision to send him was made in July.[cviii] It is fully possible, however, that such a meeting did occur on the date Ginzberg cited at which Feldbin’s assignment to Spain was discussed. Feldbin also contradicted Ginzberg’s claim of supplying arms to Spanish Republicans, stating that “not a single gun” arrived in Spain via networks noted by Ginzberg and that that no Soviet aircraft ever arrived in Spain.[cix] If Feldbin could paint Ginzberg as an unreliable source, he could plausibly contradict Ginzberg in relation to other matters that Feldbin had taken great care to keep hidden.
While in Spain, Feldbin once again handled Philby when the NKVD paid for his travel in February 1937 as a freelance journalist to report on the civil war. Philby’s NKVD assignment was to gather information about the Francoist military and about German and Italian troops supporting Franco. Additionally, in April, Maly instructed Philby to “discover the system of guards, primarily of Franco and then of other leaders.” He was to identify vulnerabilities in Franco’s security measures, Franco’s routines, and places where he stayed. In short, he was to get close enough to Franco to develop information that could be used in an eventual assassination plot.[cx] Ginzberg provided a similar account in his 1940 MI5 debriefing, stating that Yezhov instructed Maly to recruit an English source to arrange for Franco’s assassination. Although Ginzberg did not know the name of the individual that Maly chose, he described him as “a young Englishman, a journalist of a good family, an idealist and fanatical anti-Nazi,” which MI5 over 20 years later realized was Philby.[cxi] Maly and Deutsch, however, questioned whether Philby possessed the internal fortitude to perform such a risky mission.[cxii] Maly’s and Deutsch’s concerns about Philby’s suitability for an assassination mission proved accurate, and no assassination operation was ever attempted.
Philby’s intelligence from inside Franco’s headquarters was valuable in informing the Soviet leadership about the plans and strategies of Nationalist troops, even if the assassination plot never materialized. Feldbin never mentioned Philby, and denied knowledge of any Englishman being sent to Spain to assassinate Franco. However, he did admit that the Soviets had a source with almost daily access to Franco.[cxiii] Soviet archival information cited by Tsarev indicates that the Soviet source was likely Philby, with whom Feldbin arranged to meet twice a month in France across the border from Spain to receive his reports.
One of the operations in Spain for which Feldbin is best known is the transport of Spanish gold reserves to the Soviet Union. In September 1936, the Republican government moved the Spanish treasury from Madrid to near Cartagena to protect it from advancing Francoist troops. The move was not a secret, and the Francoist government protested publicly.[cxiv] But in October, Feldbin reported receiving a classified telegram from Yezhov providing further instructions about what to do with the gold:
“Together with Rosenberg [Soviet ambassador in Spain], arrange with the head of the Spanish government, Caballero, for the shipment of the gold reserves of Spain to the Soviet Union. Use for that purpose a Soviet steamer. This operation must be carried out with the utmost secrecy. If the Spaniards demand from you a receipt for the cargo, refuse. I repeat, refuse to sign anything, and say that a formal receipt will be issued in Moscow by the State Bank. I hold you personally responsible for the operation. Rosenberg has been instructed accordingly.”[cxv]
This telegram set off an NKVD operation that resulted in an estimated $600 million dollars of Spanish gold being shipped to Moscow, ostensibly for safe keeping. But Feldbin claimed to have learned from Slutskiy that Stalin had no intention of ever returning the gold.[cxvi] Stalin viewed it as payment for the military manpower and hardware that the Soviet Union was supplying the Spanish Republican government. The gold transfer became sore point between the Spanish and Soviet governments, and Khrushchev was forced to justify it in 1957—over 20 years after the event—claiming that it did not even fully cover the cost of Soviet military support to Spain during the civil war.[cxvii]
Feldbin’s responsibilities in Spain also included setting up intelligence and sabotage schools for Spanish communists to operate behind enemy lines.[cxviii] He wrote about NKVD support to Spanish Republican guerillas, although he never mentioned his own role in setting up schools for International Brigade volunteers who displayed special loyalty to the Soviet Union and aptitude for clandestine operations.[cxix] These efforts had long-ranging implications that yielded fruit for the NKVD well past the Spanish Civil War. A number of Soviet intelligence agents later investigated in the United States began their careers in the Abraham Lincoln Battalion, including Morris Cohen, William Weisband, Amadeo Sabatini, Zalmond David Franklin, and Michael Sidorovich. Additionally, several U.S. Army officers who ran anti-Fascist operations for the Office of Strategic Services during World War II were International Brigade volunteers in the late 1930s.[cxx] After WWII, the FBI began to recognize the connections between Americans who had served in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain and communist activities in the United States. Fedlbin could have provided illuminating details to assist FBI investigations of former Abraham Lincoln Brigade members, but never did.
In early 1954, Feldbin provided a point-by-point critique of Ginzberg/Krivitsky’s book, In Stalin’s Secret Service.[cxxi] Then, in 1955, the FBI provided MI5’s monograph of Ginzberg’s debriefings to Feldbin and asked him to comment.[cxxii] Feldbin agreed substantially with Ginzberg’s information that was unrelated to Soviet activities in Spain or Britain. However, Feldbin denigrated Ginzberg as a low-level OGPU non-commissioned officer who was in Holland only as a stay-behind agent in case of war with Germany. He claims that Ginzberg was never a Razvedupr general, and that Ginzberg himself never claimed to be one. Feldbin deflected all questions that would have indicated any involvement in OGPU operations in or against Britain. He may have been directing a disparaging glance at Ginzberg when he wrote “some ambitious careerists among the Soviet intelligence officers prod their informants to steal documents marked ‘top secret,’ with high-sounding letterheads such as ‘Office of the Foreign Minister’ or ‘Committee of Imperial Defense’ with the sole purpose of impressing Moscow with their ability to rummage freely in the secret files of foreign governments.”[cxxiii] MI5 assessed that, compared to Ginzberg, Feldbin knew little of interest to the British and that “Orlov’s evident jealousy and dislike of Krivitsky tends to distort the value of what little information he has to give.”[cxxiv]
With regard to Spain, Feldbin claimed that Ginzberg’s comments were fictional and inspired by Trotskyist propaganda. The competing stories of Soviet activities in Spain need to be read within their separate contexts. Ginzberg was a support player in Spanish events, not at the center. Nevertheless, while Ginzberg may have made some misstatements or spoken beyond his own experience, there are no known occasions when Ginzberg intentionally provided inaccurate information. Feldbin, on the other hand, was at the very center of the events in Spain so should have had more reliable first-hand knowledge, but he also is known to have omitted many pertinent details and even lied in regards to his own role and mission. His information about people and events separate from himself tended to be accurate, but whenever a story touched on Feldbin himself he prevaricated.
Feldbin claimed that he began to have doubts about his service to the Soviet Union as early as 1936 when he had a first-hand view of Stalin’s pursuit of old Bolsheviks. Then, in July 1937, Feldbin’s cousin Zinoviy Katsnelson, who by 1937 was a senior NKVD officer with the rank commissar of state security second rank, was arrested and became one of thousands of NKVD officers swallowed up in purges. He was executed in March 1938.[cxxv] Simultaneous with Katsnelson’s arrest, Feldbin received a cable from Moscow warning him that the NKVD has learned of a plot to kidnap Feldbin in Spain. NKVD headquarters informed him that 10 bodyguards from Moscow would be coming to Spain to protect his life. Feldbin, already frightened by the arrest of his cousin and many other colleagues, suspected that the bodyguards themselves were the real plot against his life, and cabled back informing Moscow that he already had a bodyguard made up of Spanish communists. But he decided to reinforce his security detail with a dozen “tough” German communists who he felt he could trust more than local Spanish guards or an NVKD-supplied security detail.[cxxvi]
Then in June 1938, Feldbin received a message summoning him to a meeting on board a Soviet ship in port at Antwerp, Belgium. He was convinced that the invitation was a trap—he may have even used similar invitations himself, as in the case of British International Brigade Volunteer Brian Goold-Vershoyle. He decided that his time had come to escape. He began to travel to France as if he would continue to Belgium, collected his wife and daughter, who were already staying in France away from the war zone, and went to the U.S. embassy in Paris to request asylum. The U.S. embassy was closed for the eve of the Bastille Day holiday, so he went from there to the Canadian legation and requested a visa to enter Canada as a tourist. The family boarded a ship later that same night, and arrived in Canada on 21 July 1938.[cxxvii]
Just after his defection Feldbin sent a letter to Yezhov promising to maintain secrecy, but appealing to him for his own and his mother’s safety: “If you leave me alone, I will never embark on anything harmful to the Party or the Soviet Union. I have not committed, nor will I commit, anything damaging to the Party and our country. I solemnly swear to the end of my days not to utter a word that may harm the Party that brought me up or the country in which I grew up.” He added, “I ask you to issue an order not to disturb my old mother. She is now 70; she is innocent. I am the last of her four children to survive and she is a sick and unhappy creature.” His letter referred to his daughter, stating that his “sole purpose now is to survive to bring up my child until she comes of age.”[cxxviii] She was to survive for only two years after his defection. Of note, however, the letter does not mention his mother-in-law, although he later included his mother-in-law’s safety in his justification for why waited until 1953 to reveal himself.
The NKVD may have kept its side of the bargain by officially declaring him dead. On 3 October 1940, the NKVD issued an order removing Feldbin from the ranks of the NKVD by cause of death.[cxxix] The NKVD new he was still alive once he revealed himself in 1953, but the order may have been an administrative device to cut off pursuit of him to prevent him from fulfilling his threat.
In the same letter he wrote multiple pages of sensitive operational details covering operations in France, Britain, and Spain, including information about Donald Maclean and Kim Philby. He included code names of officers who had participated in Poretskiy’s assassination and who had penetrated Trotsky’s organization in France. He included information about the purge trials, as well as assassination operations in Spain. His inclusion of these details was a clear threat to Yezhov that he had the capability to harm Soviet interests if he, his immediate family in the United States, or his mother who remained in the Soviet Union were ever harmed. He already suspected that the NKVD had tried to lure him back. He was well aware of Poretskiy’s fate and had probably personally dispatched International Brigade volunteers, such as Goold-Vershcoyle, from Spain to Russia to face their destruction. Thus he knew what the NKVD was capable and willing to do.
The details in his letter belied many of the denials that he gave U.S. officials after he made his presence known 15 years later. Costello and Tsarev applauded Feldbin's "ingenuity and audacity [that] were typical of [his] carefully contrived operations...," particularly in relation to his work in Spain.[cxxx] He appears to have applied this same ingenuity and audacity to his personal history. Feldbin had fifteen years to develop, perfect, and memorize a version of his personal history that highlighted certain parts and eliminated others. He read the writings of other defectors and contrived explanations for the inconsistencies between his story and theirs. By the time the FBI interviewed him beginning in 1953, a time of his choosing, he was ready to give them only what he intended and nothing else.
U.S. authorities had an opportunity to talk to Feldbin soon after his arrival but did not pursue it. In September 1938, John F. Finerty, a lawyer who Feldbin had contacted for immigration help, introduced Feldbin to James A. Houghteling, the Commissioner for Immigration and Naturalization. Houghteling’s assistant sympathized with Fedlbin’s concerns for his safety, and paved the way for him and his family to stay in the United States in secret. It appears that Houghteling did not consider introducing Feldbin to anyone in the U.S. government that might be interested in an NKVD officer.[cxxxi] Then, in December 1940, Finerty introduced Feldbin to Attorney General Francis Biddle when the Alien Registration Act placed Feldbin in a situation that would potentially require him to expose himself. Biddle’s direct involvement in the case paved the way for Fedlbin to be allowed to register without identifying his whereabouts.[cxxxii] Biddle, however, never informed the FBI of this arrangement.
Feldbin came to the United States hoping to hide from the NKVD’s long arm. Ginzberg’s suspicious death in the United States in 1940—whether perpetrated by a Soviet hand or his own—occurred only two years after Fedlbin had arrived, and cemented Feldbin’s resolve to stay hidden and to keep his mouth shut.[cxxxiii] Only Stalin’s death in 1953, and the expectation that his mother had died sometime previous to that, gave him sufficient confidence to make his presence pubic. Even so, Feldbin wrote, “the death of Stalin has not diminished the threat to my life.”[cxxxiv]
The FBI began its debriefings in May 1953 from the embarrassing position of only just having learning that a Soviet intelligence officer had been living in the United States for 15 years without the FBI knowing about it. J. Edgar Hoover wrote in anger, “Just who is this NKVD general writing for Life magazine?”[cxxxv] As early as October 1953, the FBI began sharing the results of its debriefings with MI5, but MI5 quickly became frustrated because of the FBI’s slowness in answering MI5’s inquiries about leads in Feldbin’s material, assuming that the FBI was loath to admit that a senior NKVD officer had lived in the United States unnoticed.[cxxxvi] But the FBI’s slowness was based not on the FBI’s unwillingness to share, but on Feldbin’s reticence.
MI5’s suspicion was fueled by an FBI stipulation at the outset that the MI5 could not share Feldbin’s debriefings with the SIS.[cxxxvii] In January 1954 MI5 considered asking the FBI to lift that restriction so MI5 could get SIS’s views of Feldbin’s material.[cxxxviii] No response is recorded. It is unclear on whose initiative the FBI instructed MI5 to boycott the SIS. It might have been on Feldbin’s insistence, based on his knowledge of Soviet penetrations of the SIS through which his information could have made its way into Soviet hands in violation of the agreement he had offered Soviet authorities in return for his safety. However, the FBI also had reason to suspect that the British government was penetrated, especially after Burgess and MacLean defected to the Soviet Union in 1951.
Although Feldin’s information was out of date and incomplete by the time he began speaking to the FBI, it was not completely without value. The CIA distributed an excerpt from Feldbin/Orlov’s Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare in the spring 1963 issue of Studies in Intelligence. The article was accompanied by the header: “a thoughtful former insider examines in depth Soviet (and Western) intelligence services.” It was recommended as warranting special presentation to the intelligence community.[cxxxix]
Feldbin contrasted the Western and Soviet intelligence mindset in his article: “Both Soviet and Western intelligence strive to learn the secret intentions, capabilities, and strategic plansof other states, but they don't go about it in the same way. The Russians believe that such important secrets can and should be procured directly from the classified files in offices ofthe government in question and from informants among its civil servants.” Soviet intelligence organizations viewed the Western method of gathering large amounts of information and hiring educated specialists to make sense of it as being “one step removed from mysticism and metaphysics.” The Soviet method was to provide insider information to leaders, Stalin in particular, and let them draw their own conclusions.[cxl]
Feldbin described eight Soviet intelligence emphases that showed the Soviet mindset of merging intelligence and covert action into a unified state security enterprise. While Feldbin’s information about these emphases was over 25 years old when his writings appeared, they nevertheless gave insights into the Soviet intelligence activities that had not changed significantly in the intervening years.
1. Diplomatic intelligence: Learn the true intentions of capitalist countries toward the Soviet Union, operating under the assumption that capitalist countries’ intentions were harmful to Soviet interests.
2. Military intelligence: Learn the military posture of Western and other countries;the quality and strength of their armies, navies, and air forces;their degree of mechanization, mobility, fire power, technological advancement, and modernization; and the productive capacity of the armament industries and the mobilization plansof the major powers.
3. Economic warfare: Soviet leaders assumed that Western trade partners colluded to overcharge and bilk the Soviet Union of its money. Consequently, Soviet state security was charged with controlling Soviet export and import operations and protecting Soviet foreign trade from perceived pressures and abuses of international cartels and other organizations of monopolistic capital.
4. Misinformation: The Soviet government was not only interested in obtaining information from other countries’ inner decision making circles but also in inserting misinforming and misleading information into those circles concerning Soviet position and intentions.
5. Infiltrating foreign intelligence and security services: Soviet intelligence services sought to penetrate foreign intelligence counterparts both to counter foreign intelligence threats directed against the Soviet Union, and to take advantage of the special accesses to information the intelligence employees enjoyed. The Soviet Union wanted to know how others perceived the Soviet Union and on what information they based those perceptions.
6. Political action: Similar to misinformation, the Soviet government sought to recruit sympathetic, high-level foreign decision makers, through which the Soviet Union could “tip the scales of policy in favor of the Soviet Union.” Targets included government leaders and politicians who influenced their country’s policymaking processes.
7. Industrial intelligence: Soviet intelligence sought to steal production secrets from the advanced countries of Europe and America, including industrial production processes, new inventions, and secret technological breakthroughs, to assist in the industrializing the Soviet Union.[cxli] In the 1920s and early 1930s, the OGPU focused much of its industrial collection on Germany and France. But in subsequent years, the OGPU viewed the United States as a “storehouse of industrial know-how.”[cxlii]
8. Guerilla Warfare: Soviet intelligence officers conducted guerilla warfare and trained foreign guerillas in tactics and techniques, including sabotage and covert penetrations.[cxliii]
These Soviet intelligence missions reflected an ever-present assumption that Western countries were dangerous enemies bent on destroying the Soviet Union. Although in the 1963 context this was not a startling revelation, Feldbin’s information, combined with reporting from other defectors, like Ginzberg, Graff, and Volodarsky, showed a Soviet perception in the 1930s that differed little from the Cold War adversarial approach to the West.
But this material was the exception. He attempted various other publications over the following decades with uneven results. In April 1956, Feldbin published another article in Life magazine claiming the Stalin arrested and executed Tukhachevskiy and his military colleagues in 1937 because they had learned of a secret that Stalin had long suppressed—that Stalin himself was an intelligence source of the Tsarist Okhrana. The article appeared two months after Nikita Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech,” in which Khrushchev criticized Stalin’s cult of personality. Feldbin wrote that, “Happily the current turn of events in the Soviet Union has made it possible for me to publish the facts myself. Khrushchev now no doubt knows them; there is no longer a reason for me to keep silent.”[cxliv] Feldbin‘s Life article was followed by an expose by Isaac Don Levine that claims to have located an Okhrana document proving the story was true.[cxlv] Rumors of Stalin’s Okhrana collaboration had circulated for many years but had never been proven. Levine’s purported evidence, however, was later shown to be a forgery, and the allegation was never taken seriously.
In June 1965, Feldbin wrote a letter to Henry Luce, the owner of Life magazine, promising a new story “no less sensational” than his book The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes. He asked for Luce’s help to publish materials based on “genuine documents and photostats, the authenticity of which will be so evident that the Kremlin itself won’t even try to contest it.” He did not detail the substance of the new spectacular revelations, but warned that the “plan would seriously endanger my life if my former associates get wind of it prematurely.” An assistant to Henry Luce wrote a courteous letter in return, but there is not further indication that the magazine pursued the story.
For the rest of his life, he continued to write and consult with U.S. officials on Soviet intelligence topics. Near the end of his life he reviewed several books about Soviet intelligence, such as Paul Blackstock’s book, The Secret Road to World War II (probably 1970), Elizabeth Poretsky’s book, Our Own People: A Memoir of Ignace Reiss and His Friends (March 1970), and a chapter titled “The Case of the British Engineers” in Lord William Strang’s book Home and Abroad (June 1971).[cxlvi] In these reviews he compares his personal memories with the details in these works, often overlaying the cover stories that he had been telling his debriefers for years. There is no indication that these reviews were ever published.
Feldbin died nearly 20 years after he revealed himself publicly. He continued to frustrate FBI and CIA debriefers, especially as it became increasingly apparent that his information was incomplete. Costello and Tsarev’s book, published 20 years after Feldbin’s death—and 55 years after his defection—provided the first glimpse into the areas that Feldbin refused to reveal. Subsequent biographies, particularly those by Gazur and Volodarsky, as well as Feldbin’s own autobiography, portrayed competing images of Feldbin, shedding only a little additional light. All of these sources, combined with materials that the FBI and MI5 have made public, give a reasonably complete picture of Feldbin’s career. While the long delays limited the impact that his information could have and meant that his insights into Soviet decision making were primarily historical, his detailed information about the purge trials and Soviet intelligence mindsets in general are still read today.
Notes
- [i] Photo from https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Орлов,_Александр_Михайлович.
- [ii] Alexander Orlov, “Ghastly Secrets of Stalin’s Powers,” Life, 6 April 1953, pp. 111-112, 115-123; Alexander Orlov, “Stalin’s Secrets: Inside Story of How the Trials Were Rigged,” Life, 13 April 1953, pp. 160-161, 164-166, 168, 170, 173-174, 177-178); Alexander Orlov, “Stalin’s Secrets: Treachery to His Friends, Cruelty to Their Children,“ Life, 20 April 1953, pp. 142-144, 145, 148, 150, 153-154, 156, 159; Alexander Orlov, “Stalin’s Secret: The Man Himself,” Life, 27 April 1953, pp. 145-146, 148-152, 157-158.
- [iii] Alexander Orlov, “The Beria I Knew,” Life, 20 July 1953, pp. 33-36.
- [iv] Alexander Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes (New York: Random House, 1953), pp. ix-xvi.
- [v] Alexander Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerilla Warfare (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 1963).
- [vi] The Michigan University press, to which Feldbin sent the manuscript for publication, assigned it to four readers for blind scholarly review. Each reader emphasized that the material was of uneven historical significance because it was completely undocumented and hence lacked credibility; Pre-publication review comments, NARA, Orlov Collection, Box 3.
- [vii] Alexander Orlov, The March of Time: Reminiscences (London: St. Ermin's, 2004).
- [viii] FBI Summary of Orlov’s information provided to MI5 in Washington, dated 26 October 1953, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 9a.
- [ix] MI5 list of questions for Feldbin’s debriefing, dated 17 November 1953, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 13a. FBI memo to MI5, dated 17 December 1953, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 28a.
- [x] Gordon Brook-Shepherd, Storm Petrels (New York, London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), pp. 195-239.
- [xi] John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, Deadly Illusions: The KGB Orlov Dossier Reveals Stalin's Master Spy (New York: Crown, 1993).
- [xii] Edward Gazur, Alexander Orlov: the FBI's KGB General (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2002), p. xvii.
- [xiii] Boris Volodarsky, Stalin’s Agent: The Life and Death of Alexander Orlov (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
- [xiv] Brook-Shepherd, p. 238.
- [xv] Volodarsky, p. 171.
- [xvi] “Приказ НКВД СССР № 832,” 14.12.1935 (“Order of the USSR NKVD No. 832,” 14 December 1935), Кадровый Состав Органов Государственной Безопасности СССР, 1935-1939 (Staff Personnel of the Organs of USSR State Security, 1935-1939), https://nkvd.memo.ru/index.php/Документ:Приказ_НКВД_СССР_№_832_от_14.12.1935.
- [xvii] FBI Summary of Orlov’s information provided to MI5 in Washington, dated 26 October 1953, p. 3, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 9a.
- [xviii] Brook-Shepherd, p. 212.
- [xix] Katsnelson’s career is detailed in Nikita Vasilyevich Petrov and Konstantin Vladislavovich Skorkin, Кто руководил НКВД 1934-1941 (Who Led the NKVD 1934-1941) (Moscow: Zvenya, 1999), http://www.memo.ru/history/nkvd/kto/index.htm.
- [xx] Orlov, March of Time, p. 134. Gazur does not mention Kalamatiano in his story of British intelligence agent Sydney Reilly, although Kalamatiano was associated with Reilly, Gazur, pp. 494-533. Foglesong notes that Soviet sources, including a 26 November 1918 Izvestiya article recounting Kalamatiano’s trial and later memoirs of Soviet officers who had been involved in the case, describe the cane incident. See David S. Foglesong, “Xenophon Kalamatiano: An American spy in Revolutionary Russia?,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 6 (1991), No. 1, p. 167 and footnote 53, p. 188.
- [xxi] Gazur, p. 5; Volodarsky, p. 10.
- [xxii] Orlov, March of Time, pp. 35-32; Gazur, pp. 5-10; Volodarsky, p. 9. Volodarsky argues the incident with Senkowski is a fabrication, but to prove his assertion he provides evidence about different person.
- [xxiii] The journal is called Soviet Jurisprudence Weekly in United States Congress. Senate. Judiciary Committee, The Legacy of Alexander Orlov, 93rd Congress, First Session (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 4-5. Gazur, and Costello and Tsarev repeat the title Soviet Jurisprudence Weekly.
- [xxiv] Transcript of press conference held on 18 April 1956, p. 2; NARA, Orlov Collection, Box 2.
- [xxv] SIS information quoted in New Scotland Yard memo, dated 12 December 1928, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial number unclear.
- [xxvi] L. Nikolaev, “Суд и Жизнь: ‘Судебные Деятели'” (“The Court and Life: ‘Judicial Officials’”), Еженедельник Советской Юстиции (Soviet Jurisprudence Weekly), 19 April 1923, p. 349; L. Nikolaev, “Суд и Жизнь: 'Следователь' Гернуши” (“The Court and Life: ‘Investigator’ Gernushi”), Soviet Jurisprudence Weekly, 17 May 1923, p. 444., Belinki Electronic Library, http://elib.uraic.ru/handle/123456789/3305.
- [xxvii] L. N.,, “Суд и Жизнь: Дело Госторга” (“The Court and Life: The Gostorg Case”), Soviet Jurisprudence Weekly, 26 April 1923, pp. 370-372.
- [xxviii] United States Congress. The Legacy of Alexander Orlov, pp. 4-5. For a reason that is unclear, Costello and Tsarev state that this incident occurred in 1923, not 1924; Costello and Tsarev, p. 29.
- [xxix] Costello and Tsarev assert that Feldbin did not actually leave OGPU employment while he was in law school, but that his purported separation was actually a device used by Dzerzhinskiy to allow OGPU officers to gain an education, and thereby respectability in their career; see Costello and Tsarev, p. 27.
- [xxx] Transcript of press conference held on 18 April 1956, p. 3; NARA, Orlov Collection, Box 2. The unnamed OGPU officer who defected in August 1926 noted above provided a list of OGPU directorate chiefs, showing Katsnelson as chief of the Economic Directorate and Blagonravov as chief of the Transportation Directorate; MI5 Memo CX/3129, dated 11 January 1927, TNA, KV 2/11, serial 50a. Blagonravov briefly led both directorates from April 1925 until February 1926, probably to cover for Katsnelson’s sudden departure to replace Mogilevich; see V. Vinogradov, Natalya Peremyshlennikova compilers, Архив ВЧК: Сборник документов (The VChk Archive: Collection of Documents) (Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole, 2007), p. 667.
- [xxxi] Gazur, 12; Volodarsky, 11.
- [xxxii] Costello and Tsarev, p. 43.
- [xxxiii] Petrov Skorkin, Who Led the NKVD 1934-1941.
- [xxxiv] FBI Summary of Orlov’s information provided to MI5 in Washington, dated 26 October 1953, p. 3, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 9a. Feldbin repeated the number 11,000 on other public occasions; see transcript of press conference held on 18 April 1956, p. 4; NARA, Orlov Collection, Box 2.
- [xxxv] Feldbin discusses his impressions of Beria in “The Beria I Knew,” Life, 20 July 1953, pp. 33-36.
- [xxxvi] Amy W. Knight, Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 35.
- [xxxvii] United States Congress. The Legacy of Alexander Orlov, p. 5.
- [xxxviii] Brook-Shepherd, pp. 203-204.
- [xxxix] Volodarsky pp. 11, 15. Gazur claims that Vera contracted the illness after the family had already arrived in Paris during the summer of 1926 (Gazur p. 45).
- [xl] Costello and Tsarev, p. 43.”
- [xli] Costello and Tsarev, pp. 48-49.
- [xlii] Vladimir Burtsev, “Парижская сеть ГПУ с 1925 г. с сетками коминтернa” (“The Paris GPU Network from 1925 with the Comintern Nets”), Hoover Institution Archive, Boris Nicolaevsky collection, Box 800, Folder 16 (Microfilm reel 744).
- [xliii] Also spelled Boggovut-Kolomiytsev and Bogovut-Kolomiytsev.
- [xliv] Vladislav Ivanovich Goldin, Солдаты На Чужбине: Русский Обще-Воинский Союз, Россия и Русское Зарубежье в XX-XXI Веках ( Soldiers in a Foreign Land: The Russian All-Military Union, Russia, and the Russian Abroad in the 20th and 21st Centuries) (Electronic Publication: Russian All-Military Union, 2011), pp. 136, 401.
- [xlv] Costello and Tsarev, p. 54.
- [xlvi] Feldbin maintained throughout his debriefings that he had never been to Britain; see, for example, FBI memo dated 17 December 1953, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 28a.
- [xlvii] SIS information quoted in New Scotland Yard memo, dated 12 December 1928, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial number unclear.
- [xlviii] Gazur, 435.
- [xlix] [Authors name redacted], “A Stone for Willy Fisher,” Studies in Intelligence, Winter 1986, p. 21; NARA, RG 263, Entry A1-27, Box 10, number 112-2. See also Costello and Tsarev, p. 482, n13.
- [l] Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare, p. 31.
- [li] Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 99-102. Costello and Tsarev assert that Feldbin was the case officer in this operation, but did not find specific evidence in his file to prove their assertion; Costello and Tsarev, p. 62 and p. 438 n18-19.
- [lii] Feldbin/Orlov discusses the counterfeit operation in United States Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States, 85th Congress, First Session, Part 50, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 3441, 3442.
- [liii] Costello and Tsarev, p. 72-73.
- [liv] Costello and Tsarev give the name as Alexander Belkin, p. 75.
- [lv] FBI Summary of Orlov’s information provided to MI5 in Washington, dated 26 October 1953, p. 8, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 9a
- [lvi] Gazur, p. 22.
- [lvii] Volodarsky, p. 37; see also William E. Duff, A Time for Spies: Theodore Stephanivoch Mally and the Era of the Great Illegals (Nashville; London: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999), p. 77.
- [lviii] Frank J. Rafalko, ed., CI Reader: American Revolution Into the New Millennium (Washington, DC: Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2004), p. 23. See also Costello ad Tsarev, p. 93.
- [lix] Gazur, p. 324.
- [lx] FBI letter 7319-100-771, dated 10 April 1956, TNA, KV 2/2879, serial 69a.
- [lxi] Pub. L. 84-810, Chap. 732, S. 1627, 25 July 1956.
- [lxii] Costello and Tsarev, pp. 111-113.
- [lxiii] Compilation of Ginzberg’s MI5 Debriefings,” TNA, KV 2/805, serial 55x, p. 41.
- [lxiv] Krivitsky, I Was Stalin’s Agent, p. 101.
- [lxv] FBI memo titled “Comments by Alexander Orlov Regarding Information Furnished by Walter Krivistky,” p. 17, TNA, KV 2/2879, serial 64b.
- [lxvi] Duff, A Time for Spies, p. 77.
- [lxvii] FBI memo titled “Comments by Alexander Orlov Regarding Information Furnished by Walter Krivistky,” p. 7, TNA, KV 2/2879, serial 64b.
- [lxviii] Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes, p. xv.
- [lxix] Volodarsky, p. 2.
- [lxx] Costello and Tsarev, pp. 145-152.
- [lxxi] Costello and Tsarev, pp. 160-161. Tsarev claims to have gotten access to a long report by Feldbin to OGPU headquarters, dated 24 April 1935; Costello and Tsarev, pp. 155-158. Feldbin’s OGPU file also contains names of other British recruitment targets about which Feldbin was aware, but which were redacted from the material made available to Tsarev. Tsarev’s data cannot be verified, because the Fedlbin/Orlov file is not open to public research.
- [lxxii] Costello and Tsarev, pp. 187-189.
- [lxxiii] Costello and Tsarev, p. 192.
- [lxxiv] Costello and Tsarev, p. 223.
- [lxxv] Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerilla Warfare, p. 16.
- [lxxvi] Costello and Tsarev, pp. 227-232.
- [lxxvii] Costello and Tsarev, pp. 158-159.
- [lxxviii] Duff, A Time for Spies, pp. 123, 124.
- [lxxix] Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerilla Warfare, pp. 78-79.
- [lxxx] Georgiy Agabekov, ЧК за работой (The Cheka at Work) (Berlin: Strela, 1931), p. 109.
- [lxxxi] This is probably a cover story to obscure his involvement in OGPU activities targeting Britain; FBI memo titled “Intelligence Activities in England,” dated 1 October 1953, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 7a. He separately claimed that he was working as the deputy chief of the NKVD Department of Railroads and Sea Transport during this same time; FBI Summary of Orlov’s information provided to MI5 in Washington, dated 26 October 1953, p. 3, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 9a.
- [lxxxii] FBI memo titled “Intelligence Activities in England,” dated 1 October 1953, p. 5, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 7a
- [lxxxiii] Costello and Tsarev, pp. 201-202.
- [lxxxiv] FBI memo titled “Intelligence Activities in England,” dated 1 October 1953, p. 5, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 7a.
- [lxxxv] MI5 Loose Minute dated 1 December 1953, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 20a; copies of Foreign Office dispatches from early 1936 on which marginal notes were written, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 22a.
- [lxxxvi] MI5 minute dated 16 December 1953, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 23a.
- [lxxxvii] MI5 note, dated 25 April 1955, TNA KV 2/2879, serial 59a.
- [lxxxviii] FBI memo titled “Intelligence Activities in England,” dated 1 October 1953, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 7a.
- [lxxxix] Preliminary MI5 summary of Krivitsky’s information, dated 26 January 1940, TNA KV 2/804, serial 9a; MI5 Debriefing Notes, dated 5 February 1940, TNA, KV 2/804, serial 33a.
- [xc] Costello and Tsarev, p. 201.
- [xci] Memo from MI5 to the FBI, dated 18 November 1953, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 15a.
- [xcii] MI5 minute dated 6 November 1953, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 10.
- [xciii] Barmine, One Who Survived, pp. 245-255, 282-285.
- [xciv] Krivitsky, I Was Stalin’s Agent, pp. 213-214.
- [xcv] Krivitsky, I Was Stalin’s Agent, pp. 220-225.
- [xcvi] Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes, p. 101.
- [xcvii] Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes, p. 179.
- [xcviii] Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes, pp. 252-253.
- [xcix] Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes, pp. 61-76.
- [c] Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes, p. 167.
- [ci] Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes, pp. 38-39.
- [cii] Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes, pp. 179-180.
- [ciii] Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes, p. 288.
- [civ] FBI Summary of Orlov’s information provided to MI5 in Washington, dated 26 October 1953, p. 3, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 9a.
- [cv] FBI memo titled “Comments of Alexander Orlov about Walter Krivitsky’s Book ‘In Stalin’s Secret Service’,” dated 13 October 1954, pp. 10-12, TNA, 2/2879, serial 45b.
- [cvi] Costello and Tsarev, pp. 268-269.
- [cvii] Krivitsky, I Was Stalin’s Agent, p. 101.
- [cviii] FBI memo titled “Comments of Alexander Orlov about Walter Krivitsky’s Book ‘In Stalin’s Secret Service’,” dated 13 October 1954, p. 3, TNA, KV 2/2879, serial 45b.
- [cix] FBI memo titled “Comments of Alexander Orlov about Walter Krivitsky’s Book ‘In Stalin’s Secret Service’,” dated 13 October 1954, pp. 6-7, TNA, KV 2/2879, serial 45b.
- [cx] Costello and Tsarev, p. 165.
- [cxi] MI5 Debriefing Notes. dated 10 February 1940, TNA, KV 2/804, serial 41a. Also extracted from Krivitsky debriefing and cross-referenced to MI5 file on Yezhov, TNA, KV 2/583, serial 21a.
- [cxii] Costello and Tsarev, p. 169.
- [cxiii] Letter from the U.S. Embassy in London to MI5, dated 24 July 1953, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 1a; letter from U.S. Embassy dated 30 September 1953, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 5z.
- [cxiv] A headline appeared in the 15 October 1936 edition of the Spanish newspaper El Heraldo de Aragón that read, "In an official note, the head of the State's government, General Franco, protests against the spoliation without precedents carried by the so-called government of Madrid by freely taking control of the national gold reserves."
- [cxv] United States Congress. The Legacy of Alexander Orlov, p. 42.
- [cxvi] United States Congress. The Legacy of Alexander Orlov, p. 45.
- [cxvii] Costello and Tsarev, pp. 263-264.
- [cxviii] FBI Summary of Orlov’s information provided to MI5 in Washington, dated 26 October 1953, p. 4, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 9a.
- [cxix] Costello and Tsarev, pp. 276-277.
- [cxx] FBI, Summary of Special Investigation of William J. Donovan, dated 15 July 1953, p. 16, FBI file 77-58706, serial 47.
- [cxxi] FBI memo titled “Comments of Alexander Orlov about Walter Krivitsky’s Book ‘In Stalin’s Secret Service’,” dated 13 October 1954, containing results of debriefings that occurred between January and May 1954. The FBI provided the memo to MI5 in late October 1954, TNA, 2/2879, serial 45a and 45b.
- [cxxii] FBI memo titled “Comments by Alexander Orlov Regarding Information Furnished by Walter Krivitsky,” dated 26 July 1955, TNA, KV 2/2879, serial 64b.
- [cxxiii] Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerilla Warfare, p. 124.
- [cxxiv] MI5 minutes, dated 24 and 31 August 1955, TNA, 2/2879, serials 66a and 67a.
- [cxxv] Petrov and Skorkin, Who Led the NKVD 1934-1941.
- [cxxvi] FBI Summary of Orlov’s information provided to MI5 in Washington, dated 26 October 1953, p. 5, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 9a.
- [cxxvii] Ibid.
- [cxxviii] ASVRR, Operational Record File No. 76659, vol. 1, pp. 245–58, quoted in Tsarev and Costello, Deadly Illusions, 308–12.
- [cxxix] “Приказ НКВД СССР № 1384 от 03.10.1940” (“NKVD of the USSR Order No. 1384,” 3 October 1940), Кадровый Состав Органов Государственной Безопасности СССР, 1935-1939 (Staff Personnel of the Organs of USSR State Security, 1935-1939), https://nkvd.memo.ru/index.php/Документ:Приказ_НКВД_СССР_№_1384_от_03.10.1940.
- [cxxx] Costello and Tsarev, p. 274.
- [cxxxi] Brook-Shepherd, p. 215.
- [cxxxii] Costello and Tsarev, pp. 324-325.
- [cxxxiii] Gazur, p. 165-166.
- [cxxxiv] Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes, p. xvi.
- [cxxxv] Costello and Tsarev, p. 342.
- [cxxxvi] MI5 Loose Minute, dated 21 October 1953, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 8a.
- [cxxxvii] Letter from British Embassy in Washington to MI5, dated 28 October 1953, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 9a.
- [cxxxviii] Letter from MI5 to British Embassy in Washington, dated 16 January 1954, TNA, KV 2/2878, serial 33a.
- [cxxxix] Alexander Orlov, “The Theory and Practice of Soviet Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 1963), pp. 45-65.
- [cxl] Ibid, p. 47-48.
- [cxli] Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerilla Warfare, pp. 14-38; see also Orlov, “The Theory and Practice of Soviet Intelligence." pp. 50-60.
- [cxlii] FBI memo titled “Comments by Alexander Orlov Regarding Information Furnished by Walter Krivistky,” TNA, KV 2/2879, serial 64b, p. 13.
- [cxliii] Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerilla Warfare, pp. 164-183.
- [cxliv] Alexander Orlov, “The Sensational Secret Behind the Damnation of Stalin,” Life, 23 April 1956, pp. 34-38, 43-45.
- [cxlv] Isaac Don Levine, “A Document on Stalin As Czarist Spy.” Life, 23 April 1956, pp. 47-49.
- [cxlvi] Manuscripts of these reviews are contained in NARA, Orlov Collection, box 2.
Published works
- “Ghastly Secrets of Stalin’s Powers
- ” Life
- 6 April 1953
- pp. 111-112
- 115-123. “Stalin’s Secrets: Inside Story of How the Trials Were Rigged
- ” Life
- 13 April 1953
- pp. 160-161
- 164-166
- 168
- 170
- 173-174
- 177-178. “Stalin’s Secrets: Treachery to His Friends
- Cruelty to Their Children
- “ Life
- 20 April 1953
- pp. 142-144
- 145
- 148
- 150
- 153-154
- 156
- 159. “Stalin’s Secret: The Man Himself
- ” Life
- 27 April 1953
- pp. 145-146
- 148-152
- 157-158. “The Beria I Knew
- ” Life
- 20 July 1953
- pp. 33-36. The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes (New York: Random House
- 1953) “The Sensational Secret Behind the Damnation of Stalin
- ” Life
- 23 Apr 1956
- pp. 34-38
- 43-45. "The Theory and Practice of Soviet Intelligence
- " Studies in Intelligence
- Vol. 7
- no. 2 (Spring 1963)
- 45-65. Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
- 1963) "How Stalin Relieved Spain of $600
- 000
- 000
- " Reader's Digest
- November 1966
- pp. 37-50. The March of Time: Reminiscences (London: St. Ermin's
- 2004)