Biography
[This is the first half of the material for Shorokhov and Kartseva. See Afanasiy Shorokhov in this database for the second half of this description and endnotes.]
The defection of husband and wife couple Afanasiy Mikhailovich Shorokhov and Yevdokiya Alekseyevna Kartseva,[i] better known by their cover names, Vladimir and Yevdokiya Petrov, in April 1954 had one of the most intense impacts on the receiving country’s political system of any defectors up to that time. The defection and the revelations that followed damaged the political prospects of Australia’s left-leaning Labor Party for decades, and even today continues to be the subject of debate about whether it was specifically engineered for political purposes. The allegation of an Australian political impetus behind the defection first surfaced in Soviet press a week after Kartseva’s defection,[ii] the circumstances of which led to a five-year break in Australian-Soviet diplomatic relations.
Information about Shorokhov and Kartseva and their revelations is extensive. Shorokhov brought with him a package of original MGB/MVD documents and notes that described Soviet plans for targeting Australians and other citizens for intelligence purposes. Based on these documents, Australian authorities conducted lengthy and detailed debriefings over several years, and the debriefings were shared with the British SIS, although not initially with the United States. The Australian government also launched a Royal Commission on Espionage in May 1954 that culminated in a final report that was presented to the Australian Governor-General on 22 August 1955. Many of the 119 witness interviews were held in public, and the reports of the proceedings were published broadly in Australia and other countries, including in Russian émigré press. The Royal Commission labeled Shorokhov’s documents the “Petrov Papers,” and ruled that they were authentic documents and that Shorokhov and Kartseva were truthful witnesses. The Royal Commission also declared publicly that the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, from its establishment in 1943 to its closure in 1954, had been used for espionage in Australia; and that the only Australians who knowingly assisted Soviet espionage were communists. The last point caused political upheaval and angry reactions from communists around the world. Large volumes of debriefing material and information from Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) debriefings and from the Royal Commission are now available in Australian and British archives.
In 1955, Dr. Michael Bialogulski, an ASIO recruited agent who became a close associate of Shorokhov and reported on his movements from 1951 to 1954, published a book on the events leading up to the defection, The Petrov Story,[iii] in which Bialogulski amplified his own importance considerably. Soon thereafter, Shorokhov and Kartseva published a newspaper series titled “The Petrovs’ Own Story,”[iv] which differed from Bialogulski’s account on a number of points. The series was expanded in 1956 into a book, provocatively titled Empire of Fear, which ended with a rebuttal to Bialogulski’s self-serving account.[v] The book was ghost written by ASIO officer Michael Thwaites, who played a personal role in their debriefings, and who in 1980 published his own account of the events surrounding the defection.[vi] Shorokhov’s and Kartseva’s defection has also attracted the attention of academic and political writers, including Australian political author Robert Manne[vii] and more recently, Swedish professor Wilhelm Agrell.[viii] Additionally, numerous articles have been written on the defection and its political impact.
Afanasiy Mikhailovich Shorokhov was born in February 1907 in the rural village of Larikha in southern Siberia. When he was seven years old, his father died after being struck by lightning, and his family scraped by as subsistence farmers throughout his childhood. Shorokhov was apprenticed to a blacksmith as a teenager—years later the blacksmith was arrested and deported as a kulak. His remote village weathered the civil war with only a few small skirmishes, and communist power was slow to take hold. In 1923, a communist agitator from a nearby town came to encourage the youth to join the Komsomol with the promise of education and a brighter future. Shorokhov was one of a few youth in the village to join, and he began to participate in Komsomol meetings regularly.[ix]
Shorokhov became an active leader in the village Komsomol cell, leading to his selection in 1926 for a high school in Perm. He traveled to Perm and took an entrance exam for the school, but failed, due to little education he had received up to that point.[x] He was forced to return to Larikha, but a year later, after continued hard work in the village Komsomol, he was sent to a teacher’s training course in Sverdlovsk. Also in 1927, Shorokhov was accepted as a full member of the Communist Party and worked in several party activist positions.
In November 1929, in what Shorokhov described as a “flush of enthusiasm,” he officially changed his name to Proletarskiy.[xi] An official notice of the name change appeared in the newspaper Izvestia.[xii] The following year, he joined the Soviet Navy, where he was trained as a cipher clerk. He also served in various Party positions during three years in the Navy. He got married in 1932, and he claims he left the Navy and joined the OGPU in May 1933 primarily because he had a wife and needed a job; the marriage only lasted until 1938. Fellow sailors who had taken the same route recommended him as a cipher clerk in the OGPU, and he was assigned to the Special Cipher Section.[xiii]
Shorokhov’s unit processed communications to and from NKVD legal rezidenturas abroad. He remembered decrypting “a flood of cables” from Berlin and Rome that described the rising threat from Italy and Germany. He also decrypted cables from NKVD representatives in Spain during the civil war, including a “dramatic cable” from Paris in July 1938 that described the desertion of the NKVD rezident in Spain—Aleksandr Orlov (See separate entry for Leyba Feldbin in this database). The cable also communicated Orlov’s threat to reveal Soviet intelligence agents and operations if any harm came to him.[xiv]
Shorokhov wrote about his work in the Special Cipher Section during the Yezhovshchina, where he processed communications between NKVD offices and headquarters, including frequent cables that reported suspects’ confessions to being British, German, and Japanese spies. The cables also communicated orders for mass executions, to which senior officers in the field would respond with the names of the executed. Sometimes offices were forced to manufacture reasons to arrest people to meet the quotas placed on them by Moscow. He discussed an NKVD officer, whom he labeled B----, who arrived in Rostov at the height of the purge, and then was transferred to the Far East, and from where, when Yezhov was arrested, he “saw the writing on the wall and fled to Japan.”[xv] Although Shorokhov concealed the name and incorrectly remembered some of the chronology, the person he described could only have been Genrikh Lyushkov (see separate entry in this database).
In September 1937, Shorokhov was assigned temporarily to Xinjiang, China, where the Soviet Union was endeavoring to establish Soviet dominance. He had worked with cables from the legal NKVD rezidentura in China and Mongolia for several years, and while Germany and Italy were an increasing focus of Soviet intelligence activities in Europe, Japan was a topic of growing apprehension in the east. He had also read in those cables about Soviet operations to remove British and American influence from China and replace it with Soviet influence. Shorokhov described the Soviet effort as a “dramatic purge,” condemning to death any British, American, and other anti-Soviet elements. Soviet agents operated primarily among the Chinese Party ruling class that had been transplanted in Sinkiang, since the local Muslim population was not inclined to support Soviet dominance. However, the NKVD had some success recruiting agents among the Muslim Uighur population.[xvi]
Shorokhov’s temporary assignment to China lasted only a few months, but it had a positive effect on his career. In October 1937, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star,[xvii] and by 1939, he was promoted to major of state security and assigned deputy chief of Special Cipher Section, responsible for NKVD secure communications inside the USSR.
At about this time, Shorokhov met Yevdokiya Alekseyevna Kartseva, a cipher clerk in a different NKVD section. He was recently divorced, and he soon found himself looking for reasons to go to her office to talk to her, until one of his colleagues recommended that he consider marrying Kartseva.
Kartseva was born in February 1914 in the village of Lipki, Ryazan Oblast, southeast of Moscow. Her family moved in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, in 1919 and lived there until 1924, when they moved to Moscow. Kartseva lived in Moscow from then until her first foreign assignment to Sweden in 1942. Her father initially worked as a tram driver, but when the family moved to Moscow he took a job as a wagon driver for the OGPU. In about 1935 he became an NKVD noncommissioned officer working as a uniformed guard.[xviii]
Soon after moving to Moscow, Kartseva remembers walking down Lubyanka Street and seeing a group of children wearing bright red scarves and playing. She approached the adult leader and asked to join. The leader said it was a Pioneer group for OGPU employees, and asked it her parents worked for the OGPU. Her father had recently taken a job with the OGPU, so she was allowed to join, beginning her indoctrination as a Soviet citizen.[xix] Kartseva progressed to the Komsomol in 1929, when she was 15.
Kartseva finished secondary school in 1930 and began studying English in the Technical Institute of Foreign Languages in Moscow. She had multiple friends, especially men, who worked for the OGPU, and one of them suggested that she come work there. She initially resisted because she had not completed her institute studies, but she was persuaded and began as a junior cipher clerk for the Razvedupr in early 1933. She became a fulltime NKVD employee transferred in June 1934 to the NKVD Special Department when Razvedupr cipher clerks were reorganized into civilian intelligence. Her department was responsible for decrypting the codes used by foreign diplomatic missions in Moscow, including Japanese, Chinese, Romanian, Turkish, British, American, and Scandinavian. Petrova was assigned to the Japanese section from 1934 to 1942. She was promoted to sergeant of state security in April 1939.[xx] She completed a four-year Japanese language course, and by 1942 she had reached the rank of captain of state security and was a specialist in decrypting Japanese telegrams.[xxi]
Kartseva joined the Communist Party in 1950, not long before she left for her assignment in Australia. Her Communist Party membership was delayed for over a decade because she fell into suspicion during the Yezhovshchina in 1937. In 1936, she met and moved in with another NKVD officer, Roman Vladimirovich Krivosh, who also worked in the Special Section as a cipher officer. She had a daughter with Krivosh in June 1937. But in July 1937, the NKVD arrested Krivosh because of his foreign connections and his father, who had worked for the tsarist Okhrana. The father had subsequently cooperated with the OGPU/NKVD as a Balkan language translator, but was arrested and exiled several times. Krivosh’s arrest was linked to his father, and he was jailed until the outbreak of the war, when he was released and reinstalled as a cipher operator.[xxii]
Kartseva was suspect by association with Krivosh, and her career was temporarily put on hold while the NKVD investigated her. This put her membership in the Komsomol at risk, and thus her job. However, she was fortunate: rather than expulsion, the NKVD Komsomol chairman let her off with a “severe reprimand and serious warning” for her lapse in judgment for entering into a relationship with an “enemy of the people.” Although it took time for the reprimand to be expunged, she was eventually accepted back into full Komsomol membership and she retained her position in the NVKD, which was especially important as Krivosh’s arrest left her as a single mother with a newborn daughter.[xxiii]
Kartseva met Shorokhov, who was using the name Proletarskiy, at work in the late 1930s. He was the deputy chief of the 6th Section (Internal NKVD Cipher Communications) of the Special Cipher Section. He became a friend who did not shun her during the time she was under suspicion, and his friendship was an indicator that she was being accepted back into Party society. Kartseva’s daughter became acquainted with Shorokhov, and Kartseva was impressed by how he treated the child and how the child took him. However, in April 1940 the child fell ill and after a few weeks, died of meningitis. Kartseva was grief stricken, and Shorokhov supported her in the difficult time that followed. By July 1940, they had grown close enough to be married.[xxiv]
In July 1942, Shorokhov received his first foreign assignment to the Soviet embassy in Sweden as cipher clerk to the NKGB rezident and the embassy’s Line SK (Советская колония; Soviet colony) officer, responsible for monitoring the security and loyalty of Soviet government employees in Sweden. At this time, the couple was assigned the cover name Petrov.
Shorokhov described his duties in Sweden as a Line SK officer:
· Supervising the security of all Soviet official staff stationed in a given country, including at the embassy, consulate, trade delegation, service attachés, TASS representatives, Inturist, Aeroflot, and other Soviet government institutions. This included keeping a personal file on each Soviet official.
· Liaison with the SK representatives accompanying Soviet delegations.
· Supervising the security of crews aboard Soviet ships calling at a given country’s ports. In some cases, such as in the United Kingdom, a full-time maritime SK officer is posted to an embassy. Maritime SK officers recruit sources in the local population who can report on the behavior of Soviet ship crews when they are in port.
· Supervising the security of all non-official Soviet passport holders in the given country.
· Collecting information about the local security service and conducting operations to penetrate it.[xxv]
On their trip from Moscow to Stockholm, they experienced firsthand the dangers of travelling in wartime. They departed Moscow in July 1942 for Archangel, planning to reach Stockholm via an overland route. However, German military operations prevented them from proceeding and in September they returned to Moscow. They traveled instead by air from Kuybishev, via Baku and Tehran, to Cairo, where they boarded a ship for Cape Town. Along the way, a German submarine attacked their ship and sank it off the coast of Mozambique, and they were rescued after two days at sea in a lifeboat. They were taken to South Africa, where they boarded and British naval vessel bound for London. From there they took a military air transport and finally arrived in Stockholm in March 1943—eight months after they first set out.[xxvi]
Shorokhov came under Swedish surveillance at least as early as August 1945.[xxvii] By May 1946, the Swedish security service had strong grounds to suspect that he was an NKVD officer.[xxviii] A Swedish source associated Shorokhov’s name with an alleged plot, planned for 16 September 1946, to explode bombs in Stockholm, and then to raise a propaganda campaign against the police for failing to maintain safety. The substance of the allegation is questionable; however, Shorokhov’s name being associated with it raised his profile with the Swedish Security Police.[xxix] In April 1947, Swedish surveillance recorded him conducting surveillance detection en route to agent meetings.[xxx] He used the false names Johan Johansson and Jakob Pettersson while operating in Sweden.
SIS first became aware that Shorokhov was an intelligence office in 1945 when he was in Sweden.[xxxi] SIS sources reported that he served in Sweden without diplomatic status, that he was a liaison with the Communist Party, and that he departed Sweden as of 30 January 1948.[xxxii] Shorokhov told later Australian debriefers that he “worked like an animal” photographing documents for transmission to NKVD headquarters in Moscow while he worked as a cipher clerk in Sweden. Sometimes the volume was so big that he had to work all day and all night to process it.[xxxiii]
Shorokhov’s job as the Line SK officer was to recruit sources among the Soviet colony to monitor Soviet personnel. When Shorokhov arrived in Sweden, his predecessor had not recruited any sources. But by the time Shorokhov left Sweden in 1948, he had recruited 13 sources. Shorokhov’s duties included keeping track of Soviet sailors during port calls in Sweden and ensuring they did not defect. If they did defect, Shorokhov’s job included investigating the incident and meeting the defector through consular channels to attempt to persuade him to return to the Soviet Union. This was the case with a sailor named Vladimir Semenchenko, who failed to return to his Soviet commercial ship that was ported in Göteborg. After an argument with the ship’s political officer, Semenchenko went ashore, approached Swedish police, and asked for asylum. Sweden granted Semenchenko’s asylum request, despite Shorokhov’s efforts,[xxxiv] as mandated from Moscow, to convince Swedish authorities that he was a criminal.[xxxv] Shorokhov would almost certainly have also been aware of Anatoliy Granovskiy, who similarly defected in Sweden from a Soviet ship in September 1946. Strangely, however, neither Shorokhov’s writings nor Shorokhov’s Swedish Security Police file mentions Granovskiy.
Kartseva was not initially assigned any intelligence duties in Sweden, but she later took on clerical and operational responsibilities, and for the first time was given the opportunity to recruit an agent. Her first thought when the rezident offered the opportunity to handle an agent recruitment was that Moscow had finally forgiven her for her indiscretion with Krivosh in 1937. Her target was a young Swedish woman, whom Kartseva referred to as Maria, who worked as a secretary in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kartseva approached her and offered to exchange language lessons—a tactic she later again proposed in Australia. Kartseva met with her frequently and cultivated her interest in the Soviet Union, until finally Kartseva presented a recruitment pitch. Kartseva told Maria that the Soviet Union needed to know the content of secret treaties between capitalist countries, and about the negotiation strategies of countries with the Soviet Union. Kartseva indicated that Sweden and the Soviet Union were at that time negotiating a treaty. Kartseva asked Maria to give Kartseva copies of the plans and treaties. Maria firmly refused, and Kartseva’s first recruitment attempt failed.[xxxvi]
Her next assignment, however, was to handle a Swedish communist who was already an active NKVD agent. The agent was positively disposed to help the Soviet Union, but one day she reported that the NKVD rezident was having an affair with a Swedish woman. She mentioned it to Shorokhov, who, as SK officer, was obliged to report such matters to Moscow. However, because all such reports had to be reported through the rezident, Shorokhov decided to refrain.[xxxvii]
Shorokhov noted that the officer recruitment practices of Soviet state security organizations changed in about 1938. Previous to that time State Security officers were not required to be well educated, but beginning in about 1938, officers were recruited from among loyal Soviet citizens with higher education. They were expected to be able to converse plausibly with scientists and other educated and cultured people, and to understand how to build confidence in their agents. While there was also no relaxation in the requirement to be free of “bourgeois” background, Shorokhov noticed particularly when he returned from his assignment in Sweden in 1947 that the expectations of foreign intelligence officers in particular were higher than previously.[xxxviii]
Upon his return to Moscow in 1947, Shorokhov was assigned as a desk officer in the SK Department of the Committee of Information (Комитет Информации; KI). In this position he was responsible for maintaining personal files on Soviet personnel posted abroad and for screening newly designated Soviet personnel to determine whether they had anything on their past record that would prevent them from going abroad. However, his time in the KI was short, because the office that managed Line SK operations was returned to the MGB in 1948 and he remained in the MGB until the KI was dismantled in 1951 and the rest of its functions returned to the MGB. Kartseva, on the other hand, remained in the KI working Swedish intelligence matters until 1950, when the couple was assigned together to Canberra. Kartseva continued to work on KI tasks after she was assigned to Canberra until the organizations merged.
Shorokhov and Kartseva provided a detailed account of the brief history of the KI and the purpose for which it was created. The KI was created in summer 1947 by separating the Foreign Intelligence Directorate from the MGB and joining it with the GRU. Both were responsible for collecting foreign intelligence and both used legal Soviet institutions, such as embassies and TASS, as cover. The KI’s creation was intended to reduce duplication and streamline Soviet foreign intelligence operations. However, the GRU remained an independent entity even within the KI, with separate sections in KI headquarters for military intelligence and separate military intelligence rezidents in the field. A new post of chief legal rezident was created in the field to supervise both the civilian and military intelligence rezidenturas. This chief legal rezident was often a non-intelligence professional, such as the ambassador. The new organization was placed under the direct control of the Council of Ministers, with mostly Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials placed in leadership positions.
At times the MGB and KI cooperated, such as when Shorokhov received his assignment to Australia and he spent three days at KI headquarters reviewing the KI file on the ASIO.[xxxix] However, Shorokhov also discussed the rivalry that existed between the MGB and the KI. Line SK officers, who were responsible for security of embassy-based employees, fell under the MGB. But that partially duplicated the KI’s mission of offensively penetrating foreign counterintelligence services.
The cooperation between civilian and military intelligence was particularly short lived. In mid-1948, after less than a year, military intelligence was removed from the KI and returned to an independent GRU under the Ministry of Defense. Then, in December 1948, the Line EM (émigré operations) and Line SK were removed from the KI and returned to the MGB. The rationale for removing these functions was that they were primarily related to counterintelligence, not foreign intelligence, and thus belonged with state security. This created separate rezidenturas for the MGB and KI at Soviet diplomatic establishments abroad, with the KI rezidentura responsible purely for foreign intelligence in non-communist countries. At this time, Petrov was reorganized into the MGB.
In late 1951, while Shorokhov and Kartseva were in Australia, the four-year experiment of the KI was declared over and the organization was dissolved. The foreign intelligence functions that had been under the KI were returned to the MGB. The organization failed partly due to the GRU’s unwillingness to be subordinated to civilian leadership, and partly because the committee management structure was unwieldy and overly bureaucratic.[xl]
While Shorokhov was working in Moscow in 1949, he learned that his mother was seriously ill on her deathbed, and he received several weeks of leave to visit her. He returned to Larikha after years of having been away and noted the poverty and devastation that the village had suffered due to years of Soviet policies. His mother died not long after he returned to Moscow, leaving Shorokhov with no living family members in the Soviet Union.
After three years in Moscow, Shorokhov and Kartseva, again using the name Petrov, received their second foreign assignment, this time to Australia. Their voyage to Canberra was much less dangerous or lengthy than the voyage to Stockholm had been seven years earlier, and they arrived with no delays in February 1951. ASIO sources began to report on the couple immediately upon their arrival, likely based on SIS reporting about Shorokhov’s intelligence affiliation. ASIO noted that when the Shorokhov and Kartseva were sailing to Australia for their new assignment, they associated little with the other Soviet passengers, and Shorokhov appeared to be the “boss” of the group. A source reported that, although the Soviet ambassador in Canberra was the figurehead, Shorokhov, only a third secretary, was the real head of the embassy.[xli] ASIO noted that the Shorokhov and Kartseva must have been trusted members of the embassy staff because they lived in a house to themselves, which was unusual among the Soviet staff.[xlii] A source reported that Shorokhov was feared and respected by other members of the Soviet embassy, which the source interpreted as meaning that he was the highest-ranking MVD officer in the embassy.[xliii] As of 1952, ASIO was still not certain of his intelligence affiliation, but was watching him closely, particularly because of his association with Australian leftists.[xliv]
Desire to defect
ASIO began to monitor Shrokhov’s presence from the moment he arrived in Australia.[xlv] ASIO conducted surveillance and recruited sources close to him to monitor his movements. One of the primary sources was Polish immigrant Michael Bialogulski, a medical doctor with whom Shorokhov became acquainted not long after arriving. Shorokhov assigned him the MGB codename GRIGORIY, while ASIO assigned him the codename DIABLO and later CRANE. Shorokhov and Bialogulski began to spend a great deal of time together, and Shorokhov developed him as a potential witting agent. But Bialogulski reported his movements with Shorokhov to ASIO, giving ASIO a well-positioned asset to report on Shorokhov.
As early as November 1951, after only 9 months in Australia, Bialogulski assessed that Shorokhov and Kartseva would not return to the Soviet when their tour ended. Bialogulski added that other members of the Soviet embassy would also choose to remain in Australia.[xlvi] ASIO did not fully trust Bialogulski’s assessment, but continued to monitor Shorokhov. By February 1952, ASIO was considering Shorokhov as a potential “Cabin” candidate, meaning a possible defector.[xlvii] In March, Bialogulski suggested that ASIO send a formal letter on the letterhead of a prominent Australian business offering for Shorokhov to remain in Australia, saying, “You won’t ever get it if you don’t try. You remember GOUSENKO (sic) was one, but remember all the damage he did.”[xlviii] But as of April 1952, no plan had been made to effect a defection.[xlix]
During the course of their relationship, Bialogulski described Shorokhov as a womanizer and heavy drinker. Shorokhov indicated to his friends that he had previously been a sailor, and ASIO reported that when he was in Sydney, he behaved like a sailor “on shore leave in his search for wine, women, and song.”[l] Petrov was involved in a car accident on 1 July 1952, and he received a head injury and lost consciousness[li]; the accident may have resulted from driving under the influence of alcohol. In May 1953, Bialogulski reported that he regularly tried to procure some girls for Shorokhov, but not prostitutes, because it was costing Bialogulski too much money.[lii] On the other hand, Bialogulski described Kartseva as being “far superior mentally to Petrov.” But Kartseva was not completely unaware of Shorokhov’s exploits. Her job until November 1953 was to keep the accounts at the Soviet embassy,[liii] and at times she would cover for his purchases of alcohol by writing them off as work-related expenses.
Bialogulski again reported that Shorokhov would not need much encouragement to defect as of February 1953, because he was humiliated by events in the embassy.[liv] By May 1953 he added that Shorokhov would not likely discuss sensitive matters inside his own home because he believed his home was bugged, but that Shorokhov was more inclined to think the Soviet government was bugging his home rather than the Australians.[lv] Bialogulski proposed approaching Shorokhov in the hospital in May 1953, when Shorokhov was being treated for an eye problem. Bialogulski noted, “I am sure he doesn’t want to go back to the Soviet.”[lvi] When Shorokhov told him that he would have to delay his return home, Shorokhov winked, indicating that he would prefer to stay anyway.[lvii] Bialogulski also proposed that Shorokhov purchase property in Australia—recommending a chicken farm—so that Shorokhov would have a place to stay if he decided to remain.
In early May 1953, ASIO received information that the Shorokhov and Kartseva were scheduled to rotate back to the Soviet Union.[lviii] The departure was reportedly delayed several weeks, but was still expected to occur.[lix] He agreed to an Australian friend’s proposal to throw him a farewell party.[lx] In April 1953, Shorokhov began discussions with Bialogulski about a business deal, for which the ASIO could initially only speculate the reason.[lxi] He continued the business discussions even when he announced that he was planning to take up to six months of leave in the Soviet Union in May. He promised the business partner that if he never returned to Australia, the business partner could keep all the money.[lxii] Shorokhov subsequently booked a flight alone from Canberra to Prague for 29 May.[lxiii] However, a week before he was to fly, Shorokhov was admitted to a hospital in Canberra for treatments on his eyes. His departure was postponed indefinitely.[lxiv]
Shorokhov again scheduled a departure date for July 1953, contingent on the doctor’s advice, with the expectation that he would return two months later. He complained that the other members of the embassy staff delight in making intrigues; nevertheless expressed anxiety about his return to the Soviet Union and he seemed depressed about going.[lxv] SIS contemplated placing a source next to Shorokhov on the airplane as he returned to the Soviet Union to induce his defection, in what SIS called a CAFE operation.[lxvi] SIS also considered trying to induce the Soviet ambassador in Canberra, Nikolay Mikhailovich Lifanov, to defect at the same time, offering him an opportunity to escape the punishment that would ensue from Shorokhov’s defection.[lxvii]
His flight schedule slipped several times in July, and was eventually cancelled again at the last minute.[lxviii] An ASIO source asked a Soviet embassy employee, Yanis Eduardovich Plaitkais (codename DVINSKIY), with whom Shorokhov worked on repatriation matters, why Shorokhov’s return was cancelled. Plaitkais answered that Shorokhov’s leave was cancelled because “everything [is] upside down at home.”[lxix] Beriya’s arrest occurred on 26 July 1953.
In addition to Bialogulski, ASIO recruited another source close to Shorokhov, an ophthalmologist named Dr. H. C. Beckett, who treated Shorokhov eye in 1953, to raise the prospect of defection overtly with Shorokhov. He did this for the first time in July 1953, to which Shorokhov responded in the negative. However, Beckett renewed the conversation several times thereafter, promising that if Shorokhov decided to remain in Australia, the doctor could arrange a meeting with Australian security representatives.[lxx] Shorokhov told Bialogulski about Dr. Beckett’s approach and Shorokhov considered it improper. He stated that he was foolish and bold and that he must be connected with the Security Police.[lxxi] Neither Shorokhov not Bialogulski knew how correct Shorokhov’s assessment was.
Finally, on 27 February 1954, Shorokhov agreed to meet with ASIO officer Ron Richards and he expressed his intention to remain in Australia.[lxxii] Shorokhov began at least as early as 2 March 1954 to gather documents from his office in anticipation of defecting.[lxxiii] He told Richards on 20 March that he could provide interesting information about the Department of External Affairs. However, he did not take the most recent documents, including the instructions from Moscow for the year 1953, because he could not be sure whether Kartseva would defect with him. Because she was the MVD document custodian, he could not take recent documents without her knowledge, and he did not want her to be implicated if she decided not to defect.[lxxiv]
Shorokhov’s defection came less than three months after Rastvorov’s defection in Japan and prompted angry remonstrations from the Soviet Union and allegations of kidnapping. When discussing the possibility of similar blow-back from Shorokhov’s defection, the SIS and MI5 agreed that obtaining counterespionage information was the paramount aim, and that, despite the “cold war and disruption aspect” of relations with the Soviet Union, “the main object is to get Petrov to defect, all else being secondary.”[lxxv]
During his post-defection debriefing, Shorokhov admitted that he had made up his mind to remain in Australia as early as 1952, prompted by what he described as being “persecuted and hounded” by the Soviet ambassador Lifanov.[lxxvi] After Beriya’s arrest in July 1953, Lifanov and the embassy Party chief, Kovalev, alleged that Shorokhov had formed a “Beriya group” in the embassy to undermine the authority of the Party.[lxxvii] But Shorokhov could not overtly show any signs of planning to defect for fear of either his wife or another embassy colleague noticing and reporting it.
Finally, Shorokhov’s replacement, Kovalenok, arrived on 3 April 1954. Shorokhov met him and other new arrivals from the Soviet Union in Sydney and put them on an airplane for Canberra. Then, he placed himself at the disposal of the Australian government and handed over the documents that he had collected in anticipation of his defection.[lxxviii]
On 6 April, three days after Shorokhov disappeared, Soviet ambassador Nikolay Ivanovich Generalov, who had replaced Lifanov in October 1953, called Kartseva into his office and inquired whether Petrov had contacted her. Petrova had not heard from him, but Generalov informed her that, as a precaution, she should move into the embassy building until further notice. A few days later, Generalov informed her that he received information indicating that Petrov was not coming back. From that moment, Kartseva felt like she was under house arrest. Other embassy staff shunned her and she was not allowed to leave the embassy.[lxxix]
On 19 April 1954, she was escorted to the Mascot Airport in Sydney, and boarded a plane amidst a large crowd of Australians yelling at her to stay in Australia. When she was shown the dramatic photos that were published in newspapers showing what appeared to be two thugs dragging her to the plane, she claimed to have been more afraid of the crowd than of the couriers who were escorting her. She denied press reports that claimed that she had appealed for help at the Sydney airport, and instead stated that if she had been offered asylum at that moment, in the midst of what to her appeared to be a hostile crowd, she would have refused.[lxxx] She was still shaken when she arrived at Darwin the next morning, but the quieter and less threatening environment of the Darwin airport was more to an ASIO approach, and after ASIO arranged a phone conversation between Shorokhov and Kartseva, she decided to accept the offer of asylum.
She wrote that her decision to remain in Australia was based on a combination of factors: the attitude toward her at the embassy; knowing her husband was still alive and well; a fear for her life. Before she left Canberra, a member of the embassy staff predicted that she would be sent to a prison camp or worse, and she feared for her fate if she were to return to the Soviet Union. She also knew her escorts were armed, and she was afraid they might kill her en route to the Soviet Union and call it an “accident.” Nevertheless, she admitted that her decision was difficult because she knew her family in the Soviet Union would suffer for it.[lxxxi]
Overt cover position
Shorokhov’s overt cover assignments included serving as third secretary and consul at the Soviet Embassy in Canberra and the representative for the All-Union Society for Cultural Contacts with Foreign Countries (Всесоюзное Общество Культурных Связей с Заграницей; VOKS) in Australia. These assignments gave him overt reasons to travel around Australia and to meet people, this facilitating his intelligence operations.
In his consular assignment he regularly traveled to Sydney to meet and escort new Soviet diplomats and diplomatic couriers traveling to and from Australia and New Zealand. He used these trips to meet intelligence sources and, eventually, as a pretext for his defection. He later provided a detailed description of the diplomatic and MGB couriers based on his experience working with them.[lxxxii]
His consular assignment also put him in contact with Russian émigrés who wanted either to renew their Soviet passports or to return to the Soviet Union.[lxxxiii] This allowed him to become involved in repatriation operations as part of his overt duties, which further necessitated contacts with the Australian Department of External Affairs, one of his primary intelligence targets. It also directly facilitated his role as a Line EM officer until in February 1952 when he handed repatriation responsibilities to a replacement officer.[lxxxiv]
In this role, Shorokhov met with a young man in September 1951 who wanted to travel to the Soviet Union, join the Soviet Army, and “go to Korea and kill Yanks and bloody Australians.” Shorokhov praised the young man and told him, “You are a good Soviet citizen already.”[lxxxv] Shorokhov continued to meet Russian émigrés even after he turned over the Line EM duties to help them with the consular process. In June 1952, he assisted a Russian émigré named Nikolay Vasilyevich Yalinichev in Melbourne to complete forms for repatriation.[lxxxvi] Shorokhov also facilitated the repatriation of Major Prokopenko, a Soviet Army officer who deserted from the Soviet Army in 1949 because of his wife’s unfaithfulness. He crossed into Turkish territory and was detained and questioned by Turkish Border Patrol. He was subsequently transported to Istanbul where he was offered employment with the Turkish Intelligence Service. Turkish Authorities intended to send Prokopenko to the Soviet Union to work for Turkish interests. However, he declined the offer and was released from custody. He met a Russian national who helped him to travel to Germany, where he was placed in a DP camp. From there he emigrated to New Zealand in late 1950 or early 1951. He worked as a forestry worker near Wellington and he attended screenings of Soviet films and came into contact with the Soviet embassy through other émigrés. He decided to repatriate to the Soviet Union. Shorokhov met him in Sydney in December 1952 and they attended the New Year’s party at the Russian Social Club. Shorokhov put him on a ship to the Soviet Union on 2 January 1953.[lxxxvii]
Shorokhov was aware of several Soviet intelligence sources who provided information about individual Soviet émigrés and émigré communities in Australia to identify potential repatriation cases and anti-Soviet attitudes. Shorokhov had a source in Sydney named Meer Israilovich Neplokh, who reported on Soviet immigrants to Australia. He reported to Shorokhov any arrival who did not report to the Oriental Hotel in Sydney, where Shorokhov worked while he was in Sydney; did not appear to want to renew their Soviet passport; or who tried to avoid contact with pro-Soviet Russians in Sydney. However, Shorokhov reported that Neplokh never provided any information of value to Soviet intelligence.[lxxxviii]
More successful was a Russian émigré named Andrey Andreyevich Friedenbergs (code name SYGMA), who has originally been recruited by Soviet intelligence soon after the Soviet occupation of Latvia in 1940, but who had subsequently worked for the Germans during the German occupation of Latvia. After the war he moved to Denmark and then emigrated to Australia in about 1950 without the MGB’s knowledge. The MGB learned of his whereabouts when he sent a letter to his sister in the Soviet Union. MGB headquarters sent instructions to reestablish contact, and Shorokhov met him several times during which Friedenbergs provided information about Latvian émigrés and Latvian organizations in Australia until Plaitkais arrived to take over Line EM duties.[lxxxix] Plaitkais had studied Friedenbergs’s case file before he left Moscow, and he indicated that Friedenbergs’s information was mostly copied from Latvian newspapers in Australia.[xc]
The MGB similarly planned to use Gunars Ritenbergs, another Latvian émigré living in Australia, whom Plaitkais planned direct against anti-Soviet Latvian groups in Australia.[xci] Plaitkais also met an individual named Bundalis who he thought could be a source of information about the Latvian community in Australia. Bundalis had escaped Latvia during the German occupation and emigrated to Australia. He had a brother who he thought was killed during the war, but who, upon further MGB investigation, was alive and working as a senior official in Latvia. The MVD instructed Plaitkais to develop Bundalis in Australia as a source.[xcii]
MGB headquarters instructed the rezidentura in 1951 to contact Nikolay Kirillovich Novikov (code name KLIMENT) through the Line EM and develop him as a source of information about other Soviet émigrés living in Sydney.[xciii] His son, Nikolay Nikolayevich Novikov (code name MEFODY), owned a photo studio, and the rezidentura was also instructed to recruit him as a safe house keeper.[xciv] However, Shorokhov, despite meeting KLIMENT at the Russian Social Club several times, made no progress toward those goals and headquarters later chastised the rezidentrura for not moving forward quickly enough with the recruitment.[xcv]
The rezidentura also received instructions to study émigré Nikolay Daghian (variant Nicholas Daghinian) (codename MONACH) and task him to open a small commercial enterprise, like a photography studio, that could be used as a safe house.[xcvi] Shorokhov met him at the Russian Soviet Club in Sydney, but the MGB never used his studio as a location for clandestine meetings.[xcvii]
Shorokhov’s VOKS responsibilities put him in regular contact with Australian-Soviet friendship groups and Russian social clubs where Russian émigrés and sympathetic Australians met to talk about the Soviet Union. His role as the VOKS representative provided opportunities to present a positive image of the Soviet Union through printed literature and Soviet films. It also offered plausible reasons for meeting with potential sources.
Soon after Shorokhov arrived in Australia, he met Jean Ferguson (code name RAFAEL), the executive officer of the Australian-Russian Friendship Society in Sydney, and she became one of his primary contacts in his overt position as the VOKS representative and consul.[xcviii] Overtly, he met her frequently in relation to distributing Soviet literature and screening Soviet films. Although Shorokhov indicated she was never fully recruited as a witting agent, he used her extensively as a talent spotter and to arrange meetings with sources.[xcix] Similarly to Ferguson, John Rogers (code name LOVKY) of the Australia Russia Society in Melbourne made arrangements for Shorokhov to meet with sources when he traveled to Melbourne.[c] Shorokhov also had contact with an individual named Kafka from the Czechoslovakian embassy in Canberra, who introduced him to people of possible intelligence interest during public cultural events.[ci]
Ferguson was also a primary contact between the Soviet embassy and the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) and she wittingly facilitated the issuance of visas for Australians traveling to the Soviet Union for Communist Party events and meetings. For example, under his overt position as consul, Shorokhov arranged through Jean Ferguson for Victor Williams, an Australian wharf laborer and poet, to travel to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Union of Soviet Writers and Authors. The embassy had initially identified Katherine Pritchard to receive the invitation, but she declined due to her age. Williams subsequently agreed, and traveled at the embassy’s expense. Williams received money for the trip directly from the embassy, and he subsequently wrote positive articles about the Soviet Union when he returned to Australia.[cii]
Shorokhov received a cable from MGB headquarters in April 1952 instructing him to ask Ferguson to introduce him to contact M.J.R. “Jack” Hughes, a member of the Central Committee of the CPA, who the MGB hoped could provide information about Australian security personnel. She also facilitated an introduction to John Bramwell (“Jack”) Miles, the chairman of the CPA, to whom Shorokhov issued a visa in January 1954.[ciii] Shorokhov also issued visas, with Ferguson’s facilitation, to Charles Bresland, national secretary of the Eureka Youth League (EYL), and Harry Bocquet, to attend a Komsomol Conference in Moscow in March 1954.[civ] The EYL was the CPA’s youth auxiliary organization. In all of these instances, Shorokhov’s overtly supported the issuance of visas in his consular role.[cv] But in Bresland’s and Bocquet’s case, he passed Soviet embassy funds for the travel to Ferguson, not directly to the travellers: consequently, unlike Williams, Bocquet was not aware that the money for the trip had come from the Soviet embassy, and he later testified that he believed the EYL had paid for the trip.[cvi]
In April 1953, Shorokhov issued invitations on behalf of the Soviet ambassador for two correspondents from the Sydney Morning Herald to visit the Soviet Union.[cvii] In his role as VOKS representative, Petrov worked this contact through Ferguson. In December 1953, Shorokhov received instructions from VOKS headquarters in Moscow to submit a proposal for how the Society could improve its work. Shorokhov again worked through Ferguson, who convened a meeting of Australian-Russian Friendship Society branches across Australia to develop a proposal.[cviii] Ferguson also assisted in contacting communist writer Rex Chilpin, through whom the rezidentura sought to obtain information about the Department of External Affairs.
In 1953, Shorokhov received a package from Moscow containing US$25,000 in cash, along with instructions to pass the money to Lawrence Louis Sharkey, the General Secretary of the CPA, to be used as a fund for assistance to trade unions.” Shorokhov arranged for the money to be delivered by another rezidentura officer. Both Shorokhov and Kartseva remembered the occasion identically,[cix] but it is unclear how or when the delivery took place because ASIO had Sharkey under close surveillance at the same time and reported no interaction of Soviet officials with Sharkey.[cx]
Source handling and operational procedures
Shorokhov and Kartseva provided ASIO with a wealth of information about how MGB selected, vetted, and interacted with sources. This gave ASIO numerous leads to investigate Soviet-inspired activities in Australia. Although no arrests resulted from Shorokhov’s and Kartseva’s defections, their information, combined with information from other allied counterintelligence efforts, such as the VENONA program in the United States, shed light on Soviet methods and priorities in the early Cold War.
Shorokhov indicated the characteristics that the MGB sought in a potential agent to “attract to our work,” which include placement, access, vulnerabilities, and ideology:
· Is the potential agent in real need of material assistance?
· Is he of bad character of conduct and in a position to be compromised?
· Has he possession of, or access to, useful information?
· Is he sympathetic to the Soviet [Union]?
· Is he willing to express his sympathy by working for the Soviet [Union] in supplying to them information of use.[cxi]
The vulnerabilities provided opportunities for leverage. Shorokhov noted that Soviet state security sometimes used blackmail to persuade a source, particularly inside the Soviet Union, but that it was considered a less effective method because it upset the target and even drove him to suicide in some cases. In other cases, blackmailed sources agreed to cooperate but never produced anything of value.[cxii] Shorokhov cited an example of the MGB targeting a Japanese diplomat in Moscow. The operation was similar to one that Rastvorov revealed, but the target in Rastvorov’s incident was a Japanese press correspondent. In Shorokhov’s example the MGB dangled a girl for the diplomat and he took the bait. The MGB photographed the couple in an intimate situation and confronted him with the photos. However, unlike Rastvorov’s example, the Japanese diplomat responded that he was authorized by Japanese law to have intimate relations with women while he was abroad and was unfazed by MGB threats to publish the photos. Shorokhov cited this example as the reason why the MGB needed to learn the laws of the countries they were targeting to allow operations to proceed smoothly.[cxiii] Kartseva also noted that Soviet intelligence hesitated to use women to persuade a targeted agent to fall in love because of the risk that the woman might reciprocate and become a handling problem. Women were used for compromise purposes only in Moscow.[cxiv]
Soviet state security recognized the power of money in recruiting and maintaining agents, and Soviet intelligence paid sources money commensurate with the value of the information. Money also gave the source a sense of obligation and threat: Soviet intelligence required that sources sign receipts for the money they received, leaving a trail of evidence that the MGB threatened to use against the agent is he/she refused to cooperate. Conversely, Beriya also recognized the risk of Soviet state security officers being enticed away with money, and he ensured that officers were well paid—a State security typist received a higher salary than an engineer in a Soviet factory. However, that situation changed in 1953 when Beriya was removed—Soviet state security salaries were reduced by 25 percent in 1953.[cxv]
Shorokhov described the process through which communist parties were tapped for sources and support networks for intelligence activities. However, exposures, such as in the United States, Canada, and Sweden prompted the MGB to issue instructions in 1946 or 1947, while Shorokhov was in Sweden, to abandon the use of communists as agents, although ideology was still a favored impetus for recruitment. This was particularly strictly enforced in Australia after 1951, when an Australian referendum approved the dissolution of the CPA.[cxvi]
That did not eliminate the factor of ideology from the recruitment process, however. The MGB in Australia actively sought potential sources among left wing and communist circles. The MGB in Australia recruited several sources who could identify ideologically inclined university students with promising futures in the Department of External Affairs, ASIO, or scientific institutions. For example, Charles Bresland (Codename COOK), whose travel to Moscow Shorokhov facilitated, was used to identify students at Sydney and Canberra Universities.[cxvii] Additionally. Mrs. Audrey Blake, a member of the Communist Youth league in Sydney, had worked in the Comintern with her husband in the 1940s, when she was recruited as a Soviet intelligence source. When she returned to Australia she provided written character sketches about students at Sydney University. The MGB collected the information with the intention of recruiting them in the future and instructing them to apply for useful positions.[cxviii]
Although left-wing ideology was often common among targeted students, the MGB instructed recruits to conceal their communist sympathies after becoming an agent to avoid counterintelligence scrutiny.[cxix] Although the Soviet embassy overtly interacted with the CPA, the MGB steered away from developing a clandestine relationship with a potential source who was overtly affiliated with the CPA.
When Kartseva arrived in Australia, she was initially assigned operational support and research tasks, along with KI officer Ivan Mikhailovich Pakhomov, such as identifying suitable dead drop sites and clandestine meeting places to be used in further operational work.[cxx] In mid-1952, MGB headquarters instructed Shorokhov to limit Kartseva to cipher work and remove her from duties connected with external contacts. At the same time, headquarters instructed Shorokhov to issue an appropriate reprimand to Kartseva because she “sometimes exhibits a lack of tact in her dealings with fellow workers in the embassy, including the Ambassador, which cannot fail to have a detrimental effect on her work.”[cxxi] Thereafter, her intelligence work consisted of being a cipher clerk, which gave her access to MGB and KI files. Kartseva subsequently provided lists of codenames that the MGB had assigned to sources and contacts.[cxxii]
Messages from Moscow to Canberra arrived as unexposed photos of documents, which Shorokhov or Kartseva developed to reveal the message, which Kartseva then decrypted. A similar process was used in reverse to send messages to Moscow. Shorokhov was reported to have purchased photo enlargers and equipment in Australia to facilitate this process.[cxxiii]
Petrov mentioned that he assumed the Australian security service had a microphone placed inside the Soviet embassy in Canberra, and that it had been installed when Australian workmen had recently done work in the embassy. When an ASIO officer posited that it would not be much use because the Soviet Union had equipment to locate hidden microphones, Petrov responded “we have no gadgets here to do that; they are at home.”[cxxiv]
[See Afanasiy Shorokhov in this database for second half of this description and endnotes.]
The defection of husband and wife couple Afanasiy Mikhailovich Shorokhov and Yevdokiya Alekseyevna Kartseva,[i] better known by their cover names, Vladimir and Yevdokiya Petrov, in April 1954 had one of the most intense impacts on the receiving country’s political system of any defectors up to that time. The defection and the revelations that followed damaged the political prospects of Australia’s left-leaning Labor Party for decades, and even today continues to be the subject of debate about whether it was specifically engineered for political purposes. The allegation of an Australian political impetus behind the defection first surfaced in Soviet press a week after Kartseva’s defection,[ii] the circumstances of which led to a five-year break in Australian-Soviet diplomatic relations.
Information about Shorokhov and Kartseva and their revelations is extensive. Shorokhov brought with him a package of original MGB/MVD documents and notes that described Soviet plans for targeting Australians and other citizens for intelligence purposes. Based on these documents, Australian authorities conducted lengthy and detailed debriefings over several years, and the debriefings were shared with the British SIS, although not initially with the United States. The Australian government also launched a Royal Commission on Espionage in May 1954 that culminated in a final report that was presented to the Australian Governor-General on 22 August 1955. Many of the 119 witness interviews were held in public, and the reports of the proceedings were published broadly in Australia and other countries, including in Russian émigré press. The Royal Commission labeled Shorokhov’s documents the “Petrov Papers,” and ruled that they were authentic documents and that Shorokhov and Kartseva were truthful witnesses. The Royal Commission also declared publicly that the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, from its establishment in 1943 to its closure in 1954, had been used for espionage in Australia; and that the only Australians who knowingly assisted Soviet espionage were communists. The last point caused political upheaval and angry reactions from communists around the world. Large volumes of debriefing material and information from Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) debriefings and from the Royal Commission are now available in Australian and British archives.
In 1955, Dr. Michael Bialogulski, an ASIO recruited agent who became a close associate of Shorokhov and reported on his movements from 1951 to 1954, published a book on the events leading up to the defection, The Petrov Story,[iii] in which Bialogulski amplified his own importance considerably. Soon thereafter, Shorokhov and Kartseva published a newspaper series titled “The Petrovs’ Own Story,”[iv] which differed from Bialogulski’s account on a number of points. The series was expanded in 1956 into a book, provocatively titled Empire of Fear, which ended with a rebuttal to Bialogulski’s self-serving account.[v] The book was ghost written by ASIO officer Michael Thwaites, who played a personal role in their debriefings, and who in 1980 published his own account of the events surrounding the defection.[vi] Shorokhov’s and Kartseva’s defection has also attracted the attention of academic and political writers, including Australian political author Robert Manne[vii] and more recently, Swedish professor Wilhelm Agrell.[viii] Additionally, numerous articles have been written on the defection and its political impact.
Afanasiy Mikhailovich Shorokhov was born in February 1907 in the rural village of Larikha in southern Siberia. When he was seven years old, his father died after being struck by lightning, and his family scraped by as subsistence farmers throughout his childhood. Shorokhov was apprenticed to a blacksmith as a teenager—years later the blacksmith was arrested and deported as a kulak. His remote village weathered the civil war with only a few small skirmishes, and communist power was slow to take hold. In 1923, a communist agitator from a nearby town came to encourage the youth to join the Komsomol with the promise of education and a brighter future. Shorokhov was one of a few youth in the village to join, and he began to participate in Komsomol meetings regularly.[ix]
Shorokhov became an active leader in the village Komsomol cell, leading to his selection in 1926 for a high school in Perm. He traveled to Perm and took an entrance exam for the school, but failed, due to little education he had received up to that point.[x] He was forced to return to Larikha, but a year later, after continued hard work in the village Komsomol, he was sent to a teacher’s training course in Sverdlovsk. Also in 1927, Shorokhov was accepted as a full member of the Communist Party and worked in several party activist positions.
In November 1929, in what Shorokhov described as a “flush of enthusiasm,” he officially changed his name to Proletarskiy.[xi] An official notice of the name change appeared in the newspaper Izvestia.[xii] The following year, he joined the Soviet Navy, where he was trained as a cipher clerk. He also served in various Party positions during three years in the Navy. He got married in 1932, and he claims he left the Navy and joined the OGPU in May 1933 primarily because he had a wife and needed a job; the marriage only lasted until 1938. Fellow sailors who had taken the same route recommended him as a cipher clerk in the OGPU, and he was assigned to the Special Cipher Section.[xiii]
Shorokhov’s unit processed communications to and from NKVD legal rezidenturas abroad. He remembered decrypting “a flood of cables” from Berlin and Rome that described the rising threat from Italy and Germany. He also decrypted cables from NKVD representatives in Spain during the civil war, including a “dramatic cable” from Paris in July 1938 that described the desertion of the NKVD rezident in Spain—Aleksandr Orlov (See separate entry for Leyba Feldbin in this database). The cable also communicated Orlov’s threat to reveal Soviet intelligence agents and operations if any harm came to him.[xiv]
Shorokhov wrote about his work in the Special Cipher Section during the Yezhovshchina, where he processed communications between NKVD offices and headquarters, including frequent cables that reported suspects’ confessions to being British, German, and Japanese spies. The cables also communicated orders for mass executions, to which senior officers in the field would respond with the names of the executed. Sometimes offices were forced to manufacture reasons to arrest people to meet the quotas placed on them by Moscow. He discussed an NKVD officer, whom he labeled B----, who arrived in Rostov at the height of the purge, and then was transferred to the Far East, and from where, when Yezhov was arrested, he “saw the writing on the wall and fled to Japan.”[xv] Although Shorokhov concealed the name and incorrectly remembered some of the chronology, the person he described could only have been Genrikh Lyushkov (see separate entry in this database).
In September 1937, Shorokhov was assigned temporarily to Xinjiang, China, where the Soviet Union was endeavoring to establish Soviet dominance. He had worked with cables from the legal NKVD rezidentura in China and Mongolia for several years, and while Germany and Italy were an increasing focus of Soviet intelligence activities in Europe, Japan was a topic of growing apprehension in the east. He had also read in those cables about Soviet operations to remove British and American influence from China and replace it with Soviet influence. Shorokhov described the Soviet effort as a “dramatic purge,” condemning to death any British, American, and other anti-Soviet elements. Soviet agents operated primarily among the Chinese Party ruling class that had been transplanted in Sinkiang, since the local Muslim population was not inclined to support Soviet dominance. However, the NKVD had some success recruiting agents among the Muslim Uighur population.[xvi]
Shorokhov’s temporary assignment to China lasted only a few months, but it had a positive effect on his career. In October 1937, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star,[xvii] and by 1939, he was promoted to major of state security and assigned deputy chief of Special Cipher Section, responsible for NKVD secure communications inside the USSR.
At about this time, Shorokhov met Yevdokiya Alekseyevna Kartseva, a cipher clerk in a different NKVD section. He was recently divorced, and he soon found himself looking for reasons to go to her office to talk to her, until one of his colleagues recommended that he consider marrying Kartseva.
Kartseva was born in February 1914 in the village of Lipki, Ryazan Oblast, southeast of Moscow. Her family moved in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, in 1919 and lived there until 1924, when they moved to Moscow. Kartseva lived in Moscow from then until her first foreign assignment to Sweden in 1942. Her father initially worked as a tram driver, but when the family moved to Moscow he took a job as a wagon driver for the OGPU. In about 1935 he became an NKVD noncommissioned officer working as a uniformed guard.[xviii]
Soon after moving to Moscow, Kartseva remembers walking down Lubyanka Street and seeing a group of children wearing bright red scarves and playing. She approached the adult leader and asked to join. The leader said it was a Pioneer group for OGPU employees, and asked it her parents worked for the OGPU. Her father had recently taken a job with the OGPU, so she was allowed to join, beginning her indoctrination as a Soviet citizen.[xix] Kartseva progressed to the Komsomol in 1929, when she was 15.
Kartseva finished secondary school in 1930 and began studying English in the Technical Institute of Foreign Languages in Moscow. She had multiple friends, especially men, who worked for the OGPU, and one of them suggested that she come work there. She initially resisted because she had not completed her institute studies, but she was persuaded and began as a junior cipher clerk for the Razvedupr in early 1933. She became a fulltime NKVD employee transferred in June 1934 to the NKVD Special Department when Razvedupr cipher clerks were reorganized into civilian intelligence. Her department was responsible for decrypting the codes used by foreign diplomatic missions in Moscow, including Japanese, Chinese, Romanian, Turkish, British, American, and Scandinavian. Petrova was assigned to the Japanese section from 1934 to 1942. She was promoted to sergeant of state security in April 1939.[xx] She completed a four-year Japanese language course, and by 1942 she had reached the rank of captain of state security and was a specialist in decrypting Japanese telegrams.[xxi]
Kartseva joined the Communist Party in 1950, not long before she left for her assignment in Australia. Her Communist Party membership was delayed for over a decade because she fell into suspicion during the Yezhovshchina in 1937. In 1936, she met and moved in with another NKVD officer, Roman Vladimirovich Krivosh, who also worked in the Special Section as a cipher officer. She had a daughter with Krivosh in June 1937. But in July 1937, the NKVD arrested Krivosh because of his foreign connections and his father, who had worked for the tsarist Okhrana. The father had subsequently cooperated with the OGPU/NKVD as a Balkan language translator, but was arrested and exiled several times. Krivosh’s arrest was linked to his father, and he was jailed until the outbreak of the war, when he was released and reinstalled as a cipher operator.[xxii]
Kartseva was suspect by association with Krivosh, and her career was temporarily put on hold while the NKVD investigated her. This put her membership in the Komsomol at risk, and thus her job. However, she was fortunate: rather than expulsion, the NKVD Komsomol chairman let her off with a “severe reprimand and serious warning” for her lapse in judgment for entering into a relationship with an “enemy of the people.” Although it took time for the reprimand to be expunged, she was eventually accepted back into full Komsomol membership and she retained her position in the NVKD, which was especially important as Krivosh’s arrest left her as a single mother with a newborn daughter.[xxiii]
Kartseva met Shorokhov, who was using the name Proletarskiy, at work in the late 1930s. He was the deputy chief of the 6th Section (Internal NKVD Cipher Communications) of the Special Cipher Section. He became a friend who did not shun her during the time she was under suspicion, and his friendship was an indicator that she was being accepted back into Party society. Kartseva’s daughter became acquainted with Shorokhov, and Kartseva was impressed by how he treated the child and how the child took him. However, in April 1940 the child fell ill and after a few weeks, died of meningitis. Kartseva was grief stricken, and Shorokhov supported her in the difficult time that followed. By July 1940, they had grown close enough to be married.[xxiv]
In July 1942, Shorokhov received his first foreign assignment to the Soviet embassy in Sweden as cipher clerk to the NKGB rezident and the embassy’s Line SK (Советская колония; Soviet colony) officer, responsible for monitoring the security and loyalty of Soviet government employees in Sweden. At this time, the couple was assigned the cover name Petrov.
Shorokhov described his duties in Sweden as a Line SK officer:
· Supervising the security of all Soviet official staff stationed in a given country, including at the embassy, consulate, trade delegation, service attachés, TASS representatives, Inturist, Aeroflot, and other Soviet government institutions. This included keeping a personal file on each Soviet official.
· Liaison with the SK representatives accompanying Soviet delegations.
· Supervising the security of crews aboard Soviet ships calling at a given country’s ports. In some cases, such as in the United Kingdom, a full-time maritime SK officer is posted to an embassy. Maritime SK officers recruit sources in the local population who can report on the behavior of Soviet ship crews when they are in port.
· Supervising the security of all non-official Soviet passport holders in the given country.
· Collecting information about the local security service and conducting operations to penetrate it.[xxv]
On their trip from Moscow to Stockholm, they experienced firsthand the dangers of travelling in wartime. They departed Moscow in July 1942 for Archangel, planning to reach Stockholm via an overland route. However, German military operations prevented them from proceeding and in September they returned to Moscow. They traveled instead by air from Kuybishev, via Baku and Tehran, to Cairo, where they boarded a ship for Cape Town. Along the way, a German submarine attacked their ship and sank it off the coast of Mozambique, and they were rescued after two days at sea in a lifeboat. They were taken to South Africa, where they boarded and British naval vessel bound for London. From there they took a military air transport and finally arrived in Stockholm in March 1943—eight months after they first set out.[xxvi]
Shorokhov came under Swedish surveillance at least as early as August 1945.[xxvii] By May 1946, the Swedish security service had strong grounds to suspect that he was an NKVD officer.[xxviii] A Swedish source associated Shorokhov’s name with an alleged plot, planned for 16 September 1946, to explode bombs in Stockholm, and then to raise a propaganda campaign against the police for failing to maintain safety. The substance of the allegation is questionable; however, Shorokhov’s name being associated with it raised his profile with the Swedish Security Police.[xxix] In April 1947, Swedish surveillance recorded him conducting surveillance detection en route to agent meetings.[xxx] He used the false names Johan Johansson and Jakob Pettersson while operating in Sweden.
SIS first became aware that Shorokhov was an intelligence office in 1945 when he was in Sweden.[xxxi] SIS sources reported that he served in Sweden without diplomatic status, that he was a liaison with the Communist Party, and that he departed Sweden as of 30 January 1948.[xxxii] Shorokhov told later Australian debriefers that he “worked like an animal” photographing documents for transmission to NKVD headquarters in Moscow while he worked as a cipher clerk in Sweden. Sometimes the volume was so big that he had to work all day and all night to process it.[xxxiii]
Shorokhov’s job as the Line SK officer was to recruit sources among the Soviet colony to monitor Soviet personnel. When Shorokhov arrived in Sweden, his predecessor had not recruited any sources. But by the time Shorokhov left Sweden in 1948, he had recruited 13 sources. Shorokhov’s duties included keeping track of Soviet sailors during port calls in Sweden and ensuring they did not defect. If they did defect, Shorokhov’s job included investigating the incident and meeting the defector through consular channels to attempt to persuade him to return to the Soviet Union. This was the case with a sailor named Vladimir Semenchenko, who failed to return to his Soviet commercial ship that was ported in Göteborg. After an argument with the ship’s political officer, Semenchenko went ashore, approached Swedish police, and asked for asylum. Sweden granted Semenchenko’s asylum request, despite Shorokhov’s efforts,[xxxiv] as mandated from Moscow, to convince Swedish authorities that he was a criminal.[xxxv] Shorokhov would almost certainly have also been aware of Anatoliy Granovskiy, who similarly defected in Sweden from a Soviet ship in September 1946. Strangely, however, neither Shorokhov’s writings nor Shorokhov’s Swedish Security Police file mentions Granovskiy.
Kartseva was not initially assigned any intelligence duties in Sweden, but she later took on clerical and operational responsibilities, and for the first time was given the opportunity to recruit an agent. Her first thought when the rezident offered the opportunity to handle an agent recruitment was that Moscow had finally forgiven her for her indiscretion with Krivosh in 1937. Her target was a young Swedish woman, whom Kartseva referred to as Maria, who worked as a secretary in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kartseva approached her and offered to exchange language lessons—a tactic she later again proposed in Australia. Kartseva met with her frequently and cultivated her interest in the Soviet Union, until finally Kartseva presented a recruitment pitch. Kartseva told Maria that the Soviet Union needed to know the content of secret treaties between capitalist countries, and about the negotiation strategies of countries with the Soviet Union. Kartseva indicated that Sweden and the Soviet Union were at that time negotiating a treaty. Kartseva asked Maria to give Kartseva copies of the plans and treaties. Maria firmly refused, and Kartseva’s first recruitment attempt failed.[xxxvi]
Her next assignment, however, was to handle a Swedish communist who was already an active NKVD agent. The agent was positively disposed to help the Soviet Union, but one day she reported that the NKVD rezident was having an affair with a Swedish woman. She mentioned it to Shorokhov, who, as SK officer, was obliged to report such matters to Moscow. However, because all such reports had to be reported through the rezident, Shorokhov decided to refrain.[xxxvii]
Shorokhov noted that the officer recruitment practices of Soviet state security organizations changed in about 1938. Previous to that time State Security officers were not required to be well educated, but beginning in about 1938, officers were recruited from among loyal Soviet citizens with higher education. They were expected to be able to converse plausibly with scientists and other educated and cultured people, and to understand how to build confidence in their agents. While there was also no relaxation in the requirement to be free of “bourgeois” background, Shorokhov noticed particularly when he returned from his assignment in Sweden in 1947 that the expectations of foreign intelligence officers in particular were higher than previously.[xxxviii]
Upon his return to Moscow in 1947, Shorokhov was assigned as a desk officer in the SK Department of the Committee of Information (Комитет Информации; KI). In this position he was responsible for maintaining personal files on Soviet personnel posted abroad and for screening newly designated Soviet personnel to determine whether they had anything on their past record that would prevent them from going abroad. However, his time in the KI was short, because the office that managed Line SK operations was returned to the MGB in 1948 and he remained in the MGB until the KI was dismantled in 1951 and the rest of its functions returned to the MGB. Kartseva, on the other hand, remained in the KI working Swedish intelligence matters until 1950, when the couple was assigned together to Canberra. Kartseva continued to work on KI tasks after she was assigned to Canberra until the organizations merged.
Shorokhov and Kartseva provided a detailed account of the brief history of the KI and the purpose for which it was created. The KI was created in summer 1947 by separating the Foreign Intelligence Directorate from the MGB and joining it with the GRU. Both were responsible for collecting foreign intelligence and both used legal Soviet institutions, such as embassies and TASS, as cover. The KI’s creation was intended to reduce duplication and streamline Soviet foreign intelligence operations. However, the GRU remained an independent entity even within the KI, with separate sections in KI headquarters for military intelligence and separate military intelligence rezidents in the field. A new post of chief legal rezident was created in the field to supervise both the civilian and military intelligence rezidenturas. This chief legal rezident was often a non-intelligence professional, such as the ambassador. The new organization was placed under the direct control of the Council of Ministers, with mostly Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials placed in leadership positions.
At times the MGB and KI cooperated, such as when Shorokhov received his assignment to Australia and he spent three days at KI headquarters reviewing the KI file on the ASIO.[xxxix] However, Shorokhov also discussed the rivalry that existed between the MGB and the KI. Line SK officers, who were responsible for security of embassy-based employees, fell under the MGB. But that partially duplicated the KI’s mission of offensively penetrating foreign counterintelligence services.
The cooperation between civilian and military intelligence was particularly short lived. In mid-1948, after less than a year, military intelligence was removed from the KI and returned to an independent GRU under the Ministry of Defense. Then, in December 1948, the Line EM (émigré operations) and Line SK were removed from the KI and returned to the MGB. The rationale for removing these functions was that they were primarily related to counterintelligence, not foreign intelligence, and thus belonged with state security. This created separate rezidenturas for the MGB and KI at Soviet diplomatic establishments abroad, with the KI rezidentura responsible purely for foreign intelligence in non-communist countries. At this time, Petrov was reorganized into the MGB.
In late 1951, while Shorokhov and Kartseva were in Australia, the four-year experiment of the KI was declared over and the organization was dissolved. The foreign intelligence functions that had been under the KI were returned to the MGB. The organization failed partly due to the GRU’s unwillingness to be subordinated to civilian leadership, and partly because the committee management structure was unwieldy and overly bureaucratic.[xl]
While Shorokhov was working in Moscow in 1949, he learned that his mother was seriously ill on her deathbed, and he received several weeks of leave to visit her. He returned to Larikha after years of having been away and noted the poverty and devastation that the village had suffered due to years of Soviet policies. His mother died not long after he returned to Moscow, leaving Shorokhov with no living family members in the Soviet Union.
After three years in Moscow, Shorokhov and Kartseva, again using the name Petrov, received their second foreign assignment, this time to Australia. Their voyage to Canberra was much less dangerous or lengthy than the voyage to Stockholm had been seven years earlier, and they arrived with no delays in February 1951. ASIO sources began to report on the couple immediately upon their arrival, likely based on SIS reporting about Shorokhov’s intelligence affiliation. ASIO noted that when the Shorokhov and Kartseva were sailing to Australia for their new assignment, they associated little with the other Soviet passengers, and Shorokhov appeared to be the “boss” of the group. A source reported that, although the Soviet ambassador in Canberra was the figurehead, Shorokhov, only a third secretary, was the real head of the embassy.[xli] ASIO noted that the Shorokhov and Kartseva must have been trusted members of the embassy staff because they lived in a house to themselves, which was unusual among the Soviet staff.[xlii] A source reported that Shorokhov was feared and respected by other members of the Soviet embassy, which the source interpreted as meaning that he was the highest-ranking MVD officer in the embassy.[xliii] As of 1952, ASIO was still not certain of his intelligence affiliation, but was watching him closely, particularly because of his association with Australian leftists.[xliv]
Desire to defect
ASIO began to monitor Shrokhov’s presence from the moment he arrived in Australia.[xlv] ASIO conducted surveillance and recruited sources close to him to monitor his movements. One of the primary sources was Polish immigrant Michael Bialogulski, a medical doctor with whom Shorokhov became acquainted not long after arriving. Shorokhov assigned him the MGB codename GRIGORIY, while ASIO assigned him the codename DIABLO and later CRANE. Shorokhov and Bialogulski began to spend a great deal of time together, and Shorokhov developed him as a potential witting agent. But Bialogulski reported his movements with Shorokhov to ASIO, giving ASIO a well-positioned asset to report on Shorokhov.
As early as November 1951, after only 9 months in Australia, Bialogulski assessed that Shorokhov and Kartseva would not return to the Soviet when their tour ended. Bialogulski added that other members of the Soviet embassy would also choose to remain in Australia.[xlvi] ASIO did not fully trust Bialogulski’s assessment, but continued to monitor Shorokhov. By February 1952, ASIO was considering Shorokhov as a potential “Cabin” candidate, meaning a possible defector.[xlvii] In March, Bialogulski suggested that ASIO send a formal letter on the letterhead of a prominent Australian business offering for Shorokhov to remain in Australia, saying, “You won’t ever get it if you don’t try. You remember GOUSENKO (sic) was one, but remember all the damage he did.”[xlviii] But as of April 1952, no plan had been made to effect a defection.[xlix]
During the course of their relationship, Bialogulski described Shorokhov as a womanizer and heavy drinker. Shorokhov indicated to his friends that he had previously been a sailor, and ASIO reported that when he was in Sydney, he behaved like a sailor “on shore leave in his search for wine, women, and song.”[l] Petrov was involved in a car accident on 1 July 1952, and he received a head injury and lost consciousness[li]; the accident may have resulted from driving under the influence of alcohol. In May 1953, Bialogulski reported that he regularly tried to procure some girls for Shorokhov, but not prostitutes, because it was costing Bialogulski too much money.[lii] On the other hand, Bialogulski described Kartseva as being “far superior mentally to Petrov.” But Kartseva was not completely unaware of Shorokhov’s exploits. Her job until November 1953 was to keep the accounts at the Soviet embassy,[liii] and at times she would cover for his purchases of alcohol by writing them off as work-related expenses.
Bialogulski again reported that Shorokhov would not need much encouragement to defect as of February 1953, because he was humiliated by events in the embassy.[liv] By May 1953 he added that Shorokhov would not likely discuss sensitive matters inside his own home because he believed his home was bugged, but that Shorokhov was more inclined to think the Soviet government was bugging his home rather than the Australians.[lv] Bialogulski proposed approaching Shorokhov in the hospital in May 1953, when Shorokhov was being treated for an eye problem. Bialogulski noted, “I am sure he doesn’t want to go back to the Soviet.”[lvi] When Shorokhov told him that he would have to delay his return home, Shorokhov winked, indicating that he would prefer to stay anyway.[lvii] Bialogulski also proposed that Shorokhov purchase property in Australia—recommending a chicken farm—so that Shorokhov would have a place to stay if he decided to remain.
In early May 1953, ASIO received information that the Shorokhov and Kartseva were scheduled to rotate back to the Soviet Union.[lviii] The departure was reportedly delayed several weeks, but was still expected to occur.[lix] He agreed to an Australian friend’s proposal to throw him a farewell party.[lx] In April 1953, Shorokhov began discussions with Bialogulski about a business deal, for which the ASIO could initially only speculate the reason.[lxi] He continued the business discussions even when he announced that he was planning to take up to six months of leave in the Soviet Union in May. He promised the business partner that if he never returned to Australia, the business partner could keep all the money.[lxii] Shorokhov subsequently booked a flight alone from Canberra to Prague for 29 May.[lxiii] However, a week before he was to fly, Shorokhov was admitted to a hospital in Canberra for treatments on his eyes. His departure was postponed indefinitely.[lxiv]
Shorokhov again scheduled a departure date for July 1953, contingent on the doctor’s advice, with the expectation that he would return two months later. He complained that the other members of the embassy staff delight in making intrigues; nevertheless expressed anxiety about his return to the Soviet Union and he seemed depressed about going.[lxv] SIS contemplated placing a source next to Shorokhov on the airplane as he returned to the Soviet Union to induce his defection, in what SIS called a CAFE operation.[lxvi] SIS also considered trying to induce the Soviet ambassador in Canberra, Nikolay Mikhailovich Lifanov, to defect at the same time, offering him an opportunity to escape the punishment that would ensue from Shorokhov’s defection.[lxvii]
His flight schedule slipped several times in July, and was eventually cancelled again at the last minute.[lxviii] An ASIO source asked a Soviet embassy employee, Yanis Eduardovich Plaitkais (codename DVINSKIY), with whom Shorokhov worked on repatriation matters, why Shorokhov’s return was cancelled. Plaitkais answered that Shorokhov’s leave was cancelled because “everything [is] upside down at home.”[lxix] Beriya’s arrest occurred on 26 July 1953.
In addition to Bialogulski, ASIO recruited another source close to Shorokhov, an ophthalmologist named Dr. H. C. Beckett, who treated Shorokhov eye in 1953, to raise the prospect of defection overtly with Shorokhov. He did this for the first time in July 1953, to which Shorokhov responded in the negative. However, Beckett renewed the conversation several times thereafter, promising that if Shorokhov decided to remain in Australia, the doctor could arrange a meeting with Australian security representatives.[lxx] Shorokhov told Bialogulski about Dr. Beckett’s approach and Shorokhov considered it improper. He stated that he was foolish and bold and that he must be connected with the Security Police.[lxxi] Neither Shorokhov not Bialogulski knew how correct Shorokhov’s assessment was.
Finally, on 27 February 1954, Shorokhov agreed to meet with ASIO officer Ron Richards and he expressed his intention to remain in Australia.[lxxii] Shorokhov began at least as early as 2 March 1954 to gather documents from his office in anticipation of defecting.[lxxiii] He told Richards on 20 March that he could provide interesting information about the Department of External Affairs. However, he did not take the most recent documents, including the instructions from Moscow for the year 1953, because he could not be sure whether Kartseva would defect with him. Because she was the MVD document custodian, he could not take recent documents without her knowledge, and he did not want her to be implicated if she decided not to defect.[lxxiv]
Shorokhov’s defection came less than three months after Rastvorov’s defection in Japan and prompted angry remonstrations from the Soviet Union and allegations of kidnapping. When discussing the possibility of similar blow-back from Shorokhov’s defection, the SIS and MI5 agreed that obtaining counterespionage information was the paramount aim, and that, despite the “cold war and disruption aspect” of relations with the Soviet Union, “the main object is to get Petrov to defect, all else being secondary.”[lxxv]
During his post-defection debriefing, Shorokhov admitted that he had made up his mind to remain in Australia as early as 1952, prompted by what he described as being “persecuted and hounded” by the Soviet ambassador Lifanov.[lxxvi] After Beriya’s arrest in July 1953, Lifanov and the embassy Party chief, Kovalev, alleged that Shorokhov had formed a “Beriya group” in the embassy to undermine the authority of the Party.[lxxvii] But Shorokhov could not overtly show any signs of planning to defect for fear of either his wife or another embassy colleague noticing and reporting it.
Finally, Shorokhov’s replacement, Kovalenok, arrived on 3 April 1954. Shorokhov met him and other new arrivals from the Soviet Union in Sydney and put them on an airplane for Canberra. Then, he placed himself at the disposal of the Australian government and handed over the documents that he had collected in anticipation of his defection.[lxxviii]
On 6 April, three days after Shorokhov disappeared, Soviet ambassador Nikolay Ivanovich Generalov, who had replaced Lifanov in October 1953, called Kartseva into his office and inquired whether Petrov had contacted her. Petrova had not heard from him, but Generalov informed her that, as a precaution, she should move into the embassy building until further notice. A few days later, Generalov informed her that he received information indicating that Petrov was not coming back. From that moment, Kartseva felt like she was under house arrest. Other embassy staff shunned her and she was not allowed to leave the embassy.[lxxix]
On 19 April 1954, she was escorted to the Mascot Airport in Sydney, and boarded a plane amidst a large crowd of Australians yelling at her to stay in Australia. When she was shown the dramatic photos that were published in newspapers showing what appeared to be two thugs dragging her to the plane, she claimed to have been more afraid of the crowd than of the couriers who were escorting her. She denied press reports that claimed that she had appealed for help at the Sydney airport, and instead stated that if she had been offered asylum at that moment, in the midst of what to her appeared to be a hostile crowd, she would have refused.[lxxx] She was still shaken when she arrived at Darwin the next morning, but the quieter and less threatening environment of the Darwin airport was more to an ASIO approach, and after ASIO arranged a phone conversation between Shorokhov and Kartseva, she decided to accept the offer of asylum.
She wrote that her decision to remain in Australia was based on a combination of factors: the attitude toward her at the embassy; knowing her husband was still alive and well; a fear for her life. Before she left Canberra, a member of the embassy staff predicted that she would be sent to a prison camp or worse, and she feared for her fate if she were to return to the Soviet Union. She also knew her escorts were armed, and she was afraid they might kill her en route to the Soviet Union and call it an “accident.” Nevertheless, she admitted that her decision was difficult because she knew her family in the Soviet Union would suffer for it.[lxxxi]
Overt cover position
Shorokhov’s overt cover assignments included serving as third secretary and consul at the Soviet Embassy in Canberra and the representative for the All-Union Society for Cultural Contacts with Foreign Countries (Всесоюзное Общество Культурных Связей с Заграницей; VOKS) in Australia. These assignments gave him overt reasons to travel around Australia and to meet people, this facilitating his intelligence operations.
In his consular assignment he regularly traveled to Sydney to meet and escort new Soviet diplomats and diplomatic couriers traveling to and from Australia and New Zealand. He used these trips to meet intelligence sources and, eventually, as a pretext for his defection. He later provided a detailed description of the diplomatic and MGB couriers based on his experience working with them.[lxxxii]
His consular assignment also put him in contact with Russian émigrés who wanted either to renew their Soviet passports or to return to the Soviet Union.[lxxxiii] This allowed him to become involved in repatriation operations as part of his overt duties, which further necessitated contacts with the Australian Department of External Affairs, one of his primary intelligence targets. It also directly facilitated his role as a Line EM officer until in February 1952 when he handed repatriation responsibilities to a replacement officer.[lxxxiv]
In this role, Shorokhov met with a young man in September 1951 who wanted to travel to the Soviet Union, join the Soviet Army, and “go to Korea and kill Yanks and bloody Australians.” Shorokhov praised the young man and told him, “You are a good Soviet citizen already.”[lxxxv] Shorokhov continued to meet Russian émigrés even after he turned over the Line EM duties to help them with the consular process. In June 1952, he assisted a Russian émigré named Nikolay Vasilyevich Yalinichev in Melbourne to complete forms for repatriation.[lxxxvi] Shorokhov also facilitated the repatriation of Major Prokopenko, a Soviet Army officer who deserted from the Soviet Army in 1949 because of his wife’s unfaithfulness. He crossed into Turkish territory and was detained and questioned by Turkish Border Patrol. He was subsequently transported to Istanbul where he was offered employment with the Turkish Intelligence Service. Turkish Authorities intended to send Prokopenko to the Soviet Union to work for Turkish interests. However, he declined the offer and was released from custody. He met a Russian national who helped him to travel to Germany, where he was placed in a DP camp. From there he emigrated to New Zealand in late 1950 or early 1951. He worked as a forestry worker near Wellington and he attended screenings of Soviet films and came into contact with the Soviet embassy through other émigrés. He decided to repatriate to the Soviet Union. Shorokhov met him in Sydney in December 1952 and they attended the New Year’s party at the Russian Social Club. Shorokhov put him on a ship to the Soviet Union on 2 January 1953.[lxxxvii]
Shorokhov was aware of several Soviet intelligence sources who provided information about individual Soviet émigrés and émigré communities in Australia to identify potential repatriation cases and anti-Soviet attitudes. Shorokhov had a source in Sydney named Meer Israilovich Neplokh, who reported on Soviet immigrants to Australia. He reported to Shorokhov any arrival who did not report to the Oriental Hotel in Sydney, where Shorokhov worked while he was in Sydney; did not appear to want to renew their Soviet passport; or who tried to avoid contact with pro-Soviet Russians in Sydney. However, Shorokhov reported that Neplokh never provided any information of value to Soviet intelligence.[lxxxviii]
More successful was a Russian émigré named Andrey Andreyevich Friedenbergs (code name SYGMA), who has originally been recruited by Soviet intelligence soon after the Soviet occupation of Latvia in 1940, but who had subsequently worked for the Germans during the German occupation of Latvia. After the war he moved to Denmark and then emigrated to Australia in about 1950 without the MGB’s knowledge. The MGB learned of his whereabouts when he sent a letter to his sister in the Soviet Union. MGB headquarters sent instructions to reestablish contact, and Shorokhov met him several times during which Friedenbergs provided information about Latvian émigrés and Latvian organizations in Australia until Plaitkais arrived to take over Line EM duties.[lxxxix] Plaitkais had studied Friedenbergs’s case file before he left Moscow, and he indicated that Friedenbergs’s information was mostly copied from Latvian newspapers in Australia.[xc]
The MGB similarly planned to use Gunars Ritenbergs, another Latvian émigré living in Australia, whom Plaitkais planned direct against anti-Soviet Latvian groups in Australia.[xci] Plaitkais also met an individual named Bundalis who he thought could be a source of information about the Latvian community in Australia. Bundalis had escaped Latvia during the German occupation and emigrated to Australia. He had a brother who he thought was killed during the war, but who, upon further MGB investigation, was alive and working as a senior official in Latvia. The MVD instructed Plaitkais to develop Bundalis in Australia as a source.[xcii]
MGB headquarters instructed the rezidentura in 1951 to contact Nikolay Kirillovich Novikov (code name KLIMENT) through the Line EM and develop him as a source of information about other Soviet émigrés living in Sydney.[xciii] His son, Nikolay Nikolayevich Novikov (code name MEFODY), owned a photo studio, and the rezidentura was also instructed to recruit him as a safe house keeper.[xciv] However, Shorokhov, despite meeting KLIMENT at the Russian Social Club several times, made no progress toward those goals and headquarters later chastised the rezidentrura for not moving forward quickly enough with the recruitment.[xcv]
The rezidentura also received instructions to study émigré Nikolay Daghian (variant Nicholas Daghinian) (codename MONACH) and task him to open a small commercial enterprise, like a photography studio, that could be used as a safe house.[xcvi] Shorokhov met him at the Russian Soviet Club in Sydney, but the MGB never used his studio as a location for clandestine meetings.[xcvii]
Shorokhov’s VOKS responsibilities put him in regular contact with Australian-Soviet friendship groups and Russian social clubs where Russian émigrés and sympathetic Australians met to talk about the Soviet Union. His role as the VOKS representative provided opportunities to present a positive image of the Soviet Union through printed literature and Soviet films. It also offered plausible reasons for meeting with potential sources.
Soon after Shorokhov arrived in Australia, he met Jean Ferguson (code name RAFAEL), the executive officer of the Australian-Russian Friendship Society in Sydney, and she became one of his primary contacts in his overt position as the VOKS representative and consul.[xcviii] Overtly, he met her frequently in relation to distributing Soviet literature and screening Soviet films. Although Shorokhov indicated she was never fully recruited as a witting agent, he used her extensively as a talent spotter and to arrange meetings with sources.[xcix] Similarly to Ferguson, John Rogers (code name LOVKY) of the Australia Russia Society in Melbourne made arrangements for Shorokhov to meet with sources when he traveled to Melbourne.[c] Shorokhov also had contact with an individual named Kafka from the Czechoslovakian embassy in Canberra, who introduced him to people of possible intelligence interest during public cultural events.[ci]
Ferguson was also a primary contact between the Soviet embassy and the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) and she wittingly facilitated the issuance of visas for Australians traveling to the Soviet Union for Communist Party events and meetings. For example, under his overt position as consul, Shorokhov arranged through Jean Ferguson for Victor Williams, an Australian wharf laborer and poet, to travel to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Union of Soviet Writers and Authors. The embassy had initially identified Katherine Pritchard to receive the invitation, but she declined due to her age. Williams subsequently agreed, and traveled at the embassy’s expense. Williams received money for the trip directly from the embassy, and he subsequently wrote positive articles about the Soviet Union when he returned to Australia.[cii]
Shorokhov received a cable from MGB headquarters in April 1952 instructing him to ask Ferguson to introduce him to contact M.J.R. “Jack” Hughes, a member of the Central Committee of the CPA, who the MGB hoped could provide information about Australian security personnel. She also facilitated an introduction to John Bramwell (“Jack”) Miles, the chairman of the CPA, to whom Shorokhov issued a visa in January 1954.[ciii] Shorokhov also issued visas, with Ferguson’s facilitation, to Charles Bresland, national secretary of the Eureka Youth League (EYL), and Harry Bocquet, to attend a Komsomol Conference in Moscow in March 1954.[civ] The EYL was the CPA’s youth auxiliary organization. In all of these instances, Shorokhov’s overtly supported the issuance of visas in his consular role.[cv] But in Bresland’s and Bocquet’s case, he passed Soviet embassy funds for the travel to Ferguson, not directly to the travellers: consequently, unlike Williams, Bocquet was not aware that the money for the trip had come from the Soviet embassy, and he later testified that he believed the EYL had paid for the trip.[cvi]
In April 1953, Shorokhov issued invitations on behalf of the Soviet ambassador for two correspondents from the Sydney Morning Herald to visit the Soviet Union.[cvii] In his role as VOKS representative, Petrov worked this contact through Ferguson. In December 1953, Shorokhov received instructions from VOKS headquarters in Moscow to submit a proposal for how the Society could improve its work. Shorokhov again worked through Ferguson, who convened a meeting of Australian-Russian Friendship Society branches across Australia to develop a proposal.[cviii] Ferguson also assisted in contacting communist writer Rex Chilpin, through whom the rezidentura sought to obtain information about the Department of External Affairs.
In 1953, Shorokhov received a package from Moscow containing US$25,000 in cash, along with instructions to pass the money to Lawrence Louis Sharkey, the General Secretary of the CPA, to be used as a fund for assistance to trade unions.” Shorokhov arranged for the money to be delivered by another rezidentura officer. Both Shorokhov and Kartseva remembered the occasion identically,[cix] but it is unclear how or when the delivery took place because ASIO had Sharkey under close surveillance at the same time and reported no interaction of Soviet officials with Sharkey.[cx]
Source handling and operational procedures
Shorokhov and Kartseva provided ASIO with a wealth of information about how MGB selected, vetted, and interacted with sources. This gave ASIO numerous leads to investigate Soviet-inspired activities in Australia. Although no arrests resulted from Shorokhov’s and Kartseva’s defections, their information, combined with information from other allied counterintelligence efforts, such as the VENONA program in the United States, shed light on Soviet methods and priorities in the early Cold War.
Shorokhov indicated the characteristics that the MGB sought in a potential agent to “attract to our work,” which include placement, access, vulnerabilities, and ideology:
· Is the potential agent in real need of material assistance?
· Is he of bad character of conduct and in a position to be compromised?
· Has he possession of, or access to, useful information?
· Is he sympathetic to the Soviet [Union]?
· Is he willing to express his sympathy by working for the Soviet [Union] in supplying to them information of use.[cxi]
The vulnerabilities provided opportunities for leverage. Shorokhov noted that Soviet state security sometimes used blackmail to persuade a source, particularly inside the Soviet Union, but that it was considered a less effective method because it upset the target and even drove him to suicide in some cases. In other cases, blackmailed sources agreed to cooperate but never produced anything of value.[cxii] Shorokhov cited an example of the MGB targeting a Japanese diplomat in Moscow. The operation was similar to one that Rastvorov revealed, but the target in Rastvorov’s incident was a Japanese press correspondent. In Shorokhov’s example the MGB dangled a girl for the diplomat and he took the bait. The MGB photographed the couple in an intimate situation and confronted him with the photos. However, unlike Rastvorov’s example, the Japanese diplomat responded that he was authorized by Japanese law to have intimate relations with women while he was abroad and was unfazed by MGB threats to publish the photos. Shorokhov cited this example as the reason why the MGB needed to learn the laws of the countries they were targeting to allow operations to proceed smoothly.[cxiii] Kartseva also noted that Soviet intelligence hesitated to use women to persuade a targeted agent to fall in love because of the risk that the woman might reciprocate and become a handling problem. Women were used for compromise purposes only in Moscow.[cxiv]
Soviet state security recognized the power of money in recruiting and maintaining agents, and Soviet intelligence paid sources money commensurate with the value of the information. Money also gave the source a sense of obligation and threat: Soviet intelligence required that sources sign receipts for the money they received, leaving a trail of evidence that the MGB threatened to use against the agent is he/she refused to cooperate. Conversely, Beriya also recognized the risk of Soviet state security officers being enticed away with money, and he ensured that officers were well paid—a State security typist received a higher salary than an engineer in a Soviet factory. However, that situation changed in 1953 when Beriya was removed—Soviet state security salaries were reduced by 25 percent in 1953.[cxv]
Shorokhov described the process through which communist parties were tapped for sources and support networks for intelligence activities. However, exposures, such as in the United States, Canada, and Sweden prompted the MGB to issue instructions in 1946 or 1947, while Shorokhov was in Sweden, to abandon the use of communists as agents, although ideology was still a favored impetus for recruitment. This was particularly strictly enforced in Australia after 1951, when an Australian referendum approved the dissolution of the CPA.[cxvi]
That did not eliminate the factor of ideology from the recruitment process, however. The MGB in Australia actively sought potential sources among left wing and communist circles. The MGB in Australia recruited several sources who could identify ideologically inclined university students with promising futures in the Department of External Affairs, ASIO, or scientific institutions. For example, Charles Bresland (Codename COOK), whose travel to Moscow Shorokhov facilitated, was used to identify students at Sydney and Canberra Universities.[cxvii] Additionally. Mrs. Audrey Blake, a member of the Communist Youth league in Sydney, had worked in the Comintern with her husband in the 1940s, when she was recruited as a Soviet intelligence source. When she returned to Australia she provided written character sketches about students at Sydney University. The MGB collected the information with the intention of recruiting them in the future and instructing them to apply for useful positions.[cxviii]
Although left-wing ideology was often common among targeted students, the MGB instructed recruits to conceal their communist sympathies after becoming an agent to avoid counterintelligence scrutiny.[cxix] Although the Soviet embassy overtly interacted with the CPA, the MGB steered away from developing a clandestine relationship with a potential source who was overtly affiliated with the CPA.
When Kartseva arrived in Australia, she was initially assigned operational support and research tasks, along with KI officer Ivan Mikhailovich Pakhomov, such as identifying suitable dead drop sites and clandestine meeting places to be used in further operational work.[cxx] In mid-1952, MGB headquarters instructed Shorokhov to limit Kartseva to cipher work and remove her from duties connected with external contacts. At the same time, headquarters instructed Shorokhov to issue an appropriate reprimand to Kartseva because she “sometimes exhibits a lack of tact in her dealings with fellow workers in the embassy, including the Ambassador, which cannot fail to have a detrimental effect on her work.”[cxxi] Thereafter, her intelligence work consisted of being a cipher clerk, which gave her access to MGB and KI files. Kartseva subsequently provided lists of codenames that the MGB had assigned to sources and contacts.[cxxii]
Messages from Moscow to Canberra arrived as unexposed photos of documents, which Shorokhov or Kartseva developed to reveal the message, which Kartseva then decrypted. A similar process was used in reverse to send messages to Moscow. Shorokhov was reported to have purchased photo enlargers and equipment in Australia to facilitate this process.[cxxiii]
Petrov mentioned that he assumed the Australian security service had a microphone placed inside the Soviet embassy in Canberra, and that it had been installed when Australian workmen had recently done work in the embassy. When an ASIO officer posited that it would not be much use because the Soviet Union had equipment to locate hidden microphones, Petrov responded “we have no gadgets here to do that; they are at home.”[cxxiv]
[See Afanasiy Shorokhov in this database for second half of this description and endnotes.]
Published works
- Empire of Fear (New York: Praeger
- 1956)
- (London: André Deutsch
- 1956).