Biography
[Continued from Yevdokiyа Kartseva in this database]
Operational Targets
Shorokhov’s overt assignments supported the fulfillment of his clandestine intelligence missions. Soviet operational targets in Australia fell into several major categories: penetrating Australian and other security services to ascertain foreign counterintelligence activities directed against Soviet personnel; penetrating the Australian Department of External Affairs, as well as other countries’ foreign affairs organizations, to collect intelligence about Allied political movements and plans; and late in 1953, collecting information about atomic tests in Australia and the people who were involved in them. The MGB rezidentura in Australia also had an operational support mission to collect Australian travel and residency documents to lay the foundation for a future illegal rezidentura.
When Shorokhov and Kartseva arrived in Australia, Moscow lamented that it lacked basic information about Australian government institutions and leaders. Australia had presumably been a low priority for Soviet intelligence collection up to that point. In August 1951, Kartseva was assigned, along with MGB officer Pakhomov, to compile a series of reports concerning government and political leaders in the country. The rezidentura was to use both clandestine and overt collection to obtain information about:
· Sir Robert Gordon Menzies – Prime Minister
· Richard Gavin Gardiner Casey – Minister for External Affairs
· McDonald – Minister for Defense (this may have been a reference to Sir Philip McBride)
· Sir Josiah Francis – Minister for the Army and the Navy
· Faddon – Minister for Finance and Leader of the Country Party (probably a reference to Sir Arthur William Fadden, who was Treasurer of Australia in the 1950s)
· Sir William John McKell– Governor General
· Sir Edward John Williams – High Commissioner for Great Britain in Australia
· Herbert Vere “Bert” Evatt– Leader of the Labor Party[cxxv]
In January 1952, MGB headquarters complained that it had received no information resulting from this tasking and requested an update.[cxxvi]
Penetrating the Australian Department of External Affairs. According to Shorokhov, among the government institutions for which the Soviet Union sought intelligence, the primary target was a country’s foreign policy department. Correspondingly, the sources that Soviet rezidenturas were tasked to recruit were often either staff employees of such a department or associates of foreign affairs personnel, particularly those with access to secret information.[cxxvii] Shorokhov’s intelligence operations in Australia reflected that priority. Many of the people that Shorokhov targeted for intelligence recruitment were inside or associated with what was then called the Australia’s Department of External Affairs (DEA) or in an equivalent third-country organization represented in Australia, such as the embassies of France, Indonesia, and Israel.
In early 1952, Moscow instructed the Canberra rezidentura to study and survey the DEA, requesting basic information that indicated a lack of even foundational knowledge about the organization. The instruction was to collect brief historical data about the DEA, its structure and its location; information about the DEA executive staff; what sections handled Soviet, American, and British affairs and information about the executives who led those sections. The rezidentura was to collect information about the selection and training of Australian diplomatic staff and to determine whether DEA employees had formed trade unions or clubs, what was the nature of those organizations, and what were their addresses. The rezidentura was further instructed to obtain information about document and personnel security procedures in the DEA.[cxxviii]
Up until Shorokhov’s defection, much of the rezidentura’s efforts were directed against this task. The rezidentura investigated a number of DEA staff members and associated as possible sources, although it appeared from Shorokhov’s reports that the efforts yielded few concrete results. One of the few indications of access to unpublished information came when Shorokhov conversed with a source about growing unemployment in Australia, and he noted that the United States was going to give Australia a large loan, which would help matters. The source noted that Shorokhov knew about the American loan three days before it was reported in the newspaper.[cxxix]
On 14 November 1951, Australian Communist Party activist Rex Chiplin published as article in the Communist Party newspaper, The Tribune, titled “Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Immigration with the USA.” After that article appeared, Shorokhov informed Moscow that DEA employees were reluctant to meet with Soviet embassy officials.[cxxx] Nevertheless, Chiplin continued to wittingly provide information that he gathered from sub-sources in the DEA. In 1952, he reported that the United States and Australia were communicating with each other via ciphered messages.[cxxxi]
Shorokhov instructed Pakhomov to prepare a message to Moscow describing the potential of developing F. J. McLean (code name LOT), a First Secretary in the DEA Political Intelligence Section, as a source.[cxxxii] However, McLean fell ill with heart troubles and left the Department.[cxxxiii]
The rezidentura pursued several leads regarding DEA employees who had previously worked in Moscow and who were positively inclined toward the Soviet Union. In 1952, Shorokhov sent Moscow a list of promising DEA officials, one of whom was Richard Prichard “Ric” Throssell (code name FERRO), a DEA employee, who had been recruited as a Soviet agent during a previous tour of duty in Moscow. He was a member of the CPA and a friend of Jean Ferguson. Moscow identified Throssell was a recruited source who had provided information to a Soviet agent codenamed KLOD (CLAUDE) during World War II. Shorokhov did not have information about Soviet intelligence recruitments in Australia prior to his arrival in 1950, and by that time, KLOD was no longer active. It was unclear whether the members of KLOD’s group were witting that their information was going to Moscow; they may have thought they only supporting the CPA.[cxxxiv] Nevertheless, Moscow instructed the Canberra rezidentura to contact Throssell and reactivate him as a source.[cxxxv]
After Moscow, Throssell was posted to Rio de Janeiro and continued to work there as a Soviet agent. However, while Throssell was in Brazil, Brazilian counterintelligence investigated one of his subagents, and when he was posted back to Australia, he was afraid to continue his work for the Soviet Union. The rezidentura invited him, along with other DEA employees, to screenings of Soviet films at the embassy, but he never came. Finally, he did come to a reception at the embassy on 7 November 1953, and rezidentura officer Filip Vasilyevich Kislitsyn attempted to become acquainted with him, but did not succeed.[cxxxvi] The case never progressed further.
The Canberra KI rezidentura also sought an individual named Herbert Stanley North, who had worked from 1947 to 1951 at the Australian embassy in Moscow as a cipher clerk.[cxxxvii] But the rezidentura never made contact with him.[cxxxviii]
Another past contact of KLOD was Bernie Francisca, a clerk-typist in the DEA who reportedly provided interesting information in the past.[cxxxix] She was mentioned in the documents that Shorokhov brought with him when he defected. The information she had provided was mostly low-level information about DEA activities, including the car travel and meal arrangements for delegates to a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Association (UNRRA) Conference held at Lapstone, N.S.W., in February 1945.[cxl]
Ian Milner (codename BUR or BOOR) was a DEA employee who was working in a United Nations position in Korea when he defected in July 1950 and later reappeared in Prague. Milner had reportedly been in contact with KLOD, and although Shorokhov had no direct contact with Milner, he had the impression that he had been an important agent.[cxli] In 1953, the MGB asked the Canberra rezidentura about the risks involved in renewing him as an agent. The MGB asked if there was any continued discussion about Milner in the DEA and whether Milner was still of interest to Australian security. Shorolkhov approached Chiplin to investigate the situation, and Chiplin, possibly after obtaining information from a DEA, responded that there was no further discussion of Milner in the department, but people remembered him negatively for his left-wing views.[cxlii] Moscow planned to send him to New Zealand as an agent and inquired whether there would be opposition to him travelling there to stay with his parents.[cxliii] Shorokhov did not know what targets Milner would be pursuing if he were to travel to New Zealand.
In late 1951, Shorokhov and Kartseva hosted a DEA employee named Alfred Herbert Body (codename GOST) and his wife at their home for dinner. Body had been one of Shorokhov’s DEA contacts in Shorokhov’s overt consular activities, such as when he was assigned to escort diplomatic couriers. Shorokhov speculated that Moscow gave Body the code name GOST (Russian for guest) because he and his wife had been a guest at their home. Moscow instructed that the rezidentura to develop Body as a source of information about atmospherics in the DEA and about the characteristics of delegates in international organizations and conferences.[cxliv] Kartseva also proposed to exchange language lessons with Mrs. Body, and Mrs. Body initially agreed but later evaded the question; MGB headquarters instructed the Kartseva drop the idea to avoid frightening the Bodys away.[cxlv] Shorokhov assessed that Body would never have become a witting Soviet agent because he was very guarded and careful and Moscow subsequently instructed Shorokhov to drop Body as a developmental after the case made no progress.
In addition to Australian DEA employees, Shorokhov revealed Soviet intelligence efforts to recruit third-country diplomats assigned to Australia. One of these was a diplomat from the Indonesian embassy named Agus Yaman, who had frequent contact with members of the Soviet embassy. Shorokhov used Yaman to print photographs and they socialized frequently from at least October 1951 until Yaman returned to Indonesia in March 1953. Yaman was in Australia at a time when Australia was negotiating a program to assist in the training of the Indonesian Army.[cxlvi] Shorokhov denied that his relationship had ever progressed to the point of discussing topic such as the negotiations, although he may have been developing him for such information.[cxlvii]
Shorokhov not only targeted Yaman directly, but also used him to meet Australian DEA employees with whom Yaman was acquainted. Shorokhov went on a hunting trip in 1952 with Yaman and Roy Fernandez, a third secretary in the DEA. He reported the contact to Moscow and received instructions to study them and make their acquaintance.[cxlviii] Yaman was to be developed with a view to obtaining information about Australian policy.[cxlix] After only meeting Fernandez two times, he was posted to Indonesia and Shorokhov had no more contact with him.[cl]
Shorokhov also went on a fishing trip in late 1952 with Yaman, along with Soviet embassy official G. I. Kharkovets and a DEA employee named George Legge (codenamed RIBAK). Shorokhov went on another fishing trip with Legge in February 1953. Shorokhov reported the trips to Moscow, and Moscow responded that Legge worked in the European Section and was a very important man in the DEA. Legge’s girlfriend also worked in the department. Although Shorokhov met him socially and was instructed to study him for intelligence purposes, he never recruited him and Legge never supplied any information.[cli] Legge informed Petrov that he had been transferred out of the DEA to the Department of Commerce and Agriculture due to a drunk driving incident. Nevertheless, when Shorokhov’s replacement, Kovalenok, arrived in Australia, he expressed interest in meeting Legge.[clii]
The Canberra rezidentura also received instructions from Moscow to cultivate Ayre Lapid, the consul at the Israeli embassy in Canberra, as a potential future source. Lapid had apparently been to Moscow previously and spoke Russian well. He attended the national day celebration at the Soviet embassy in November 1952.[cliii] But he ended his tour in Australia in October 1954 and there is no indication that the rezidentura made any progress toward recruitment.
In January 1952, Moscow instructed the rezidentura to develop Rose-Marie Ollier (code name OLGA), a Second Secretary at the French Embassy in Canberra, and to obtain from her information about the French embassy’s process for enciphering and deciphering documents and about the storage of cipher keys in safes, as well as any information of interest that passed through her hands.[cliv] In July 1952, Moscow instructed Shorokhov to task Ollier to supply information about the policies and staff of the American and British delegations to the 7th UN General Assembly.[clv] Ollier’s case was assigned to Pakhomov; however, he made no progress and did not handle her well, so Shorokhov took over the operation himself. He was instructed to use an ideological approach, telling her that she could give considerable service to the cause of peace by providing information about the “machinations of the British, American, French, and Australian ruling circles directed against the Soviet Union and the countries of the People’s Democracies.” Shorokhov was also instructed to tell her to make the acquaintance of members of the press gallery, including Canadian journalists and a Brazilian journalist.[clvi] However, Ollier was always too afraid to provide cipher information and Shorokhov’s relationship with Ollier never reached the level where he could use that approach.[clvii]
On 24 December 1953, Shorokhov was en route to a meeting with Ollier when he was involved in a serious car accident in which his car ran off the road and caught fire. Although Shorokhov was not seriously injured, the accident shook him. Sources reported that Shorokhov was nervous after the accident, his hand shook when he lit a cigarette, and he had lost his jovial nature.[clviii] He later met her again, but the meeting yielded little.
Shorokhov reported to the Royal Commission that he was not aware of any valuable that the Soviets received from Ollier.[clix] In February 1954, the rezidentura received a message from Moscow complaining that, although Soviet intelligence had been in contact with Ollier for five years, she had produced nothing of value. Shorokhov was instructed that before he departed Australia he should have one more talk with her to determine her intentions and to ask again if she would provide technical details of the French cipher program. The only information that Ollier ever provided concerned the French government’s acquisition of armaments from the Australian government for use in Indochina. She told Shorokhov that an Australian ship loaded about 200 planes and ammunition in New Zealand, returned to Australia and trans-loaded them to another ship, which took the weapons to Indochina. [clx] This information was the predicate for Ollier’s arrest when she returned to France; however, the French government never obtained enough information to prosecute her and she was later released with charge.[clxi]
Probably Shorokhov’s most explosive revelation involving a Soviet penetration of a foreign ministry came not from his operations in Australia, but second hand from another MGB officer, Fillip Vasilyevich Kislitsyn, who arrived in Canberra during Shorokhov’s time there. Kislitsyn mentioned to Shorokhov his role in preparing the plan to exfiltrate Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess from the UK to the USSR. Kislitsyn recounted that Maclean and Burgess had both been recruited when they were students and they became very important agents who supplied a large volume of information about the British Foreign Office. Kislitsyn had worked as a cipher clerk in London during Burgess and Maclean’s active period, and, although he did not know them personally, he photographed and prepared their information for transmission to Moscow.[clxii] Shorokhov’s revelations about Burgess and Maclean became a major news story that provided an explanation for their disappearance and the first confirmation of their long-time intelligence careers.
Shorokhov also noted that Soviet intelligence sought recruits among high-level sources who could influence policies in the source’s country in a pro-Soviet direction. But Soviet intelligence treaded cautiously with such sources recognizing the risks of such operations.[clxiii] In early 1951, Rex Chiplin identified Fergan O’Sullivan, the Sydney Morning Herald correspondent in the parliamentary press corps, as a possible contact for the Australia rezidentura. O’Sullivan was assigned the code name ZEMLIAK. His attractiveness as an agent became even greater when he became the information secretary of Labor Party leader Evatt, who was being discussed as a possible future prime minister. Moscow viewed O’Sullivan as a promising candidate for recruitment and instructed the rezidentura to develop him clandestinely.[clxiv] The rezidentura gave O’Sullivan a test task to provide a list of members of fellow press corps members and their personal characteristics, which he fulfilled.[clxv] The rezidentura had previously given Chiplin a similar task.[clxvi] Shorokhov initially met O’Sullivan when the latter attended screenings of films at the Soviet embassy with other journalists in April 1952. Shorokhov met him several times after that, but he never became acquainted enough with him to ask him to supply information of interest to Moscow.[clxvii]
Another developmental source, codenamed ROOT, was a progressive journalist with Soviet sympathies who lived in Canberra. He was a contact of rezidentura officers Sadovnikov and Pakhomov. He participated in the arrangements for Queen Elizabeth’s visit to Australia in February 1954.[clxviii]
Guarding Against and Penetrating Security Services. Shorokhov indicated that ASIO was an obstacle to the MGB’s operations in Australia, and MGB officers considered Australia to be a hostile counterintelligence environment.[clxix] Consequently, Soviet intelligence was interested in penetrating ASIO, and while Shorokhov and Kartseva were operating in Australia, they received a few tidbits of information about ASIO monitoring of Soviet diplomats. But the MGB had not recruited a fully-fledged source before their defection.
On 27 September 1952, Moscow Center distributed a circular to all rezidenturas in democratic countries instructing them to penetrate counterintelligence services. The instruction originated from the MGB department dealing with U.S. intelligence activities. Shorokhov subsequently received a similar instruction to collect information about Australian, Canadian, British and New Zealand counterintelligence activities.[clxx] The rezidentura received another circular in January 1954 instructing MVD offices to acquire ciphers of countries in the “Anglo-American Bloc: the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, Canada and other countries in that bloc.”[clxxi] The purpose for penetrating a foreign counterintelligence service was to learn the contents of the security files on each Soviet diplomat stationed in the country and to uncover security service operations directed against the Soviet Union.[clxxii]
The rezidentura became acquainted with a Communist Party activist named Morris John Rodwell “Jack” Hughes (code name BASK), who had reported on the development of a peace movement in Australia to Shorokhov’s predecessor Sadovnikov.[clxxiii] Hughes also had friends in ASIO, and through one of them Hughes learned about the targets of ASIO surveillance operations. Among these targets were Kartseva and a Miss Kozlova, who worked for the Soviet embassy commercial attaché. Hughes also learned of a young woman who worked in ASIO headquarters who had fallen in love with a communist, and the young woman informed the man that ASIO was interested in Kartseva and Kozlova; Rex Chiplin (code name CHARLIE), a Communist journalist who was a contact of the MGB rezidentura in Australia, had previously reported ASIO’s interest in Kartseva and Kozlova.[clxxiv] The young woman, whose name Hughes did not reveal, was not aware that the information would be provided to the Soviet Union.[clxxv] The MGB looked into developing the young woman as a source, but the operation never progressed; the girl left for the UK and contact was lost.[clxxvi] Moscow instructed the rezidentura to identify other communists who were working in ASIO who could assist with placing Soviet recruited sources into the service. Shorokhov met Hughes in March 1952 to identify candidates, but Hughes provided no details about any of the reports or individuals, and Shorokhov did not further pursue it.[clxxvii]
In early 1952, Shorokhov received instructions to assign Pakhomov to investigate Geoffrey Ronald Anderson (code name YEGER) as a source.[clxxviii] Anderson worked in Revenue Customs and was a reverend of a church mission, where he was a leader in a Peace Convention that took place in Sydney.[clxxix] Mrs. Anderson was affiliated with the Australia Russia Society. Anderson was an Australian union activist; however, in mid-1952 he failed to be elected to a trade union leadership position and was subsequently out of work. But Moscow instructed Shorokhov to maintain contact with him because he still had acquaintances among employees of government institutions.[clxxx] Anderson had a friend who worked in ASIO who reported that Nosov (an MGB co-optee at embassy) was under ASIO surveillance.[clxxxi] This report made its way to Sadovnikov, the KI rezident, and Nosov was recalled to the Soviet Union.
Mary Ellen Casper Lewis was a barmaid at the Elizabeth Hotel in Sydney. She had traveled to Moscow in 1952 after participating in the International Conference for the Protection of Children, and when she returned, the MGB instructed the Australia rezidentura to contact her and develop her as a source. She had friends in ASIO that the MGB was hoping to exploit.[clxxxii] Shorokhov instructed rezidentura officer Viktor Nikolayevich Antonov to make her acquaintance, but he was not successful.[clxxxiii] No discussions about recruitment were ever held with her, and when the Royal Commission on Espionage interviewed her she denied ever having contact with Soviet intelligence and expressed surprise that the Soviet Union would view her as a potential source.
During his time in Australia, Shorokhov received several reports from Moscow identifying supposed American or British agents in Australia and warning against contact with them. One, a Mr. Klodnitsky, was affiliated with the Russian Social Club in Sydney. Moscow instructed Shorokhov to have no dealings with him because he was an American agent.[clxxxiv] Bialogulski remembered Shorokhov telling him in July 1952 that Klodnitsky and his wife were “spies and swine.”[clxxxv] Shorokhov also received a cable in early 1953 identifying a Boris Nikolayevich Binetsky, who was also affiliated with the Russian Social Club, as a British agent.[clxxxvi]
In April 1953, Rupert Lockwood (codename VORON) offered his services to Antonov to write a report about American espionage in Australia. He also provided information about American and British investments in Australia, which he obtained from Australian publications.[clxxxvii] Lockwood traveled from Sydney to Canberra and spent three days typing a report for the MVD in the presence of Antonov. During those three days, Lockwood reportedly worked inside the embassy from 10:00 am to 3:00 pm typing on an embassy typewriter two copies of the report, one of which was sent to Moscow and the other remained at the rezidentura. The work resulted in a 37-page report that provided what Lockwood claimed were Japanese and American espionage efforts in Australia during and after World War II. The report was filled with conspiracy theories about dozens of alleged anti-Australian spies, many of whom were prominent Australian businessmen and journalists. It claimed that the United States had tried to retaliate against Australian Labor Party leader Herbert Vere “Bert” Evatt for his efforts to overturn the law that dissolved the Communist Party of Australia. Lockwood sourced his allegations to left-wing activists and to people in Evatt’s office.[clxxxviii] ASIO referred to the document as containing “scandalous material.”[clxxxix] Lockwood was paid £30 for the report. This report became known as “Document J” in the Royal Commission on Espionage, and it caused a great of debate about the Royal Commission’s legitimacy.[cxc]
Atomic Information. One item of Soviet interest in Australia that received little attention in the Royal Commission was atomic information. According to Kartseva, as late as 1953, the Canberra rezidentura used the special top secret codeword ENORMAZ to refer to collection of atomic information. The codeword could not be used in regular cables but only transmitted via courier. Kartseva remembered that the first time ENORMAZ was used in a message to Canberra was 15 days after an atomic test, presumably meaning a British nuclear test that occurred in October 1953. When ASIO first heard the codeword from Kartseva, it was unsure of what it signified, but Kartseva confirmed its connection to “anything connected with materials used for manufacture of atomic bombs.”[cxci] The message using the code word instructed Shorokhov to collect information about the atomic test and the people involved in it.[cxcii] Kartseva indicated, however, that the only information the rezidentura obtained on the topic was from press clippings.[cxciii] Nevertheless, the enquiry to Canberra identified Soviet interest in a high priority topic.
Advisors in China. Based on his time in China in the late 1930s, the ASIO directed questions to Shorokhov about Soviet intelligence activities in China. Shorokhov claimed no direct knowledge about the activities of the Third (Near and Far East) Section of the MGB/MVD, and when asked about Soviet intelligence liaison operations with Chinese communist state security, both Shorokhov and Kartseva recommended that ASIO speak to Yuriy Rastvorov, whom they knew worked in the KI Third Section.[cxciv] Nevertheless, Shorokhov did provide some insight into the workings of the “Advisors’ Section,” which dispatched officers to establish and train state security services of other communist countries. The KI posted officers from the Advisors’ Section in non-official cover positions throughout China as liaison officers with the local Chinese state security office. These officers collected information about the Chinese People’s Government, members of parliament, and administration officials. This data was used to vet potential Chinese officials for posts in Chinese government positions. These officers also collected information about White Russians and Soviet citizens living in China. If a Chinese national or a stateless or foreign individual was suspected of being a foreign agent, an MGB liaison officer would work through the local Chinese state security office to investigate, and if necessary, arrest the individual. For Soviet citizens, the MGB liaison would conduct a unilateral operation to recruit or entice the person back to the Soviet Union.[cxcv]
The MGB also trained Chinese state security officers for assignments abroad, and the Chinese state security service reported to the Soviet liaison office the identities of agents whom they dispatched abroad. The Chinese service did not attempt to recruit agents among the stateless White Russians living in China, but left that to the MGB, but worked with the individuals under direction from an MGB officer.
Preparing for an Illegal Rezidentura. In 1952, Moscow began actively planning to develop an infrastructure for a future illegal rezidentura in Australia that could operate uninterrupted and effectively under any circumstances. Illegals were to be codenamed NOVATORs. Shorokhov was instructed to collect various documents and prepare favorable conditions for the entry and settling of illegals.[cxcvi] Moscow instructed the Canberra rezidentura to develop a source in good standing in the business community with a view to later requesting the source to assist in bringing Soviet émigrés to Australia to settle. Unknown to the business people, the real purpose would be to bring the people to Australia as Soviet illegals. Once in the country, they would seek employment in targeted organizations.[cxcvii]
Shorokhov responded to this tasking by asking sources about the papers necessary for entry into and exit from Australia and about Australian naturalization and divorce laws.[cxcviii] Shorokhov also asked a source about the documents needed in Australia to exempt a man from military service.[cxcix] He asked Bialogulski whether he had contacts with the Immigration Department who could obtain forms for entry into or departure from Australia, blank passports, blank driver’s license forms, and blank checks on the Rural Bank or any other bank.[cc] Bialogulski provided immigration forms in 1951, and Moscow responded, “these application forms are very important for Moscow to know how people can migrate to Australia.”[cci]
In 1953, Shorokhov received instructions from Moscow to develop a Dr. Clive Earnest Sandy from Melbourne as a source. Sandy had visited the Soviet Union previously, and the MGB wanted to use his house as a place to hold clandestine meetings and as a place to accommodate illegal agents. Shorokhov never fulfilled this instruction, and Sandy never contacted the embassy. Shorokhov decided to allow his successor, Kovalenok, to pursue Sandy because he would come to Australia with more updated information about Soviet illegals.[ccii]
Shorokhov’s work with illegals appears to have been solely operational support; he denied having worked directly with any Soviet illegals operating in Australia.[cciii] However, he was aware of one Soviet illegal named Vintses (variant Vincene) Vintsesovich Divišek (code name PECHEK). Divišek had been a Soviet agent during World War II and Moscow dispatched him to Australia to set up a business, preferably a restaurant, to assimilate, and to prepare for future intelligence missions.[cciv] Moscow instructed the Canberra rezidentura to contact him, but Divišek never appeared at the prearranged meetings and Shorokhov never met him.[ccv] When Shorokhov’s replacement, Kovalenok, arrived in Canberra, he told Kartseva, “I know all about him [Divišek].”[ccvi] Divišek testified before the Royal Commission that it was true that he had been trained and dispatched to Australia as an illegal officer, but that he never had an intention of fulfilling the instructions. He claimed to have accepted the assignment to travel to Australia only because he had family there and he planned to settle.[ccvii]
After defection
Kartseva was the fifth Soviet intelligence officer to defect in a three-month period, from January to April 1954. The revelations from these officers, combined with the upheaval in Moscow caused by Beriya’s execution just two months earlier and the ensuing succession struggle, left Soviet intelligence services reeling. ASIO and SIS hoped to exploit the confusion and fear that Soviet intelligence officers were feeling by proposing defection to others. Immediately after Shorokhov’s defection, on 3 April 1954, ASIO had him write a letter to Fillip Vasilyevich Kislitsyn, one of Shorokhov’s MVD colleagues covered as a second secretary at the Soviet embassy in Canberra. Kislitsyn was one of the few people at the embassy with whom Shorokhov had gotten along, and the ASIO asked Shorokhov for a biography of Kislitsyn.[ccviii] Shorokhov wrote to Kislitsyn urging him to follow Shorokhov’s example and defect. However, there is no indication that Kislitsyn even considered the offer seriously, and instead he escorted Kartseva on her journey back to the Soviet Union. Soviet and Eastern European press reacted strongly to Kartseva’s defection, and it was Kislitsyn who reported that Australian officials had abducted Kartseva at Darwin, and that he himself had been assaulted, which Australian official strenuously denied.[ccix] Australian police disarmed the guards escorting Kartseva, who were posing as diplomatic couriers, which the Soviet Union used as the pretext to sever diplomatic relations with Australia on 23 April 1954.
Based on a combination of Shorokhov’s and Kartseva’s revelations and ASIO surveillance or Shorokhov and his associates from 1951 to 1954, ASIO identified and prioritized 24 people for additional investigation and surveillance.[ccx] Several of the names were related to operational support, such as providing safe houses, photographic services, or talent spotting. Many of the sources were affiliated with the Australian Communist Party and labor movements. These investigations paralleled the interviews being conducted under the Royal commission on Espionage, which continued for the year after the defection.
In about November 1954, ASIO compiled a detailed summary of the operation that led to the Shorokhov’s and Kartseva’s defection. ASIO assessed that they were motivated by a mix of factors: attraction to Western prosperity, fear, and ideology.[ccxi] Both remembered fondly their time in Sweden, which Shorokhov described as a “very good country,” and Shorokhov enjoyed outdoor activities such as fishing and hunting in Sweden and Australia. But ASIO points out that material inducements were not the sole factor in their defection, because their combined salary was abundant by Soviet standards and the enjoyed significant privileges.
Their motivation also included dissatisfaction about their position at the embassy and fear for what could happen to them if their internal enemies denounced them. Problems at the embassy began to arise soon after the couple arrived in Australia. Kartseva gained a reputation among women in the embassy as being the only Soviet woman who wore Western-style clothes and make-up, which attracted jealousy and antagonism from other women in the embassy. Initially, neither she nor Shorokhov seemed to care about the antagonism.[ccxii] However, the treatment became increasingly petty, and Kartseva at times responded with a sharp tongue. In June 1952, Shorokhov received instructions from Moscow reprimand her for a “lack of tact in her dealings with fellow workers in the Embassy, including the Ambassador.”[ccxiii] Shorokhov’s position as MGB rezident, which placed him outside the control of the ambassador, also drew the enmity and created a “tangled skein of intrigue against them.”[ccxiv]
Their motivation also included an element of ideological disenchantment. Both had begun in the Party as true believers. But both also had experiences that left them embittered toward the Party and the Soviet elite. Kartseva had endured almost five years of shunning because of her relationship with a man who was arrested as an “enemy of the people.” Her only child died because of the inefficiency of the Soviet medical system. Yet, she was less cynical than Shorokhov, who complained about how collectivization led to the destruction of the peasantry, including his own family; how denunciations ruined many lives; the injustice and brutality of Stalin’s purges, to which he had direct access as a cipher clerk; to the growing elite class that showed no interest in the country’s mass poverty, and the contrast between official propaganda and reality.[ccxv]
After their defection, Shorokhov and Kartseva corresponded with several other Soviet intelligence officer defectors in the United States and Canada. On 15 April 1954, before Kartseva’s defection, Igor Gouzenko (see see separate entry in this database) sent a telegram from Canada expressing a desire for others to follow Shorokhov’s example.[ccxvi] Shorokhov subsequently wrote letters to Gouzenko in Canada, as well as to Yuriy Rastvorov and Aleksandr Orlov in the United States.[ccxvii] In a letter to Orlov, Shorokhov thanked him for his book Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes, which he said he read with pleasure because it exposed “to the people the truth about Stalin’s regime which is responsible for the loss of countless human lives.” Shorokhov wrote that when he was a cipher clerk in the NKVD in Moscow, he enciphered and deciphered cables addressed to Orlov. Sergey Mikhailovich Spigelglas, at the time a deputy NKVD director, often visited the cipher section when Petrov was there and enquired about news from Spain. Shorokhov told Orlov that Shpigelglas later disappeared without trace, along with many other Soviet state security leaders whom Orlov mentioned his book.[ccxviii] Shorokhov and Orlov also exchanged letters about publishing their books.[ccxix]
In July 1956, after the contents of Nikita Khrushchev’s “secret speech” at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had made their way into the public, an officer from the DEA interviewed Shorokhov to obtain his views of the speech and about Soviet relations with international communist parties. Shorokhov explained Khrushchev’s denigration of Stalin as the result of the mass discontent that had grown among the Soviet population, prompting the new Soviet leaders to disassociate themselves from Stalin and his purges. An interviewer commented on Shorokhov’s answers during the interview: “In recalling his work in past years for he Soviet Union and the Communist Party of that country, he spoke with an air of interested detachment, much as one might expect to find in a man of middle age discussing a great love affair of his your, now irrevocably done with.”[ccxx]
Shorokhov and Kartseva enjoyed great popularity in Australia for several years, and then disappeared intentionally into obscurity. They received Australian citizenship in 1956 took the names Sven and Maria Anna Allyson and settled into Australian life, although Shorokhov was constantly on alert for the possibility of a Soviet assassination attempt. In November 1963, the Australian government received a letter, through the International Red Cross, from Kartseva’s sister Tamara, who was living in Moscow, asking about Kartseva’s whereabouts. Kartseva was overjoyed to receive word that her family was well and was convinced that the letter was genuine, although Shorokhov expressed concern that it was prompted by the KGB. The KGB was certainly aware of them—Shorokhov and Kartseva were both listed in the 1969 KGB Wanted List.[ccxxi] Kartseva began a correspondence with her mother and sister, and in 1964, Tamara inquired about the possibility of visiting Australia with their mother.[ccxxii] Although Kartseva was anxious for ASIO to arrange for the visit, ASIO suspected KGB manipulation behind the timing and substance of the letters and proceeded carefully, expecting that the KGB could use a visit as propaganda to discredit the Royal commission on Espionage.[ccxxiii] However, the visit does not appear to have ever happened.
Shorokhov died in June 1991, and Kartseva died in July 2002.
Operational Targets
Shorokhov’s overt assignments supported the fulfillment of his clandestine intelligence missions. Soviet operational targets in Australia fell into several major categories: penetrating Australian and other security services to ascertain foreign counterintelligence activities directed against Soviet personnel; penetrating the Australian Department of External Affairs, as well as other countries’ foreign affairs organizations, to collect intelligence about Allied political movements and plans; and late in 1953, collecting information about atomic tests in Australia and the people who were involved in them. The MGB rezidentura in Australia also had an operational support mission to collect Australian travel and residency documents to lay the foundation for a future illegal rezidentura.
When Shorokhov and Kartseva arrived in Australia, Moscow lamented that it lacked basic information about Australian government institutions and leaders. Australia had presumably been a low priority for Soviet intelligence collection up to that point. In August 1951, Kartseva was assigned, along with MGB officer Pakhomov, to compile a series of reports concerning government and political leaders in the country. The rezidentura was to use both clandestine and overt collection to obtain information about:
· Sir Robert Gordon Menzies – Prime Minister
· Richard Gavin Gardiner Casey – Minister for External Affairs
· McDonald – Minister for Defense (this may have been a reference to Sir Philip McBride)
· Sir Josiah Francis – Minister for the Army and the Navy
· Faddon – Minister for Finance and Leader of the Country Party (probably a reference to Sir Arthur William Fadden, who was Treasurer of Australia in the 1950s)
· Sir William John McKell– Governor General
· Sir Edward John Williams – High Commissioner for Great Britain in Australia
· Herbert Vere “Bert” Evatt– Leader of the Labor Party[cxxv]
In January 1952, MGB headquarters complained that it had received no information resulting from this tasking and requested an update.[cxxvi]
Penetrating the Australian Department of External Affairs. According to Shorokhov, among the government institutions for which the Soviet Union sought intelligence, the primary target was a country’s foreign policy department. Correspondingly, the sources that Soviet rezidenturas were tasked to recruit were often either staff employees of such a department or associates of foreign affairs personnel, particularly those with access to secret information.[cxxvii] Shorokhov’s intelligence operations in Australia reflected that priority. Many of the people that Shorokhov targeted for intelligence recruitment were inside or associated with what was then called the Australia’s Department of External Affairs (DEA) or in an equivalent third-country organization represented in Australia, such as the embassies of France, Indonesia, and Israel.
In early 1952, Moscow instructed the Canberra rezidentura to study and survey the DEA, requesting basic information that indicated a lack of even foundational knowledge about the organization. The instruction was to collect brief historical data about the DEA, its structure and its location; information about the DEA executive staff; what sections handled Soviet, American, and British affairs and information about the executives who led those sections. The rezidentura was to collect information about the selection and training of Australian diplomatic staff and to determine whether DEA employees had formed trade unions or clubs, what was the nature of those organizations, and what were their addresses. The rezidentura was further instructed to obtain information about document and personnel security procedures in the DEA.[cxxviii]
Up until Shorokhov’s defection, much of the rezidentura’s efforts were directed against this task. The rezidentura investigated a number of DEA staff members and associated as possible sources, although it appeared from Shorokhov’s reports that the efforts yielded few concrete results. One of the few indications of access to unpublished information came when Shorokhov conversed with a source about growing unemployment in Australia, and he noted that the United States was going to give Australia a large loan, which would help matters. The source noted that Shorokhov knew about the American loan three days before it was reported in the newspaper.[cxxix]
On 14 November 1951, Australian Communist Party activist Rex Chiplin published as article in the Communist Party newspaper, The Tribune, titled “Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Immigration with the USA.” After that article appeared, Shorokhov informed Moscow that DEA employees were reluctant to meet with Soviet embassy officials.[cxxx] Nevertheless, Chiplin continued to wittingly provide information that he gathered from sub-sources in the DEA. In 1952, he reported that the United States and Australia were communicating with each other via ciphered messages.[cxxxi]
Shorokhov instructed Pakhomov to prepare a message to Moscow describing the potential of developing F. J. McLean (code name LOT), a First Secretary in the DEA Political Intelligence Section, as a source.[cxxxii] However, McLean fell ill with heart troubles and left the Department.[cxxxiii]
The rezidentura pursued several leads regarding DEA employees who had previously worked in Moscow and who were positively inclined toward the Soviet Union. In 1952, Shorokhov sent Moscow a list of promising DEA officials, one of whom was Richard Prichard “Ric” Throssell (code name FERRO), a DEA employee, who had been recruited as a Soviet agent during a previous tour of duty in Moscow. He was a member of the CPA and a friend of Jean Ferguson. Moscow identified Throssell was a recruited source who had provided information to a Soviet agent codenamed KLOD (CLAUDE) during World War II. Shorokhov did not have information about Soviet intelligence recruitments in Australia prior to his arrival in 1950, and by that time, KLOD was no longer active. It was unclear whether the members of KLOD’s group were witting that their information was going to Moscow; they may have thought they only supporting the CPA.[cxxxiv] Nevertheless, Moscow instructed the Canberra rezidentura to contact Throssell and reactivate him as a source.[cxxxv]
After Moscow, Throssell was posted to Rio de Janeiro and continued to work there as a Soviet agent. However, while Throssell was in Brazil, Brazilian counterintelligence investigated one of his subagents, and when he was posted back to Australia, he was afraid to continue his work for the Soviet Union. The rezidentura invited him, along with other DEA employees, to screenings of Soviet films at the embassy, but he never came. Finally, he did come to a reception at the embassy on 7 November 1953, and rezidentura officer Filip Vasilyevich Kislitsyn attempted to become acquainted with him, but did not succeed.[cxxxvi] The case never progressed further.
The Canberra KI rezidentura also sought an individual named Herbert Stanley North, who had worked from 1947 to 1951 at the Australian embassy in Moscow as a cipher clerk.[cxxxvii] But the rezidentura never made contact with him.[cxxxviii]
Another past contact of KLOD was Bernie Francisca, a clerk-typist in the DEA who reportedly provided interesting information in the past.[cxxxix] She was mentioned in the documents that Shorokhov brought with him when he defected. The information she had provided was mostly low-level information about DEA activities, including the car travel and meal arrangements for delegates to a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Association (UNRRA) Conference held at Lapstone, N.S.W., in February 1945.[cxl]
Ian Milner (codename BUR or BOOR) was a DEA employee who was working in a United Nations position in Korea when he defected in July 1950 and later reappeared in Prague. Milner had reportedly been in contact with KLOD, and although Shorokhov had no direct contact with Milner, he had the impression that he had been an important agent.[cxli] In 1953, the MGB asked the Canberra rezidentura about the risks involved in renewing him as an agent. The MGB asked if there was any continued discussion about Milner in the DEA and whether Milner was still of interest to Australian security. Shorolkhov approached Chiplin to investigate the situation, and Chiplin, possibly after obtaining information from a DEA, responded that there was no further discussion of Milner in the department, but people remembered him negatively for his left-wing views.[cxlii] Moscow planned to send him to New Zealand as an agent and inquired whether there would be opposition to him travelling there to stay with his parents.[cxliii] Shorokhov did not know what targets Milner would be pursuing if he were to travel to New Zealand.
In late 1951, Shorokhov and Kartseva hosted a DEA employee named Alfred Herbert Body (codename GOST) and his wife at their home for dinner. Body had been one of Shorokhov’s DEA contacts in Shorokhov’s overt consular activities, such as when he was assigned to escort diplomatic couriers. Shorokhov speculated that Moscow gave Body the code name GOST (Russian for guest) because he and his wife had been a guest at their home. Moscow instructed that the rezidentura to develop Body as a source of information about atmospherics in the DEA and about the characteristics of delegates in international organizations and conferences.[cxliv] Kartseva also proposed to exchange language lessons with Mrs. Body, and Mrs. Body initially agreed but later evaded the question; MGB headquarters instructed the Kartseva drop the idea to avoid frightening the Bodys away.[cxlv] Shorokhov assessed that Body would never have become a witting Soviet agent because he was very guarded and careful and Moscow subsequently instructed Shorokhov to drop Body as a developmental after the case made no progress.
In addition to Australian DEA employees, Shorokhov revealed Soviet intelligence efforts to recruit third-country diplomats assigned to Australia. One of these was a diplomat from the Indonesian embassy named Agus Yaman, who had frequent contact with members of the Soviet embassy. Shorokhov used Yaman to print photographs and they socialized frequently from at least October 1951 until Yaman returned to Indonesia in March 1953. Yaman was in Australia at a time when Australia was negotiating a program to assist in the training of the Indonesian Army.[cxlvi] Shorokhov denied that his relationship had ever progressed to the point of discussing topic such as the negotiations, although he may have been developing him for such information.[cxlvii]
Shorokhov not only targeted Yaman directly, but also used him to meet Australian DEA employees with whom Yaman was acquainted. Shorokhov went on a hunting trip in 1952 with Yaman and Roy Fernandez, a third secretary in the DEA. He reported the contact to Moscow and received instructions to study them and make their acquaintance.[cxlviii] Yaman was to be developed with a view to obtaining information about Australian policy.[cxlix] After only meeting Fernandez two times, he was posted to Indonesia and Shorokhov had no more contact with him.[cl]
Shorokhov also went on a fishing trip in late 1952 with Yaman, along with Soviet embassy official G. I. Kharkovets and a DEA employee named George Legge (codenamed RIBAK). Shorokhov went on another fishing trip with Legge in February 1953. Shorokhov reported the trips to Moscow, and Moscow responded that Legge worked in the European Section and was a very important man in the DEA. Legge’s girlfriend also worked in the department. Although Shorokhov met him socially and was instructed to study him for intelligence purposes, he never recruited him and Legge never supplied any information.[cli] Legge informed Petrov that he had been transferred out of the DEA to the Department of Commerce and Agriculture due to a drunk driving incident. Nevertheless, when Shorokhov’s replacement, Kovalenok, arrived in Australia, he expressed interest in meeting Legge.[clii]
The Canberra rezidentura also received instructions from Moscow to cultivate Ayre Lapid, the consul at the Israeli embassy in Canberra, as a potential future source. Lapid had apparently been to Moscow previously and spoke Russian well. He attended the national day celebration at the Soviet embassy in November 1952.[cliii] But he ended his tour in Australia in October 1954 and there is no indication that the rezidentura made any progress toward recruitment.
In January 1952, Moscow instructed the rezidentura to develop Rose-Marie Ollier (code name OLGA), a Second Secretary at the French Embassy in Canberra, and to obtain from her information about the French embassy’s process for enciphering and deciphering documents and about the storage of cipher keys in safes, as well as any information of interest that passed through her hands.[cliv] In July 1952, Moscow instructed Shorokhov to task Ollier to supply information about the policies and staff of the American and British delegations to the 7th UN General Assembly.[clv] Ollier’s case was assigned to Pakhomov; however, he made no progress and did not handle her well, so Shorokhov took over the operation himself. He was instructed to use an ideological approach, telling her that she could give considerable service to the cause of peace by providing information about the “machinations of the British, American, French, and Australian ruling circles directed against the Soviet Union and the countries of the People’s Democracies.” Shorokhov was also instructed to tell her to make the acquaintance of members of the press gallery, including Canadian journalists and a Brazilian journalist.[clvi] However, Ollier was always too afraid to provide cipher information and Shorokhov’s relationship with Ollier never reached the level where he could use that approach.[clvii]
On 24 December 1953, Shorokhov was en route to a meeting with Ollier when he was involved in a serious car accident in which his car ran off the road and caught fire. Although Shorokhov was not seriously injured, the accident shook him. Sources reported that Shorokhov was nervous after the accident, his hand shook when he lit a cigarette, and he had lost his jovial nature.[clviii] He later met her again, but the meeting yielded little.
Shorokhov reported to the Royal Commission that he was not aware of any valuable that the Soviets received from Ollier.[clix] In February 1954, the rezidentura received a message from Moscow complaining that, although Soviet intelligence had been in contact with Ollier for five years, she had produced nothing of value. Shorokhov was instructed that before he departed Australia he should have one more talk with her to determine her intentions and to ask again if she would provide technical details of the French cipher program. The only information that Ollier ever provided concerned the French government’s acquisition of armaments from the Australian government for use in Indochina. She told Shorokhov that an Australian ship loaded about 200 planes and ammunition in New Zealand, returned to Australia and trans-loaded them to another ship, which took the weapons to Indochina. [clx] This information was the predicate for Ollier’s arrest when she returned to France; however, the French government never obtained enough information to prosecute her and she was later released with charge.[clxi]
Probably Shorokhov’s most explosive revelation involving a Soviet penetration of a foreign ministry came not from his operations in Australia, but second hand from another MGB officer, Fillip Vasilyevich Kislitsyn, who arrived in Canberra during Shorokhov’s time there. Kislitsyn mentioned to Shorokhov his role in preparing the plan to exfiltrate Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess from the UK to the USSR. Kislitsyn recounted that Maclean and Burgess had both been recruited when they were students and they became very important agents who supplied a large volume of information about the British Foreign Office. Kislitsyn had worked as a cipher clerk in London during Burgess and Maclean’s active period, and, although he did not know them personally, he photographed and prepared their information for transmission to Moscow.[clxii] Shorokhov’s revelations about Burgess and Maclean became a major news story that provided an explanation for their disappearance and the first confirmation of their long-time intelligence careers.
Shorokhov also noted that Soviet intelligence sought recruits among high-level sources who could influence policies in the source’s country in a pro-Soviet direction. But Soviet intelligence treaded cautiously with such sources recognizing the risks of such operations.[clxiii] In early 1951, Rex Chiplin identified Fergan O’Sullivan, the Sydney Morning Herald correspondent in the parliamentary press corps, as a possible contact for the Australia rezidentura. O’Sullivan was assigned the code name ZEMLIAK. His attractiveness as an agent became even greater when he became the information secretary of Labor Party leader Evatt, who was being discussed as a possible future prime minister. Moscow viewed O’Sullivan as a promising candidate for recruitment and instructed the rezidentura to develop him clandestinely.[clxiv] The rezidentura gave O’Sullivan a test task to provide a list of members of fellow press corps members and their personal characteristics, which he fulfilled.[clxv] The rezidentura had previously given Chiplin a similar task.[clxvi] Shorokhov initially met O’Sullivan when the latter attended screenings of films at the Soviet embassy with other journalists in April 1952. Shorokhov met him several times after that, but he never became acquainted enough with him to ask him to supply information of interest to Moscow.[clxvii]
Another developmental source, codenamed ROOT, was a progressive journalist with Soviet sympathies who lived in Canberra. He was a contact of rezidentura officers Sadovnikov and Pakhomov. He participated in the arrangements for Queen Elizabeth’s visit to Australia in February 1954.[clxviii]
Guarding Against and Penetrating Security Services. Shorokhov indicated that ASIO was an obstacle to the MGB’s operations in Australia, and MGB officers considered Australia to be a hostile counterintelligence environment.[clxix] Consequently, Soviet intelligence was interested in penetrating ASIO, and while Shorokhov and Kartseva were operating in Australia, they received a few tidbits of information about ASIO monitoring of Soviet diplomats. But the MGB had not recruited a fully-fledged source before their defection.
On 27 September 1952, Moscow Center distributed a circular to all rezidenturas in democratic countries instructing them to penetrate counterintelligence services. The instruction originated from the MGB department dealing with U.S. intelligence activities. Shorokhov subsequently received a similar instruction to collect information about Australian, Canadian, British and New Zealand counterintelligence activities.[clxx] The rezidentura received another circular in January 1954 instructing MVD offices to acquire ciphers of countries in the “Anglo-American Bloc: the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, Canada and other countries in that bloc.”[clxxi] The purpose for penetrating a foreign counterintelligence service was to learn the contents of the security files on each Soviet diplomat stationed in the country and to uncover security service operations directed against the Soviet Union.[clxxii]
The rezidentura became acquainted with a Communist Party activist named Morris John Rodwell “Jack” Hughes (code name BASK), who had reported on the development of a peace movement in Australia to Shorokhov’s predecessor Sadovnikov.[clxxiii] Hughes also had friends in ASIO, and through one of them Hughes learned about the targets of ASIO surveillance operations. Among these targets were Kartseva and a Miss Kozlova, who worked for the Soviet embassy commercial attaché. Hughes also learned of a young woman who worked in ASIO headquarters who had fallen in love with a communist, and the young woman informed the man that ASIO was interested in Kartseva and Kozlova; Rex Chiplin (code name CHARLIE), a Communist journalist who was a contact of the MGB rezidentura in Australia, had previously reported ASIO’s interest in Kartseva and Kozlova.[clxxiv] The young woman, whose name Hughes did not reveal, was not aware that the information would be provided to the Soviet Union.[clxxv] The MGB looked into developing the young woman as a source, but the operation never progressed; the girl left for the UK and contact was lost.[clxxvi] Moscow instructed the rezidentura to identify other communists who were working in ASIO who could assist with placing Soviet recruited sources into the service. Shorokhov met Hughes in March 1952 to identify candidates, but Hughes provided no details about any of the reports or individuals, and Shorokhov did not further pursue it.[clxxvii]
In early 1952, Shorokhov received instructions to assign Pakhomov to investigate Geoffrey Ronald Anderson (code name YEGER) as a source.[clxxviii] Anderson worked in Revenue Customs and was a reverend of a church mission, where he was a leader in a Peace Convention that took place in Sydney.[clxxix] Mrs. Anderson was affiliated with the Australia Russia Society. Anderson was an Australian union activist; however, in mid-1952 he failed to be elected to a trade union leadership position and was subsequently out of work. But Moscow instructed Shorokhov to maintain contact with him because he still had acquaintances among employees of government institutions.[clxxx] Anderson had a friend who worked in ASIO who reported that Nosov (an MGB co-optee at embassy) was under ASIO surveillance.[clxxxi] This report made its way to Sadovnikov, the KI rezident, and Nosov was recalled to the Soviet Union.
Mary Ellen Casper Lewis was a barmaid at the Elizabeth Hotel in Sydney. She had traveled to Moscow in 1952 after participating in the International Conference for the Protection of Children, and when she returned, the MGB instructed the Australia rezidentura to contact her and develop her as a source. She had friends in ASIO that the MGB was hoping to exploit.[clxxxii] Shorokhov instructed rezidentura officer Viktor Nikolayevich Antonov to make her acquaintance, but he was not successful.[clxxxiii] No discussions about recruitment were ever held with her, and when the Royal Commission on Espionage interviewed her she denied ever having contact with Soviet intelligence and expressed surprise that the Soviet Union would view her as a potential source.
During his time in Australia, Shorokhov received several reports from Moscow identifying supposed American or British agents in Australia and warning against contact with them. One, a Mr. Klodnitsky, was affiliated with the Russian Social Club in Sydney. Moscow instructed Shorokhov to have no dealings with him because he was an American agent.[clxxxiv] Bialogulski remembered Shorokhov telling him in July 1952 that Klodnitsky and his wife were “spies and swine.”[clxxxv] Shorokhov also received a cable in early 1953 identifying a Boris Nikolayevich Binetsky, who was also affiliated with the Russian Social Club, as a British agent.[clxxxvi]
In April 1953, Rupert Lockwood (codename VORON) offered his services to Antonov to write a report about American espionage in Australia. He also provided information about American and British investments in Australia, which he obtained from Australian publications.[clxxxvii] Lockwood traveled from Sydney to Canberra and spent three days typing a report for the MVD in the presence of Antonov. During those three days, Lockwood reportedly worked inside the embassy from 10:00 am to 3:00 pm typing on an embassy typewriter two copies of the report, one of which was sent to Moscow and the other remained at the rezidentura. The work resulted in a 37-page report that provided what Lockwood claimed were Japanese and American espionage efforts in Australia during and after World War II. The report was filled with conspiracy theories about dozens of alleged anti-Australian spies, many of whom were prominent Australian businessmen and journalists. It claimed that the United States had tried to retaliate against Australian Labor Party leader Herbert Vere “Bert” Evatt for his efforts to overturn the law that dissolved the Communist Party of Australia. Lockwood sourced his allegations to left-wing activists and to people in Evatt’s office.[clxxxviii] ASIO referred to the document as containing “scandalous material.”[clxxxix] Lockwood was paid £30 for the report. This report became known as “Document J” in the Royal Commission on Espionage, and it caused a great of debate about the Royal Commission’s legitimacy.[cxc]
Atomic Information. One item of Soviet interest in Australia that received little attention in the Royal Commission was atomic information. According to Kartseva, as late as 1953, the Canberra rezidentura used the special top secret codeword ENORMAZ to refer to collection of atomic information. The codeword could not be used in regular cables but only transmitted via courier. Kartseva remembered that the first time ENORMAZ was used in a message to Canberra was 15 days after an atomic test, presumably meaning a British nuclear test that occurred in October 1953. When ASIO first heard the codeword from Kartseva, it was unsure of what it signified, but Kartseva confirmed its connection to “anything connected with materials used for manufacture of atomic bombs.”[cxci] The message using the code word instructed Shorokhov to collect information about the atomic test and the people involved in it.[cxcii] Kartseva indicated, however, that the only information the rezidentura obtained on the topic was from press clippings.[cxciii] Nevertheless, the enquiry to Canberra identified Soviet interest in a high priority topic.
Advisors in China. Based on his time in China in the late 1930s, the ASIO directed questions to Shorokhov about Soviet intelligence activities in China. Shorokhov claimed no direct knowledge about the activities of the Third (Near and Far East) Section of the MGB/MVD, and when asked about Soviet intelligence liaison operations with Chinese communist state security, both Shorokhov and Kartseva recommended that ASIO speak to Yuriy Rastvorov, whom they knew worked in the KI Third Section.[cxciv] Nevertheless, Shorokhov did provide some insight into the workings of the “Advisors’ Section,” which dispatched officers to establish and train state security services of other communist countries. The KI posted officers from the Advisors’ Section in non-official cover positions throughout China as liaison officers with the local Chinese state security office. These officers collected information about the Chinese People’s Government, members of parliament, and administration officials. This data was used to vet potential Chinese officials for posts in Chinese government positions. These officers also collected information about White Russians and Soviet citizens living in China. If a Chinese national or a stateless or foreign individual was suspected of being a foreign agent, an MGB liaison officer would work through the local Chinese state security office to investigate, and if necessary, arrest the individual. For Soviet citizens, the MGB liaison would conduct a unilateral operation to recruit or entice the person back to the Soviet Union.[cxcv]
The MGB also trained Chinese state security officers for assignments abroad, and the Chinese state security service reported to the Soviet liaison office the identities of agents whom they dispatched abroad. The Chinese service did not attempt to recruit agents among the stateless White Russians living in China, but left that to the MGB, but worked with the individuals under direction from an MGB officer.
Preparing for an Illegal Rezidentura. In 1952, Moscow began actively planning to develop an infrastructure for a future illegal rezidentura in Australia that could operate uninterrupted and effectively under any circumstances. Illegals were to be codenamed NOVATORs. Shorokhov was instructed to collect various documents and prepare favorable conditions for the entry and settling of illegals.[cxcvi] Moscow instructed the Canberra rezidentura to develop a source in good standing in the business community with a view to later requesting the source to assist in bringing Soviet émigrés to Australia to settle. Unknown to the business people, the real purpose would be to bring the people to Australia as Soviet illegals. Once in the country, they would seek employment in targeted organizations.[cxcvii]
Shorokhov responded to this tasking by asking sources about the papers necessary for entry into and exit from Australia and about Australian naturalization and divorce laws.[cxcviii] Shorokhov also asked a source about the documents needed in Australia to exempt a man from military service.[cxcix] He asked Bialogulski whether he had contacts with the Immigration Department who could obtain forms for entry into or departure from Australia, blank passports, blank driver’s license forms, and blank checks on the Rural Bank or any other bank.[cc] Bialogulski provided immigration forms in 1951, and Moscow responded, “these application forms are very important for Moscow to know how people can migrate to Australia.”[cci]
In 1953, Shorokhov received instructions from Moscow to develop a Dr. Clive Earnest Sandy from Melbourne as a source. Sandy had visited the Soviet Union previously, and the MGB wanted to use his house as a place to hold clandestine meetings and as a place to accommodate illegal agents. Shorokhov never fulfilled this instruction, and Sandy never contacted the embassy. Shorokhov decided to allow his successor, Kovalenok, to pursue Sandy because he would come to Australia with more updated information about Soviet illegals.[ccii]
Shorokhov’s work with illegals appears to have been solely operational support; he denied having worked directly with any Soviet illegals operating in Australia.[cciii] However, he was aware of one Soviet illegal named Vintses (variant Vincene) Vintsesovich Divišek (code name PECHEK). Divišek had been a Soviet agent during World War II and Moscow dispatched him to Australia to set up a business, preferably a restaurant, to assimilate, and to prepare for future intelligence missions.[cciv] Moscow instructed the Canberra rezidentura to contact him, but Divišek never appeared at the prearranged meetings and Shorokhov never met him.[ccv] When Shorokhov’s replacement, Kovalenok, arrived in Canberra, he told Kartseva, “I know all about him [Divišek].”[ccvi] Divišek testified before the Royal Commission that it was true that he had been trained and dispatched to Australia as an illegal officer, but that he never had an intention of fulfilling the instructions. He claimed to have accepted the assignment to travel to Australia only because he had family there and he planned to settle.[ccvii]
After defection
Kartseva was the fifth Soviet intelligence officer to defect in a three-month period, from January to April 1954. The revelations from these officers, combined with the upheaval in Moscow caused by Beriya’s execution just two months earlier and the ensuing succession struggle, left Soviet intelligence services reeling. ASIO and SIS hoped to exploit the confusion and fear that Soviet intelligence officers were feeling by proposing defection to others. Immediately after Shorokhov’s defection, on 3 April 1954, ASIO had him write a letter to Fillip Vasilyevich Kislitsyn, one of Shorokhov’s MVD colleagues covered as a second secretary at the Soviet embassy in Canberra. Kislitsyn was one of the few people at the embassy with whom Shorokhov had gotten along, and the ASIO asked Shorokhov for a biography of Kislitsyn.[ccviii] Shorokhov wrote to Kislitsyn urging him to follow Shorokhov’s example and defect. However, there is no indication that Kislitsyn even considered the offer seriously, and instead he escorted Kartseva on her journey back to the Soviet Union. Soviet and Eastern European press reacted strongly to Kartseva’s defection, and it was Kislitsyn who reported that Australian officials had abducted Kartseva at Darwin, and that he himself had been assaulted, which Australian official strenuously denied.[ccix] Australian police disarmed the guards escorting Kartseva, who were posing as diplomatic couriers, which the Soviet Union used as the pretext to sever diplomatic relations with Australia on 23 April 1954.
Based on a combination of Shorokhov’s and Kartseva’s revelations and ASIO surveillance or Shorokhov and his associates from 1951 to 1954, ASIO identified and prioritized 24 people for additional investigation and surveillance.[ccx] Several of the names were related to operational support, such as providing safe houses, photographic services, or talent spotting. Many of the sources were affiliated with the Australian Communist Party and labor movements. These investigations paralleled the interviews being conducted under the Royal commission on Espionage, which continued for the year after the defection.
In about November 1954, ASIO compiled a detailed summary of the operation that led to the Shorokhov’s and Kartseva’s defection. ASIO assessed that they were motivated by a mix of factors: attraction to Western prosperity, fear, and ideology.[ccxi] Both remembered fondly their time in Sweden, which Shorokhov described as a “very good country,” and Shorokhov enjoyed outdoor activities such as fishing and hunting in Sweden and Australia. But ASIO points out that material inducements were not the sole factor in their defection, because their combined salary was abundant by Soviet standards and the enjoyed significant privileges.
Their motivation also included dissatisfaction about their position at the embassy and fear for what could happen to them if their internal enemies denounced them. Problems at the embassy began to arise soon after the couple arrived in Australia. Kartseva gained a reputation among women in the embassy as being the only Soviet woman who wore Western-style clothes and make-up, which attracted jealousy and antagonism from other women in the embassy. Initially, neither she nor Shorokhov seemed to care about the antagonism.[ccxii] However, the treatment became increasingly petty, and Kartseva at times responded with a sharp tongue. In June 1952, Shorokhov received instructions from Moscow reprimand her for a “lack of tact in her dealings with fellow workers in the Embassy, including the Ambassador.”[ccxiii] Shorokhov’s position as MGB rezident, which placed him outside the control of the ambassador, also drew the enmity and created a “tangled skein of intrigue against them.”[ccxiv]
Their motivation also included an element of ideological disenchantment. Both had begun in the Party as true believers. But both also had experiences that left them embittered toward the Party and the Soviet elite. Kartseva had endured almost five years of shunning because of her relationship with a man who was arrested as an “enemy of the people.” Her only child died because of the inefficiency of the Soviet medical system. Yet, she was less cynical than Shorokhov, who complained about how collectivization led to the destruction of the peasantry, including his own family; how denunciations ruined many lives; the injustice and brutality of Stalin’s purges, to which he had direct access as a cipher clerk; to the growing elite class that showed no interest in the country’s mass poverty, and the contrast between official propaganda and reality.[ccxv]
After their defection, Shorokhov and Kartseva corresponded with several other Soviet intelligence officer defectors in the United States and Canada. On 15 April 1954, before Kartseva’s defection, Igor Gouzenko (see see separate entry in this database) sent a telegram from Canada expressing a desire for others to follow Shorokhov’s example.[ccxvi] Shorokhov subsequently wrote letters to Gouzenko in Canada, as well as to Yuriy Rastvorov and Aleksandr Orlov in the United States.[ccxvii] In a letter to Orlov, Shorokhov thanked him for his book Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes, which he said he read with pleasure because it exposed “to the people the truth about Stalin’s regime which is responsible for the loss of countless human lives.” Shorokhov wrote that when he was a cipher clerk in the NKVD in Moscow, he enciphered and deciphered cables addressed to Orlov. Sergey Mikhailovich Spigelglas, at the time a deputy NKVD director, often visited the cipher section when Petrov was there and enquired about news from Spain. Shorokhov told Orlov that Shpigelglas later disappeared without trace, along with many other Soviet state security leaders whom Orlov mentioned his book.[ccxviii] Shorokhov and Orlov also exchanged letters about publishing their books.[ccxix]
In July 1956, after the contents of Nikita Khrushchev’s “secret speech” at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had made their way into the public, an officer from the DEA interviewed Shorokhov to obtain his views of the speech and about Soviet relations with international communist parties. Shorokhov explained Khrushchev’s denigration of Stalin as the result of the mass discontent that had grown among the Soviet population, prompting the new Soviet leaders to disassociate themselves from Stalin and his purges. An interviewer commented on Shorokhov’s answers during the interview: “In recalling his work in past years for he Soviet Union and the Communist Party of that country, he spoke with an air of interested detachment, much as one might expect to find in a man of middle age discussing a great love affair of his your, now irrevocably done with.”[ccxx]
Shorokhov and Kartseva enjoyed great popularity in Australia for several years, and then disappeared intentionally into obscurity. They received Australian citizenship in 1956 took the names Sven and Maria Anna Allyson and settled into Australian life, although Shorokhov was constantly on alert for the possibility of a Soviet assassination attempt. In November 1963, the Australian government received a letter, through the International Red Cross, from Kartseva’s sister Tamara, who was living in Moscow, asking about Kartseva’s whereabouts. Kartseva was overjoyed to receive word that her family was well and was convinced that the letter was genuine, although Shorokhov expressed concern that it was prompted by the KGB. The KGB was certainly aware of them—Shorokhov and Kartseva were both listed in the 1969 KGB Wanted List.[ccxxi] Kartseva began a correspondence with her mother and sister, and in 1964, Tamara inquired about the possibility of visiting Australia with their mother.[ccxxii] Although Kartseva was anxious for ASIO to arrange for the visit, ASIO suspected KGB manipulation behind the timing and substance of the letters and proceeded carefully, expecting that the KGB could use a visit as propaganda to discredit the Royal commission on Espionage.[ccxxiii] However, the visit does not appear to have ever happened.
Shorokhov died in June 1991, and Kartseva died in July 2002.
Notes
- [i] Photo from NAA, A6285, item number 7462033.
- [ii] UK High Commissioner to Australia telegram, 28 April 1954, TNA, KV 2/3443, serial 171c.
- [iii] Michael Bialogulski, The Petrov Story (London: William Heinemann, 1955).
- [iv] Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, “The Petrovs’ Own Story,” published serially in The Sun (Sydney) from 17 September to 7 October 1955, and in the Sydney Morning Herald from 17 September to 13 October 1955.
- [v] Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, Empire of Fear (London: André Deutsch, 1956), pp. 343-344.
- [vi] Michael Thwaites, Truth Will Out: ASIO and the Petrovs (Sydney: Collins, 1980).
- [vii] Robert Manne, The Petrov Affair: Politics and Espionage (Sydney; New York: Pergamon, 1987).
- [viii] Wilhelm Agrell, Fru Petrovas sko: en rysk spiontragedi i 50-talets Australien (Mrs. Petrova's Shoe: A Russian Spy Tragedy in 50s Australia) (Stockholm: Bokförlaget Atlantis, 2014).
- [ix] Petrov and Petrov, Empire of Fear, p. 28.
- [x] Petrov and Petrov, Empire of Fear, p. 39.
- [xi] Petrov and Petrov, Empire of Fear, p. 51.
- [xii] Statement by Petrov to the Royal Commission on Espionage, 2 June 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 115.
- [xiii] Petrov and Petrov, Empire of Fear, pp. 54-55.
- [xiv] Petrov and Petrov, Empire of Fear, p.p 57-58.
- [xv] Petrov and Petrov, Empire of Fear, p. 75.
- [xvi] Petrov and Petrov, Empire of Fear, p. 59-66.
- [xvii] “Указ Президиума ВС СССР,” 19.10.1938 (“Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces,” 10 October 1938), Кадровый Состав Органов Государственной Безопасности СССР, 1935-1939 (Staff Personnel of the Organs of USSR State Security, 1935-1939), https://nkvd.memo.ru/index.php/Документ:Указ_Президиума_ВС_СССР_от_19.10.1938.
- [xviii] “Report on the Background History of Evdokia Alexeyevna Petrova,” 2 July 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 130-142.
- [xix] Petrov and Petrov, Empire of Fear, p. 112.
- [xx] “Приказ НКВД СССР № 885,” 21.04.1939 (“Order of the USSR NKVD No. 885,” 21 April 1939), Кадровый Состав Органов Государственной Безопасности СССР, 1935-1939 (Staff Personnel of the Organs of USSR State Security, 1935-1939), https://nkvd.memo.ru/index.php/Документ:Приказ_НКВД_СССР_№_885_от_21.04.1939.
- [xxi] “Mrs. Petrov’s Statement Concerning Her Past Intelligence History,” 15 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 37-41; also in TNA, KV 5/107, serial 96a; an extract also in TNA, KV 5/83, serial 99a.
- [xxii] Petrov and Petrov, Empire of Fear, pp. 138-139.
- [xxiii] Petrov and Petrov, Empire of Fear, pp. 142-147.
- [xxiv] Petrov and Petrova, Empire of Fear, p. 155.
- [xxv] ASIO Report, “S.K. Functions of the State Security Service,”25 January 1955, NAA, A6283, folder 16, item number 4104677, pp. 172-196.
- [xxvi] Petrov and Petrov, Empire of Fear, pp. 157-170.
- [xxvii] Surveillance report, 29 August 1945, Säkerhetspolisen, P5279, löp. nr. 1, p. 1.
- [xxviii] Security Police memo, 4 May 1946, Säkerhetspolisen, P5279, löp. nr. 2, p. 7.
- [xxix] Security Police memo, 19 November 1946, Säkerhetspolisen, P5279, löp. nr. 2, p. 8.
- [xxx] Security Police memo, 22 April 1947, Säkerhetspolisen, P5279, löp. nr. 2,
- [xxxi] SIS report on Activities of Soviet Legation in Stockholm, 8 May 1946, KV 2/3439, serial 1a; Report on Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov, 9 November 1950, TNA, KV 2/3439, serial 4a.
- [xxxii] SIS telegram to SLO Australia, 8 November 1950, KV 2/3429, serial 3a, 4a.
- [xxxiii] ASIO minute, 17 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 88.
- [xxxiv] State Police memo 30 June 1947, Säkerhetspolisen, P5279, löp. nr. 2, pp. 40-41.
- [xxxv] Petrov and Petrov, Empire of Fear, pp. 199-200.
- [xxxvi] Petrov and Petrov, Empire of Fear, pp. 176-183.
- [xxxvii] Petrov and Petrov, Empire of Fear, pp. 183-185.
- [xxxviii] “Soviet State Security Service Foreign Intelligence Operational Techniques (“Legal” Residency System), 18 May 1955, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 144.
- [xxxix] “RIS Penetration of Foreign Security Services,” 20 May 1955, A6283, folder 9, item number 4199156, pp. 150-152.
- [xl] ASIO Report, “The Committee of Information (‘KI’), 1947 – 1951,” 17 November 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 16, item number4104677, pp. 1-25.
- [xli] Extract from ASIO source report, 8 August 1951, NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 38.
- [xlii] ASIO investigative summary, 15 April 1952, NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 98.
- [xliii] Extract from ASIO source report, 21 October 1952, NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 216.
- [xliv] Office of the High Commissioner of the UK in Australia letter to MI5, 11 March 1952, TNA, K 2/3439, serial 11a.
- [xlv] Australian surveillance and agent reports regarding Petrov, 1950 to 1954, are in NAA, A6119, volumes 1-5.
- [xlvi] Extract from ASIO source report, 13 November 1951, NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 52.
- [xlvii] Handwritten memo, 14 February 1952, NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 73.
- [xlviii] Extract from ASIO source report, 10 March 1952, NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 93.
- [xlix] ASIO investigative summary, 15 April 1952, NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 98.
- [l] ASIO investigative summary, undated but late 1952, NAA, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serial 46.
- [li] Extract from ASIO source report, 7 June 1952 NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 112.
- [lii] ASIO investigative summary, 8 May 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serial 224.
- [liii] ASIO investigative memo, 3 December 1951, NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 65.
- [liv] Extract from ASIO source report, 23 February 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serial 70.
- [lv] Extract from ASIO source report, 8 May 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serial 223.
- [lvi] Extract from ASIO source report, 22 May 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serial 255.
- [lvii] Extract from ASIO source report, 22 May 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serial 254.
- [lviii] ASIO investigative reports, NAA, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serials 201, 202, 209, 210, 211, 215.
- [lix] ASIO nvestigative reports, NAA, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serials 212, 213, 232.
- [lx] Extract from ASIO source report, 8 May 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serial 227.
- [lxi] Extract from ASIO source report, 8 May 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serial 222.
- [lxii] Extract from ASIO source report, 8 May 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serial 229.
- [lxiii] Extract from ASIO source report, 20 May 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serial 249.
- [lxiv] Extract from ASIO source report, 21 May 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serial 251
- [lxv] Extract from ASIO source report, 30 June to 13 July 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 9, item number 12077931, serials 22, 36, 37.
- [lxvi] SIS telegrams, 9 July 1953 and 13 July 1953, TNA, KV 2/3439, serials 22a and 25a.
- [lxvii] SIS telegram from Canberra to London, 20 July 1953, TNA, KV 2/3439, serial 37a.
- [lxviii] ASIO investigative memo, 20 and 22 July 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 9, item number 12077931, serials 84, 85.
- [lxix] ASIO investigative memo, 11 August 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 9, item number 12077931, serial 126.
- [lxx] “Defection of Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov @ Proletarski, and Evdokia Alexeevna Petrova @ Kartseva,” undated but probably November 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 15, item number 4104676, pp. 148-149. See also SIS telegram from Canberra to London, 17 July 1953, TNA, KV 2/3438, serial 35a.
- [lxxi] Extract from ASIO source report, 30 September 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 9, item number 12077931, serial 165.
- [lxxii] “Statement of V. M. Petrov,” 5 July 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 147-150.
- [lxxiii] “Interview with Petrov at Safe House Commencing Tuesday, 6.4.54,” 6 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 51.
- [lxxiv] “The Year 1953,” 12 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 127; duplicate in NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 30.
- [lxxv] SIS letter, 8 February 1954, TNA, KV 2/3439, serial 66a.
- [lxxvi] “The Year 1953,” 12 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 127; duplicate in NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 30.
- [lxxvii] Petrov and Petrov, Empire of Fear, pp. 251-252.
- [lxxviii] “Statement of V. M. Petrov,” 5 July 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 147-150.
- [lxxix] Statement of Evdokija Alekseevna Petrov, 22 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 51-54; duplicate pp. 116-119..
- [lxxx] Statement by Petrova, 22 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 50.
- [lxxxi] “Copy of Statement in the Handwriting of Mrs. Petrov Setting Out the Reasons for Her Departure,” 7 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 55-56; duplicate a pp. 112-123; “Exhibit 63,” NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 58.
- [lxxxii] “Soviet Diplomatic Couriers,” 18 April 1955, NAA, A6283, folder 9, item number 4199156, pp. 108-112.
- [lxxxiii] Extract from ASIO source report, 29 August 1951, NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 15. “Meer Israilevitch Neplokh,” 15 June 1955, NAA, A6283 , folder 11, item number 4199158, pp. 38-39.
- [lxxxiv] ASIO Investigative memo, 11 February 1952, NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 70.
- [lxxxv] Extract from ASIO source report, 12 November 1951, NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 41.
- [lxxxvi] ASIO investigative memo, 6 September 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 11, item number 4199158, p. 7.
- [lxxxvii] “Interview with V. Petrov by [redacted] on Monday, 24th May, 1954: Re Lisenko and Major Prokopenko, New Zealand Personalities,” NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, pp. 72-72.
- [lxxxviii] Military Intelligence report, 3 July 1952, NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 109.
- [lxxxix] Statement by Petrova re Zosare, 17 January 1955, NAA A6283, folder 16, item number 4104677, p. 142.
- [xc] “Petrov’s Written Statement, 15 May, 1954,” NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, pp. 79-81; Statement by Petrov to the Royal Commission on Espionage, 31 May 1954, pp 103-113.
- [xci] “Statement of V. M. Petrov re Clarification of Matters Relating to Statement re Gunars Ritenbergs,” 30 September 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 15, item number 4104676, pp. 61-62.
- [xcii] “Statement of Mrs. E. A. Petrov Concerning Bundalis,”18 August 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 172-174.
- [xciii] Statement of Petrov about Nikolay Kirillovich Novikov, 8 December 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 16, item number 4104677, pp. 85-86.
- [xciv] “Translation and Interpretation – Document C.5,” 12 March 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 9.
- [xcv] “The Year 1953,” 12 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 124; MGB telegram, 2 January 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 4.
- [xcvi] “Translation and Interpretation – Document D.15.,” 6 June 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 15.
- [xcvii] “Interview with Petrov at Safe House Commencing Tuesday, 6th April, 1954,” NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, pp. 54, 59.
- [xcviii] Statement of Petrov re Jean Ferguson, 4 February 1955, NAA, A6283, item number 4104677, pp. 205-210; extract from ASIO source report, 12 November 1951, NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 42.
- [xcix] “Interview with Petrov at Safe House Commencing Tuesday, 6.4.54,” 6 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 36.
- [c] “Interview with Petrov at Safe House Commencing Tuesday, 6.4.54,” 6 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 35; “Interview with Petrov at Safe House Commencing Tuesday, 6th April, 1954,” NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 55.
- [ci] Extract from ASIO source report, 1 April 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serials 118, 119; extract from ASIO source report, 23 October 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 9, item number 12077931, serial 181.
- [cii] “Statement by Mr. V. M. Petrov re Payment of Money to Vic Williams for the Purpose of Assisting Him to Visit the Soviet Union,” 24 August 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 193-197.
- [ciii] “Statement of V. M. Petrov re: J. B. Miles,” 14 August 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 177-178.
- [civ] Petrov statement, undated, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 155.
- [cv] Petrov statement, 12 September 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 155, pp. 212-214.
- [cvi] “Unaware Soviet Embassy Helped to Finance Trip to Moscow,” Morning Bulletin (Rockhampton, Australia), 23 July 1954, p. 1.
- [cvii] Extract from ASIO source report, NAA, 21 April 1953, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serial 159.
- [cviii] Petrov statement, 17 August 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 184-187.
- [cix] Statements by Petrov and Petrova, August 1954 and 12 September 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 198-202, 222-226.
- [cx] Stuart Macintyre, ed., Australian Dictionary of Biography, Volume 16, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2002), pp. 217-218.
- [cxi] ASIO memo, 14 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 96.
- [cxii] “Soviet State Security Service Foreign Intelligence Operational Techniques (“Legal” Residency System), 18 May 1955, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 144.
- [cxiii] ASIO memo, 14 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 96.
- [cxiv] “Soviet State Security Service Foreign Intelligence Operational Techniques (“Legal” Residency System), 18 May 1955, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 140, 144.
- [cxv] “Soviet State Security Service Foreign Intelligence Operational Techniques (“Legal” Residency System), 18 May 1955, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 143.
- [cxvi] “Soviet State Security Service Foreign Intelligence Operational Techniques (“Legal” Residency System), 18 May 1955, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 130, 141.
- [cxvii] “Interview with Petrov at Safe House Commencing Tuesday, 6th April, 1954,” NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 60.
- [cxviii] Petrov statement, 17 August 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 182-183.
- [cxix] “Soviet State Security Service Foreign Intelligence Operational Techniques (“Legal” Residency System), 18 May 1955, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 130, 141.
- [cxx] MGB telegram, 2 January 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 7; MGB telegram, 2 January 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 1, 3.
- [cxxi] MGB telegram, 6 June 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 5.
- [cxxii] Index of Personal Code Names, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 123-126; Memo “Code-names,” TNA, KV 5/107, serial 14a? (probably 104a), 20 September 1954.
- [cxxiii] ASIO investigative memo, “Photographic Equipment – Petrov, 14 May 1954, NAA, A6119, folder 11, item number 12122661, p. 29; ASIO memo, 11 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 98.
- [cxxiv] ASIO memo, 12 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 91.
- [cxxv] MGB telegram to Canberra, 6 June 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 18-19.
- [cxxvi] MGB telegram to Canberra, 2 January 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 7; MGB telegram, 2 January 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 1, 3; Statement of Petrov, 8 December 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 16, item 4104677, pp. 87-88.
- [cxxvii] “Soviet State Security Service Foreign Intelligence Operational Techniques (“Legal” Residency System), 18 May 1955, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, pp. 129-149.
- [cxxviii] MGB telegram to Canberra, 2 January 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 4-5; “Interview with Petrov at Safe House Commencing Tuesday, 6th April 1954,” NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 53; ASIO memo, 7 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 71; duplicate in NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 18.
- [cxxix] Extract from ASIO source report, 21 July 1952 NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 149
- [cxxx] ASIO memo, 13 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 94; Statement by Petrov and Petrova to the Royal Commission on Espionage, 20 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, pp. 117-118; duplicate in NAA A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 45-46; “Royal Commission on Espionage,” 3 June 1954, NAA A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 81.
- [cxxxi] Statement by Petrov, 8 December 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 16, item number 4104677, pp. 103-104.
- [cxxxii] Letter from Moscow to Canberra, 2 January 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 3; “Interview with Petrov at Safe House Commencing Tuesday, 6.4.54,” 6 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 52.
- [cxxxiii] Commonwealth of Australia minute, 18 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 78.
- [cxxxiv] “Statement of V. Petrov: Richard (Ric) Throssell,” 21 May 1954, NAA. A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 79-80.
- [cxxxv] “Richard Prichard Throssell or “FERRO,” 28 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 102; duplicate in NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 70.
- [cxxxvi] “The Year 1953,” 12 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 124.
- [cxxxvii] “Translation and Interpretation of Document D.16.,” 6 June 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 16.
- [cxxxviii] “Statement of V. M. Petrov re Herbert Stanley North,” 1 October 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 15, item number 4104676, p. 66.
- [cxxxix] “Interview with Petrov at Safe House Commencing Tuesday, 6.4.54,” 6 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 41.
- [cxl] M.G.L. Dunn, The Royal Commission on Espionage, 1954-1955, PhD thesis, University of Adelaide, December 1979, pp. 183-184.
- [cxli] “Interview with Petrov at Safe House Commencing Tuesday, 6th April, 1954,” NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, pp. 65-67.
- [cxlii] Statement of Petrova on Ian Milner, 22 November 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 16, item number 4104677, pp. 56-57.
- [cxliii] “Ian Milner, or ‘BUR’,” 27 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 69; Petrova statement, 14 September 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 251-255.
- [cxliv] ASIO memo, 27 September 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 22.
- [cxlv] MGB telegram to Canberra, 6 June 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 5.
- [cxlvi] ASIO investigative memo, 13 April 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serial 154.
- [cxlvii] Statement by Petrova, 12 September 1954, NAA. A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 220-221.
- [cxlviii] “Translation and Interpretation – Document A.17.,” 27 September 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 22.
- [cxlix] ASIO memo, 7 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 71; duplicate in NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 18.
- [cl] Statement by Petrov, 16 November 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 15, item number 4104676, p. 183.
- [cli] “Statement of V. Petrov: George Legge: Code Name “RIBAK,” NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 74-75; duplicate in NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 35-36; “Interview with Petrov at Safe House Commencing Tuesday, 6.4.54,” 6 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 41. The work RIBAK means fisherman, and many have been assigned based on Shorokhov’s fishing trips with Legge.
- [clii] Statement by Petrova, 2 October 1954, NAA A6283, folder 15, item number 4104676, pp. 120-121.
- [cliii] Statement by Petrova, 14 October 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 15, item number 4104676, p. 80.
- [cliv] Moscow instructions to Canberra, 2 January 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 1, 2.
- [clv] “Statement by Mrs. E. A. Petrova re Madame Ollier – Code name ‘OLGA’,” 22 June 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 102-108.
- [clvi] “Translation and Interpretation of Document E.12.,” 6 June 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, pp. 12-13.
- [clvii] “Interview with Mr. and Mrs. Petrov re Madame Ollier, Code Name ‘Olga’,” 24 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, pp. 119-122; duplicate in NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 63-66.
- [clviii] ASIO investigative report, 4 and 5 January 1954, NAA, A6117, folder 9, item number 12077931, serial 81, 82.; ASIO investigative report, 25 January 1954, NAA, A6117, folder 9, item number 12077931, serial 109; ASIO minute, 5 January 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, pp. 144-147.
- [clix] Royal Commission on Espionage report, 19 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 100; Royal Commission on Espionage: “Further Interview with Petrov re Madame Ollier, Code Name ‘OLGA’,” NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 97.
- [clx] “Interview with Petrov at Safe House Commencing Tuesday, 6.4.54,” 6 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 44.
- [clxi] Translations of French press articles regarding Ollier are in NAA, A6283, folder 9, item number 4199156, pp. 55-70.
- [clxii] ASIO memo, 13 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 94; “Questions Raised by Mr. Richards About Burgess and Maclean,” 6 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 33; ASIO memo, 13 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, pp. 93-94. See also SIS telegrams from Canberra to London, 7 and 9 April 1954, TNA, KV 2/3440, serials 74a and 85a.
- [clxiii] “Soviet State Security Service Foreign Intelligence Operational Techniques (“Legal” Residency System), 18 May 1955, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 144.
- [clxiv] “The Year 1953,” 12 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 124; “Translation and Interpretation – Document E.9.,” 6 June 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 21.
- [clxv] ASIO memo, 13 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 93; Statement by Petrova, 12 September 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 215-217.
- [clxvi] Statement by Petrov, 12 August 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 238-249.
- [clxvii] Statement by Petrov to the Royal Commission on Espionage, undated, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 116.
- [clxviii] ASIO memo, 13 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 93.
- [clxix] “Interview with Petrov at Safe House Commencing Tuesday, 6.4.54,” 6 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 50.
- [clxx] ASIO memo, 12 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 92.
- [clxxi] “The Year 1953,” 12 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, pp. 123-124
- [clxxii] “Soviet State Security Service Foreign Intelligence Operational Techniques (“Legal” Residency System), 18 May 1955, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 133.
- [clxxiii] Excerpt from ASIO report, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 76.
- [clxxiv] Excerpt from ASIO report, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 76.
- [clxxv] Statement of Petrova, 24 August 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 192
- [clxxvi] “Interview with Petrov at Safe House Commencing Tuesday, 6th April, 1954,” NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, pp. 55-56.
- [clxxvii] “Statement of V. Petrov Regarding Leakage of Information from ASIO,” 23 August 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 188-191.
- [clxxviii] NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 3, letter from Moscow to Canberra, 2 January 1952; the Russian language version of the letter is in NAA, A6202, file B, item number 11184729.
- [clxxix] “Interview with Petrov at Safe House Commencing Tuesday, 6.4.54,” 6 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 45.
- [clxxx] “Translation and Interpretation – Document D.16.,” 6 June 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 16.
- [clxxxi] Statement by Petrov, 12 August 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 238-249.
- [clxxxii] Statements by Petrov and Petrova re Mary Ellen Casper Lewis, 10 and 12 January 1955, NAA, A6283, folder 16, item number 4104677, p. 122.
- [clxxxiii] ASIO memo, 10 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 89.
- [clxxxiv] Statements by Petrov and Petrova, 31 August 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 205-206.
- [clxxxv] Robert Manne, The Petrov Affair: Politics and Espionage (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2014), p. 13.
- [clxxxvi] Statements by Petrov and Petrova, 31 August 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 209-211.
- [clxxxvii] Statement by Petrov, 12 August 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 238-249
- [clxxxviii] NAA, A6202, item number 11482554. See NAA, A6283, folder 46, item number 273896 for an ASIO analysis of the document, along with a summary of all of the sources cited.
- [clxxxix] ASIO minute paper, 19 September 1956, NAA, A6283, folder 47, item number 273911.
- [cxc] “Activities of Rupert Lockwood, ‘WARREN’,” 25 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 67; Royal Commission on Espionage report, 2 June 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 75; Royal Commission on Espionage report, 10 June 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4106475, p. 90. The ASIO spelling of Lockwood’s code name as “WARREN” was a mistaken transcription of the Russian code name VORON (raven).
- [cxci] “Operation Cabin 12,” 11 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 15.
- [cxcii] ASIO memo, 12 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 99; duplicate in NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 34. The U.S. VENONA decryption program had identified the code word ENORMOZ at least by the late 1940s as referring to the U.S. Manhattan Project. Kartseva remembered the same code word as describing the equivalent Australian program.
- [cxciii] “Memorandum for Counsel,” 9 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder number 14, item number 4104675, p. 24.
- [cxciv] “Liaison Between the Soviet and Chinese State Security Services,” 29 March 1955, NAA, A6283, folder 9, item number 4199156 p. 54.
- [cxcv] “Liaison Between the Soviet and Chinese State Security Services,” 29 March 1955, NAA, A6283, folder 9, item number 4199156 pp. 51-54.
- [cxcvi] MGB telegram to Canberra, 6 June 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 10.
- [cxcvii] ASIO memo, 7 May 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 71; duplicate in NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 18.
- [cxcviii] Extract from ASIO source report, 12 and 21 July 1952, NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 148, 150.
- [cxcix] Extract from ASIO source report, 21 October 1952, NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 215.
- [cc] Extract from ASIO source report, 13 March and 1 April 1953, NAA, A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serials 100, 118.
- [cci] Statement by Petrova, 8 September 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 218.
- [ccii] Petrov statement, 30 September 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 15, item number 4104676, p. 57.
- [cciii] “Liaison Between the Soviet and Chinese State Security Services,” 29 March 1955, NAA, A6283, folder 9, item number 4199156 p. 54.
- [cciv] Statement by Petrov, 12 August 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, pp. 238-249; Statement by Petrov, 18 October 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 15, item number 4104676, p. 104.
- [ccv] ASIO memo, 12 April 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 92.
- [ccvi] Statement by Petrova, 13 October 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 15, item number 4104676, pp, 78-79.
- [ccvii] “Deceived the Soviet: Czech Had Mission in Australia,” Barrier Miner (Broken Hill, New South Wales), 20 October 1954, p. 1
- [ccviii] Petrov’s biography of Kislitsyn, 17 April 1954, NAA, A6122, Folder 13, item number 11980357, serial 115-116. See also SIS telegram from Canberra to London, 7 April 1954, TNA, 2/3440, serial 75a, in which SIS recommended that ASIO consider inducing Kislitsyn’s defection because of his knowledge of Burgess and MacLean.
- [ccix] English translation of letter from Petrov to Kislitsyn, 17 April 1954, NAA, A6122, Folder 13, item number 11980357, serial 113. See also text of Australian government diplomatic note to Soviet government refuting Soviet allegations of kidnapping, 25 April 1954, TNA, KV 2/3441, serial 16a. The text of the Soviet diplomatic note leveling the accusations, 23 April 1954, is at serial 10a.
- [ccx] Names of Australian citizens whom the ASIO planned to investigate, NAA, A6122, Folder 13, item number 11980357, pp. 120-122.
- [ccxi] “Defection of Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov @ Proletarski, and Evdokia Alexeevna Petrova @ Kartseva,” undated but probably November 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 15, item number 4104676, pp. 132-154.
- [ccxii] Extract from ASIO source report, 22 February 1952, NAA, A6117, folder 7, Item number 12037437, serial 84.
- [ccxiii] MGB telegram to Canberra, 6 June 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, p. 11.
- [ccxiv] “Defection of Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov @ Proletarski, and Evdokia Alexeevna Petrova @ Kartseva,” undated but probably November 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 15, item number 4104676, p. 136.
- [ccxv] “Defection of Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov @ Proletarski, and Evdokia Alexeevna Petrova @ Kartseva,” undated but probably November 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 15, item number 4104676, p. 135.
- [ccxvi] Telegram from Igor Gouzenko, 15 April 1954, NAA, A6122, Folder 13, item number 11980357, p. 106.
- [ccxvii] ASIO memo, 22 March 1955, NAA, A6283, folder 9, item number 4199156, p. 48; ASIO memo, 14 September 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, p. 250.
- [ccxviii] Letter from Petrov to Orlov, 12 September 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 11, item number 4199158, pp. 13-14.
- [ccxix] Letter from Petrov to Alexander Orlov, 23 May 1955, A6283, folder 9, item number 4199156, p. 153
- [ccxx] “Interview with Petrov,” TNA, FO 371/122940.
- [ccxxi] “KGB Wanted List," Entry numbers 456 (Shorokhov) and 241 (Kartseva), HIA, Vladislav Krasnov Writings file. Krasnov misidentifies Shorokhov and Kartseva as being among those who were not listed in the KGB Wanted List because neither is listed with the name Petrov; see Krasnov, p. 180. However, Shorohkov is listed under the name Proletarskiy and Kartseva is listed as Kartseva.
- [ccxxii] ASIO letter to the Department of Immigration, 23 October 1964, NAA, A7452, A338, item number 6930355.
- [ccxxiii] “Summary of Developments since January 1965,” NAA, A7452, A338, item number 6930355, pp. 31-32.
Published works
- Empire of Fear (New York: Praeger
- 1956)
- (London: André Deutsch
- 1956).