Intelligence and state security officers who left Soviet serviceCompiled by Kevin Riehle

Entry 116 of 121 · revised 2026-11-22

Nikolay Yevgenyevich Khokhlov

Николай Евгеньевич Хохлов

Biography

Nikolay Yevgenyevich Khokhlov[i] began his career as a young idealist during World War II. He gained prominence as a covert operator during the war and was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War for his exploits. He was even the prototype for the protagonist of a post-war Soviet spy movie. But when exposed to Western culture and ways, he became disenchanted with the Soviet system and attempted to resign from the MGB. He was never allowed to resign, so he remained in the West after refusing to fulfill a mission to assassinate an anti-Soviet activist. He rejected the label “defector,” because he claimed that was prepared to return to the Soviet Union to be with his family. However, the risk of returning was too high after he contacted the assassination target and asked for assistance.

Information about Khokhlov comes primarily from his press conferences, debriefings, testimony before the U.S. Congress, and autobiographical writings. Debriefings of his German assistants also provide collaboration for his story, which American debriefers initially disbelieved, but later came to accept. His first published stories appeared in November 1954, ten months after his defection, in the Saturday Evening Post.[ii] This story was published in the UK and in Germany over the following several months. Then in 1957, he published his first full-length book, Право на Совесть (The Right to Conscience),[iii] which was published in English in 1959 as In the Name of Conscience.[iv] He appeared before the U.S. Senate in 1954 and the U.S. House of Representatives in 1956.

Khokhlov was born in June 1922 in Gorkiy (Nizhniy Novgorod). His father was an old Bolshevik who boasted of having met Lenin in person, and Khokhlov looked up to him as a man who was willing to work for a cause larger than himself.[v] But Khokhlov’s parents divorced when he was six years old and he remained with his mother and her new husband, seldom seeing his father until he finished secondary school in 1940. In the early 1930s both his real father and his stepfather moved to Moscow. Khokhlov joined the Komsomol in 1938. He did not feel the same respect for his stepfather as he did for his birth father, causing him to become increasing discord with his mother.

Khokhlov and his mother disagreed on his future, with his mother planning for him to study to become a lawyer, like his stepfather, or an engineer or teacher. Khokhlov’s own aspiration, however, was for show business. He had participated in plays in school and grew to love the stage, and after school he applied for the Moscow Institute of Cinematography against his mother’s wishes. However, he failed to pass the entrance exam, leaving him the choice to apply to another institute or reapply for the cinematography institute the following year. He chose the latter, and in the interim joined a traveling vaudeville group, leading to a final break with his mother and prompting him to move in with his father. His specialty was whistling, a popular performance genre in 1930s Russia. He traveled with the performing group until the war, when both his father and stepfather volunteered for the Army. His father was a regimental commissar during the war, but eventually died in a penal battalion, to which he had been sentenced for expressing anti-Soviet views.[vi]

Khokhlov’s eyesight prevented him from following their example, but he joined a paramilitary “destroyer battalion” (“истребительный батальон”), which was made up of volunteers who maintained civil order in the rear area and protected the city against German saboteurs and parachutists. While he was training with his battalion, he received a letter assigning him to duty as an actor in a propaganda movie, and in August 1941 he left with a special theater group to Ulyanovsk to shoot the film.[vii]

When he returned to Moscow, he was summoned to an NKVD office and given a new assignment: he was to join a performing group that would stay behind in Moscow if the Germans overran the city and conduct sabotage against German occupiers. The performing group consisted of four people, two women and two men, who traveled around the front lines performing for troops. But by autumn of 1941, it appeared that Moscow would survive the German advances and the theater group was never called into action.

The leader of the “performing-intelligence brigade” was an actor, Sergey Palnikov. One of the women was Taisya Ignatova, a singer who became Khokhlov’s girlfriend. Ignatova was killed in October 1944, presumably in wartime operations.[viii] Khokhlov referred in his writings to the other woman with the false name Nina “the juggler” Meshcheryakova,[ix] but her real name was Yuliya Aleksandrovna Zapolskaya, a singer who reentered Khokhlov’s life after his defection. In a strange coincidence, Zapolskaya’s mother’s maiden name was Khokhlovkina, very similar to Khokhlov.[x] Zapolskaya married Associated Press correspondent Thomas Whitney in 1945 and immigrated to the United States in 1953. She and her husband were living in New York City in 1954. The FBI interviewed Zapolskaya about Khokhlov on 23 April 1954, the day after Khokhlov’s press conference in Germany in which he referred to her,[xi] and she recalled Khokhlov’s status as an NKVD officer while they worked together in the performing group.[xii] She also told the FBI that Ignatova’s death had left Khokhlov embittered. Khokhlov contacted Zapolskaya in August 1954 and apologized for what he characterized as a misquote about her from his press conference.[xiii]

The concept for he NKVD-sponsored performing group came from Mikhail Borisovich Maklyarskiy, a career Soviet intelligence officer who became a Soviet film writer after the war.[xiv] In 1947, Maklyarskiy wrote the script for a movie titled Подвиг разведчика (Exploits of an Intelligence Officer), in which a Soviet intelligence officer sneaks behind German lines to steal the correspondence of a high-ranking Nazi general with Hitler.[xv] Khokhlov, who worked for Maklyarskiy in this position and for the next several years, was believed to be the prototype for the movie’s protagonist.

Khokhlov wrote that on New Year’s Eve 1941-1942 he met Lieutenant General Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov, who led the NKVD section that ran sabotage-intelligence operations against German forces. According to Khokhlov, Sudoplatov informed him that the performance group would be disbanded and personally gave him his next assignment: to become an illegal in Germany. Sudoplatov explained that Khokhlov would be sent to Georgia, where there was a community of German ethnic settlers from the eighteenth century who maintained their German language and culture. His initial mission would be live in that community and become acculturated as a German. He had taken four years of German language in school, and his blonde hair and blue eyes helped him to pass as a German. After spending time with the German ethic community, he would then cross into Turkey, get himself caught by Turkish authorities, and demand to be repatriated to Germany, where he would make contact with Soviet agents and begin his assignment behind German lines. He later claimed to have learned that this mission was to also include an attempt to assassinate the German ambassador to Turkey, Franz von Papen. However, the NKVD agents in Turkey with whom Khokhlov was to work were arrested after an attempt was made on von Papen’s life in February 1942.[xvi]

He traveled to Georgia for the first phase of the operation; however, he fell ill with typhoid fever and was unconscious for several weeks.[xvii] Sudoplatov, who Khokhlov indicated had “conclusively gotten used to the idea that I should become a German, wear a Nazi uniform, and be sent into the rear of the fascist forces,”[xviii] gave him a new mission to prepare to play the role of a German officer. From July 1942 to August 1943, Khokhlov underwent training to become a Soviet illegal. He was trained in German language and culture; clandestine radio communications and codes; using weapons and bombs; and parachute jumping. He also spent a month during his training at a Soviet camp for German POWs, where he lived among the German prisoners to test whether he could convincingly live among Germans.

At the end of the training, he was dispatched into German-occupied Soviet territory supporting sabotage and intelligence operations. He organized the successful explosion of a tank repair shop in the German rear and collected intelligence on German military forces throughout German-held territory. The operation for which he became best known was an operation to assassinate the German Nazi Party official in Belarus, Wilhelm Kube, in September 1942.[xix]

After Khokhov’s defection, the FBI developed doubts about his bona fides, and one of the elements of his story that the FBI suspected as questionable was his claim to have participate in Kube’s assassination. Significant confusion surrounds Kube’s assassination, partly because, according to Belarusian historian Emmanuil Grigoryevich Ioffe, Moscow had assigned twelve different sabotage groups to assassinate Kube.[xx] Khokhlov claimed to have recruited a young woman who worked as maid for Kube to place a bomb under his bed while he was sleeping.[xxi] The FBI received a May 1954 article about Kube’s assassination from the Russian émigré newspaper Novoe Russkoe Slovo, which claimed Khokhlov’s version of the story was false, but provided two other possible versions, much of which corresponded with Khokhlov’s version.[xxii]

In early 1945, Sudoplatov contacted Khokhlov and gave him his next assignment: he was to travel to Romania posing as a Stanislaw Lewandowski, a Polish refugee. He arrived in Bucharest in April 1945. Sudoplatov explained his mission: “In the next war, which could begin unexpectedly, we may have to expand our partisan activities. In that event, we might put you in charge of a partisan detachment. At any rate you should be useful in the countries we’re turning into people’s democracies, such as Rumania, or possibly in Western Europe. We may leave you in deep cover for several months or maybe several years. Meanwhile, you will learn the ways of the West.”[xxiii]

Khokhlov established himself in Bucharest as and opened a small radio appliance shop. He operated the shop while learning Romanian customs and culture. He provided little information publicly about his mission in Romania, except to say that he organized a chain of partisan activities in preparation for the outbreak of another war.[xxiv] After a year in Romania, Khokhlov’s false Polish passport was reaching its expiration date, and he needed to find a way to have it extended. He hesitated to approach the Polish consulate, realizing that his Polish refugee legend was shallow and he did not speak Polish well. His MGB contact in Romania recommended that he marry a Romanian girl, because that would allow him to immediately begin the process of receiving Romanian naturalization. So he arranged to marry his landlady’s younger sister, explaining to her his residency problem, and she agreed. They were married in 1946.

Khokhlov’s legend included posing as an anti-communist, and to maintain that legend he listened to BBC and the Voice of America, through which he began to see the effects of communism on the Romanian state. He wrote, “During my four years in Bucharest, I saw the deadly origins of a new communist state and was finally revolted. There I watched the progressive wrecking of a free country at the hands of my own leaders.” His experience in Romania sewed the seeds of doubt in his belief in the Soviet system that led to his eventual defection.[xxv]

The path that led to Khokhlov’s recruitment as an NKVD illegal corresponds closely to the paths that other defectors described. Khokhlov claimed that his dispatch to Romania was part of an internal political decision within the Soviet Union to retain a sabotage and diversionary element within the MGB in peacetime. The MGB decided to redirect the element from conducting operations behind enemy lines during wartime to emplacing agents to be prepared for operations in the next war. This became known as Special Bureau Number 1, changed to the Ninth Department in 1953, which sent agents outside the Soviet Union to become familiar with language, customs, politics, and infrastructure. The program began with agents in Soviet satellite countries, including Romania, Poland Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. In 1951, it was extended into Austria, West Germany, and Denmark, often using East Germans instead of Soviet officers.[xxvi]

Anatoliy Granovskiy (see separate entry in this database), for example, was also trained for operations behind German lines under the Fourth Department of the NKGB. Both Granovskiy and Khokhlov claimed to have met personally with Sudoplatov, who told them they might be assigned abroad for a long period of time to become familiar with Western ways and be in place to run partisan operations in the next war. Both began as seksoty (secret collaborators) and received training in clandestine tradecraft in 1942-1943. Both were in their early 20s—born in the same year, 1922—when they were assigned during the same month—April 1945—as illegals to an Eastern European country to establish partisan networks in preparation for a future war: Granovskiy was assigned to Czechoslovakia and Khokhlov to Romania. The primary difference between them was their personalities. Granovskiy was uncooperative and undisciplined, leading to his reassignment to a less sensitive position in 1946, and eventually to his defection later that year. Khokhlov was obedient and disciplined until his assignment to Romania, where he was exposed to Western philosophies and ways and his faith in the Soviet system began to waver. From his return to Moscow in 1949 until his defection in 1954, he continually tried to be released from his job as an intelligence officer.

After over four years in Romania, Khokhlov returned to Moscow in October 1949. He met with Sudoplatov and his assistant, Leonid Aleksandovich Eitingon, and requested to be relieved from his duties as an intelligence officer. But Sudoplatov and Eitingon ignored his request and began to brief him on his next assignment. When he later raised the request again, Eitingon sharply rebuked him, “You know perfectly well that nobody leaves the intelligence service just like that. We've spent time and money on you, we’ve fussed over you, and now you talk about leaving just when you’re getting useful. It's out of the question.”[xxvii] Khokhlov claims that Soviet intelligence found it difficult to find even a handful of dependable Russians who could operate without suspicion in the free world. He quotes Eitingon as saying, “Of course you can’t quit, Khokhlov. We need men like you who can pass, who can go out of Russia without acting so damnalby Russian.”[xxviii]

It was at this time of Khokhov’s beginning disillusionment that he reignited an acquaintance with a former school friend, Yanina Adamovna Timashkevich, who was working as an engineer in Moscow. He informed her about his job as a Soviet intelligence officer along with his disenchantment, and she supported his desire to resign. The MGB also left him alone for a cooling off period, and in 1950 he enrolled in Moscow State University where he majored in philology.

It was also at this time that he received a formal MGB officer’s rank; up to this point he described himself as an “illegal collaborator,” although he had been send on several full-time intelligence and sabotage missions.[xxix] Khokhlov himself admitted, “Although I was an intelligence officer of MGB, I was seldom called to headquarters. Customarily I met my superiors and colleagues in “safe houses” elsewhere in the city. The MGB preferred to deal with its agents by remote control and in Moscow I was deliberately isolated from office personnel to keep my identity concealed.”[xxx] As of 1950, he was brought into overt status as an MGB officer.

In February 1951, to give him his next assignment to travel through Austria, Germany, France, and Denmark using an Austrian identity and passport. The primary purpose for the mission was to obtain and test genuine Austrian passports.[xxxi] Sudoplatov told him that visiting Denmark was especially important, since Denmark might become a Soviet bridgehead to Western Europe in the event of another war. In March 1951, Khokhlov traveled to Vienna, to Geneva, and then on to France and Denmark to test border and customs requirements. Sudoplatov recalled that Khokhlov traveled to Western Europe several times, and one of the intended purposes the travel was for Khokhlov to become acquainted with a ballerina of who perfomed at the Paris Opera, and who known to associate with American officers and officers at NATO headquarters. Sudoplatov claimed that Khokhlov successfully established a network of intelligence sources and a stay-behind network of sabotage agents to be used if war broke out.[xxxii]

In August, he began his trip back to Moscow, and when he reached the Austrian border, he forgot to declare an accordion that he had bought in Geneva. Customs officials confronted him about the instrument, and he decided to try to use it to his advantage. He refused to pay customs fees, hoping that it would lead to an Austrian investigation and compromise his cover, making him unusable in the future as an illegal. He was taken to Vienna and questioned, but released and returned to Moscow. Sudoplatov and Eitingon scolded him for his carelessness, but did not release him from service.

Khokhlov and Yana formally got married in November 1951, and they settled in their home as a married couple and Khokhlov resumed his studies. In February 1952, Sudoplatov contacted him again with an “important job.” He was to travel with MGB Major Ivanova to Paris, where he would make contact with an old Soviet agent, and through him meet and assassinate a Russian émigré who was “causing trouble.” Khokhlov stated that this task was part of the expansion of the mission of Special Bureau Number 1 from emplacing stay-behind agents to actively organizing sabotage and propaganda operations. Khokhlov resisted and eventually refused the job. British journalist Mary-Kay Wilmers, who was related to Eitingon, learned that the mission was called off at the last minute without Khokhlov ever knowing who the “troublesome” Russian émigré was. The intended target was Alexander Fedorovich Kerensky, Chairman of the provisional Russian government in 1917.[xxxiii] Khokhlov admitted that he could have been arrested for refusing the assignment, but instead the MGB left him alone for a few more months.[xxxiv]

In April 1952, Khokhlov was called again to MGB headquarters and instructed to report to duty in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany; he considered it an exile and he was not given the option to refuse. He arrived in Karlshorst, Germany, in late April and began an assignment as a case officer responsible for recruiting agents among the German population. The eventual goal was to infiltrate the agents into West Germany with instructions to sabotage West German and U.S. forces, rail yards, and military installations in the event of war. He worked with German Communist Party members to identify and vet potential agents. Khokhlov’s claimed that his team in Germany recruited about 20 agents during his time there and dispatched them to Germany and Denmark, and planned to send agents to the Netherlands.[xxxv]

While Khokhlov was in Germany, he was exposed for the first time to the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists (Народно-Трудовой Союз российских солидаристов; NTS) and its publishing arm, Posev. The NTS literature claimed that anti-Soviet émigrés had penetrated into the seemingly impenetrable Soviet Union and were working to overthrow the Soviet system. The realization gave Khokhlov hope that he could leave the Soviet Union and fight the system that he had grown to dislike.

In August 1952, Khokhlov returned on leave to Moscow for the birth of his first son, Aleksandr. While he was in Moscow, he asked for permission for his family to join him in Germany, hoping that he could defect from there. The MGB leadership agreed that after Khokhlov had returned to Germany for a few months and developed a source network, he and his family could be assigned to Switzerland together and he would continue to run the network from there. He returned to Germany in October to begin developing the network. He chose two agents as the foundation of his Swiss network: Kurt Weber and Hans Kukowitsch, whom he later used in his final operation. Khokhlov probably did not know that the U.S. Army CIC had been monitoring Kukowitsch since 1946, was well aware of his clandestine activities in support of the German Communist Party, and suspected him of being a Soviet agent.[xxxvi] In January 1953, Khokhlov traveled to Moscow to report on his progress, only to find out that his wife’s false documents were taking longer than expected. He returned to Berlin with a promise that his wife would arrive in Germany in March.

Then, on 5 March, Stalin died. The MGB reacted by suspending intelligence operations and ordering MGB and MVD officers back to Moscow. The plan for Khokhlov’s family to join him in Germany and eventually to travel to Switzerland was put on hold. In the confusion, Khokhlov decided to ask for a release from service again. Sudoplatov reportedly responded, “Khokhov will be the last man to be released.”[xxxvii] Khokhlov returned to his studies, which he completed in August, and awaited further orders. Then, in September, Khokhlov heard the news that Sudoplatov and Eitingon had been arrested. Wilmers later wrote that, after interviewing Khokhlov, she got the impression that he saw Sudoplatov as a father figure to him and a model intelligence officer. But Sudoplatov remembered Khokhlov chiefly for his protracted attempt to leave the service; his “sniveling,” as Sudoplatov called it.[xxxviii]

In October 1953, Khokhlov learned that he was to be given another assignment, which he received from Sudoplatov’s successor, Colonel Lev Aleksandrovich Studnikov, and that he should choose the best men to join him in it. He chose Weber and Kukowitsch, who knew him as “Josef” while he was in Germany. The mission was called Operation Rhine, and entailed Khokhlov organizing the assassination of Georgiy Sergeyevich Okolovich, a leader of the anti-Soviet émigré organization NTS, about which Khokhov had first heard the previous year when he was in Germany. The assignment was a priority for the Soviet government, because, as Khokhlov learned, the MGB viewed the NTS as a serious threat that had the potential to organize underground cells inside Soviet territory. The MGB had tried twice previously to kidnap Okolovich and his wife and would spare no expense to have him eliminated. Weber and Kukowitsch were taken to Moscow in November 1953, where the person known to then only as “Josef’s chief” told them that their mission was to “render harmless” person who was an enemy of both the Soviet Union and Germany.[xxxix] Khokhlov spent the following several months preparing for the mission, which included obtaining false passports, developing new easily concealable weapons, and training in marksmanship and driving, and rehearsing every detail.[xl] Khokhlov himself was not to perform the assassination, but he was to lead German agents in the operation.

Finally, in January he was dispatched to Frankfurt, Germany, via a circuitous route that passed through Lausanne, Switzerland, for the mission. He copied material from the MGB’s NTS file to hand over and store in Lausanne, in case he could use it as leverage to help rescue his family. He had gone through various scenarios for how he could sabotage the mission. He even considered allowing German agents to perform the assassination and then return to the Soviet Union. However, his wife replied that if he did so, he would be an assassin in fact, and that she could no longer be his wife. In the end, he decided simply to confront Okolovich personally, inform him of the operation, and put himself in Okolovich’s hands for protection. On 20 February 1954, he knocked on Okolovich’s door, introduced himself as a Soviet intelligence officer, and informed him that he had been sent to assassinate Okolovich. But Khokhlov admitted to him that he could not go through with the mission and asked for assistance in making the mission fail so Khokhov could returned to the Soviet Union to be with his family, or so that his family could be exfiltrated from the Soviet Union. Okolovich offered to introduce Khokhlov to Americans who could possibly help.

Khokhlov appears to have truly believed that he could be reunited with his family somehow. But he soon came to realize that it was not likely to happen. Initially, the Americans did not believe his story about Operation Rhine. Then Khokhlov led them to Weber and Kukowitsch, who corroborated his story and produced the specially prepared weapons for the operation. He showed them to the Americans and persuaded them that he was telling the truth about his mission. The Americans then persuaded Kukowitsch and Weber to allow themselves to be taken into custody, and they were held in a U.S. facility for two months for their own safety, while they were also interrogated.[xli]

The Americans promised little assistance in retrieving his wife. However, they offered the plan that Khokhlov would appear in a press conference and make a public appeal for the Soviet Union to allow his wife to emigrate. On 22 April 1954, he spoke to the press and made his appeal. The press conference was broadcast widely and attracted the sympathy of a large viewing audience. However, it ultimately failed: Khokhlov learned in June that his wife had disappeared in Moscow and was in State Security custody.[xlii]

Khokhkov later wrote, “When, at the beginning of February and then in April 1954, one after another of my hopes collapsed, I was ready to blame many people. I blamed the American intelligence service for its myopia and stagnation; the NTS for its ‘indecisiveness’; the West for its powerlessness in the struggle against communism; the press, radio, and television for distorting my ‘story.’ But wasn't I guilty myself for much of what happened? Today I must tell myself soberly and honestly: yes, the guilt lies with me as well.”[xliii]

A few weeks after his press conference, he was flown to the United States and prepared for an appearance before the U.S. Senate. However, Khokhlov’s arrival in the United States was the cause for a strong reaction from the FBI, which had learned of his defection in March.[xliv] The FBI found out that he was scheduled to brief Congress before the FBI had received any interrogation reports or had a chance to interview him. The Congressional briefing was scheduled for 11 May 1954, and the FBI scrambled to arrange an interview earlier on the same day to ask specifically whether Khokhlov had information about Soviet intelligence activities inside the United States.[xlv] On 19 May, J. Edgar Hoover sent a strongly worded letter to CIA Director Allen Dulles, protesting the “irregular and shabby treatment afforded us [the FBI] in this matter.”[xlvi]

Khokhlov appeared before a closed session of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on 11 May. He particularly appealed to the U.S. government for assistance in helping his wife and son to escape the Soviet Union. His public briefing repeated much of the same testimony that he had given in the closed session.

In addition to feeling slighted by the CIA for not being informed about Khokhlov’s Congressional testimony, the FBI received reports from multiple sources claiming that Khokhlov was a false defector. Just after Khokhlov’s 22 April 1954 press conference, an FBI source cautioned the FBI that Khokhlov was a Soviet plant.[xlvii] In May 1954, the FBI asked Leyba Feldbin (Alexander Orlov) for his opinion of Khokhlov’s revelations, despite the fact that Feldbin had had minimal contact with Soviet intelligence for the previous 16 years. Feldbin cast doubt on Khokhlov’s authenticity because of his claim that Beriya’s office was on the first floor of the Lubyanka MVD headquarters. Feldbin claimed that any real MVD officer would know that Beriya’s office was on the third floor, and thus Khokhlov must not be a real MVD officer. He also cast doubt on Khokhlov’s story because Khokhlov claimed that Leonid Eitingon had engineered the kidnapping of White General Aleksandr Pavlovich Kutepov in Paris in 1927—Feldbin posited that Yakov Serebryanskiy had been in charge of that operation.[xlviii] Feldbin’s critique of Khokhlov, calling him a “small man” was similar to his critique of Samuel Ginzberg (Walter Krivitskiy), who Feldbin described as a low-level, uninfluential agent in a FBI interview in October 1954.[xlix] Feldbin similarly cautioned that Khokhlov could be a Soviet plant dispatched to spread disinformation.

Another FBI source gave his opinion in July 1954 that Khokhlov may have been a Soviet plant in the United States to collect information about the operations of U.S. intelligence agencies. The FBI source had received this information third hand through a friend in New York City, who had a friend in Germany, who knew Khokhlov in Germany or the Soviet Union. This source also represented an anti-Soviet émigré group that was in competition with the NTS, and the source similarly cast doubt on the NTS’s capabilities.[l] Unbeknownst to the FBI, Khokhlov was sentenced in absentia to execution on 5 June 1954, and was thus not likely a Soviet plant.[li]

The FBI’s doubts about Khokhlov’s legitimacy were echoed in London, and his defection coincided with the British government’s plan to expel two Soviet military attaches for espionage. The British Prime Minster stated that there was no corroboration for Khokhlov’s claims, and that a proposal for Khokhlov to hold a press conference in the UK would only arouse “anti-Russian hate” at a politically inconvenient time. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office expressed the view that the rush of five MVD defectors in the previous two months could be useful to encourage more defectors, “as despicable as they may be…to undermine the Soviet Spy System and to obtain information about possible traitors who might still be working in the British Services.”[lii]

Unaware of those sentiments, in December 1954, Khokhlov sent a letter to the British Consulate General in New York City requesting asylum in the UK. He explained his plan to save his family had failed, and thus he was resigned to remain in the West until “the liberation of Russia from its present regime.”[liii] The U.S. government was not aware of Khokhlov’s appeal to the British, and the British Foreign Office was apprehensive about responding predicting that the U.S. government would be “distinctly irritated.”[liv] The Foreign Office was also concerned that accepting him in the UK would bring him closer to Europe, from where he might launch out on his own to return to the Soviet Union and bring out his wife. The Foreign Office resolved to employ “masterly inactivity” and simply ignore his request.[lv]

Khokhlov remained in the United States for several more years, where the FBI watched him closely, continuing to suspect that he was a Soviet plant. He continued to make public appearances, including public testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities in April 1956,[lvi] and to give interviews about the dangers of the Soviet system and enlist public opinion in support of his goal of freeing his family.[lvii] He also worked on the draft of his future book. Then in late 1956, he returned to Germany, where he offered his services to the NTS. In September 1957, he suddenly fell ill and was admitted to a German hospital. Eleven days later he was transferred to a U.S. military hospital. It was determined that he was likely poisoned with thallium arsenate, although the diagnosis was never conclusively determined, and a Soviet hand was immediately suspected.[lviii] Khokhlov returned to the United States in October 1957 to recover from the incident.[lix]

In 1957, he published his first book, Право на Совесть (The Right to Conscience) in Russian through NTS’s press, Posev, and then in 1960 the book was published in English as In the Name of Conscience. The book expressed much of Khokhlov’s frustration with his treatment in the West and the failure of his plan to save his wife, prompting a CIA reviewer to assert, ”If the Russian edition of Khokhlov’s book is clandestinely circulating in the USSR, as he claims, his unfavorable description of American intelligence officers, their boorish conduct, rapacity, lack of depth and operational skill, and their inability to help him in any way, will not encourage defections to American intelligence.”[lx] Nevertheless, the NTS, with CIA support, sent Khokhlov to East Asia, and over the following several years he conducted propaganda operations and training of partisans in Korea and Southeast Asia.[lxi]

Khokhlov returned to the United States in 1962 to enroll in Duke University, and in 1967 he graduated with a Ph.D. in psychology. From 1968 to 1993 he worked as a professor at California State University at San Bernardino, where he specialized in parapsychology and research into extrasensory perception. He retired in 1992 and, after the Russian Government rehabilitated his record and vacated his death sentence, he returned to the Russia and met his wife Yanina for the first time since he left the Soviet Union in 1954. He learned that she had served a five-year term in a prison camp in Syktivkar, Komi Republic, and that she had lived the rest of her life in the city of Ivanovo.

Khokhlov divorced his Romanian wife when he returned to Moscow in 1949. He also divorced his Russian wife after he left the Soviet Union. Yanina was a deeply religious person, and Khokhlov followed her example and became an adherent of the Russian Orthodox Church after settling in the United States. He remarried in the United States and had two children, one of which died as a young child. Khokhlov died in September 2007 in California.

Notes

  1. [i] Photo from http://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/nikolai-khokhlov-kgb-paranormal, The Life Picture Collection/Getty Images.
  2. [ii] Nikolai E. Khokhlov, as told to Milton Lehman, “I Would Not Murder for the Soviets,” Saturday Evening Post, 20 November 1954, pp. 27-29, 121-124; 27 November 1954, pp. 34-35, 68, 72-76; 4 December 1954, pp. 30, 139-142; 11 December 1954, pp. 30, 126-130.
  3. [iii] Nikolai Yevgenyevich Khokhlov, Право на Совесть (The Right to Conscience) (Frankfurt-am-Main: Posev, 1957).
  4. [iv] Nikolai Yevgenyevich Khokhlov, In the Name of Conscience: The Testament of a Soviet Secret Agent (New York: David McKay, 1959).
  5. [v] Khokhlov, The Right to Conscience, p. 20.
  6. [vi] United States Congress. Senate. Judiciary Committee. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security and Other Internal Security Laws. Activities of Soviet Secret Service, 83th Congress, Second Session. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 3; Nikolai E. Khokhlov, “I Would Not Murder for the Soviets,” Saturday Evening Post, 20 November 1954, p. 28.
  7. [vii] Khokhlov, The Right to Conscience, p. 24.
  8. [viii] FBI memo, 19 May 1954, FBI serial number 65-62536, serial 28, p. 3. This memo contains the contents of the of the FBI’s first interview with Khokhlov.
  9. [ix] Khokhlov, The Right to Conscience, pp. 29-30.
  10. [x] A biography of Zapolskaya is on the web site Russia-InfoCentre, http://russia-ic.com/people/general/z/479.
  11. [xi] FBI teletype, 24 April 1954, FBI file number 65-HQ-62536; FBI communications received via FOIA request.
  12. [xii] FBI memo, 10 May 1954, FBI file number 65-HQ-62536.
  13. [xiii] FBI teletype, 24 August 1954, FBI file number 65-HQ-62536. Zapolskaya reported that Ignatova’s death occurred in 1943.
  14. [xiv] Vadim Abramov, Евреи в КГБ (Jews in the KGB) (Moscow: Bystrov Publishing, 2006), http://royallib.com/book/abramov_vadim/evrei_v_kgb.html.
  15. [xv] Internet Movie Database, Secret Agent, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0039716/.
  16. [xvi] Khokhlov, “I Would Not Murder for the Soviets,” 20 November 1954, p. 122.
  17. [xvii] Khokhlov, “I Would Not Murder for the Soviets,” 20 November 1954, p. 122.
  18. [xviii] Khokhlov, The Right to Conscience, p. 44.
  19. [xix] Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov, Спецоперации. Лубянка и Кремль 1930–1950 годы (Special Operations: Lubyanka and the Kremlin 1930-1950) (Moscow: OLMA-Press, 1997), p. 188.
  20. [xx] Emmanuil Grigoryevich Ioffe, “800 дней воли и борьбы” (“800 Days of Will and Struggle”), Беларусь Сегодня (Belarus Today), 21 October 2003, https://www.sb.by/articles/800-dney-voli-i-borby.html.
  21. [xxi] Khokhlov, “I Would Not Murder for the Soviets,” 20 November 1954, p. 124.
  22. [xxii] FBI memo, 9 September 1954, FBI file 65-62536, serial 66.
  23. [xxiii] Khokhlov, “I Would Not Murder for the Soviets,” 27 November 1954, p. 72.
  24. [xxiv] Curriculum vitae attached to Khokhlov letter to the UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 13 December 1954, TNA, FO 371/111756.
  25. [xxv] Khokhlov, “I Would Not Murder for the Soviets,” 27 November 1954, p. 72.
  26. [xxvi] Debriefing report, “Organization of the 9th Otdel,” 8 May 1954, TNA, KV 5/107, serial 86a.
  27. [xxvii] Khokhlov, “I Would Not Murder for the Soviets,” 27 November 1954, p. 72.
  28. [xxviii] Nikolai E. Khokhlov, “I Would Not Murder for the Soviets,” Saturday Evening Post, 4 December 1954, p. 30.
  29. [xxix] United States Congress. Senate. Judiciary Committee. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security and Other Internal Security Laws. Activities of Soviet Secret Service, 83th Congress, Second Session. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 4.
  30. [xxx] Khokhlov, “I Would Not Murder for the Soviets,” 27 November 1954, p. 35.
  31. [xxxi] Questions Put to Khokhlov and His Answers Thereto, 13 May 1954, TNA, KV 5/107, serial 87a.
  32. [xxxii] Sudoplatov, Special Operations: Lubyanka and the Kremlin 1930-1950, p. 188.
  33. [xxxiii] Mary-Kay Wilmers, The Eitingons: A Twentieth Century Story (New York: Verso Books, 2012), p. 416.
  34. [xxxiv] Khokhlov, “I Would Not Murder for the Soviets,” 4 December 1954, p. 139.
  35. [xxxv] Khokhlov, “I Would Not Murder for the Soviets,” 4 December 1954, p. 140.
  36. [xxxvi] Kukowitsch’s CIC file is at NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 443. Kukowitsch had been arrested in July 1946 for couriering communist propaganda; CIC memo, 8 August 1946.
  37. [xxxvii] Khokhlov, “I Would Not Murder for the Soviets,” 4 December 1954, p. 141-142.
  38. [xxxviii] Wilmers, The Eitingons: A Twentieth Century Story, p. 415.
  39. [xxxix] U.S. Army G-2 memo and attached Kukowitsch debriefing report, 29 Mach 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 443, Kukowitch file.
  40. [xl] Nikolai E. Khokhlov, “I Would Not Murder for the Soviets,” Saturday Evening Post, 11 December 1954, p. 126.
  41. [xli] U.S. Army G-2 memo and attached debriefing reports, 29 Mach 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 443, Kukowitch file.
  42. [xlii] Khokhlov, “I Would Not Murder for the Soviets,” Saturday Evening Post, 11 December 1954, p. 130.
  43. [xliii] Khokhlov, The Right to Conscience, p. 603.
  44. [xliv] FBI Heidelberg memo, 11 March 1954, FBI file number 65-62536 serial 1. The content of this memo is redacted in its entirety.
  45. [xlv] FBI memos, 11 and 13 May 1954, FBI file number 65-62536, serials 21 and 22.
  46. [xlvi] Hoover letter to Dulles, 19 May 1954, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
  47. [xlvii] FBI teletype, 24 April 1954, FBI file number 65-62536, serial 15.
  48. [xlviii] FBI memo, subject redacted, 7 June 1954, FBI file number 65-62536. Feldbin/Orlov’s name is redacted from the document, but it referred to FBI file number 105-22869, which is Feldbin/Orlov’s file.
  49. [xlix] FBI memo, “Comments of Alexander Orlov about Walter Krivitsky’s Book ‘In Stalin’s Secret Service’,” 13 October 1954, pp. 10-12, TNA, 2/2879, serial 45b.
  50. [l] FBI Memos, 19 and 21 July 1954, FBI file number 65-62536, serials 49, 55.
  51. [li] “KGB Wanted List,” Entry number 450, HIA, Vladislav Krasnov Writings File,
  52. [lii] Record of Meeting, 1 May 1954, TNA, PREM 11/773.
  53. [liii] Khokhlov letter to the UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 13 December 1954, TNA, FO 371/111756.
  54. [liv] Foreign Office minute, 9 February 1955, TNA, FO 371/111756.
  55. [lv] Foreign Office minute, 24 March 1955, TNA, FO 371/111756.
  56. [lvi] United States Congress. House. Committee on Un-American Activities. Investigation of Communist Activities in the Los Angeles, California, Area, 84th Congress, second session (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1956).
  57. [lvii] “Interview with Former Soviet Spy Nikolai E. Khokhlov: Executioners’ Shots Reveal New Struggle Inside Kremlin,” U.S. News and World Report, 21 January 1955, pp. 42-47; “Interview with Nikolai E. Khokhlov, former Soviet Intelligence Officer: Revolt in Soviet Russia Starting,” U.S. News and World Report, 30 March 1956, pp. 26-35.
  58. [lviii] Boris Volodarsky, The KGB’s Poison Factory: from Lenin to Litvinenko (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2009) pp. 176-178. See also “Russian Defense is Poisoned: He Blames gents of Kremlin,” New York Times, 28 September 1957; “Poison Idea Persists: But Tests on Ex-Red Agent Fail to Prove It,” New York Times, 9 October 1957,
  59. [lix] “Defector Lays Poisoning to Soviet,” New York Times, 15 October 1957.
  60. [lx] Review of In the Name of Conscience, Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 4, Spring 1960, in NARA RG 263, Entry A1-27, Box 2-11-8.
  61. [lxi] Vitaliy Karavashkin, Кто Предал Россию (Who Betrayed Russia) (Moscow: AST, 2008), pp. 593-595.

Published works

  • Nikolai Yevgenyevich Khokhlov
  • Право на Совесть (The Right to Conscience) (Frankfurt-am-Main: Posev
  • 1957). In the Name of Conscience: The Testament of a Soviet Secret Agent (New York: David McKay
  • 1959).

Cite this entry

Kevin Riehle, “Khokhlov, Nikolay Yevgenyevich,” Soviet Defectors Database, revised 2026-11-22, https://sovietdefectors.com/defector/khokhlov-nikolay-yevgenyevich/