Biography
Petr Sergeyevich Deryabin[i] became one of the most prominent defectors of the Cold War. He was extensively debriefed by the CIA, FBI, and MI6 in the several years after his defection and he provided vast amounts of information about Soviet intelligence leadership, personnel, and organization, including some of he first reliable insights into the machinations around Soviet leadership succession after Stalin’s death. He became a trusted consultant to the CIA, from which he retired in 1981. He also published extensively about his own life and about Soviet intelligence and security services, and he appeared before committees of both the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. He was one of the first defectors to benefit from the passage of a private law in the U.S. Congress that paved the way for his naturalization as a U.S. citizen.
Yet his career both before and after defection showed an inability to stick with anything very long. He quickly became dissatisfied with his counterintelligence career, yet he returned to it when he saw that he could not make enough money anywhere else. He worked as a counterintelligence and intelligence officer in several varied elements within the MGB and used his connections several times to obtain reassignments, hoping for a more satisfying job somewhere other than where he worked at the time. After defection, he often complained about how he was treated and had several false starts in various jobs. His defection was at least partially motivated by his dissatisfaction with his life in general.
Deryabin gave two different birthdates after his defection. He initially told U.S. authorities that he was born in December 1919.[ii] He later wrote that he was born in February 1921.[iii] The 1919 birthdate was likely for his cover identity, and in both cases he gave his birthplace as Lokot, Altai Krai, in southern Siberia on the border with Kazakhstan. He came from a peasant family, and he was the only of his siblings to attend an organized school. He encountered Communist Party indoctrination at the school and became involved in the Pioneers and then the Komsomol. He became an enthusiastic follower of the Party and its slogans and assumed ever-increasing student leadership positions.
Deryabin graduated from secondary school in 1937. After a year of correspondence courses, he was certified as a teacher, and he began teaching history and civics in a local school. He claims that he lied about his age to obtain the certificate, but that the local Komsomol administration allowed him to do it because he was politically reliable, and the area lacked qualified teachers. He was a full-time teacher from the time he was seventeen years old.[iv]
In October 1939, Deryabin was drafted into the Soviet Army. He had been identified twice during the previous year as a draftee, but he was deferred because of his job as a village teacher. Immediately upon enlisting, he was sent to the regimental NCO school and quickly rose in the Party ranks within his infantry division in eastern Siberia. His political reliability, combined with his ability to teach illiterate soldiers about Communism and Soviet views of international events, made him a trusted assistant to the Division commissar. He was afforded the privileges of an officer even though he was only a junior NCO in rank. He became a full Party member in September 1941.[v]
Deryabin’s unit was ordered to the defense of Moscow in September 1941, and he found that the German invasion initially made the duties of a political officer easier. Even the soldier most disgruntled about the Soviet government became a patriot in the face of a German threat to Moscow. Deryabin was wounded and spent three months in hospital, and then in April 1942 was sent to political officers school. But his schooling was interrupted when his unit was deployed to participate in the Battle of Stalingrad. He worked as a political officer during the battle, imparting a Soviet propaganda narrative to soldiers who, as the battle progressed, realized was opposite to what they saw around them. Professional military officers became bolder and often contradicted or sidelined political officers. Nevertheless, political officers still enjoyed more authority than their rank implied. Deryabin was promoted to senior lieutenant in December 1943.[vi] He also conducted POW interrogations on the front lines during combat, his first introduction to intelligence work.[vii]
After Stalingrad, Deryabin’s unit advanced westward following retreating German forces, and he was severely wounded in a battle to recapture Odessa in April 1944. After two months in hospital, Deryabin was approached by a SMERSH officer and offered a position in a counterintelligence officer’s school. The offer was persuasive—as a counterintelligence officer, he would no longer be on the front lines of the battle. He agreed and began the school in the summer of 1944.[viii]
Deryabin indicated that instruction at the school focused on reestablishing Party control over the Soviet Union at the end of the war and relabeling wartime allies as enemies. Former prisoners of war and German forced laborers were all suspect, especially anyone who had been affiliated with Vlasov’s army. Eliminating all associations or affinities outside the Soviet Union was a priority. Counterintelligence training focused on Great Britain, France, and the United States, along with Germany. He quoted his instructor as saying, “Remember that your allies today are your enemies tomorrow.”[ix]
Counterintelligence, particularly to identify Western spies among the Soviet people, became the priority for Soviet state security. Deryabin quoted what he labeled a familiar saying that summarized the evolving emphasis of Soviet state security: “In the Yezhovshchina, the god of state security sat in the political section. During the period of collectivization god sat in the economic section. During the war god was in intelligence, after the war in counterintelligence.”[x] He cited a number of examples of Soviet citizens being coerced into becoming agents because they had some blemish on their background—a parent was exiled as a kulak in the 1930s; a brother had worked for the German police during the war; a young girl’s father had been a German POW. In each case, the subject was carefully selected and offered the opportunity to become an agent, usually in place of being arrested.[xi]
Deryabin’s first assignment after graduating from the counterintelligence officers’ school in the fall of 1945 was to Naval Counterintelligence. But in March 1946, when Naval Counterintelligence was merged into the MGB, he requested an assignment closer to his hometown so that he could look after his younger sister, who was his only living relative. His request was denied, so he resigned from military service as a captain and returned to Altai Krai to find a job. He soon found that few jobs were available, and even returning to teaching provided insufficient salary to live on. He realized that a salary as an MGB officer was better than he could get anywhere else, so he applied to return to his MGB status. He was accepted as a case officer in the MGB office in Barnaul, Altai Krai, and was reinstated as a Captain of State Security in July 1946.[xii]
Deryabin was assigned as the chief of the surveillance group in the Barnaul MGB Office.[xiii] Surveillance subjects often came from among the ethnic groups deported to Siberia during the war: Poles, Volga Germans, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, or others foreign to the region. At any time Deryabin estimated that 1,000 of the two million people in the Altai Krai were subjects of a state security investigation, but only a few of them were kept under regular surveillance, primarily after other investigative methods had not developed sufficient evidence.[xiv]
Deryabin wrote in particular about state security investigations of Soviet citizens who practiced religion. During World War II, religion had been allowed to exist more openly in the Soviet Union in concert with a State-endorsed increase in Russian nationalism. But after the war, Soviet state security refocused its efforts on co-opting and restricting religious activity. Deryabin’s testimony to the U.S. Senate in May 1959 was dedicated primarily to descriptions of Soviet investigations into religious activity, which Soviet state security automatically assumed to be anti-Soviet. The Barnaul MGB office produced a detailed report of religious activity in the Altai Krai in December 1946, including Orthodox and Baptist followers and Old Believers. The report led to the arrests of sixteen religious leaders for allegedly harboring a Soviet army deserter during the war. Deryabin noted that a Major General Karpov was in charge of the MGB’s religion section in Moscow, referring to Georgiy Grigoryevich Karpov, an MGB officer who chaired the Soviet Council on Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church.[xv]
After less than a year in Barnaul, Deryabin’s wife, whom he married not long after returning to the Altai Krai, died. He decided that he no longer wanted to work in a provincial MGB office, and, after leaving his younger sister in the care of an aunt, he requested leave in the Caucasus, but took the train to Moscow and dropped in on an old friend from the war. His friend arranged a transfer to Moscow.[xvi] Deryabin’s new job initially involved administrative work at MGB headquarters and in the spring of 1947 he was supposed to receive an assignment in the MGB Personnel Directorate. But at the very time when his assignment was being arranged, the chief of the Personnel Directorate, Serafim Vasilyevich Goryshev, was transferred to be the Chief of Personnel for the MGB Guard Directorate. Goryshev chose the staff that would accompany him to this new assignment and included Deryabin, altering the course of Deryabin’s career.[xvii]
Thus, from March 1947 to April 1952, Deryabin worked in the MGB Guard Directorate, which was responsible for the security of senior Soviet leaders. His work included conducting background investigations on Guard Directorate personnel and investigations of alleged violations of rules. Because of their sensitive assignment, Guard Directorate personnel were monitored closely for loyalty and potentially embarrassing behavior. Deryabin wrote, “Here at the top the penalties for a misstep are the heaviest in Soviet society.”[xviii] Conformity and obedience were valued over imagination and initiative. The directorate also conducted investigations of anyone who cаme into contact with senior government leaders. Deryabin explained that, although the Guard Directorate was part of the MGB/MVD, the Chief of the Guard Directorate answered to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, due to the directorate’s close association with the senior Party leaders.[xix]
Deryabin’s exposure to the private lives of senior officials was an initial factor in his eventual decision to break with the Soviet Union. Like other defectors, he described the vast difference between the lives of the Soviet leaders and the Soviet people. As a member of the Guard Directorate, he saw the luxury in which senior Soviet officials lived, and the cars, chauffeurs, special barbers, cooks, and cleaners that were dedicated solely to the Soviet elite. He witnessed the drinking, parties, and prostitutes in which the Soviet elite indulged.[xx] Deryabin described the detachments of the Guard Directorate that were positioned at the Soviet leaders’ summer dachas and at the specially reserved resorts on the Black Sea coast and in the Caucasus.[xxi] To maintain the separateness of the leaders from the Soviet citizens, officers in the Guard Directorate were required to sign nondisclosure agreements before take the job promising to never reveal their activities, with whom they were working, and how they were working.[xxii] Full background investigations were conducted on every Guard Directorate employee annually, or for those in direct contact with Stalin, twice per year.[xxiii]
Deryabin’s time in the Guard Directorate was the inspiration for his book, Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars,[xxiv] which traced the history of Russian personal bodyguards. As Deryabin noted, it was a topic that had never been reliably explored in academic literature, and much of what was available about Soviet-era personal security was heavily shaded by Soviet propaganda. His book, however, was clearly intended as a counterweight to Soviet propaganda, and his description of Lenin was far from complimentary.[xxv] Although his experience in the Guard Directorate prompted him to research the topic, much of the book’s content came not from his own experience, but rather from material he gathered after defecting and from personal his views of the Soviet regime.
In 1951, not long after the Minister of State Security Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov was arrested, Deryabin was offered two different jobs: Chief of the Personnel Office for the Kremlin Guard, or Party Secretary for the Guard Directorate Personnel Office. Both were promotions and represented opportunities for increased power and influence. However, he was loath to take either because the tense political situation in the Soviet leadership created a high professional risk in the Guard Directorate.[xxvi] From 1951 to 1953, the Guard Directorate had five different chiefs. Deryabin later learned that the Guard Directorate was completely shaken up after Stalin’s death and many of the officers were sent into exile in Siberia.[xxvii]
Deryabin’s friend in the Deputy Minister of State Security’s office, who had helped him transfer from Barnaul to Moscow five years earlier, recommended that he consider a position in foreign intelligence instead. Deryabin saw a move to foreign intelligence as a relief from the disillusionment that had build up inside him during his five years in the Guard Directorate. He hoped that foreign intelligence would offer a break from monitoring his own colleagues and represented what Deryabin called the “cleanest” branch of state security because it directed its energies against foreign threats.[xxviii] In April 1952, Deryabin transferred to the Austria-Germany Section of the MVD Second Directorate.
Initially, Deryabin’s job in the Austria-Germany Section initially involved working as an analyst preparing reports for the Soviet leadership. He found the working environment in the Intelligence Directorate to be very different than in the Guard Directorate. Intelligence personnel were more educated, sophisticated, and world-wise. They did not kowtow to Party propaganda lines and were more likely read foreign newspapers than Pravda. Party secretaries had a more difficult task convincing intelligence officers to follow the Party line.
Deryabin reported that the operations of the Austria-Germany section were heavily dominated by the pursuit of anti-Soviet Germans. As of 1952, the section continued to investigate the German Operation ZEPPELIN, which dispatched recruited Soviet POWs into Soviet territory during World War II. MGB minister Viktor Abakumov launched an operation to recruit ex-Nazis in 1947, and MGB officers regularly interrogated captured Nazi officers, who were held in Soviet prisons into the early 1950s.[xxix] The section was also responsible for counterintelligence operations against the Gehlen Organization, the U.S.-sponsored West German intelligence service led by former Nazi intelligence officer Richard Gehlen.[xxx]
While he was working in Moscow, Deryabin was involved in the July 1952 kidnapping of German lawyer, Dr. Walter Linse, who worked for the Association of Free Jurists, a powerful anti-communist organization in Germany. The leader of the Association, Horst Eerdmann, who was publicly known as Dr. Theo Friedenau, planned to sponsor an International Congress of Free Jurists in July 1952 at which attendees would discuss Soviet crimes in East Germany. The MVD was intent on preventing the conference from proceeding and planned to kidnap Erdmann/Friedenau. However, just before the operation, Erdmann/Friedenau took a trip out of Germany, forcing a change of plans. Deryabin, as the desk officer in Moscow, received a cable from Berlin with a recommendation to substitute Linse for Erdmann/Friedenau. Moscow approved the new target, and the operation occurred on 8 July, just a week before the conference was scheduled to begin. For several years after Linse’s disappearance, Soviet representatives in Germany denied any knowledge of his whereabouts, and Deryabin’s reporting of the operation was the first unequivocal indication of Soviet involvement.[xxxi] The operation had the opposite effect from what the Soviets intended—despite Soviet denials, Linse’s disappearance strengthened the anti-communist cause and served as another example of Soviet criminality in Germany.
Deryabin reported that after Stalin’s death, Beriya commissioned a committee at MVD headquarters to study the MVD representation in Germany. The committee arrived at a number of recommendations, including reducing the size of the Soviet advisor force in East Germany from 2,500 to 350, and turning over most security responsibilities to the East German government. However, on 17 June 1953, mass uprisings occurred in East Germany protesting the region’s economic collapse under Soviet dominance. This, along with Beriya’s arrest, led to another recalculation of the MVD structure and leadership in Germany, and Deryabin reported that at the time of his defection the MVD apparatus in Germany employed 900 people, including administrative and technical support personnel.[xxxii]
Deryabin’s debriefings yielded detailed information about the organization of MVD. His knowledge of the leaders in charge of MVD directorates was somewhat out of date when U.S. and British officials debriefed him, but he eventually identified thousands of Soviet personnel. At the time Deryabin was a Soviet intelligence officer, the First Chief Directorate was responsible for counterintelligence, with sections dedicated to the United States, United Kingdom, and France/Benelux, indicating the powers that Soviet state security considered as the primary counterintelligence threats to the Soviet Union.
The Second Chief Directorate was responsible for foreign intelligence and operations in foreign countries. The United States also had a dedicated section (First Section) in the First Chief Directorate, as did the United Kingdom and its colonies (Second Section). The Third Section, the Austria-Germany Section, was where Deryabin worked. The Fourth Section was dedicated to operations in the rest of Western Europe, while the Fifth Section was organized not geographically, but against Russian émigrés worldwide. Other sections were dedicated to operations in the Near and Middle East, and in the Far East. The Tenth Section was called the Delegations Section, supplying state security officers who accompanied nearly all Soviet delegations and ship crews to monitor the members and prevent them from defecting.[xxxiii]
Deryabin noted that the Soviet government had experienced a series of defeats at the end of the 1940s and early 1950s. They included the Berlin Airlift in 1948, the formation of NATO in 1949, and the American counteractions against Soviet-sponsored military actions in Korea in 1950. Soviet state security was left to try to concentrate its efforts in Germany, and consequently the Austria-Germany Section was the second largest in the Second Chief Directorate only after the American Section.[xxxiv]
Deryabin was aware of one operation run by the Second (British) Section of the Second Chief Directorate against the United Kingdom. The case involved a proposal to recruit the wife of the West German ambassador to London. Her son was a former POW who had been sentenced to 25 years in a forced labor camp in the Soviet Union, and she had submitted a request to the Soviet High Commission in Germany requesting news of her son’s fate. The responsibility for meeting with the woman was assigned to the Third (Austria-Germany) Section, where Deryabin worked. However, because the German government planned to recall the ambassador, the operation was called off.[xxxv]
Deryabin reported that the First Chief (Counterintelligence) Directorate would normally run agents directed at penetrating a foreign intelligence service. But in some cases, another directorate’s agent could also be used for that purpose, such as if the Émigrés Section was running an agent associated with a Russian émigré organization that had exploitable access to a foreign intelligence service. Nevertheless, the First Chief Directorate may still recruit an agent inside the same émigré organization to monitor the Émigrés Section’s agent.[xxxvi]
The Seventh Section, known as the Advisors’ Section, managed MVD activities in Eastern European satellites, with the exception of East Germany. This section managed a team of MVD officers who operated in each Soviet satellite, including a chief advisor, advisors from intelligence and counterintelligence, an advisor for police matters and another for military counterintelligence in the satellites’ military forces.[xxxvii]
Deryabin also provided information about the Eighth Section, known as the Illegals Section, which was divided into two subsections, one for training illegals for service abroad and the other for documenting and dispatching illegals abroad.[xxxviii] He noted that he knew of no illegals operating in Austria while he was at MVD headquarters. He did, however, discuss illegal rezidenturas in Germany, which consisted of German nationals recruited and organized into 3- to 6-person cells directed to collect intelligence on Allied installations in and West German government institutions. Deryabin cited the case of an illegal agent codenamed CHEKH who had access to Bonn government circles and was handled by an MVD case officer in Vienna.[xxxix] As Deryabin’s book was published in 1959, five years after his defection, he also cited the well-publicized case of William August Fisher (aka Rudolph Abel), who was arrested and convicted of espionage in the United States in 1957, to illustrate the activities of the Illegals Section.[xl]
Finally, Deryabin described the Special Bureau, which conducted assassinations and terrorist operations abroad. He reported that the Special Bureau perpetrated the assassinations of Lev Trotsky in 1940 and Walter Krivitsky (Ginsberg) in 1941, although it is unclear whether his information was first-hand regarding these operations.[xli] During his debriefing, he reported that the chief of the Special Bureau, Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov was arrested and executed along with Beriya. Deryabin was probably reporting only his assumptions, unaware that Sudoplatov was not executed but was imprisoned for fifteen years, briefly sharing a cell with defector Yevgeniy Vladimirovich Brik, eventually being released in 1968 and dying only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1996.
Deryabin reported that Soviet state security managed mining and construction projects for a number of years, but in April or May 1953, not long after Stalin’s death, Beriya ordered that they be transferred out of the MVD and into the ministry that was most appropriate for them. The MVD’s Chief Directorate of Gold and Precious Metal Mining, for example, was transferred to the Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy. GULAG was moved to the Ministry of Justice, although GULAG was so large that the Ministry of Justice could not manage it and it was returned to the MVD in January 1954.[xlii]
One organization that was not moved out of the MVD was the Main Administration of Building of the Far North (Главное Управление строительства Дальнего Севера; Dalstroy), which employed forced labor requisitioned from the GULAG to build roads and infrastructure and work in mines in northern Siberia. All of the Dalstroy management personnel were MVD staff officers, and from 1939 to 1948, the chief of Dalstroy was MVD General Lieutenant Ivan Fedorovich Nikishov. Deryabin noted that Nikishov was the Deputy Chief of GULAG in 1953. He reported that so many resettlees and exilees came to the far north to mine gold that the Soviet government established the Magadan Oblast to provide municipal administration for them. Dalstroy also hired paid laborers, who were enticed with high pay and benefits to accept harsh jobs in the far north.[xliii] Another CIA report dated 15 December 1954, also likely from Deryabin, contains substantially the same information about Dalstroy and its relationship with the GULAG.[xliv] Two additional CIA reports from July 1955, probably sourced to Deryabin, provide locations and descriptions of MVD facilities in Moscow, including the offices of Dalstroy and an MVD/MGB hotel and club.[xlv]
After a year and a half at MVD headquarters, Deryabin received his first and only overseas assignment to Vienna in September 1953. He claimed officers who had previously served in the Guard Directorate were typically prohibited from travelling abroad, but his assignment was allowed due to a bureaucratic oversight in the confusion that followed Stalin’s death.[xlvi] Deryabin arrived in Vienna several months after Beriya’s arrest, and his defection came less than two months after Beriya’s execution. According to Deryabin, the charges that led to Beriya’s arrest included attempting to take over the government and using the power of the state security apparatus against the Party. Beriya reportedly issued an order to state security officers across the Soviet Union to monitor Party officials. The plot became known, according to Deryabin, when a state security officer in Ukraine reported the order to the local Party official, who tried to report it to the Central Committee, but Beriya intercepted it. MI6 assessed that Derabin’s information reflected the official Soviet version of Beriya’s indictment that he heard when the 70-page report of Beriya’s charges was read to all state security officers soon after his arrest.[xlvii] Deryabin was not directly involved in the affair, but he recalled seeing tanks on the streets of Moscow on the night of Beriya’s arrest in June 1953 and he learned from his former colleagues in the Guard Directorate that Beriya was arrested.[xlviii]
He was assigned to line SK (советская колония; Soviet colony), which was responsible for the security of Soviet employees in Austria, including those posted to the embassy and delegations visiting Austria. Deryabin complained during debriefings that the Line SK section was very busy, and although it supposed to have seven officers, seldom were more than two or three of them available for Line SK work due to collateral assignments or illnesses.[xlix]
Deryabin wrote briefly about several of the agents he was running at the time of his defection. One was a former White officer whose code name was Builder. Another was a young French woman of Russian extraction who served as the secretary of Louis Saillant, the Secretary-General of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), who provided reports of the office conversations at the WFTU’s Vienna headquarters.[l] He recruited numerous agents among the Soviet colony who reported on the activities of other Soviet employees. He was particularly tasked with monitoring the GRU officers posted in Vienna. The MVD rezident in Vienna reportedly instructed Deryabin, “you must always keep your eye on any GRU personnel.”[li]
As a Line SK officer, Deryabin’s job included investigating disloyalty, and in extreme cases, defections of Soviet employees. In that capacity, Deryabin received a phone call at 5:00 am on 14 February 1954 with a report that a Soviet official, Anatoliy Ignatiyevich Skachkov, had gone missing. The previous evening, Skachkov had come home drunk, packed a suitcase, and bluntly told his wife that he was leaving for the Americans. Skachkov’s frightened wife phoned the embassy security officer, which led to Deryabin’s task to investigate the incident. After investigating for over 24 hours and finding little evidence of Skachkov’s fate, even being instructed, “don’t dig too deep,”[lii] Deryabin began to question whether the Skachkov’s “defection” was actually staged to dispatch him as a double agent to U.S. intelligence. However, at the same time, Deryabin began to wonder “what was it like to leave behind the Soviet state and all it stood for?”[liii] This thought was compounded by an argument with his wife, who questioned him about why he had been out so late, to which he reportedly responded, “Maybe I’ll never come back.”[liv] On 15 February 1954, Deryabin followed that thought and walked into the American Military Command Headquarters in Vienna and requested political asylum.
According to CIA report of his debriefing, Deryabin defected “for a combination of ideological and personal reasons.”[lv] He described his ideological reasons in his public writings: he had become disenchanted with the Soviet leaders’ attitudes toward the Soviet people, fueled by his close association with the Soviet elite during his tenure in the Guard Directorate. His personal reasons included a failing marriage and a feeling of being overworked and underappreciated. He may have also been the victim of denunciations resulting from jealousy: Brook-Shepherd claims that during his time in the Austria-Germany Section in Moscow, a female assistant denounced Deryabin for anti-Stalinist statements—in the form of sharing gossip about Stalin’s son, Vasiliy—after he refused her advances.[lvi] He weathered the ensuing investigation, probably to a great extent because of his connections in the MVD, and was even posted to a foreign assignment, which was clear evidence that the MVD did not take the denunciation seriously. But he was increasingly dissatisfied with his work and sought an escape, which led to his decision to defect.
January and February 1954 were a concentrated time for Soviet defectors. The U.S. National Security Council met on 17 February 1954—just two days after Deryabin’s defection—and mentioned four defectors that had recently come into U.S. custody: one in Norway (Pavlov), one in Japan (Rastvorov), and two in Vienna (Skachkov and Deryabin).[lvii] Although Pavlov had defected in Norway the previous summer, he had arrived in U.S. custody not long before this NSC meeting. The report indicated that the defectors had heavily impacted Soviet intelligence operations in the countries of their defection.
U.S. intelligence exfiltrated Deryabin from Vienna to Salzburg, and later to the United States, and began actively debriefing him. MI6 was brought in for debriefings in March. In a memo probably referring to Deryabin and Skachkov, the CIA noted that from February to September 1954, the two defectors, whom the CIA referred to as AEFILTER 1 and AEFILTER 2, yielded 7,500 pages of material resulting in over 200 reports. The sources identified and described over 3,000 Soviet and other foreign nationals, and drafted a history of the NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD. The memo energetically praised the defectors’ material: “Information such as this could not have been ‘bought’ at any price and has contributed significantly and uniquely to the records and operational potential of the CIA.”[lviii]
Deryabin arrived in the United States in the midst of strong anti-Communist sentiments among the U.S. population and in the U.S. Congress. In June 1952, the U.S. Congress passed an amendment to the Immigration and Naturalization Act that restricted anyone who had been a member of a Communist Party from being naturalized as a U.S. citizen, doubling from five to ten years the length of time such a person must be a legal resident of the United States before he or she could apply for citizenship.[lix] In 1990, a provision was added to that law that allowed the Director of Central Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and Attorney General, to appeal for relief from the ten-year requirement for a person who had “made a contribution to the national security or to the national intelligence mission of the United States.”[lx] Although that provision was formally added only in 1990, it had already been exercised on multiple occasions previously, including in the case of Deryabin. On 18 August 1959, Deryabin, who also used the name Theodore Stanley Orel, was the subject of a special Congressional action that exempted him from the limitations of that law and opened the path for him to become a U.S. citizen.[lxi]
Local media began to report the disappearance of two Soviet officials in Vienna soon after Deryabin’s and Skachkov’s defections in February 1954. However, Deryabin did not officially enter the public eye until 1959. He co-authored a series of two articles with Life magazine journalist Frank Gibney in March 1959, which were expanded later that year and turned into Deryabin’s first book, The Secret World. He also appeared before both the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate in March and May 1959, respectively. After those public appearances, his name became well known in anti-Soviet circles, and over the following 40 years, he collaborated on four more books on Soviet state security, teaming with various co-authors. His last book, Inside Stalin's Kremlin: An Eyewitness Account of Brutality, Duplicity, and Intrigue,[lxii] was published in 1998 after his death. One of his collaborators, retired CIA officer Tennent “Pete” Bagley, co-wrote KGB, Masters of the Soviet Union[lxiii] in 1990, and then accredited Deryabin with providing support for his 2007 book Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games.[lxiv]
Deryabin continued to be consulted for information about Soviet intelligence for over 25 years. In December 1963, the CIA asked him to comment on the case of Lee Harvey Oswald and his Russian wife, Marina, just a few weeks after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Deryabin provided opinions about how they were handled during Oswald’s three years in the Soviet Union, and, while he could not definitively say that the KGB was behind the Kennedy assassination, he asserted that the Soviet Union had much to gain by killing the President.[lxv] His opinions fueled the debate over Soviet complicity in Kennedy’s assassination and impacted the interrogations of another KGB officer, Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, who defected in February 1964 and claimed that the KGB had no connections to Oswald.
Deryabin worked as an operational consultant and planner, as an instructor in training courses, and as a lecturer until his retirement in 1981. He continued to lecture on Soviet intelligence even after retirement. He died in 1992 in the Washington, DC, area.
Yet his career both before and after defection showed an inability to stick with anything very long. He quickly became dissatisfied with his counterintelligence career, yet he returned to it when he saw that he could not make enough money anywhere else. He worked as a counterintelligence and intelligence officer in several varied elements within the MGB and used his connections several times to obtain reassignments, hoping for a more satisfying job somewhere other than where he worked at the time. After defection, he often complained about how he was treated and had several false starts in various jobs. His defection was at least partially motivated by his dissatisfaction with his life in general.
Deryabin gave two different birthdates after his defection. He initially told U.S. authorities that he was born in December 1919.[ii] He later wrote that he was born in February 1921.[iii] The 1919 birthdate was likely for his cover identity, and in both cases he gave his birthplace as Lokot, Altai Krai, in southern Siberia on the border with Kazakhstan. He came from a peasant family, and he was the only of his siblings to attend an organized school. He encountered Communist Party indoctrination at the school and became involved in the Pioneers and then the Komsomol. He became an enthusiastic follower of the Party and its slogans and assumed ever-increasing student leadership positions.
Deryabin graduated from secondary school in 1937. After a year of correspondence courses, he was certified as a teacher, and he began teaching history and civics in a local school. He claims that he lied about his age to obtain the certificate, but that the local Komsomol administration allowed him to do it because he was politically reliable, and the area lacked qualified teachers. He was a full-time teacher from the time he was seventeen years old.[iv]
In October 1939, Deryabin was drafted into the Soviet Army. He had been identified twice during the previous year as a draftee, but he was deferred because of his job as a village teacher. Immediately upon enlisting, he was sent to the regimental NCO school and quickly rose in the Party ranks within his infantry division in eastern Siberia. His political reliability, combined with his ability to teach illiterate soldiers about Communism and Soviet views of international events, made him a trusted assistant to the Division commissar. He was afforded the privileges of an officer even though he was only a junior NCO in rank. He became a full Party member in September 1941.[v]
Deryabin’s unit was ordered to the defense of Moscow in September 1941, and he found that the German invasion initially made the duties of a political officer easier. Even the soldier most disgruntled about the Soviet government became a patriot in the face of a German threat to Moscow. Deryabin was wounded and spent three months in hospital, and then in April 1942 was sent to political officers school. But his schooling was interrupted when his unit was deployed to participate in the Battle of Stalingrad. He worked as a political officer during the battle, imparting a Soviet propaganda narrative to soldiers who, as the battle progressed, realized was opposite to what they saw around them. Professional military officers became bolder and often contradicted or sidelined political officers. Nevertheless, political officers still enjoyed more authority than their rank implied. Deryabin was promoted to senior lieutenant in December 1943.[vi] He also conducted POW interrogations on the front lines during combat, his first introduction to intelligence work.[vii]
After Stalingrad, Deryabin’s unit advanced westward following retreating German forces, and he was severely wounded in a battle to recapture Odessa in April 1944. After two months in hospital, Deryabin was approached by a SMERSH officer and offered a position in a counterintelligence officer’s school. The offer was persuasive—as a counterintelligence officer, he would no longer be on the front lines of the battle. He agreed and began the school in the summer of 1944.[viii]
Deryabin indicated that instruction at the school focused on reestablishing Party control over the Soviet Union at the end of the war and relabeling wartime allies as enemies. Former prisoners of war and German forced laborers were all suspect, especially anyone who had been affiliated with Vlasov’s army. Eliminating all associations or affinities outside the Soviet Union was a priority. Counterintelligence training focused on Great Britain, France, and the United States, along with Germany. He quoted his instructor as saying, “Remember that your allies today are your enemies tomorrow.”[ix]
Counterintelligence, particularly to identify Western spies among the Soviet people, became the priority for Soviet state security. Deryabin quoted what he labeled a familiar saying that summarized the evolving emphasis of Soviet state security: “In the Yezhovshchina, the god of state security sat in the political section. During the period of collectivization god sat in the economic section. During the war god was in intelligence, after the war in counterintelligence.”[x] He cited a number of examples of Soviet citizens being coerced into becoming agents because they had some blemish on their background—a parent was exiled as a kulak in the 1930s; a brother had worked for the German police during the war; a young girl’s father had been a German POW. In each case, the subject was carefully selected and offered the opportunity to become an agent, usually in place of being arrested.[xi]
Deryabin’s first assignment after graduating from the counterintelligence officers’ school in the fall of 1945 was to Naval Counterintelligence. But in March 1946, when Naval Counterintelligence was merged into the MGB, he requested an assignment closer to his hometown so that he could look after his younger sister, who was his only living relative. His request was denied, so he resigned from military service as a captain and returned to Altai Krai to find a job. He soon found that few jobs were available, and even returning to teaching provided insufficient salary to live on. He realized that a salary as an MGB officer was better than he could get anywhere else, so he applied to return to his MGB status. He was accepted as a case officer in the MGB office in Barnaul, Altai Krai, and was reinstated as a Captain of State Security in July 1946.[xii]
Deryabin was assigned as the chief of the surveillance group in the Barnaul MGB Office.[xiii] Surveillance subjects often came from among the ethnic groups deported to Siberia during the war: Poles, Volga Germans, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, or others foreign to the region. At any time Deryabin estimated that 1,000 of the two million people in the Altai Krai were subjects of a state security investigation, but only a few of them were kept under regular surveillance, primarily after other investigative methods had not developed sufficient evidence.[xiv]
Deryabin wrote in particular about state security investigations of Soviet citizens who practiced religion. During World War II, religion had been allowed to exist more openly in the Soviet Union in concert with a State-endorsed increase in Russian nationalism. But after the war, Soviet state security refocused its efforts on co-opting and restricting religious activity. Deryabin’s testimony to the U.S. Senate in May 1959 was dedicated primarily to descriptions of Soviet investigations into religious activity, which Soviet state security automatically assumed to be anti-Soviet. The Barnaul MGB office produced a detailed report of religious activity in the Altai Krai in December 1946, including Orthodox and Baptist followers and Old Believers. The report led to the arrests of sixteen religious leaders for allegedly harboring a Soviet army deserter during the war. Deryabin noted that a Major General Karpov was in charge of the MGB’s religion section in Moscow, referring to Georgiy Grigoryevich Karpov, an MGB officer who chaired the Soviet Council on Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church.[xv]
After less than a year in Barnaul, Deryabin’s wife, whom he married not long after returning to the Altai Krai, died. He decided that he no longer wanted to work in a provincial MGB office, and, after leaving his younger sister in the care of an aunt, he requested leave in the Caucasus, but took the train to Moscow and dropped in on an old friend from the war. His friend arranged a transfer to Moscow.[xvi] Deryabin’s new job initially involved administrative work at MGB headquarters and in the spring of 1947 he was supposed to receive an assignment in the MGB Personnel Directorate. But at the very time when his assignment was being arranged, the chief of the Personnel Directorate, Serafim Vasilyevich Goryshev, was transferred to be the Chief of Personnel for the MGB Guard Directorate. Goryshev chose the staff that would accompany him to this new assignment and included Deryabin, altering the course of Deryabin’s career.[xvii]
Thus, from March 1947 to April 1952, Deryabin worked in the MGB Guard Directorate, which was responsible for the security of senior Soviet leaders. His work included conducting background investigations on Guard Directorate personnel and investigations of alleged violations of rules. Because of their sensitive assignment, Guard Directorate personnel were monitored closely for loyalty and potentially embarrassing behavior. Deryabin wrote, “Here at the top the penalties for a misstep are the heaviest in Soviet society.”[xviii] Conformity and obedience were valued over imagination and initiative. The directorate also conducted investigations of anyone who cаme into contact with senior government leaders. Deryabin explained that, although the Guard Directorate was part of the MGB/MVD, the Chief of the Guard Directorate answered to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, due to the directorate’s close association with the senior Party leaders.[xix]
Deryabin’s exposure to the private lives of senior officials was an initial factor in his eventual decision to break with the Soviet Union. Like other defectors, he described the vast difference between the lives of the Soviet leaders and the Soviet people. As a member of the Guard Directorate, he saw the luxury in which senior Soviet officials lived, and the cars, chauffeurs, special barbers, cooks, and cleaners that were dedicated solely to the Soviet elite. He witnessed the drinking, parties, and prostitutes in which the Soviet elite indulged.[xx] Deryabin described the detachments of the Guard Directorate that were positioned at the Soviet leaders’ summer dachas and at the specially reserved resorts on the Black Sea coast and in the Caucasus.[xxi] To maintain the separateness of the leaders from the Soviet citizens, officers in the Guard Directorate were required to sign nondisclosure agreements before take the job promising to never reveal their activities, with whom they were working, and how they were working.[xxii] Full background investigations were conducted on every Guard Directorate employee annually, or for those in direct contact with Stalin, twice per year.[xxiii]
Deryabin’s time in the Guard Directorate was the inspiration for his book, Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars,[xxiv] which traced the history of Russian personal bodyguards. As Deryabin noted, it was a topic that had never been reliably explored in academic literature, and much of what was available about Soviet-era personal security was heavily shaded by Soviet propaganda. His book, however, was clearly intended as a counterweight to Soviet propaganda, and his description of Lenin was far from complimentary.[xxv] Although his experience in the Guard Directorate prompted him to research the topic, much of the book’s content came not from his own experience, but rather from material he gathered after defecting and from personal his views of the Soviet regime.
In 1951, not long after the Minister of State Security Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov was arrested, Deryabin was offered two different jobs: Chief of the Personnel Office for the Kremlin Guard, or Party Secretary for the Guard Directorate Personnel Office. Both were promotions and represented opportunities for increased power and influence. However, he was loath to take either because the tense political situation in the Soviet leadership created a high professional risk in the Guard Directorate.[xxvi] From 1951 to 1953, the Guard Directorate had five different chiefs. Deryabin later learned that the Guard Directorate was completely shaken up after Stalin’s death and many of the officers were sent into exile in Siberia.[xxvii]
Deryabin’s friend in the Deputy Minister of State Security’s office, who had helped him transfer from Barnaul to Moscow five years earlier, recommended that he consider a position in foreign intelligence instead. Deryabin saw a move to foreign intelligence as a relief from the disillusionment that had build up inside him during his five years in the Guard Directorate. He hoped that foreign intelligence would offer a break from monitoring his own colleagues and represented what Deryabin called the “cleanest” branch of state security because it directed its energies against foreign threats.[xxviii] In April 1952, Deryabin transferred to the Austria-Germany Section of the MVD Second Directorate.
Initially, Deryabin’s job in the Austria-Germany Section initially involved working as an analyst preparing reports for the Soviet leadership. He found the working environment in the Intelligence Directorate to be very different than in the Guard Directorate. Intelligence personnel were more educated, sophisticated, and world-wise. They did not kowtow to Party propaganda lines and were more likely read foreign newspapers than Pravda. Party secretaries had a more difficult task convincing intelligence officers to follow the Party line.
Deryabin reported that the operations of the Austria-Germany section were heavily dominated by the pursuit of anti-Soviet Germans. As of 1952, the section continued to investigate the German Operation ZEPPELIN, which dispatched recruited Soviet POWs into Soviet territory during World War II. MGB minister Viktor Abakumov launched an operation to recruit ex-Nazis in 1947, and MGB officers regularly interrogated captured Nazi officers, who were held in Soviet prisons into the early 1950s.[xxix] The section was also responsible for counterintelligence operations against the Gehlen Organization, the U.S.-sponsored West German intelligence service led by former Nazi intelligence officer Richard Gehlen.[xxx]
While he was working in Moscow, Deryabin was involved in the July 1952 kidnapping of German lawyer, Dr. Walter Linse, who worked for the Association of Free Jurists, a powerful anti-communist organization in Germany. The leader of the Association, Horst Eerdmann, who was publicly known as Dr. Theo Friedenau, planned to sponsor an International Congress of Free Jurists in July 1952 at which attendees would discuss Soviet crimes in East Germany. The MVD was intent on preventing the conference from proceeding and planned to kidnap Erdmann/Friedenau. However, just before the operation, Erdmann/Friedenau took a trip out of Germany, forcing a change of plans. Deryabin, as the desk officer in Moscow, received a cable from Berlin with a recommendation to substitute Linse for Erdmann/Friedenau. Moscow approved the new target, and the operation occurred on 8 July, just a week before the conference was scheduled to begin. For several years after Linse’s disappearance, Soviet representatives in Germany denied any knowledge of his whereabouts, and Deryabin’s reporting of the operation was the first unequivocal indication of Soviet involvement.[xxxi] The operation had the opposite effect from what the Soviets intended—despite Soviet denials, Linse’s disappearance strengthened the anti-communist cause and served as another example of Soviet criminality in Germany.
Deryabin reported that after Stalin’s death, Beriya commissioned a committee at MVD headquarters to study the MVD representation in Germany. The committee arrived at a number of recommendations, including reducing the size of the Soviet advisor force in East Germany from 2,500 to 350, and turning over most security responsibilities to the East German government. However, on 17 June 1953, mass uprisings occurred in East Germany protesting the region’s economic collapse under Soviet dominance. This, along with Beriya’s arrest, led to another recalculation of the MVD structure and leadership in Germany, and Deryabin reported that at the time of his defection the MVD apparatus in Germany employed 900 people, including administrative and technical support personnel.[xxxii]
Deryabin’s debriefings yielded detailed information about the organization of MVD. His knowledge of the leaders in charge of MVD directorates was somewhat out of date when U.S. and British officials debriefed him, but he eventually identified thousands of Soviet personnel. At the time Deryabin was a Soviet intelligence officer, the First Chief Directorate was responsible for counterintelligence, with sections dedicated to the United States, United Kingdom, and France/Benelux, indicating the powers that Soviet state security considered as the primary counterintelligence threats to the Soviet Union.
The Second Chief Directorate was responsible for foreign intelligence and operations in foreign countries. The United States also had a dedicated section (First Section) in the First Chief Directorate, as did the United Kingdom and its colonies (Second Section). The Third Section, the Austria-Germany Section, was where Deryabin worked. The Fourth Section was dedicated to operations in the rest of Western Europe, while the Fifth Section was organized not geographically, but against Russian émigrés worldwide. Other sections were dedicated to operations in the Near and Middle East, and in the Far East. The Tenth Section was called the Delegations Section, supplying state security officers who accompanied nearly all Soviet delegations and ship crews to monitor the members and prevent them from defecting.[xxxiii]
Deryabin noted that the Soviet government had experienced a series of defeats at the end of the 1940s and early 1950s. They included the Berlin Airlift in 1948, the formation of NATO in 1949, and the American counteractions against Soviet-sponsored military actions in Korea in 1950. Soviet state security was left to try to concentrate its efforts in Germany, and consequently the Austria-Germany Section was the second largest in the Second Chief Directorate only after the American Section.[xxxiv]
Deryabin was aware of one operation run by the Second (British) Section of the Second Chief Directorate against the United Kingdom. The case involved a proposal to recruit the wife of the West German ambassador to London. Her son was a former POW who had been sentenced to 25 years in a forced labor camp in the Soviet Union, and she had submitted a request to the Soviet High Commission in Germany requesting news of her son’s fate. The responsibility for meeting with the woman was assigned to the Third (Austria-Germany) Section, where Deryabin worked. However, because the German government planned to recall the ambassador, the operation was called off.[xxxv]
Deryabin reported that the First Chief (Counterintelligence) Directorate would normally run agents directed at penetrating a foreign intelligence service. But in some cases, another directorate’s agent could also be used for that purpose, such as if the Émigrés Section was running an agent associated with a Russian émigré organization that had exploitable access to a foreign intelligence service. Nevertheless, the First Chief Directorate may still recruit an agent inside the same émigré organization to monitor the Émigrés Section’s agent.[xxxvi]
The Seventh Section, known as the Advisors’ Section, managed MVD activities in Eastern European satellites, with the exception of East Germany. This section managed a team of MVD officers who operated in each Soviet satellite, including a chief advisor, advisors from intelligence and counterintelligence, an advisor for police matters and another for military counterintelligence in the satellites’ military forces.[xxxvii]
Deryabin also provided information about the Eighth Section, known as the Illegals Section, which was divided into two subsections, one for training illegals for service abroad and the other for documenting and dispatching illegals abroad.[xxxviii] He noted that he knew of no illegals operating in Austria while he was at MVD headquarters. He did, however, discuss illegal rezidenturas in Germany, which consisted of German nationals recruited and organized into 3- to 6-person cells directed to collect intelligence on Allied installations in and West German government institutions. Deryabin cited the case of an illegal agent codenamed CHEKH who had access to Bonn government circles and was handled by an MVD case officer in Vienna.[xxxix] As Deryabin’s book was published in 1959, five years after his defection, he also cited the well-publicized case of William August Fisher (aka Rudolph Abel), who was arrested and convicted of espionage in the United States in 1957, to illustrate the activities of the Illegals Section.[xl]
Finally, Deryabin described the Special Bureau, which conducted assassinations and terrorist operations abroad. He reported that the Special Bureau perpetrated the assassinations of Lev Trotsky in 1940 and Walter Krivitsky (Ginsberg) in 1941, although it is unclear whether his information was first-hand regarding these operations.[xli] During his debriefing, he reported that the chief of the Special Bureau, Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov was arrested and executed along with Beriya. Deryabin was probably reporting only his assumptions, unaware that Sudoplatov was not executed but was imprisoned for fifteen years, briefly sharing a cell with defector Yevgeniy Vladimirovich Brik, eventually being released in 1968 and dying only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1996.
Deryabin reported that Soviet state security managed mining and construction projects for a number of years, but in April or May 1953, not long after Stalin’s death, Beriya ordered that they be transferred out of the MVD and into the ministry that was most appropriate for them. The MVD’s Chief Directorate of Gold and Precious Metal Mining, for example, was transferred to the Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy. GULAG was moved to the Ministry of Justice, although GULAG was so large that the Ministry of Justice could not manage it and it was returned to the MVD in January 1954.[xlii]
One organization that was not moved out of the MVD was the Main Administration of Building of the Far North (Главное Управление строительства Дальнего Севера; Dalstroy), which employed forced labor requisitioned from the GULAG to build roads and infrastructure and work in mines in northern Siberia. All of the Dalstroy management personnel were MVD staff officers, and from 1939 to 1948, the chief of Dalstroy was MVD General Lieutenant Ivan Fedorovich Nikishov. Deryabin noted that Nikishov was the Deputy Chief of GULAG in 1953. He reported that so many resettlees and exilees came to the far north to mine gold that the Soviet government established the Magadan Oblast to provide municipal administration for them. Dalstroy also hired paid laborers, who were enticed with high pay and benefits to accept harsh jobs in the far north.[xliii] Another CIA report dated 15 December 1954, also likely from Deryabin, contains substantially the same information about Dalstroy and its relationship with the GULAG.[xliv] Two additional CIA reports from July 1955, probably sourced to Deryabin, provide locations and descriptions of MVD facilities in Moscow, including the offices of Dalstroy and an MVD/MGB hotel and club.[xlv]
After a year and a half at MVD headquarters, Deryabin received his first and only overseas assignment to Vienna in September 1953. He claimed officers who had previously served in the Guard Directorate were typically prohibited from travelling abroad, but his assignment was allowed due to a bureaucratic oversight in the confusion that followed Stalin’s death.[xlvi] Deryabin arrived in Vienna several months after Beriya’s arrest, and his defection came less than two months after Beriya’s execution. According to Deryabin, the charges that led to Beriya’s arrest included attempting to take over the government and using the power of the state security apparatus against the Party. Beriya reportedly issued an order to state security officers across the Soviet Union to monitor Party officials. The plot became known, according to Deryabin, when a state security officer in Ukraine reported the order to the local Party official, who tried to report it to the Central Committee, but Beriya intercepted it. MI6 assessed that Derabin’s information reflected the official Soviet version of Beriya’s indictment that he heard when the 70-page report of Beriya’s charges was read to all state security officers soon after his arrest.[xlvii] Deryabin was not directly involved in the affair, but he recalled seeing tanks on the streets of Moscow on the night of Beriya’s arrest in June 1953 and he learned from his former colleagues in the Guard Directorate that Beriya was arrested.[xlviii]
He was assigned to line SK (советская колония; Soviet colony), which was responsible for the security of Soviet employees in Austria, including those posted to the embassy and delegations visiting Austria. Deryabin complained during debriefings that the Line SK section was very busy, and although it supposed to have seven officers, seldom were more than two or three of them available for Line SK work due to collateral assignments or illnesses.[xlix]
Deryabin wrote briefly about several of the agents he was running at the time of his defection. One was a former White officer whose code name was Builder. Another was a young French woman of Russian extraction who served as the secretary of Louis Saillant, the Secretary-General of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), who provided reports of the office conversations at the WFTU’s Vienna headquarters.[l] He recruited numerous agents among the Soviet colony who reported on the activities of other Soviet employees. He was particularly tasked with monitoring the GRU officers posted in Vienna. The MVD rezident in Vienna reportedly instructed Deryabin, “you must always keep your eye on any GRU personnel.”[li]
As a Line SK officer, Deryabin’s job included investigating disloyalty, and in extreme cases, defections of Soviet employees. In that capacity, Deryabin received a phone call at 5:00 am on 14 February 1954 with a report that a Soviet official, Anatoliy Ignatiyevich Skachkov, had gone missing. The previous evening, Skachkov had come home drunk, packed a suitcase, and bluntly told his wife that he was leaving for the Americans. Skachkov’s frightened wife phoned the embassy security officer, which led to Deryabin’s task to investigate the incident. After investigating for over 24 hours and finding little evidence of Skachkov’s fate, even being instructed, “don’t dig too deep,”[lii] Deryabin began to question whether the Skachkov’s “defection” was actually staged to dispatch him as a double agent to U.S. intelligence. However, at the same time, Deryabin began to wonder “what was it like to leave behind the Soviet state and all it stood for?”[liii] This thought was compounded by an argument with his wife, who questioned him about why he had been out so late, to which he reportedly responded, “Maybe I’ll never come back.”[liv] On 15 February 1954, Deryabin followed that thought and walked into the American Military Command Headquarters in Vienna and requested political asylum.
According to CIA report of his debriefing, Deryabin defected “for a combination of ideological and personal reasons.”[lv] He described his ideological reasons in his public writings: he had become disenchanted with the Soviet leaders’ attitudes toward the Soviet people, fueled by his close association with the Soviet elite during his tenure in the Guard Directorate. His personal reasons included a failing marriage and a feeling of being overworked and underappreciated. He may have also been the victim of denunciations resulting from jealousy: Brook-Shepherd claims that during his time in the Austria-Germany Section in Moscow, a female assistant denounced Deryabin for anti-Stalinist statements—in the form of sharing gossip about Stalin’s son, Vasiliy—after he refused her advances.[lvi] He weathered the ensuing investigation, probably to a great extent because of his connections in the MVD, and was even posted to a foreign assignment, which was clear evidence that the MVD did not take the denunciation seriously. But he was increasingly dissatisfied with his work and sought an escape, which led to his decision to defect.
January and February 1954 were a concentrated time for Soviet defectors. The U.S. National Security Council met on 17 February 1954—just two days after Deryabin’s defection—and mentioned four defectors that had recently come into U.S. custody: one in Norway (Pavlov), one in Japan (Rastvorov), and two in Vienna (Skachkov and Deryabin).[lvii] Although Pavlov had defected in Norway the previous summer, he had arrived in U.S. custody not long before this NSC meeting. The report indicated that the defectors had heavily impacted Soviet intelligence operations in the countries of their defection.
U.S. intelligence exfiltrated Deryabin from Vienna to Salzburg, and later to the United States, and began actively debriefing him. MI6 was brought in for debriefings in March. In a memo probably referring to Deryabin and Skachkov, the CIA noted that from February to September 1954, the two defectors, whom the CIA referred to as AEFILTER 1 and AEFILTER 2, yielded 7,500 pages of material resulting in over 200 reports. The sources identified and described over 3,000 Soviet and other foreign nationals, and drafted a history of the NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD. The memo energetically praised the defectors’ material: “Information such as this could not have been ‘bought’ at any price and has contributed significantly and uniquely to the records and operational potential of the CIA.”[lviii]
Deryabin arrived in the United States in the midst of strong anti-Communist sentiments among the U.S. population and in the U.S. Congress. In June 1952, the U.S. Congress passed an amendment to the Immigration and Naturalization Act that restricted anyone who had been a member of a Communist Party from being naturalized as a U.S. citizen, doubling from five to ten years the length of time such a person must be a legal resident of the United States before he or she could apply for citizenship.[lix] In 1990, a provision was added to that law that allowed the Director of Central Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and Attorney General, to appeal for relief from the ten-year requirement for a person who had “made a contribution to the national security or to the national intelligence mission of the United States.”[lx] Although that provision was formally added only in 1990, it had already been exercised on multiple occasions previously, including in the case of Deryabin. On 18 August 1959, Deryabin, who also used the name Theodore Stanley Orel, was the subject of a special Congressional action that exempted him from the limitations of that law and opened the path for him to become a U.S. citizen.[lxi]
Local media began to report the disappearance of two Soviet officials in Vienna soon after Deryabin’s and Skachkov’s defections in February 1954. However, Deryabin did not officially enter the public eye until 1959. He co-authored a series of two articles with Life magazine journalist Frank Gibney in March 1959, which were expanded later that year and turned into Deryabin’s first book, The Secret World. He also appeared before both the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate in March and May 1959, respectively. After those public appearances, his name became well known in anti-Soviet circles, and over the following 40 years, he collaborated on four more books on Soviet state security, teaming with various co-authors. His last book, Inside Stalin's Kremlin: An Eyewitness Account of Brutality, Duplicity, and Intrigue,[lxii] was published in 1998 after his death. One of his collaborators, retired CIA officer Tennent “Pete” Bagley, co-wrote KGB, Masters of the Soviet Union[lxiii] in 1990, and then accredited Deryabin with providing support for his 2007 book Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games.[lxiv]
Deryabin continued to be consulted for information about Soviet intelligence for over 25 years. In December 1963, the CIA asked him to comment on the case of Lee Harvey Oswald and his Russian wife, Marina, just a few weeks after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Deryabin provided opinions about how they were handled during Oswald’s three years in the Soviet Union, and, while he could not definitively say that the KGB was behind the Kennedy assassination, he asserted that the Soviet Union had much to gain by killing the President.[lxv] His opinions fueled the debate over Soviet complicity in Kennedy’s assassination and impacted the interrogations of another KGB officer, Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, who defected in February 1964 and claimed that the KGB had no connections to Oswald.
Deryabin worked as an operational consultant and planner, as an instructor in training courses, and as a lecturer until his retirement in 1981. He continued to lecture on Soviet intelligence even after retirement. He died in 1992 in the Washington, DC, area.
Notes
- [i] Photo from Deryabin’s Soviet identity document, printed in Peter Deriabin and Frank Gibney, “Red Agent’s Vivid Tale of Terror,” Life, 23 March 1959, p. 111.
- [ii] U.S. Embassy Vienna telegram, 16 February 1954, NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 761.00/2-1654.
- [iii] Peter Deriabin and Frank Gibney, The Secret World (New York: Doubleday, 1959), p. 18.
- [iv] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 33.
- [v] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 40-45.
- [vi] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, pp. 49-50.
- [vii] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 177.
- [viii] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, pp. 55-57.
- [ix] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, pp. 63-66.
- [x] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 63.
- [xi] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 77-78.
- [xii] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, pp. 68-69.
- [xiii] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 81.
- [xiv] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 85.
- [xv] United States Congress. Senate. Judiciary Committee. Communist Controls on Religious Activity, 86th Congress, First Session (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1959). See also Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, pp. 86-87. Rastvorov also testified before the U.S. Senate and discussed Karpov’s role in overseeing religious affairs in the Soviet Union; see United States Congress. Senate. Judiciary Committee. Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States, 84th Congress, Second Session (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1956), part 13, pp. 780-782.
- [xvi] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, pp. 88-90.
- [xvii] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 109.
- [xviii] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 113.
- [xix] United States Congress. House. Committee on Un-American Activities. The Kremlin’s Espionage and Terror Organizations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 6.
- [xx] United States Congress. The Kremlin’s Espionage and Terror Organizations, p. 6-7.
- [xxi] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 118.
- [xxii] United States Congress. The Kremlin’s Espionage and Terror Organizations, p. 7.
- [xxiii] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 124.
- [xxiv] Peter Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1972)
- [xxv] For example, Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror, pp. 169-174.
- [xxvi] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 175.
- [xxvii] United States Congress. House. Committee on Un-American Activities. The Kremlin’s Espionage and Terror Organizations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 12-13.
- [xxviii] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, pp.175-176.
- [xxix] CIA Memo, “Debriefing of Peter Deryabin Concerning Operation ZEPPELIN,” 6 February 1964, CIA FOIA Program.
- [xxx] CIA Memorandum for the Record, “Heinrich MUELLER, last Chief of the Gestapo, Viktor ABAKUMOV, et al,” 18 November 1971, CIA FOIA Program.
- [xxxi] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, pp. 189-192.
- [xxxii] Deryabin Report No. 6, “M.V.D. Organzisation in Germany,” TNA, KV 5/107, serial 93a.
- [xxxiii] Deryabin Debriefing Report, “Organization of the MVD USSR,” undated but from March 1954, TNA, KV 5/107, serial 75a; see also Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, pp. 184-186.
- [xxxiv] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 188.
- [xxxv] Deryabin Report No. 9, “Projected Operation in the U.K. Controlled by the 2nd Section of the S.C.D.,” 10 May 1954, TNA, KV 5/107, serial 93a.
- [xxxvi] Deryabin Report No. 8, “Counter-Intelligence Operations in Western Germany,” 10 May 1954, TNA, KV 5/107, serial 93a. The same report is also at TNA, KV 5/83, serial 97b.
- [xxxvii] Deryabin Debriefing Report, “Organization of the MVD USSR,” p. 8.
- [xxxviii] Deryabin Debriefing Report, “Organization of the MVD USSR,” p. 8.
- [xxxix] Deryabin Report No. 7, “Establishment of Illegal Residentura in Western Germany,” 6 May 1954, TNA, KV 5/107, serial 93a.
- [xl] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, pp. 186-187.
- [xli] Deryabin Debriefing Report, “Organization of the MVD USSR,” p. 6; Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 187.
- [xlii] CIA Report, “Economic Enterprises of the MVD,” 13 July 1955, NARA, RG 319, Entry 134A, Box 138. This report lists the source as DS-2074. It does not list Deryabin’s name; however, the source description matches Deryabin. This same report is also available on the CIA FOIA Reading Room, but the source description is redacted.
- [xliii] CIA Report, “Economic Enterprises of the MVD,” 13 July 1955, NARA, RG 319, Entry 134A, Box 138; this same report is also available via the CIA FOIA Reading Room, but the source description has been redacted.
- [xliv] CIA report, “1. Relationship between Dalstroy and GULAG; 2. Identification of Dalstroy Units,” 15 December 1954, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
- [xlv] CIA Report, “MVD/MGB Clubs,” 1 July 1955, CIA FOIA Reading Room; CIA Report, “1. MVD and MGB Hotels in Moscow; 2. Location of the MVD Office,” 6 July 1955, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
- [xlvi] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 125.
- [xlvii] Deryabin Debriefing Report, “Comments Regarding Beryia,” 25 March 1954, TNA, KV 5/107, serial 77a.
- [xlviii] United States Congress. House. Committee on Un-American Activities. The Kremlin’s Espionage and Terror Organizations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 13.
- [xlix] Deryabin Debriefing Report, “Security of Soviet Personnel and Installations, Vienna,” 25 March 1954, TNA KV 5/107, serial 78a.
- [l] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 9.
- [li] Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, p. 244.
- [lii] Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), p. 107.
- [liii] Peter Deriabin and Frank Gibney, “Red Agent’s Vivid Tale of Terror, Life, 23 March 1959, pp. 111-126. Deryabin places the date at 13 February in Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, pp. 262-263. U.S. Embassy Vienna telegram, 15 February 1954, confirms the 14 February date, although his approach probably occurred in the early hours of the morning; NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 761.00/2-1654. Skachkov was a member of the Soviet Petroleum Administration posted to Vienna. He was not an intelligence officer, so he is not included in detail in this thesis. It appears that MI6 assigned the codename “WEED” to Skachkov; see TNA, KV 5/83, serial 98a.
- [liv] Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 107.
- [lv] CIA Report, “Economic Enterprises of the MVD,” 13 July 1955, NARA, RG 319, Entry 134A, Box 138
- [lvi] Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, pp. 101-102.
- [lvii] Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, “Notes on NSC Meeting – 17 February 1954,” CIA FOIA Reading Room.
- [lviii] CIA memo, “Use of DOB Facilities by SR/DR,” 21 September 1954, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
- [lix] 8 U.S.C. § 1424.
- [lx] U.S. Congress, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 106-120, Section 306.
- [lxi] US. Congress, Private Law 86-105.
- [lxii] Peter Deriabin with Joseph Culver Evans, Inside Stalin's Kremlin: An Eyewitness Account of Brutality, Duplicity, and Intrigue (Washington, DC: Brassey’s Publications, 1998).
- [lxiii] Peter Deriabin and Tennent H. Bagley, KGB, Masters of the Soviet Union (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990).
- [lxiv] Tennent H. Bagley, Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), p. xi.
- [lxv] CIA Memo to FBI, “Peter Deryabin’s Comments on the Kennedy Assassination,” 12 December 1963, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
Published works
- The Secret World
- with Frank Gibney (New York: Doubleday
- 1959) Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars (University Publications of America
- 1984) KGB
- Masters of the Soviet Union
- with Tennent H. Bagley (Hippocrene Books
- 1990) The Spy Who Saved The World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War
- with Jerrold L Schecter (Scribners
- 1992) Inside Stalin's Kremlin: An Eyewitness Account of Brutality
- Duplicity
- and Intrigue (Brasseys Publications
- 1998)