Biography
Grigoriy Feodorovich Pavlov worked in the Murmansk MVD office from 1951 to 1953. He was a Karelian who studied Finnish language, and he was recruited into the MVD as an interpreter for agent meetings and interrogations.
Information about Pavlov comes from several Russian and Norwegian researchers who have published information from archival materials, from an eyewitness who was involved in the Norwegian police investigations that followed Pavlov’s defection, and from U.S. reports of interviews after he was transferred from Norwegian to U.S. control. The eyewitness was Gunnar Haarstad, who was serving as Deputy Chief of the Norwegian Police Surveillance Agency (Politiets Overvåkningstjeneste; POT) at the time of Pavlov’s defection. Haarstad later became the Chief of POT and he wrote an autobiography in 1988 in which he gave his memories of the Pavlov case.[i]
Pavlov’s information was localized to the Murmansk area, including counterintelligence operations in the Murmansk Oblast and intelligence operations extending into northern Norway and Finland. It showed strong Soviet suspicion of foreigners working in the Soviet Union and some Soviet counterintelligence successes against them, as well as a Soviet priority for recruiting low-level sources who could provide on-the-ground perspectives on Norwegian—and thus NATO—military preparations for war against the Soviet Union.
Pavlov was born in January 1922 in village of Pryakka, near Petrozavodsk. His father was exiled to Murmansk in the 1930s, but Pavlov was called into the army during World War II and saw action in Hungary. After the war, Pavlov worked for a time in the local regional committee (raikom) of the town of Pryazha, and then went to Petrozavodsk to study Finnish. While he was at the institute in 1951, he was ordered to appear at the Murmansk MGB office. According to Russian journalist Dmitriy Yermolayev, the order came soon after Pavlov’s sister Aleksandra was arrested and sentenced to a 25-year prison term, implying that Pavlov’s introduction to the MGB was not voluntary.[ii] He was ordered to begin employment with the MGB immediately.
No information is available about Pavlov’s MGB training, but he was involved in both intelligence and counterintelligence missions. Although he held the nominal rank of lieutenant, he stated he was a civilian employee and that he had worn a military uniform only once for an identification badge photograph. Otherwise, he and the rest of the members of his office wore civilian clothes and usually referred to each other by name and patronymic, not rank. He noted that, although it was difficult to get a job in the MVD, it was impossible to leave without prejudice.[iii]
His initial assignment was to translate the results of meetings with a Finnish agent who reported on the activities of a group of Finns in Belokamenka near Murmansk. He was later assigned to conduct surveillance on a person of Finnish descent who had immigrated from the United States. In 1952, he was assigned to monitor the workers on the joint Soviet-Finnish-Norwegian Boris Gleb hydroelectric project along the Pazvik (Paz) River, which flows through all three countries and formed the border of Norway and the Soviet Union. He made contacts with Finnish workers and became aware of several Norwegians who were working as MGB double agents against the Norwegian security service.[iv]
He also had information about the MGB’s investigation into an agent whom the MGB named Oleimainen, who led what the MGB believed to be a Finnish intelligence team into Karelia to monitor Soviet military readiness. The agent was actually Lauri Sohleimainen, a former Finnish soldier who was recruited by POT to collect intelligence on the construction of a military railway along the Norwegian border and the activities of Soviet military airfields in the Murmansk area. Pavlov reported to the Norwegians that the MGB was aware of Sohleimainen in 1952 and had mobilized teams of border guards to locate him and his partner, but had never found him. Nevertheless, the Norwegians were shocked to learn that the MGB knew of Sohleimainen’s missions and was attempting to locate him. The operation also became known to the Finnish government, which became incensed that the Norwegian government was using Finnish citizens to spy on the Soviet Union.
For a short period, Pavlov also worked as a clerk in the MGB agent registry and had access to a card catalogue of agents that were dispatched into Norway and Finland for intelligence missions. He wrote down information from the agent records and sewed slips of paper into the lining of his carry bag, which he brought with him when he defected. The cards primarily contained agent pseudonyms and information about the payments they received, so when he reported them to the Norwegians, it took POT several months to narrow down the real identities. Some of the agents were active prior to or during World War II, and there was no indication that they had conducted espionage since the war. But seven of them were active after the war, tasked with reporting about military outposts in far northern Norway, iron ore output, and local government leaders. One of the suspects reported that he had been tasked with getting a local magistrate drunk and transporting him to the Soviet Union, although he did not fulfill the task.[v] Pavlov’s information, combined with additional POT investigation, was sufficient to indict these seven agents for espionage, and they were arrested in mid-November 1953.
Although Pavlov worked for the MGB, he had knowledge of one GRU agent, whom he knew as “agent Hansen.” According to Haarstad, the MGB had previously recruited “agent Hansen” to perform operational missions but had discarded him as unsuitable. The GRU picked him up in mid-1953 and sent him clandestinely into Norway, but he quickly went missing. Pavlov did not know his real name, but provided enough information for POT to identify “agent Hansen” as Edvin Bernardovich Hansen, a Norwegian-speaking Soviet citizen. The GRU infiltrated Hansen into Norway with a mission to contact two Norwegian citizens who had served as pro-Soviet partisans during the war to persuade them to come back with him to the Soviet Union for training in clandestine communication.[vi] Hansen had not lasted long; the POT arrested him two months before Pavlov’s defection. Pavlov’s information contributed to Hansen’s prosecution, which resulted in a one-year prison sentence and deportation back to the Soviet Union.
Pavlov defected on 18 August 1953 while on a mission along the border with Norway. He had joined the Communist Party less than three weeks prior to his defection. He and a team of MVD officers had traveled to the border under cover of a fishing trip for a meeting with several Norwegian sources. He rowed a boat across the river and turned himself over to Norwegian authorities, who quickly recognized his value. POT surged investigators to the far northern Finnmark province to identify the individuals for whom Pavlov provided only pseudonyms and brief descriptions.[vii]
The espionage trials that resulted from Pavlov’s revelations spurred intense media reaction. Arrests began in November and the newspaper coverage fed already fervent anti-Soviet sentiments in the West. An article published at the time of the trials in June 1954 suggested, “the Finnmark trials will surely disturb the complacency of pro-Russian sympathizers in the north and elsewhere in Norway.”[viii]
Pavlov was in Norwegian custody until the trials ended in the summer of 1954, and he was transferred to U.S. custody in Germany. He was interviewed in July at the U.S. Defector Reception Center (DRC) in Frankfurt, and his debriefer declared him “an extremely disappointing source of information on the MVD and local government activities in the Murmansk area.” Likely because Pavlov had worked for the Pryazha raikom in 1949, his debriefing focused on local government organizations and the salaries of raikom and local soviet leaders. His debriefer wrote that he had “meager information” on those topics, and he was able to provide only superficial information that added little to what U.S. intelligence already knew. The DRC debriefer noted: “source stated that he had given all the information he knew.”[ix]
However, the CIA debriefed him about the Murmansk MVD office and he was able to provide more information than about raikoms, including MVD officers’ identities, positions, salaries, and benefits. He described the structure of the Murmansk MVD operational directorate, including the locations of subunits and border guard detachments. He noted, as did later defector Petr Sergeyevich Deryabin, that the Ministry of Justice took control of forced-labor camps in 1953. Pavlov defected less than two months after Beriya’s arrest, and the arrest induced a state of “semi-panic” in his MVD office, although it resulted in no immediate changes in the administration or personnel.[x]
Yermolayev claims that Pavlov settled in West Germany, encountered unspecified troubles that Yermolayev describes as “typical for defectors,” and eventually committed suicide.[xi] It is unclear where Yermolayev obtained that information or what “typical” problems he was referring to. The KGB apparently believed he was still alive as of 1969, because he is listed in the KGB Wanted List, although the list gave his latest whereabouts as Kiel, Germany, in 1957. A Soviet court sentenced him in absentia to execution in September 1954.[xii] No further documentable information is available about him.
Information about Pavlov comes from several Russian and Norwegian researchers who have published information from archival materials, from an eyewitness who was involved in the Norwegian police investigations that followed Pavlov’s defection, and from U.S. reports of interviews after he was transferred from Norwegian to U.S. control. The eyewitness was Gunnar Haarstad, who was serving as Deputy Chief of the Norwegian Police Surveillance Agency (Politiets Overvåkningstjeneste; POT) at the time of Pavlov’s defection. Haarstad later became the Chief of POT and he wrote an autobiography in 1988 in which he gave his memories of the Pavlov case.[i]
Pavlov’s information was localized to the Murmansk area, including counterintelligence operations in the Murmansk Oblast and intelligence operations extending into northern Norway and Finland. It showed strong Soviet suspicion of foreigners working in the Soviet Union and some Soviet counterintelligence successes against them, as well as a Soviet priority for recruiting low-level sources who could provide on-the-ground perspectives on Norwegian—and thus NATO—military preparations for war against the Soviet Union.
Pavlov was born in January 1922 in village of Pryakka, near Petrozavodsk. His father was exiled to Murmansk in the 1930s, but Pavlov was called into the army during World War II and saw action in Hungary. After the war, Pavlov worked for a time in the local regional committee (raikom) of the town of Pryazha, and then went to Petrozavodsk to study Finnish. While he was at the institute in 1951, he was ordered to appear at the Murmansk MGB office. According to Russian journalist Dmitriy Yermolayev, the order came soon after Pavlov’s sister Aleksandra was arrested and sentenced to a 25-year prison term, implying that Pavlov’s introduction to the MGB was not voluntary.[ii] He was ordered to begin employment with the MGB immediately.
No information is available about Pavlov’s MGB training, but he was involved in both intelligence and counterintelligence missions. Although he held the nominal rank of lieutenant, he stated he was a civilian employee and that he had worn a military uniform only once for an identification badge photograph. Otherwise, he and the rest of the members of his office wore civilian clothes and usually referred to each other by name and patronymic, not rank. He noted that, although it was difficult to get a job in the MVD, it was impossible to leave without prejudice.[iii]
His initial assignment was to translate the results of meetings with a Finnish agent who reported on the activities of a group of Finns in Belokamenka near Murmansk. He was later assigned to conduct surveillance on a person of Finnish descent who had immigrated from the United States. In 1952, he was assigned to monitor the workers on the joint Soviet-Finnish-Norwegian Boris Gleb hydroelectric project along the Pazvik (Paz) River, which flows through all three countries and formed the border of Norway and the Soviet Union. He made contacts with Finnish workers and became aware of several Norwegians who were working as MGB double agents against the Norwegian security service.[iv]
He also had information about the MGB’s investigation into an agent whom the MGB named Oleimainen, who led what the MGB believed to be a Finnish intelligence team into Karelia to monitor Soviet military readiness. The agent was actually Lauri Sohleimainen, a former Finnish soldier who was recruited by POT to collect intelligence on the construction of a military railway along the Norwegian border and the activities of Soviet military airfields in the Murmansk area. Pavlov reported to the Norwegians that the MGB was aware of Sohleimainen in 1952 and had mobilized teams of border guards to locate him and his partner, but had never found him. Nevertheless, the Norwegians were shocked to learn that the MGB knew of Sohleimainen’s missions and was attempting to locate him. The operation also became known to the Finnish government, which became incensed that the Norwegian government was using Finnish citizens to spy on the Soviet Union.
For a short period, Pavlov also worked as a clerk in the MGB agent registry and had access to a card catalogue of agents that were dispatched into Norway and Finland for intelligence missions. He wrote down information from the agent records and sewed slips of paper into the lining of his carry bag, which he brought with him when he defected. The cards primarily contained agent pseudonyms and information about the payments they received, so when he reported them to the Norwegians, it took POT several months to narrow down the real identities. Some of the agents were active prior to or during World War II, and there was no indication that they had conducted espionage since the war. But seven of them were active after the war, tasked with reporting about military outposts in far northern Norway, iron ore output, and local government leaders. One of the suspects reported that he had been tasked with getting a local magistrate drunk and transporting him to the Soviet Union, although he did not fulfill the task.[v] Pavlov’s information, combined with additional POT investigation, was sufficient to indict these seven agents for espionage, and they were arrested in mid-November 1953.
Although Pavlov worked for the MGB, he had knowledge of one GRU agent, whom he knew as “agent Hansen.” According to Haarstad, the MGB had previously recruited “agent Hansen” to perform operational missions but had discarded him as unsuitable. The GRU picked him up in mid-1953 and sent him clandestinely into Norway, but he quickly went missing. Pavlov did not know his real name, but provided enough information for POT to identify “agent Hansen” as Edvin Bernardovich Hansen, a Norwegian-speaking Soviet citizen. The GRU infiltrated Hansen into Norway with a mission to contact two Norwegian citizens who had served as pro-Soviet partisans during the war to persuade them to come back with him to the Soviet Union for training in clandestine communication.[vi] Hansen had not lasted long; the POT arrested him two months before Pavlov’s defection. Pavlov’s information contributed to Hansen’s prosecution, which resulted in a one-year prison sentence and deportation back to the Soviet Union.
Pavlov defected on 18 August 1953 while on a mission along the border with Norway. He had joined the Communist Party less than three weeks prior to his defection. He and a team of MVD officers had traveled to the border under cover of a fishing trip for a meeting with several Norwegian sources. He rowed a boat across the river and turned himself over to Norwegian authorities, who quickly recognized his value. POT surged investigators to the far northern Finnmark province to identify the individuals for whom Pavlov provided only pseudonyms and brief descriptions.[vii]
The espionage trials that resulted from Pavlov’s revelations spurred intense media reaction. Arrests began in November and the newspaper coverage fed already fervent anti-Soviet sentiments in the West. An article published at the time of the trials in June 1954 suggested, “the Finnmark trials will surely disturb the complacency of pro-Russian sympathizers in the north and elsewhere in Norway.”[viii]
Pavlov was in Norwegian custody until the trials ended in the summer of 1954, and he was transferred to U.S. custody in Germany. He was interviewed in July at the U.S. Defector Reception Center (DRC) in Frankfurt, and his debriefer declared him “an extremely disappointing source of information on the MVD and local government activities in the Murmansk area.” Likely because Pavlov had worked for the Pryazha raikom in 1949, his debriefing focused on local government organizations and the salaries of raikom and local soviet leaders. His debriefer wrote that he had “meager information” on those topics, and he was able to provide only superficial information that added little to what U.S. intelligence already knew. The DRC debriefer noted: “source stated that he had given all the information he knew.”[ix]
However, the CIA debriefed him about the Murmansk MVD office and he was able to provide more information than about raikoms, including MVD officers’ identities, positions, salaries, and benefits. He described the structure of the Murmansk MVD operational directorate, including the locations of subunits and border guard detachments. He noted, as did later defector Petr Sergeyevich Deryabin, that the Ministry of Justice took control of forced-labor camps in 1953. Pavlov defected less than two months after Beriya’s arrest, and the arrest induced a state of “semi-panic” in his MVD office, although it resulted in no immediate changes in the administration or personnel.[x]
Yermolayev claims that Pavlov settled in West Germany, encountered unspecified troubles that Yermolayev describes as “typical for defectors,” and eventually committed suicide.[xi] It is unclear where Yermolayev obtained that information or what “typical” problems he was referring to. The KGB apparently believed he was still alive as of 1969, because he is listed in the KGB Wanted List, although the list gave his latest whereabouts as Kiel, Germany, in 1957. A Soviet court sentenced him in absentia to execution in September 1954.[xii] No further documentable information is available about him.
Notes
- [i] Gunnar Haarstad, I Hemmelig Tjeneste: Etterretning og overvåking i krig og fred (In Secret Service: Intelligence and Surveillance in War and Peace) (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1988), pp. 134-142.
- [ii] Dmitriy Anatolyevich Yermolayev, “Тайные Битвы Спецслужб” (“Secret Battles of Special Services”), Murmanskiy Vestnik, 15-17 June 2005, http://www.mvestnik.ru/shwpgn.asp?pid=200506162116 (link blocked in some regions of the world).
- [iii] CIA Report, “1. MVD Administration Data; 2. Miscellaneous Data on Resistance and on Military Installations,” 18 August 1954, CIA FOIA Reading Room. The source of this report is redacted, but the context makes it clear that Pavlov is the source.
- [iv] Yermolayev, “Secret Battles of Special Services,” 16 June 2005.
- [v] “Intrigue in the Arctic: Revelations in Spy Trial,” The Times, 1 June 1954.
- [vi] Trond Bergh and Knut Einar Eriksen, Den Hemmelige Krigen: Vervåking i Norge 1914-1997. Bind 1: Overvåkingssystemet bygges opp 1914-1955 (The Secret War: Surveillance in Norway 1914-1997. Volume 1: Surveillance System is Built Up 1914-1955) (Oslo: Cappelen Akademik Forlag, 1998), pp. 250-252; Haarstad, In Secret Service: Intelligence and Surveillance in War and Peace, pp. 139-140.
- [vii] Haarstad, In Secret Service: Intelligence and Surveillance in War and Peace, p. 135.
- [viii] “Intrigue in the Arctic: Revelations in Spy Trial,” The Times, 1 June 1954.
- [ix] HICOG Frankfurt, “Peripheral: Special Interrogation Report on Soviet Defector (DS-599),” 6 August 1954, NARA, RG 466, Peripheral Reporting Unit, DS-599.
- [x] CIA Report, “1. MVD Administration Data; 2. Miscellaneous Data on Resistance and on Military Installations,” 18 August 1954, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
- [xi] Yermolayev, “Secret Battles of Special Services,” 16 June 2005.
- [xii] KGB Wanted List," Entry number 196, HIA, Vladislav Krasnov Writings file.