Intelligence and state security officers who left Soviet serviceCompiled by Kevin Riehle

Entry 114 of 121 · revised 2026-11-22

Yuriy Aleksandrovich Rastvorov

Юрий Александрович Растворов

Biography

The Post-Stalin Purge era saw a more diverse set of defection locations than the early Cold War era. While most in the 1940s were in Germany or Austria, where large concentrations of Soviet forces were located, Yuriy Aleksandrovich Rastvorov[i] defected in a different location where the United States maintained a large military presence: Japan. Japan had not been the recipient of an intelligence officer defector since 1938, when Genrikh Lyushkov walked across the border from the Soviet Far East into Japanese-controlled China (see separate entry in this database). Unlike Lyushkov, Rastvorov was already in Japan as part of the Soviet mission in Tokyo when he made contact with both British and U.S. authorities to request asylum in January 1954.

Information about Rastvorov comes from voluminous debriefings by U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, the investigations that resulted from those debriefings, and from several biographical articles that appeared in Life magazine in 1954 and in Japanese press in 1956.[ii] Early drafts of Rastvorov’s 1954 articles are also in Boris Nikolaevskiy’s papers at the Hoover Institution Archive.[iii] Gordon Brook-Shepherd interviewed Rastvorov in 1987 and included his reminiscences in the book The Storm Birds, including Rastvorov’s claim that the 1950s articles were ghostwritten and embellished his story.[iv] Additionally, his disappearance and the trials springing from his revelations caused a media sensation in Japan and many articles appeared during the year after his defection, containing a mix of accurate and speculative information. More recently, several U.S. individuals who had access to him after his defection have written memoirs including their experiences with the Rastvorov case.[v]

Rastvorov was born in July 1921 in Dmitrievsk, Kursk Oblast in western Russia. His father was a Soviet Army officer and his grandfather a peasant farmer. Rastvorov moved around to various cities in Russia during his childhood as his father took increasingly responsible jobs in the Bolshevik Party. In 1929, Rastvorov’s grandfather was labeled a kulak because he had two cows, two horses, and hired farm hands during the harvest season. This resulted in the confiscation of all of his property, and he later died of starvation. Rastvorov’s father had joined the Bolshevik Party in 1919 and served as a military commissar and did nothing to assist out of fear of being branded a counterrevolutionary. But his “kulak” ancestry eventually caught up to him and his “social origins” led to his suspension from the Party for a short period in 1936.[vi] After an NKVD investigation he was reinstated and eventually retired as a colonel after World War II, but the father’s arrest also later tarnished Rastvorov’s career.

Rastvorov graduated from secondary school in 1939 and briefly studied at the Moscow Geodesic Institute, until he was drafted into the Soviet Army in November 1939. Rastvorov’s unit was deployed to Latvia and Lithuania from June to October 1940 in the operation to occupy the Baltic republics. In September 1940, Rastvorov was selected for training in the Institute of Oriental Languages to study Japanese. The GRU’s identification of him as a potential candidate was likely based on his membership in the Komsomol and his athleticism—he was a member of a swimming team. But his enrollment was almost derailed, because his uncle had been also arrested in 1936 and was serving a 10-year prison sentence. Rastvorov asked his father to vouch for him—by this time his father had been rehabilitated—and Rastvorov was admitted, which he ”considered a miracle.”[vii] He was officially inducted into the Razvedupr when he entered the school.

Rastvorov’s language training was interrupted by the German invasion, and in June 1941 he was sent to an intelligence/sabotage school where he received training in covert operations. His instructors taught that Germany was the enemy, and that the Japanese would be the enemy in the future.[viii] Although he was trained in military sabotage operations, he was involved in a series of other operations not directly related to sabotage. He received practical experience and was commissioned as a lieutenant later in 1941 while working as a Japanese interpreter for Soviet forces in eastern Mongolia. He traveled to the Soviet Far East as part of a team of Japanese linguists for propaganda operations. However, Rastvorov had completed less than a year of Japanese training, so his proficiency was not sufficient to allow him to participate directly in operations. Consequently, he and his colleagues were employed as typesetters for a Soviet Japanese-language propaganda newspaper.[ix]

The following year he was involved in a major deception operation targeting the United States. American politician Wendell Willkie traveled to the Soviet Union in 1942 as U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s envoy at the invitation of the Soviet government to tour Soviet farms. Members of Rastvorov’s unit were mobilized to a sovkhoz several weeks before Willkie’s arrival to clean up the farm and to play the role of farm workers—all of the young men from the sovkhoz had been drafted, leaving only old and infirm workers. A truckload of food and alcohol arrived just before Willkie’s party to give the appearance that the sovkhoz was bursting with abundance. The farm reverted to its original decrepit state after the visit.[x]

Rastvorov returned to Japanese language training in July 1942, but received an assignment in February 1943 to Khabarovsk in the Soviet Far East to run operations on Sakhalin Island. He had little desire to go to Sakhalin, so he contacted a friend who was working in the GRU Fifth Section, which was responsible for decrypting Japanese ciphers. He transferred to Khabarovsk, but spent only a few weeks there before receiving a reassignment to the Fifth Section. The move was facilitated partially because he was dating the daughter of a Soviet Army general. About the same time, the whole GRU Fifth Section was transferred to the NKGB for administrative reasons, and Rastvorov moved into the NKGB with the rest of the section.[xi]

Rastvorov was also dissatisfied with his job in the Fifth Section and started looking for a more exciting job. In January 1944 his whole unit was again assigned to Khabarovsk, but he made it clear to his supervisor that he did not want to go. After only three days there he volunteered for a deployment to the Chechen-Ingushskaya Autonomous Republic to participate in the resettlement of Chechens, the same operation that Burlutskiy described in detail when he defected seven months before Rastvorov.[xii]

Rastvorov took leave to visit his family in Moscow after the Chechen operation and while there he visited another friend who was working as an NKVD instructor. He told the friend that he was not satisfied with his job and wanted a more operational assignment. The friend suggested that he write a letter to the Commissar of State Security Merkulov and ask for a reassignment, which led to him being reassigned to NKGB foreign intelligence in April 1944. In August he was sent to clandestine operations training, where students were divided into two cohorts: one training for operations against the main target, the United States; and the other focused on the second tier targets, Germany, Japan, China, and Italy. Because of his Japanese language training, Rastvorov was assigned to the second cohort.[xiii]

Rastvorov graduated from intelligence training in June 1945 and began his operational career in the NKGB Japan Section. He was designated to travel to Japan, but in the interim he participated in operations to recruit sources among Japanese diplomats, particularly using women as bait to lure targets into compromising situations.[xiv] Rastvorov arrived for his first foreign assignment in Japan in February 1946 under cover as a diplomatic courier. His jobs included processing NKGB mail, handling Japanese sources, and working as a Japanese and English translator. According to Rastvorov, Soviet perceptions of the United States began to worsen during his tour in Japan in 1946, resulting in increased suspicion of even benign acts by American servicemen. Rastvorov mentioned an example of an American officer giving baby formula to a Soviet representative for a newborn baby. Another Soviet officer claimed that the Americans were trying to bribe the recipient, and demanded that he be sent home.[xv]

Rastvorov’s assignment in Japan suddenly ended when he was recalled to the Soviet Union in December 1946 to face allegations of disloyalty. He was summoned to a board of inquiry because he had failed to mention his father’s expulsion from the Party in 1936, even though his father had been later restored to full Party membership. Rastvorov was subjected to what he called a three-month “humiliating investigation,” but was eventually reinstated in his position in the Japan Section. However, the incident left Rastvorov with negative feelings about the Soviet Union.[xvi]

After being exonerated, Rastvorov was posted back to Khabarovsk from January to August 1948 to participate in interrogations and recruitments of Japanese personnel interned when the Soviet Union occupied Manchuria at the end of World War II.[xvii] The Soviet Union viewed Japanese detainees as an intelligence source pool, and the NKGB screened them and gave them ideological training in preparation for recruiting them and repatriating them to Japan. U.S. counterintelligence in Japan became aware of these clandestine sources in the late 1940s and captured some of them, using them as double agents against the NKGB/MGB in what the CIC labeled “Project STITCH.”[xviii] CIC learned that repatriated Japanese detainees were assigned to report the locations, activities, and strengths of U.S. military forces, particularly U.S. intelligence units, their commanding officers, and U.S. methods for dispatching intelligence agents to Sakhalin Island.[xix] Although CIC neutralized some of these repatriated detainees, others remained at large and obeyed NKGB/MGB instructions to become clandestine sources, including at least one of Rastvorov’s future agents.

Rastvorov arrived back in Tokyo in July 1950, and began to run Japanese and American sources. He was in Tokyo in March 1953 when Stalin died and Beriya began to solidify his power. Rastvorov later wrote, “The thought of Beriya’s rise to the pinnacle raised the specter of the passing of the whole Soviet empire to the exclusive power of the dreaded police and terror agencies of the government, which neither the Party nor the Army could possibly control or check as they had on occasion in the past.”[xx] However, Beriya was arrested in June, followed by mass arrests and a purge of the MVD.[xxi] The arrest had a significant impact on Rastvorov, and according to one of his Japanese agents, he lost his typical cheerfulness and became fearful.[xxii] Rastvorov later purportedly wrote, “My own life was profoundly influenced by the Beriya crisis. My slowly-ripening decision to leave the Soviet mission and to break with the Communist regime and system was hastened by the purge of Beriya, portending as it did dismissals and trials of many high officials. The news of his fall struck us like a bombshell on my 32nd birthday, July 11, 1953.”[xxiii]

The first of Rastvorov’s three Life magazine articles described the internecine struggles that followed Stalin’s death, leading to Beriya’s arrest. Authors disagree about whether Rastvorov wrote the 1954 Life magazine articles himself or if a ghostwriter wrote some portions. In the draft version of the article in Boris Nikolaevskiy’s archives, Rastvorov supposedly wrote, “Although I was in faraway Tokyo during the eventful period, I was on the inside of the most sensitive sector of the far-flung Soviet machine of power, drawing as it constantly does upon the live sources in Moscow which were making history… With the special couriers from the MVD and other intelligence services in Moscow visiting us in Japan, little of consequence even in the way of Kremlin gossip, failed to reach our ears.”[xxiv] However, Brook-Shepherd claims Rastvorov’s “version (at least in the published form) of the power struggle in Moscow after Stalin’s death had to be based entirely on snippets picket up while in Tokyo, and he himself complained of how cutoff the Soviet mission that had always felt.”[xxv] E. Howard Hunt, who was working in the CIA station in the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo when Rastvorov defected, claimed “we were able to further extend [Rastvorov’s] usefulness by having a writer pen three articles for Life magazine, ostensibly by Rastvorov.”[xxvi] However, Serge Kovaleski, the son of Fred Kovaleski, Rastvorov’s CIA handler in the United States, wrote that Rastvorov admitted to have written the articles in 1978.[xxvii] The biographic information in the 1954 Life magazine articles and the 1956 Yomiuri Japan News series closely mirrors the information in Rastvorov’s debriefings, indicating that the information originated with Rastvorov, although portions were probably elaborated for propaganda effect.

Some of the information that made its way to Japan about the succession machinations in Moscow came with MGB couriers who carried operational material and funds. Rastvorov noted one individual who was operating under cover as the purser on a Soviet ship that pulled into a Japanese port soon after Beriya’s arrest supposedly for a mechanical overhaul. The purser was actually an MGB officer who was couriering $150,000 for the Japanese Communist Party. He also brought the latest rumors from Moscow.[xxviii]

Not long after arriving in Tokyo Rastvorov joined the Tokyo Lawn Tennis Club, a gathering place for diplomats and wealthy foreigners. His objective was to make contact with and target Americans for recruitment. He developed friendships with Americans and British servicemen at the tennis club and submitted several names to Moscow for intelligence development. But none of the leads progressed very far, and his involvement at the tennis club did more to open him to Western influences than to provide recruitments.

He first reached out to British authorities in May 1953 when he submitted a request to attend the concert and ball at the British embassy in honor of Queen Elizabeth II’s coronation. He did not get invited to the events, but he did show up at a private party hosted by a British embassy staff member ten days later, and after consuming a large amount of alcohol he expressed his discontent with his job at the Soviet mission. He continued to express similar views over the following months with fellow members of the tennis club, and by September the SIS recognized him as a potential defector and began preparations to transport him out of Tokyo should he express the desire.[xxix]

Rastvorov had also met an American during his tour in Japan, Maude Burris, whom he approached in March 1951 asking for private tutoring in American-style English language, habits, customs, housing, dress, and living. Rastvorov introduced himself as “George” from the Soviet mission in Japan, and recommended that Burris not make it generally known that she was meeting with him. Burris reported the contact to a friend who worked in CIC, and the friend recommended that she proceed with teaching him but not be seen in public with him. Rastvorov met Burris every Sunday in 1951 and approximately three times per month in 1952. Their meetings became less frequent in 1953, and when she saw him in July 1953 he seemed worried and uneasy.[xxx] She noted that his behavior changed markedly after the Beriya purge. He mentioned that he had heard nothing from his family and did not know how his then eight-year-old daughter was doing.

The upheaval in Moscow added to Rastvorov’s already existing dissatisfaction with the Soviet system and led him to make overt statements to Burris about his unhappiness with the Soviet Union. At least as early as September 1953, U.S. intelligence had also identified Rastvorov as a possible candidate for defection,[xxxi] and CIC showed Burris a photo of Rastvorov, whom she identified him as the “George” that she had been teaching. After a three-month gap, Rastvorov reappeared at Burris’s hotel in October 1953 asking whether she planned to return to the United States. He told her that if she left Japan, there would be no one left whom he could trust or confide in. He told Burris that he was unhappy in his work and that he was forced to do many things that he did not want to do. He compared Burris’s life as an American with the life of a Soviet citizen, and preferred the former because Americans could save money and acquire whatever luxuries they wanted, while Soviets struggled just to have necessities. Rastvorov saw Burris on Christmas Day 1953 and again expressed his dissatisfaction, although they met in a crowded hotel lobby and they could not talk privately.[xxxii]

On 18 January 1954, the British embassy received an urgent request from the Soviet mission for a visa for Rastvorov to transit through Hong Kong. On 22 January, the rezidentura chief, Aleksandr Fedorovich Nosenko, called him into his office and told that he would depart for Moscow later that day; the date was subsequently moved to 25 January to give him time to pack his belongings. On 23 January, he told a British contact that he feared for his life and he agreed to defect to the British; the fact that his passport was in British possession for a visa simplified matters of his immigration. A British embassy vehicle picked him up and took him to an awaiting British aircraft. However, a strong snowstorm hit Japan that evening and prevented the plane from departing. After hours of waiting for clearance to take off, he decided to wait for the following day. According to Brook-Shepherd, the British government had not informed the Americans that they planned to exfiltrate Rastvorov from Japan.[xxxiii]

Rastvorov approached Burris on 24 January and asked for help to get out of Japan. He told her that he was in trouble, and that he had agreed to defect to British authorities and requested asylum, but that inclement weather had prevented the airplane from taking off. He changed his mind and decided to defect to the Americans instead, claiming to be afraid that the British planned to exchange him for British subjects who were in Soviet custody. He told Burris that he was one of “Beriya’s men,” and that he had been ordered to leave Japan immediately. He was sure that he would be executed when he arrived in the Soviet Union, and he was ready to defect to the Americans. Burris put him in contact with CIC, and they facilitated his immediate transport to Okinawa. He told the Americans that he had only the following options: return to the Soviet Union and face certain imprisonment and possible execution; commit suicide; defect to the British authorities; defect to the American authorities. He chose the last option, provided the Americans could make him “disappear without a trace.”[xxxiv]

From January to August 1954, Rastvorov’s location and fate were the subject of media debate and Soviet angst. Soon after his disappearance, press stories speculated variously that he had been killed by Soviet agents, had gone underground with Japanese friends to avoid returning to the Soviet Union, had been arrested in the act of receiving classified documents from a U.S. soldier, or had sought refuge with the American government. Soviet-inspired stories claimed that the Americans had kidnapped him and held him against his will. Leaks from unnamed U.S. sources publicly identified him as a Soviet intelligence officer, a claim that Soviet authorities vigorously denied. The Soviet mission in Japan announced on 2 February that seven members of its 31-man staff were suddenly returning to the Soviet Union. Some sources also claimed that two of the officials returning to the Soviet Union had expressed a desire to seek asylum with the U.S. government, but that they were forcibly loaded onto a Soviet ship.[xxxv]

Rastvorov’s disappearance created a tense situation for the U.S. State Department as it refused to give clear information about Rastvorov’s whereabouts for over six months. The Soviet embassy in Washington delivered a moderately worded diplomatic note on 15 February requesting that the State Department clarify press reports that claimed that Rastvorov was in the hands of U.S. intelligence.[xxxvi] The State Department responded perfunctorily that it was investigating the matter.[xxxvii] Soviet Ambassador to Washington Georgiy Nikolayevich Zarubin met personally with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on 24 March and again on 26 July to communicate an increasingly impatient Soviet demand for information about the State Department investigation of Rastvorov’s fate.[xxxviii] The State Department returned another perfunctory note on 9 April, but this time it contained the personal assurances of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that he would do everything he could to clarify the situation.[xxxix] It was another four months until verified word of Rastvorov’s desire for political asylum broke.

The Soviet mission resorted to a variety of measures to turn the Rastvorov case to its propaganda advantage. The Soviet public narrative contrasted the Rastvorov case with the Gouzenko case, claiming that, while Gouzenko surrendered himself willingly, Rastvorov was kidnapped.[xl] The Soviet mission circulated a claim that members of an American “spy ring” had approached a Soviet ship captain on 23 February and offered him $50,000 to defect. The story continued that when the captain declined, the “spy ring” tried to coerce him. The Soviet propaganda tied the story to Rastvorov’s disappearance, claiming that it was another in a series of provocative American actions directed against the Soviet Union in Japan.[xli] The story was utterly false.

The States Department finally delivered a diplomatic note to the Soviet embassy in Washington on 13 August confirming that Rastvorov had requested political asylum in the United States. The Soviet Embassy returned a sharply worded note claiming that it must have taken the United States government seven months to coerce Rastvorov to remain in the United States.[xlii] The States Department did not respond.

The next day, Rastvorov made his first public appearance since disappearing in January. He gave a press briefing explaining his reasons for defecting. He said, “I wanted to live like a decent human being. I wanted to be treated decently and I wanted to be able to treat other people decently.”

In the interval between Rastvorov’s disappearance and the U.S. government’s acknowledgment of his status, CIC and CIA conducted extensive joint debriefings leading to a series of investigations into Soviet intelligence activities, priorities, and targets. Rastvorov, whom the Defector Reception Center assigned serial number DS-2072, provided the identities of Japanese and American recruited sources working on U.S. military facilities, in U.S intelligence organizations, and in Japanese government organizations. CIC expressed frustration with the CIA’s restrictive handling of Rastvorov’s leads, stating “This headquarters [CIC] has not been authorized to fully exploit the many leads…due to the various restriction placed by Domestic Division.”[xliii] CIC wrote a week later, “Due to certain binding agreements with another intelligence agency in this theater, and the highly classified status of source, this headquarters has not been permitted to release details regarding source.”[xliv] Nevertheless, the CIC conducted a series of investigations into Rastvorov’s leads, finding a concerted effort to penetrate the U.S. military in Japan and to follow up with those contacts once they returned to the United States.

The CIC looked into a number of U.S. military members whom Rastvorov reported as having contact with Soviet intelligence in Japan. One was Captain James Arthur Reilly, a U.S. Army doctor who had become acquainted with Rastvorov at the Tokyo Lawn Tennis Club. CIC had interviewed Reilly in August or September 1953 about his relationship with Rastvorov, and Reilly had told Rastvorov about the interview, in which CIC had asked him to be a source of information on Rastvorov. He refused to cooperate with the CIC and soon thereafter redeployed to the United States. Rastvorov sent him a letter prior to his defection, care of the tennis club manager, saying “Hope the we will someday meet in the free world…”[xlv]

Another was Ernest J. Lissner, a CIC officer who approached Rastvorov’s predecessor in Tokyo in 1947 and offered classified U.S. intelligence information about Japanese ultra-nationalist organizations, for which he received 2,000 dollars. He offered further documents for even higher prices, but the Soviets assessed the documents to be of low value and dropped him as a source in 1948. However, in 1951, Rastvorov’s superior, Colonel Petr Andreyevich Shibayev arrived in Japan with a task to recontact Lissner and procure a copy of the U.S.-Japan peace treaty, to which the Soviet Union had raised strong objections at the San Francisco Conference in September 1951. Lissner was likely deceiving both the United States and the Soviets, as his initial approach was done under the control of the U.S. Army. However, he had probably also offered more information than his U.S. counterintelligence handlers had authorized, and Rastvorov’s reporting provided insights into the operation that the CIC did not have. Moscow ordered the Tokyo MGB rezidentura in 1952 to acquire his U.S.-based address so the MGB could contact him there. However, Rastvorov’s colleagues suspected Lissner was a double agent and they intentionally provided only a partial address in the United States so the MGB could not successfully contact him.[xlvi]

A third U.S. military member the Soviet intelligence targeted in Japan was Rose Esther Ennis, a Russian language teacher in the U.S. Far Eastern Command G2. Ratsvorov reported that prior to 1952 the Tokyo MVD rezidentura had received instructions from Moscow to recruit her. She was born in Russia and still had two sisters living there, and the MGB planned to exploit those relationships. However, the MGB eventually decided against approaching her in Japan because her employment in the G2 made it too dangerous. She returned to the United States in January 1952, and the MGB recommended retaining her contact information so she could be approached at a later time. Unaware of the MGB’s targeting, the CIC investigated Ennis in early 1951 because she was born in Russia and still had relatives there. The investigation concluded that Ennis was a loyal Army officer against whom there was no suspicion.[xlvii]

Although the CIC was only partially aware of these Soviet operational activities prior to Rastvorov’s defection, it had investigated another U.S. service member and documented his contacts with Rastvorov during the spring and summer of 1953. In April 1953, John Byington, a U.S. Air Force military policeman stationed in Japan since September 1952, approached the Soviet mission in Tokyo and offered to sell U.S. military information. Rastvorov received him and gave him an initial payment of 10,000 yen (less than 30 dollars). He made the mistake of going to the Soviet mission with his Japanese girlfriend, who notified U.S. Air Force counterintelligence and cooperated in the ensuing investigation. Byington was arrested in May 1953. Air Force counterintelligence did not appear to be aware at the time the Rastvorov was an intelligence officer.[xlviii]

Although it appeared that the Soviet Union had gained little from its attempts to contact these U.S. military members, Rastvorov’s reporting about Soviet intelligence targeting them and the types of information the MGB was seeking was of value to U.S. counterintelligence.

Rastvorov also provided details about the Soviet recruitment of Japanese individuals who had access to U.S. and Japanese national security information. Three mid-level Japanese Foreign Ministry officials were arrested on 14 August 1954, the same day Rastvorov appeared in public to make a statement about his decision. All three were charged with violating the National Public Service Law that regulated the activities of government employees. A Japanese press report from September 1954 claimed that over 80 people were involved in the Rastvorov case, including American, British, Indian, Chinese, Israeli, and Pakistani nationals involved in espionage, money laundering and drug trafficking.[xlix] Twenty-two were arrested and three more were being sought for arrest. But because the only Japanese law available to use in the case was the National Public Service Law, the only people who could be formally prosecuted were the three Foreign Ministry employees, although Japanese officials considered applying the Foreign Exchange Control Law to prosecute money laundering.[l]

Higurashi Nobunori had formerly worked as a secretary in the European-American Affairs Bureau and was in charge of Soviet affairs. He had worked at the Japanese embassy in Moscow during World War II, and he was approached in Moscow and given the option of cooperating with the Soviet Union or being arrested for espionage. He claimed to be afraid that if he refused to cooperate he would never see Japan again, so he agreed.[li] When he returned to Japan in 1946, he worked as a Russian specialist and was known for openly exhibiting left-leaning political view. In the summer of 1947, the Soviets recontacted him in Japan and gave code name “YABA.” [lii] He supplied secret Foreign Ministry information about U.S.-Japanese military and political relations until soon after Rastvorov’s defection, when he resigned from his government position. Rastvorov learned before his posting to Japan that Higurashi was one the MGB’s most valuable agents in Japan. In addition to general political and military information, Higurashi also provided information valuable to the Soviet Union for counterintelligence purposes. He informed his Soviet handler about the Japanese government’s decision not to expel members of the Soviet Mission even though the Japanese government did not recognize it after World War II as a diplomatic mission. He provided information about the Japanese government’s handling of an espionage case in 1952 involving Masao Mitsuhashi and Wataru Kaji. Mitsuhashi, like Higurashi, had been recruited as a Soviet agent while being held as a POW in the Soviet Union; however, he became a U.S. double agent when he returned to Japan and provided U.S.-controlled information by radio to his Soviet handlers.[liii] Higurashi also used his contacts with the Metropolitan Police Board to provide the Soviet Union with information about Rastvorov’s contacts with John Byington, which Rastvorov assessed was highly valuable.[liv] Higurashi committed suicide on 28 August 1954 after admitting to Japanese police that he had spied for the Soviets.[lv]

Shoji Hiroshi was a secretary in the International Cooperation Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. Like Higurashi, he was posted to Moscow during the war where he was involved in Japanese intelligence, and he was interned after the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in 1945, but he denied having been recruited before he was repatriated in 1946.[lvi] He continued to deny any guilt, and no information is available about the specific information that he allegedly provided to the Soviets.

Takamore Shigero was a secretary of the Economic Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. He was a Russian linguist who had previously worked in the Soviet Union for the Northern Sakhalin Oil Company, and was positively inclined toward Russia. His recruitment happened differently from other Soviet agents in Japan, in that he was not initially recruited while interned in the Soviet Union. He first met Soviet representatives in Japan when he was called to interpret for Japanese-Russian business negotiations. He had access to information from Japanese diplomatic missions related to shipping and trade, and he was formally recruited as a Soviet agent in December 1950 to provide Japanese economic information, Japanese sentiments toward Russia, documents and reference materials from the Foreign Office, and most importantly, information about U.S. economic policy in Japan.

Between early 1951 and the fall of 1953 he received regular payments from Soviet handlers in return for classified Japanese Foreign office information. He reported a series of documents that he passed to his Soviet handlers, including a table of economic agreements that Japan had entered into with other countries and classified information about Japanese trade statistics, including economic conditions after the outbreak of the war in Korea. He also provided a document detailing the Foreign Office’s policy on handling vessels from communist nations entering Japanese ports, which indicated that the Japanese government would not refuse entry of Soviet vessels into Japanese ports after the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan.[lvii] His handlers also requested a copy of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s communications codes, but Takamore did not have access to them. He claimed that the Soviets gave him the nickname the “economist” because of the information he provided.

Takamore‘s Soviet handlers expected that they would have to depart Japan after the Peace Treaty, so they gave him instructions for reporting his information to a radio operator who would relay it to the Soviet Union. His Soviet handler trained him to encode and decode messages, and later gave him money to buy his own radio and a camera with which to make microphotographs.[lviii] However, when the treaty went into force in April 1952, Japan did not demand that the Soviet Mission be closed, and Soviet officers continued to contact him in person. However, he did receive test radio messages, although he complained that they were difficult to understand.[lix]

Another Japanese source of Rastvorov’s was Masaji Shii was a Japanese intelligence officer who was interned in Manchuria by Soviet forces at the end of WWII and recruited as a Soviet source while in captivity. The MVD used him as an interpreter in a POW camp in Karaganda, Kazakhstan, because of his Russian language proficiency. He was repatriated to Japan in November 1948 with instructions to await further contact by Soviet intelligence and avoid any contact with the Japanese Communist Party.[lx]

In February 1949, Shii was hired by the G2, U.S. Far Eastern Command, to debrief other repatriated Japanese officers and perform intelligence analysis.[lxi] He admitted to having been recruited by the MVD, but he was told simply to report any suspicious contacts to CIC and he worked for the U.S. military until February 1953. In February 1954, just a few weeks after Rastvorov’s arrest, Shii approached the Tokyo Metropolitan Police requesting police protection because, admitting that he had been in contact with Rastvorov and feared for his life after Rastvorov’s disappearance. CIC interviewed Shii and he admitted to having been associated with Rastvorov from September 1951 to January 1954, during which time they met almost 40 times. He claimed in his interviews that he wanted to clarify his actions related to Rastvorov in case Rastvorov had escaped to the Americans and tried to exaggerate Shii’s role, which he claimed was only in the best interests of Japan.[lxii]

During his time working for the G2, Shii reported to Rastvorov about U.S. intelligence interest in mapping Soviet cities for possible future military targeting.[lxiii] Rastvorov also asked Shii in February 1952 to submit a report based on his opinions of the Korean conflict, to which he responded with information about U.S. military capabilities in Korea, which he claimed to have obtained from newspapers and magazines. In January 1953, Rastvorov tasked Shii to write a report about Korea, specifically about the future plans of U.S. forces in Korea. In December 1953, Rastvorov again tasked Shii to write a report, this time about U.S. plans for deploying atomic weapons and delivery capabilities to Japan. Shii again claimed to have provided a report about U.S. atomic weapons in Okinawa and plans for placing atomic artillery in Hokkaido and South Korea based only on newspaper reporting. He also claimed to have exaggerated U.S. atomic strength to give the Soviet Union grounds for demanding that U.S. forces be removed from Japan. Rastvorov also asked Shii for information about three specific U.S. military intelligence officers, but Shii did not known them and could provide no information.[lxiv]

Shii provided Rastvorov with information about Japanese policies that he considered were wrong. He reported about the re-militarization of Japan, including unit structures, training, and dispositions, again purportedly based on publicly available information. He claimed to oppose the re-militarization of Japan and hoped that by giving the information to the Soviet Union, he could put pressure on the Japanese government to put more priority on social development instead. He also reported about the domestic and foreign policies of the Shigeru Yoshida cabinet, advocating for friendly relations with all foreign powers, including China and the Soviet Union, and emphasizing the need to repatriate Japanese internees. On the political front, Rastvorov tasked Shii to confirm or refute a rumor that the Japanese Communist Party had established a revolutionary military affairs committee, and if true, to report on its structure and disposition. From November 1953 until March 1954, Shii worked for the Japanese Foreign Ministry, where he analyzed information about China, Taiwan, and Korea. He gave Rastvorov information indicating that many employees in the Foreign Office wanted to see Japan resume normal relations with China.[lxv]

Japanese press indicated that Rastvorov’s collection priorities included information about the reorganization and reinforcement of U.S. air bases in Japan, including the deployment of heavy bombers, and the Far Eastern Air Force’s strategic plan in the event of an atomic war. He also was rumored to have been trying to collect information about a U.S. biological weapons program.[lxvi]

CIC and CIA initially jointly debriefed Rastvorov on Okinawa. CIC argued, “it is strongly recommended that this important intelligence personality be retained in Okinawa for the purpose of immediate exploitation by CIC of timely and extremely valuable information directly affecting the intelligence collection responsibilities and security of U.S. Security Forces in the Far East.”[lxvii] CIC further maintained that it should retain precedence in the case, because “the operational level responsibility for U.S. Security Forces security—Army, Air Force, Navy—throughout the Far East Command rests squarely with the Counter Intelligence Corps, and therefore cannot be delegated.”[lxviii] Nevertheless, after only a few weeks Rastvorov was evacuated to the United States and CIA took complete control. CIC continued to provide interrogation questions, particularly related to Soviet intelligence activities directed against the U.S. military in Japan, but the CIA took charge of settling Rastvorov in the United States.

Rastvorov lived in the United States under the pseudonym Martin Simons for the next 50 years until his death in 2004.[lxix] In 1959, he was the subject of a private law in the U.S. Congress that cleared the way for him to receive U.S. citizenship. The law, which identified him with curious adaptation of his pseudonym, Frol Martin Simonov, was enacted on 21 September 1959, just a few weeks after Petr Sergeyevich Deryabin received a similar honor.[lxx] Rastvorov was listed in the KGB Wanted List, which indicated that he was sentenced in absentia to execution in September 1954.[lxxi]

Notes

  1. [i] Photo from Rastvorov’s identity card for access to U.S. facilities in Japan, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  2. [ii] Yuri Rastvorov, "How Red Titans Fought for Supreme Power" in Life, 29 November 1954; "Red Fraud and Intrigue in the Far East" in Life, 6 December 1954; "Goodby to Red Terror" in Life, 13 December 1954; Yuri Rastvorov, “What I Did as a Spy in Japan,” Yomiuri Japan News, 5-part series, 23-27 July 1956.
  3. [iii] Yuri A. Rastvorov, “Beria’s Plot” and “The Soviet Hand in Korea,” HIA, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 295, folder 21 (microfilm reel 255).
  4. [iv] Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), pp. 69-84.
  5. [v] See for example, Serge F. Kovaleski, “The Most Dangerous Game,” Washington Post, 15 January 2006; and E. Howard Hunt, Greg Aunapu, American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA, Watergate and Beyond (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), pp. 92-94.
  6. [vi] G2, U.S. Forces Far East report, “RASTVOROV, Yurii Alexandrovitch,” 25 March 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627. The same story was later published in "Goodby to Red Terror," Life, 13 December 1954, p. 52.
  7. [vii] G2, U.S. Forces Far East report, “RASTVOROV, Yurii Alexandrovitch,” 25 March 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627. See also Prokhorov, Сколько стоит продать Родину? (What is the Cost of Betraying One's Homeland?) (Moscow: OLMA-Press, 2005), p. 208.
  8. [viii] G2, U.S. Forces Far East report, “RASTVOROV, Yurii Alexandrovitch,” 25 March 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  9. [ix] G2, U.S. Forces Far East report, “RASTVOROV, Yurii Alexandrovitch,” 25 March 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  10. [x] Yuri Rastvorov, "Red Fraud and Intrigue in the Far East" in Life, 6 December 1954, pp. 178, 180.
  11. [xi] 441st CIC Detachment Agent Report, “RASTVOROV, Yurii Alexandrovitch,” 2 February 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  12. [xii] G2, U.S. Forces Far East report, “RASTVOROV, Yurii Alexandrovitch,” 25 March 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  13. [xiii] 441st CIC Detachment Report of Investigation, “RASTVOROV, Yuriy A.,” 2 February 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627. He did not specifically mention the United Kingdom as a target.
  14. [xiv] Yuri Rastvorov, "Red Fraud and Intrigue in the Far East" in Life, 6 December 1954, p. 182.
  15. [xv] Yuri Rastvorov, "Red Fraud and Intrigue in the Far East" in Life, 6 December 1954, p. 190.
  16. [xvi] 441st CIC Detachment Report of Investigation, “RASTVOROV, Yuriy A.,” 2 February 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  17. [xvii] 441st CIC Detachment Report of Investigation, “RASTVOROV, Yuriy A.,” 6 March 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  18. [xviii] Project Stitch, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 134A, Box 64.
  19. [xix] Project STITCH, vol. 2 of 4, folder 1 of 1, Espionage Study #9, Sakhalin Island, page 59, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 134A, Box 64.
  20. [xx] Rastvorov, “Beria’s Plot,” p. 15.
  21. [xxi] Rastvorov, “Beria’s Plot,” pp. 20-21.
  22. [xxii] “Ex-Major Shii Reveals his Present State of Mind,” Sangyo Keizai Shimbun, 15 August 1954, translation in NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  23. [xxiii] Rastvorov, “Beria’s Plot,” pp. 21-22.
  24. [xxiv] Rastvorov, “Beria’s Plot,” p. 4.
  25. [xxv] Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, pp. 82-83.
  26. [xxvi] E. Howard Hunt, Greg Aunapu, American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA, Watergate and Beyond (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), p. 94.
  27. [xxvii] Kovaleski, “The Most Dangerous Game,” Washington Post, 15 January 2006.
  28. [xxviii] Rastvorov, “Beria’s Plot,” p. 8.
  29. [xxix] Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, pp. 75-77.
  30. [xxx] 441st CIC Detachment Agent Report “RASTVOROV, Yuriy A.,” 26 January 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  31. [xxxi] 441st CIC Detachment memo to G2, U.S. Far Eastern Forces, 15 September 1953, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  32. [xxxii] 441st CIC Detachment Agent Report “RASTVOROV, Yuriy A.,” 26 January 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  33. [xxxiii] Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, pp. 80-81.
  34. [xxxiv] 441st CIC Detachment Agent Report “RASTVOROV, Yuriy A.,” 25 January 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  35. [xxxv] U.S. Embassy Tokyo telegram, 4 February 1954, NARA RG 59, 601.6194/2-454.
  36. [xxxvi] Soviet Embassy Washington diplomatic note, 15 February 1954, NARA, RG 59, 601.6194/2-1554.
  37. [xxxvii] State Department diplomatic note, 19 February 1954, NARA, RG 59, 601.6194/2-1554.
  38. [xxxviii] Soviet Embassy diplomatic notes, 5 and 24 March 1954, NARA, RG 59, 601.6194/3-554 and 3-2454.
  39. [xxxix] State Department diplomatic note, 9 April 1954, NARA, RG 59, 601.6194/4-954.
  40. [xl] “Russians State Rastvorov is ‘Not Another Gouzenko’,” Mainichi, 6 February 1954.
  41. [xli] U.S. Embassy Tokyo telegram, 4 March 1954, NARA, RG 59, 601.6194/3-454.
  42. [xlii] Soviet Embassy Washington diplomatic note, 23 August 1954, NARA, RG 59, 601.6154/8-2554.
  43. [xliii] CO, 441st CIC Detachment memo, “2072,” daed 10 March 1954, NARA RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  44. [xliv] CO, 441st CIC Detachment memo, “Transmittal of Summaries of Information,” 16 March 1954, NARA RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  45. [xlv] 441st CIC Detachment Investigative Summary, “REILLY, James Arthur,” 13 March 1945, NARA RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  46. [xlvi] 441st CIC Detachment Investigative Summary, “LISSNER, Ernest J.,” 13 March 1945, NARA RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  47. [xlvii] 441st CIC Detachment Investigative Summary, “ENNIS, Rose Esther” 13 March 1945, NARA RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  48. [xlviii] 441st CIC Detachment Agent report, “BYINGTON, John M.” 3 June 1953, NARA RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627; 441st CIC Detachment Agent reports, 28 April 1954 and 4 May 1954, NARA RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 716.
  49. [xlix] “Rastvorov Case Assumes Serious Proportions,“ Yomimuri, 28 September 1954, summary translation in NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  50. [l] Spies Involved in Rastvorov Case,” Sangyo Keizai Shimbun, 21 August 1954, summary translation in NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  51. [li] CIC investigative report, “HIGURASHI Nobinuri,” 10 September 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 289; “Spy Ends His Life After Confessing,” New York Times, 29 August 1954.
  52. [lii] CIC investigative report, “HIGURASHI Nobinuri,” 10 September 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 289.
  53. [liii] “Jap Says He’s a Spy for both U.S. and Russia,” Chicago Tribune, 17 December 1952, p.
  54. [liv] CIC investigative report, “HIGURASHI Nobinuri,” 4 November 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 289.
  55. [lv] CIC investigative report, “HIGURASHI Nobinuri,” 10 November 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 289.
  56. [lvi] CIC investigative report, “SHOJI Hiroshi,” 18 November 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 722.
  57. [lvii] CIC investigative report, “TAKAMORE Shigeru,” 7 January 1955, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 716, Takamore file.
  58. [lviii] CIC investigative report, “TAKAMORE Shigeru,” 11 January 1955, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 716, Takamore file.
  59. [lix] CIC investigative report, “TAKAMORE Shigeru,” 18 December 1954 and 31 January 1955, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 716, Takamore file.
  60. [lx] Copy of SHII Masaji investigative file from 1950 is in NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  61. [lxi] 441st CIC Detachment investigative summary, 5 May 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 716.
  62. [lxii] 441st CIC Detachment Agent report, 12 May 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 716.
  63. [lxiii] 441st CIC Detachment Agent report, 12 May 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 716.
  64. [lxiv] 441st CIC Detachment Agent report, 12 May 1954, NARA RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 716.
  65. [lxv] 441st CIC Detachment Agent report, 12 May 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 716.
  66. [lxvi] “US May Reveal the Truth on the Rastvorov Case,” Sangyo Keizai Shimbun, 27 June 1954, translation in NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  67. [lxvii] 441st CIC Detachment memo to G2, AFFE, 27 January 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  68. [lxviii] 441st CIC Detachment memo to G2, AFFE, 7 February 1954, NARA, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
  69. [lxix] Kovaleski, “The Most Dangerous Game,” Washington Post, 15 January 2006
  70. [lxx] U.S. Congress, Private Law 86-218, approved 21 September 1959.
  71. [lxxi] “KGB Wanted List,” Entry number 337, HIA, Vladislav Krasnov Writings file.

Published works

  • "How Red Titans Fought for Supreme Power
  • " Life
  • 29 November 1954. "Red Fraud and Intrigue in the Far East
  • " Life
  • 6 December 1954. "Good Bye to Red Terror
  • " Life
  • 13 December 1954.

Cite this entry

Kevin Riehle, “Rastvorov , Yuriy Aleksandrovich,” Soviet Defectors Database, revised 2026-11-22, https://sovietdefectors.com/defector/rastvorov-yuriy-aleksandrovich/