Biography
Information about Georgiy Ivanovich Samusev is in a CIC file called the “Soviet and Satellite Document Project,” which collected information about Soviet travel and identification documents for operational purposes. Thus, it contains only a subset of the CIC reports that resulted from Samusev’s debriefing. One of the missing reports is his initial debriefing in which he provided his biographic background. He was, however, listed in the 1969 “KGB Wanted List,” which gives some partial information about his life before his deployment to Germany.[i]
Samusev was born in 1914 in Taseyevo Region of the Krasnoyarsk Kray, in central Siberia. In contrast with many of the young, inexperienced officers of the Early Cold War group, Samusev attended an NKVD intelligence school in Moscow before the war, from 1938 to 1940, and was initially assigned as a militia investigator in the Krasnoyarsk Kray. He was a Party member and studied in military-political academy of the Siberian Military District. He was transferred into the NKVD in 1943, where he attended a counterintelligence school for SMERSH officers.
The CIC debriefing of Samusev included questions about the system of MGB training schools. He admitted that he had not been to an MGB school for a few years, but from what he had heard from other officers arriving in Germany the system had changed little. He assessed that 70 percent of the training was devoted to operational topics, such as agent recruiting and handling, types of operations, and interrogation methods. Samusev stated that high-pressure and violent interrogation methods are not taught in schools, but are left to the individual investigator’s innovativeness and are authorized only by a section chief. The remaining training time consisted of political lectures, study of the political and economic geography of the USSR and the principal foreign powers, foreign language, and administrative tasks. The curriculum included training on foreign intelligence services, particularly German, Japanese, American, British, and French. He noted that one change in the training since he was in the MGB school was the substitution of English as the primary foreign language in place of German, although he does not mention when that change occurred.[ii]
Samusev had come from a local militia background before he joined the NKVD, so he was able to describe the structures of both the MGB and the MVD at the local level. He provided details of the functions of both MGB and MVD sections at the ministry and oblast levels, and stated that, while they existed as separate ministries, the MGB and MVD closely coordinated their operations and investigations and regularly shared agents and operational information. The primary difference between them was that the MVD answered to the local party hierarchy, while the MGB answered only to the MGB headquarters in Moscow.[iii]
Samusev was assigned to the Eberswalde operations group near the Polish border of Germany in 1945 after the war. He stated that the chief of the MGB in Germany, Nikolay Kuzmich Kovalchuk, who arrived in Germany in September 1946, ordered that the primary task for MGB elements in Germany was to uncover and neutralize foreign intelligence agent networks in the Soviet zone. He strengthened the MGB second departments, which were responsible for foreign counterintelligence and dispatching agents into the western zones for intelligence purposes. The MGB used several categories of agents to support these operations: German POWs repatriated to the Soviet zone; Germans with personal or business connections in the western zones; owners of hotels and restaurants frequented by foreigners; black marketers who did business in the western zones; prostitutes; and priests, doctors, and teachers who might be able to work or be accepted in the western zones. Kovalchuk was kept personally abreast of all agents that MGB second departments dispatched into the western zones.[iv]
As of 1948, Samusev held the rank of senior lieutenant and the position of senior operational agent. In December 1948, he applied for home leave with an expected return date of 20 January 1949. He used the approved time away from work to disappear from his unit and slip out of the Soviet Zone with his girlfriend. He defected on 27 December 1948, but because he was scheduled to travel the long distance to Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, he assessed that his unit would not start looking for him until 25 January. He had been very careful to avoid giving any suspicion that he planned to escape and he was convinced that no one knew of his whereabouts.[v] He provides no details of his motivation for defection.
His confidence was misplaced. The MGB/KGB located him in U.S. custody and continued to monitor his whereabouts for over a decade. The KGB received a report that that he had been resettled in Chile in 1950. In 1961, he was running a café in Santiago and periodically visited the U.S. embassy.[vi] However, the KGB’s information ends there, and no further information is available about his whereabouts or death.
Samusev was born in 1914 in Taseyevo Region of the Krasnoyarsk Kray, in central Siberia. In contrast with many of the young, inexperienced officers of the Early Cold War group, Samusev attended an NKVD intelligence school in Moscow before the war, from 1938 to 1940, and was initially assigned as a militia investigator in the Krasnoyarsk Kray. He was a Party member and studied in military-political academy of the Siberian Military District. He was transferred into the NKVD in 1943, where he attended a counterintelligence school for SMERSH officers.
The CIC debriefing of Samusev included questions about the system of MGB training schools. He admitted that he had not been to an MGB school for a few years, but from what he had heard from other officers arriving in Germany the system had changed little. He assessed that 70 percent of the training was devoted to operational topics, such as agent recruiting and handling, types of operations, and interrogation methods. Samusev stated that high-pressure and violent interrogation methods are not taught in schools, but are left to the individual investigator’s innovativeness and are authorized only by a section chief. The remaining training time consisted of political lectures, study of the political and economic geography of the USSR and the principal foreign powers, foreign language, and administrative tasks. The curriculum included training on foreign intelligence services, particularly German, Japanese, American, British, and French. He noted that one change in the training since he was in the MGB school was the substitution of English as the primary foreign language in place of German, although he does not mention when that change occurred.[ii]
Samusev had come from a local militia background before he joined the NKVD, so he was able to describe the structures of both the MGB and the MVD at the local level. He provided details of the functions of both MGB and MVD sections at the ministry and oblast levels, and stated that, while they existed as separate ministries, the MGB and MVD closely coordinated their operations and investigations and regularly shared agents and operational information. The primary difference between them was that the MVD answered to the local party hierarchy, while the MGB answered only to the MGB headquarters in Moscow.[iii]
Samusev was assigned to the Eberswalde operations group near the Polish border of Germany in 1945 after the war. He stated that the chief of the MGB in Germany, Nikolay Kuzmich Kovalchuk, who arrived in Germany in September 1946, ordered that the primary task for MGB elements in Germany was to uncover and neutralize foreign intelligence agent networks in the Soviet zone. He strengthened the MGB second departments, which were responsible for foreign counterintelligence and dispatching agents into the western zones for intelligence purposes. The MGB used several categories of agents to support these operations: German POWs repatriated to the Soviet zone; Germans with personal or business connections in the western zones; owners of hotels and restaurants frequented by foreigners; black marketers who did business in the western zones; prostitutes; and priests, doctors, and teachers who might be able to work or be accepted in the western zones. Kovalchuk was kept personally abreast of all agents that MGB second departments dispatched into the western zones.[iv]
As of 1948, Samusev held the rank of senior lieutenant and the position of senior operational agent. In December 1948, he applied for home leave with an expected return date of 20 January 1949. He used the approved time away from work to disappear from his unit and slip out of the Soviet Zone with his girlfriend. He defected on 27 December 1948, but because he was scheduled to travel the long distance to Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, he assessed that his unit would not start looking for him until 25 January. He had been very careful to avoid giving any suspicion that he planned to escape and he was convinced that no one knew of his whereabouts.[v] He provides no details of his motivation for defection.
His confidence was misplaced. The MGB/KGB located him in U.S. custody and continued to monitor his whereabouts for over a decade. The KGB received a report that that he had been resettled in Chile in 1950. In 1961, he was running a café in Santiago and periodically visited the U.S. embassy.[vi] However, the KGB’s information ends there, and no further information is available about his whereabouts or death.
Notes
- [i] Entry number 20, “KGB Wanted List,” HIA, Vladislav Krasnov Writings file.
- [ii] HQ 7707 European Command Intelligence Center interrogation report, “Secret Intelligence (MGB) Schools,” dated 8 February 1949, NARA, RG 319, Entry 134A, Box 29, Soviet and Satellite Document Project, folder 1 of 2, Report of Investigation of Georgi Ivanovitch Samuseff (variant Samousev) (aka Franz Ulrich).
- [iii] HQ 7707 European Command Intelligence Center interrogation report, “MGB/MVD in the USSR, dated 8 February 1949, NARA, RG 319, Entry 134A, Box 29, Soviet and Satellite Document Project, folder 1 of 2, Report of Investigation of Georgi Ivanovitch Samuseff (variant Samousev) (aka Franz Ulrich).
- [iv] HQ 7707 European Command Intelligence Center interrogation report, “MGB Recruiting and Handling of Informant Nets in Soviet and Western Zones of Germany,” dated 17 February 1949, NARA, RG 319, Entry 134A, Box 29, Soviet and Satellite Document Project, folder 1 of 2, Report of Investigation of Georgi Ivanovitch Samuseff (variant Samousev) (aka Franz Ulrich).
- [v] HQ 7707 European Command Intelligence Center interrogation report, “Methods of Investigation,” dated 17 February 1949, NARA, RG 319, Entry 134A, Box 29, Soviet and Satellite Document Project, folder 1 of 2, Report of Investigation of Georgi Ivanovitch Samuseff (variant Samousev) (aka Franz Ulrich).
- [vi] Entry number 20, “KGB Wanted List," HIA, Vladislav Krasnov Writings file.