Biography
Iosif Volfovich Volodarsky[i] was born in Ukraine in 1903. His birthplace and early life are a matter of debate, probably because he used multiple identities with different cover histories during his career. A person identifying herself as Volodarsky's daughter claims he was born in Cherkassy, Ukraine,[ii] which is supported by his visa application for his first entry into the UK in September 1930.[iii] This daughter further states that Iosif’s parents, Wolf and Tselia (Katz) Volodarsky, had both died by the time he was 14 years old, and that he and his older brother Moishe (Misha) left Cherkassy for St. Petersburg, where they enlisted in the Red Army during the revolution, even though Iosif was still underage.[iv]
Separately, author Boris Volodarsky, who identified himself as the defector's nephew, ascribed a different background for Iosif, claiming he was born in Kiev,[v] which is supported by other UK immigration records.[vi] Boris Volodarsky further claims that Iosif moved from Kiev to Moscow, and that the OGPU sent him from there to New York City, where he and his older cousin spent several years. Iosif himself claimed to have visited the United States in 1924 or 1925[vii]; however, that was part of his cover story that did not necessarily correspond with reality. MI5 also possessed information indicating that Iosif had spent time in New York in the 1920s where he became proficient in English, although the specific timeframe is not clear.[viii]
Iosif Volodarsky himself stated that he studied at the Leningrad Industrial Institute from 1924 to 1928 graduating with a degree in oil engineering. In 1927, Volodarsky met his future wife, Elizaveta Grigoriyevna Orlik, in Leningrad and they married in 1928, presumably soon after graduation, when he began working for the Soviet oil company, Soyuzneft.[ix] He also claimed to have studied English while at university so he could read the literature on oil engineering, which was often in English.[x] He worked for Soyuzneft for the next several years.
Volodarsky’s first overseas assignment began when he and his young family arrived in the UK in September 1930 and he was assigned as the assistant manager of the Bristol Branch of Russian Oil Products, a Soyuzneft subsidiary.[xi] Before issuing a visa, the British Consulate in Moscow tasked Scotland Yard to run a check on Volodarsky, and Scotland Yard responded that sources within the OGPU indicated Volodarsky and his wife were not OGPU agents.[xii]
Volodarsky worked in Bristol until sometime before November 1931, when he was listed as an employee at Russia Oil Products headquarters in London.[xiii] He traveled to the Soviet Union from late November 1931 until March 1932,[xiv] and it was probably during this visit that Volodarsky was first co-opted as a Soviet intelligence informant. With his expertise in oil engineering and his position as a Soviet oil company employee, he had good access to information about the British oil industry, which fit into two of the OGPU’s intelligence priorities: industrial intelligence, which the OGPU collected to provide technological advantages to Soviet corporations; and economic counterintelligence, through which the OGPU sought to uncover foreign collusion to the disadvantage of Russian companies. These two OGPU priorities consistently steered Volodarsky’s work for the next six years.
Volodarsky first came to the attention of MI5 in September 1932 when he contacted Marcus Weinstein, an employee of the Shell-Mex oil company in London. Volodarsky portrayed himself to Weinstein as J. Olsen, a journalist working for a Romanian trade publication, and he offered £20 per month for detailed sales figures for all grades of petroleum products from each of the company’s branches. Volodarsky gave Weinstein a cover story that he had previously worked for the Romanian oil company Steaua Română, and that he had recently arrived from Berlin to collect data for trade publications on the Continent.[xv] Weinstein’s first impression of Volodarsky/Olsen was that he was well informed about the British oil industry. At their second meeting, Volodarsky expressed particular interest in the trade volume of an oil contract for the British Expeditionary Force: Volodarsky did not mention it, but Russian Oil Products had recently lost that contract.[xvi] Volodarsky levied specific information requirements about Shell-Mex’s production and sales and asked for updates each month. When Weinstein expressed concern that the requested information was proprietary and could be valuable to Shell-Mex’s competitors, Volodarsky promised that the information would not be used in Britain, and that if Weinstein lost his job for supplying the information, Volodarsky could get him a job in another company.[xvii]
Weinstein was suspicious of the contact and informed his superior, who engaged MI5. MI5 soon realized that Olsen was actually Volodarsky and began to monitor his meetings with Weinstein, and the company created falsified sales data for Weinstein to pass to Volodarsky. On 10 November, Volodarsky left a meeting with Weinsetin with a package of Shell-Mex financial documents and went to the Arcos office, from which he emerged after a few hours with the package[xviii]; he had presumably used Arcos photographic and communications equipment to copy the documents and transmit them to Moscow. Scotland Yard arrested Volodarsky at the next meeting with Weinstein.
MI5 suspected industrial espionage based on a number of factors. Volodarsky was a Russian government employee who had contact with Arcos. Volodarsky claimed to have other sources of information in Shell-Mex, and sources in other British oil companies providing similar sensitive information. The prosecuting attorney argued that a normal journalist would not have the means to offer such large bribes for information.[xix]
It follows…that a Soviet citizen and Soviet State employee who applied through the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet Embassy in London for permission to stay her as an “economist” in the employ of the R.O.P. was engaged in giving money to an official of the Shell-Mex Company and probably to officials of other companies, in return for which he hoped to receive information which would enable R.O.P. and indirectly the Soviet Government, to compete advantageously against British oil companies…[H]is activities constitute a case of commercial espionage on an industry vital both in peace and in war, by the agent of a foreign power.[xx]
Adding to suspicions of Soviet government involvement was the sudden departure of another Russian Oil Products employee, Vladimir Fridman, immediately after Volodarsky’s arrest, raising the possibility that Fridman was also involved in the economic espionage operation. Vladimir was the nephew of R. Fridman, the Chairman of ROP, who was a good friend of Lenin.[xxi] Vladimir was living at the same address as Volodarsky and was likely aware of his cover identity as J. Olsen.[xxii]
Nevertheless, Russian Oil Products, disclaimed any knowledge of Volodarsky’s actions. The court found no fault in the company, but ruled Volodarsky was acting alone, and it does not appear that MI5 pursued the economic espionage suspicion further. Volodarsky was charged with bribery under the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906 and fined £50. He departed the UK in late November and did not return.
There is no firm data about Volodarsky’s activities during the period between his departure from the UK in November 1932 and his arrival in the United States, probably in mid- to late 1933, but he was probably hired into formal OGPU service as an illegal during that time.[xxiii] Volodarsky himself said that an OGPU officer named Furmanov approached him in 1933 in Moscow and invited him to join the OGPU to collect information about oil production, machinery, patents, etc. He claimed that Furmanov is the same OGPU officer noted by Ginzberg in his book I Was Stalin’s Agent.[xxiv]
Volodarsky dated his arrival in the United States in March 1934. His wife Elizaveta gave two different dates, first claiming that he left the Soviet Union in 1934, and later changing the date to 1933.[xxv] He likely went through training in 1933 before his first assignment as an illegal. It was normal for an illegal to spend time in another country to establish the new identity before arriving at the ultimate operating location, and he may have left the Soviet Union in 1933 and arrived in the United States several months later. What is clear is that he was an OGPU illegal when he arrived in the United States using the code name Brit, possibly a reference to his first assignment abroad.
Initially, Volodarsky traveled to the United States alone, leaving his family in Leningrad. But in January 1936 Elizaveta traveled to Moscow to appeal to NKVD leadership to be allowed to join her husband. Elizaveta later told the RCMP during debriefings that INO chief Abram Slutskiy personally assisted with the arrangements. Elizaveta also remembered that an OGPU officer named Furmanov—likely the same person who recruited Volodarsky into the service—provided her with travel money.[xxvi] Volodarsky returned to Moscow to collect his family and they returned to the United States together on 26 June 1936 using the identities of Canadian citizens Arvo Johannes and Catherine Katainen. They discarded these identities as soon as they arrived in the United States.[xxvii]
From his arrival in 1934 until his break from Soviet service in April 1938, Volodarksy fulfilled four major missions in the United States, two for collection and two for operational support:
· Collecting scientific and technical intelligence;
· Participating in the handling of Abraham Glasser, an attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice;
· Facilitating cover documentation for other illegals; and
· Running a cover company that the NKVD used to transfer money around the world.
Volodarsky worked as an assistant to Gaik Badalovich Ovakimyan, an OGPU officer operating under cover as an engineer at Amtorg. Like Volodarsky, Ovakimyan was trained as an engineer. Ovakimyan first arrived in the United States in 1933 and his operations focused particularly on scientific and technical intelligence, although he developed a wide-ranging network of agents who supported all four of the above missions. He worked in the United States for eight years requiring him to extend his visa eleven times, and at an immigration hearing in December 1935 Ovakimyan openly stated that he was in the United States to “investigate American methods of producing chemicals. If I believe such methods would prove beneficial to my country and satisfactory arrangements can be made, I recommend license be obtained so we may produce under patent rights. In some cases we ask your manufacturers to design and sell to us chemical producing machinery.”[xxviii] Volodarsky’s engineering background corresponded well with this mission, which was not always as above board as Ovakimyan made it sound.
One of Volodarsky’s primary assistants in collecting industrial intelligence was Simon A. Rosenberg, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Poland who had been recruited as an OGPU agent in 1932.[xxix] Rosenberg worked with Volodarsky from 1934 until Volodarsky’s departure in 1938, and the FBI took him into custody before Volodarsky’s debriefings in 1940. Volodarsky described a process through which he received technology collection requirements from Ovakimyan and dispatched Rosenberg to factories and engineering facilities around the country to acquire sketches or drawings, sometimes traveling with him. Ovakimyan provided money to Volodarsky and he passed it to Rosenberg to pay sources. Rosenberg communicated the information back to Volodarsky, who evaluated it and determined whether it met the requirement and was worth the money.[xxx] Volodarsky downplayed the significance of the information received through this process. Rosenberg, on the other hand, informed the FBI that the sources of this information were in strategic industries, such an engineer working at Youngstown (Ohio) Sheet and Tube, an engineer working as a rolling mill foreman at Carnegie Illinois Steel Company in Chicago, and an engineer at United Engineering, a steel foundry in Pittsburgh.[xxxi] Volodarsky also noted targeting the McKee Engineering Company in Cleveland and the Master Machine Company in Pittsburgh, which manufactured precision steel machine products at a time when Stalin’s five-year plan was stressing the need to grow the Soviet steel industry.
Volodarsky was also involved in handling agents in explosives and chemical companies, including an unidentified individual at DuPont and another agent named William Stapler at the Hercules Power Company in Delaware. Stapler was not in an engineering position himself, but he had access to all of the company’s innovations and proprietary information. Although the FBI did not know it at the time, the NKVD cut off contact with Stapler after Volodarsky’s revelations that led to Ovakimyan’s arrest in May 1941, but recontacted him a year later after it appeared the FBI was not pursuing leads against Stapler.[xxxii]
In addition to handling sources that passed technological information, Volodarsky was also involved with an agent named Abraham Glasser, who provided inside information about FBI investigations into Soviet activities in the United States. Glasser worked as a research attorney in the Department of Justice, and in 1938 he authored a report titled “The Use of Military Force by the Federal Government in Internal Disturbances,” which examined the federal government’s use of force in race riots, strikes, and other domestic security events.[xxxiii] Glasser’s research duties gave him access to U.S. intelligence about Russian émigré activities and communist recruitment for the Spanish civil war. Volodarsky told the FBI about Glasser’s status as an NKVD agent, and Glasser was fired from his position at the Department of Justice in June 1941, although he was never prosecuted.[xxxiv]
Volodarsky was also heavily involved in facilitating cover documentation for OGPU illegals. Volodarsky worked with two lawyers in Montreal, Aaron Marcovitch and Adolph Stark, who were specialists in obtaining false naturalization certificates, and thence false passports.[xxxv] His most prominent document operation came in September 1936, when he accompanied OGPU illegal Mikhail Borovoy from New York to Canada to facilitate Borovoy receiving a false Canadian passport. The passport was issued in October 1936 under the name Willy Brandes, а naturalized Romanian with his wife Mary.[xxxvi] Borovoy later used this passport to cover his illegal identity in the UK. He and his wife arrived in the UK in about November 1936 to replace Theodore Maly as illegal OGPU rezident. Brandes posted a personal ad in the Daily Telegraph on 5 January 1937 seeking a salesman for American cosmetics[xxxvii]; the ad was probably a signal that he had arrived safely and was settled in the country. In October 1937, MI5 observed Brandes, who was using the name Mr. Stevens, meeting with Percy Glading, a suspect in the Woolwich Arsenal case, which involved the theft and photographing of classified weapons manufacturing designs. Borovoy/Brandes was somehow tipped off about the MI5 investigation and he left the UK on 6 November 1937 and disappeared. Glading and three other defendants were arrested in January 1938. Volodarsky’s revealed his involvement in facilitating Borovoy’s cover documents during his RCMP/FBI interrogations in 1940.
While escorting Borovoy to Canada, Volodarsky also received new Canadian naturalization certificates for himself and his family members. Using the identity Armand Labis Feldman, Volodarsky returned to the United States on 5 January 1937. His passport was issued based on a Canadian certification of naturalization issued 17 December 1936.[xxxviii]
RCMP began to suspect Feldman of being involved in document forgeries in October 1939, before realizing he was identical to Volodarsky. RCMP reported to MI5 that an individual named Feldman, who had received a counterfeit Canadian passport, facilitated the Brandes passport, and was living in New York City. MI5 investigated the names of people living at the address provided by RCMP. There is no indication that MI5 cleared its investigation with the FBI at the time.[xxxix] Once Volodarsky was in custody in Canada, the full story of document facilitation began to take shape.
Volodarsky’s other operational facilitation responsibility was to run a cover company called Round the World Trading Company. On Ovakimyan’s instructions, Volodarsky purchased shares in the company in February 1936 and he used the company to hide NKVD money transactions. Ovakimyan would give Volodarsky money, and Volodarsky deposited it in the company’s accounts and then wrote checks from the company to recipients all over the world.[xl] Volodarsky stated further that NKVD used Round the World Trading Company as cover for economic counterintelligence inquiries. The Soviet Union was often suspicious that American companies were overcharging for the machinery that Amtorg purchased. Volodarsky, using the cover of the Round the World Trading Company, contacted the same American companies with which Amtorg was doing business and asked for price quotations to allow Amtorg compare and determine whether Amtorg was being overcharged.[xli]
Volodarsky claimed that he quit the NKVD in April 1938 and hid from his superiors and the FBI. He moved his family to Neptune City, New Jersey, 60 miles south of New York City, where they were still living under cover identities when the U.S. Census was taken in April 1940.[xlii] On 30 March 1938, he dissolved the Round the World Trading Company and withdrew the company’s money.[xliii] He initially felt safe living in the United States until the war broke out in Europe and he began to fear that U.S. authorities would arrest him in connection with sabotage. He denied having any connection with sabotage, but he felt “jumpy” living in the United States knowing he had illegitimate papers that would be recognized as such if he were required to register as an alien.[xliv] His fear was probably based on the Alien Registration Act (known as the Smith Act), passed by the U.S. Congress in June 1940, which required all non-U.S. citizen adults to register with the U.S. government. Additionally, not knowing that his debriefers included FBI agents, he asked the RCMP not to pass information to the Americans because it might cause him tax problems. But these legal problems were minor compared to with his fear of the NKVD, which, he said, “would not hesitate to get rid of a person if they had any reason for doing so and knew where he was…It is well known that they got rid of many persons.”[xlv] He was afraid that he would be ordered back to Soviet Union and suspected that Soviet agents were searching for him. The FBI commented that it appeared that Volodarsky was more afraid that the NKVD would find him and “take him to account” than that U.S. authorities would find him and arrest him.[xlvi] Consequently, he decided in August 1940 to move to Canada.
On 18 November 1940 the RCMP took Volodarsky into custody based on an FBI referral.[xlvii] He began debriefings by repeating his cover story, giving information that the RCMP and FBI knew was false. The FBI escorted Rosenberg to Canada to give testimony about Volodarsky’s activities, and when Volodarsky was confronted with Rosenberg’s information and the results of U.S. and Canadian investigations, he gradually opened up to provide bona fide information.[xlviii] Eventually he provided significant information about Soviet intelligence operations in the United States, including information that led to the FBI arresting Ovakimyan in May 1941. Volodarsky remained interned in Canada for the remainder of the war, and the FBI continued to debrief him into the 1950s, using him as a source of information about people whom the FBI believed were associated with Soviet intelligence.[xlix]
The FBI referred to Volodarsky in a pamphlet titled The Shameful Years: Thirty Years of Soviet Espionage in the United States, prepared for the U.S. House of Representative, Committee of Un-American Activities in 1952. The pamphlet presented the story roughly as Volodarsky had told it in debriefings, but referring to him in one place as “an individual who must remain anonymous” and in another place using his name Feldman, “who has since disappeared.” Volodarsky was mentioned in the context of Ovakimian’s network, and the pamphlet publicly identified Brandes, Round the World Trading Company, Rosenberg, and other associated individuals.[l]
Volodarsky and his family settled and lived the rest of their lives in Canada. Unlike other defectors, he reverted to his original name, living in Canada as Joseph Wolodarsky. He died in 1990 and Elizaveta died in 1991.[li]
Separately, author Boris Volodarsky, who identified himself as the defector's nephew, ascribed a different background for Iosif, claiming he was born in Kiev,[v] which is supported by other UK immigration records.[vi] Boris Volodarsky further claims that Iosif moved from Kiev to Moscow, and that the OGPU sent him from there to New York City, where he and his older cousin spent several years. Iosif himself claimed to have visited the United States in 1924 or 1925[vii]; however, that was part of his cover story that did not necessarily correspond with reality. MI5 also possessed information indicating that Iosif had spent time in New York in the 1920s where he became proficient in English, although the specific timeframe is not clear.[viii]
Iosif Volodarsky himself stated that he studied at the Leningrad Industrial Institute from 1924 to 1928 graduating with a degree in oil engineering. In 1927, Volodarsky met his future wife, Elizaveta Grigoriyevna Orlik, in Leningrad and they married in 1928, presumably soon after graduation, when he began working for the Soviet oil company, Soyuzneft.[ix] He also claimed to have studied English while at university so he could read the literature on oil engineering, which was often in English.[x] He worked for Soyuzneft for the next several years.
Volodarsky’s first overseas assignment began when he and his young family arrived in the UK in September 1930 and he was assigned as the assistant manager of the Bristol Branch of Russian Oil Products, a Soyuzneft subsidiary.[xi] Before issuing a visa, the British Consulate in Moscow tasked Scotland Yard to run a check on Volodarsky, and Scotland Yard responded that sources within the OGPU indicated Volodarsky and his wife were not OGPU agents.[xii]
Volodarsky worked in Bristol until sometime before November 1931, when he was listed as an employee at Russia Oil Products headquarters in London.[xiii] He traveled to the Soviet Union from late November 1931 until March 1932,[xiv] and it was probably during this visit that Volodarsky was first co-opted as a Soviet intelligence informant. With his expertise in oil engineering and his position as a Soviet oil company employee, he had good access to information about the British oil industry, which fit into two of the OGPU’s intelligence priorities: industrial intelligence, which the OGPU collected to provide technological advantages to Soviet corporations; and economic counterintelligence, through which the OGPU sought to uncover foreign collusion to the disadvantage of Russian companies. These two OGPU priorities consistently steered Volodarsky’s work for the next six years.
Volodarsky first came to the attention of MI5 in September 1932 when he contacted Marcus Weinstein, an employee of the Shell-Mex oil company in London. Volodarsky portrayed himself to Weinstein as J. Olsen, a journalist working for a Romanian trade publication, and he offered £20 per month for detailed sales figures for all grades of petroleum products from each of the company’s branches. Volodarsky gave Weinstein a cover story that he had previously worked for the Romanian oil company Steaua Română, and that he had recently arrived from Berlin to collect data for trade publications on the Continent.[xv] Weinstein’s first impression of Volodarsky/Olsen was that he was well informed about the British oil industry. At their second meeting, Volodarsky expressed particular interest in the trade volume of an oil contract for the British Expeditionary Force: Volodarsky did not mention it, but Russian Oil Products had recently lost that contract.[xvi] Volodarsky levied specific information requirements about Shell-Mex’s production and sales and asked for updates each month. When Weinstein expressed concern that the requested information was proprietary and could be valuable to Shell-Mex’s competitors, Volodarsky promised that the information would not be used in Britain, and that if Weinstein lost his job for supplying the information, Volodarsky could get him a job in another company.[xvii]
Weinstein was suspicious of the contact and informed his superior, who engaged MI5. MI5 soon realized that Olsen was actually Volodarsky and began to monitor his meetings with Weinstein, and the company created falsified sales data for Weinstein to pass to Volodarsky. On 10 November, Volodarsky left a meeting with Weinsetin with a package of Shell-Mex financial documents and went to the Arcos office, from which he emerged after a few hours with the package[xviii]; he had presumably used Arcos photographic and communications equipment to copy the documents and transmit them to Moscow. Scotland Yard arrested Volodarsky at the next meeting with Weinstein.
MI5 suspected industrial espionage based on a number of factors. Volodarsky was a Russian government employee who had contact with Arcos. Volodarsky claimed to have other sources of information in Shell-Mex, and sources in other British oil companies providing similar sensitive information. The prosecuting attorney argued that a normal journalist would not have the means to offer such large bribes for information.[xix]
It follows…that a Soviet citizen and Soviet State employee who applied through the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet Embassy in London for permission to stay her as an “economist” in the employ of the R.O.P. was engaged in giving money to an official of the Shell-Mex Company and probably to officials of other companies, in return for which he hoped to receive information which would enable R.O.P. and indirectly the Soviet Government, to compete advantageously against British oil companies…[H]is activities constitute a case of commercial espionage on an industry vital both in peace and in war, by the agent of a foreign power.[xx]
Adding to suspicions of Soviet government involvement was the sudden departure of another Russian Oil Products employee, Vladimir Fridman, immediately after Volodarsky’s arrest, raising the possibility that Fridman was also involved in the economic espionage operation. Vladimir was the nephew of R. Fridman, the Chairman of ROP, who was a good friend of Lenin.[xxi] Vladimir was living at the same address as Volodarsky and was likely aware of his cover identity as J. Olsen.[xxii]
Nevertheless, Russian Oil Products, disclaimed any knowledge of Volodarsky’s actions. The court found no fault in the company, but ruled Volodarsky was acting alone, and it does not appear that MI5 pursued the economic espionage suspicion further. Volodarsky was charged with bribery under the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906 and fined £50. He departed the UK in late November and did not return.
There is no firm data about Volodarsky’s activities during the period between his departure from the UK in November 1932 and his arrival in the United States, probably in mid- to late 1933, but he was probably hired into formal OGPU service as an illegal during that time.[xxiii] Volodarsky himself said that an OGPU officer named Furmanov approached him in 1933 in Moscow and invited him to join the OGPU to collect information about oil production, machinery, patents, etc. He claimed that Furmanov is the same OGPU officer noted by Ginzberg in his book I Was Stalin’s Agent.[xxiv]
Volodarsky dated his arrival in the United States in March 1934. His wife Elizaveta gave two different dates, first claiming that he left the Soviet Union in 1934, and later changing the date to 1933.[xxv] He likely went through training in 1933 before his first assignment as an illegal. It was normal for an illegal to spend time in another country to establish the new identity before arriving at the ultimate operating location, and he may have left the Soviet Union in 1933 and arrived in the United States several months later. What is clear is that he was an OGPU illegal when he arrived in the United States using the code name Brit, possibly a reference to his first assignment abroad.
Initially, Volodarsky traveled to the United States alone, leaving his family in Leningrad. But in January 1936 Elizaveta traveled to Moscow to appeal to NKVD leadership to be allowed to join her husband. Elizaveta later told the RCMP during debriefings that INO chief Abram Slutskiy personally assisted with the arrangements. Elizaveta also remembered that an OGPU officer named Furmanov—likely the same person who recruited Volodarsky into the service—provided her with travel money.[xxvi] Volodarsky returned to Moscow to collect his family and they returned to the United States together on 26 June 1936 using the identities of Canadian citizens Arvo Johannes and Catherine Katainen. They discarded these identities as soon as they arrived in the United States.[xxvii]
From his arrival in 1934 until his break from Soviet service in April 1938, Volodarksy fulfilled four major missions in the United States, two for collection and two for operational support:
· Collecting scientific and technical intelligence;
· Participating in the handling of Abraham Glasser, an attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice;
· Facilitating cover documentation for other illegals; and
· Running a cover company that the NKVD used to transfer money around the world.
Volodarsky worked as an assistant to Gaik Badalovich Ovakimyan, an OGPU officer operating under cover as an engineer at Amtorg. Like Volodarsky, Ovakimyan was trained as an engineer. Ovakimyan first arrived in the United States in 1933 and his operations focused particularly on scientific and technical intelligence, although he developed a wide-ranging network of agents who supported all four of the above missions. He worked in the United States for eight years requiring him to extend his visa eleven times, and at an immigration hearing in December 1935 Ovakimyan openly stated that he was in the United States to “investigate American methods of producing chemicals. If I believe such methods would prove beneficial to my country and satisfactory arrangements can be made, I recommend license be obtained so we may produce under patent rights. In some cases we ask your manufacturers to design and sell to us chemical producing machinery.”[xxviii] Volodarsky’s engineering background corresponded well with this mission, which was not always as above board as Ovakimyan made it sound.
One of Volodarsky’s primary assistants in collecting industrial intelligence was Simon A. Rosenberg, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Poland who had been recruited as an OGPU agent in 1932.[xxix] Rosenberg worked with Volodarsky from 1934 until Volodarsky’s departure in 1938, and the FBI took him into custody before Volodarsky’s debriefings in 1940. Volodarsky described a process through which he received technology collection requirements from Ovakimyan and dispatched Rosenberg to factories and engineering facilities around the country to acquire sketches or drawings, sometimes traveling with him. Ovakimyan provided money to Volodarsky and he passed it to Rosenberg to pay sources. Rosenberg communicated the information back to Volodarsky, who evaluated it and determined whether it met the requirement and was worth the money.[xxx] Volodarsky downplayed the significance of the information received through this process. Rosenberg, on the other hand, informed the FBI that the sources of this information were in strategic industries, such an engineer working at Youngstown (Ohio) Sheet and Tube, an engineer working as a rolling mill foreman at Carnegie Illinois Steel Company in Chicago, and an engineer at United Engineering, a steel foundry in Pittsburgh.[xxxi] Volodarsky also noted targeting the McKee Engineering Company in Cleveland and the Master Machine Company in Pittsburgh, which manufactured precision steel machine products at a time when Stalin’s five-year plan was stressing the need to grow the Soviet steel industry.
Volodarsky was also involved in handling agents in explosives and chemical companies, including an unidentified individual at DuPont and another agent named William Stapler at the Hercules Power Company in Delaware. Stapler was not in an engineering position himself, but he had access to all of the company’s innovations and proprietary information. Although the FBI did not know it at the time, the NKVD cut off contact with Stapler after Volodarsky’s revelations that led to Ovakimyan’s arrest in May 1941, but recontacted him a year later after it appeared the FBI was not pursuing leads against Stapler.[xxxii]
In addition to handling sources that passed technological information, Volodarsky was also involved with an agent named Abraham Glasser, who provided inside information about FBI investigations into Soviet activities in the United States. Glasser worked as a research attorney in the Department of Justice, and in 1938 he authored a report titled “The Use of Military Force by the Federal Government in Internal Disturbances,” which examined the federal government’s use of force in race riots, strikes, and other domestic security events.[xxxiii] Glasser’s research duties gave him access to U.S. intelligence about Russian émigré activities and communist recruitment for the Spanish civil war. Volodarsky told the FBI about Glasser’s status as an NKVD agent, and Glasser was fired from his position at the Department of Justice in June 1941, although he was never prosecuted.[xxxiv]
Volodarsky was also heavily involved in facilitating cover documentation for OGPU illegals. Volodarsky worked with two lawyers in Montreal, Aaron Marcovitch and Adolph Stark, who were specialists in obtaining false naturalization certificates, and thence false passports.[xxxv] His most prominent document operation came in September 1936, when he accompanied OGPU illegal Mikhail Borovoy from New York to Canada to facilitate Borovoy receiving a false Canadian passport. The passport was issued in October 1936 under the name Willy Brandes, а naturalized Romanian with his wife Mary.[xxxvi] Borovoy later used this passport to cover his illegal identity in the UK. He and his wife arrived in the UK in about November 1936 to replace Theodore Maly as illegal OGPU rezident. Brandes posted a personal ad in the Daily Telegraph on 5 January 1937 seeking a salesman for American cosmetics[xxxvii]; the ad was probably a signal that he had arrived safely and was settled in the country. In October 1937, MI5 observed Brandes, who was using the name Mr. Stevens, meeting with Percy Glading, a suspect in the Woolwich Arsenal case, which involved the theft and photographing of classified weapons manufacturing designs. Borovoy/Brandes was somehow tipped off about the MI5 investigation and he left the UK on 6 November 1937 and disappeared. Glading and three other defendants were arrested in January 1938. Volodarsky’s revealed his involvement in facilitating Borovoy’s cover documents during his RCMP/FBI interrogations in 1940.
While escorting Borovoy to Canada, Volodarsky also received new Canadian naturalization certificates for himself and his family members. Using the identity Armand Labis Feldman, Volodarsky returned to the United States on 5 January 1937. His passport was issued based on a Canadian certification of naturalization issued 17 December 1936.[xxxviii]
RCMP began to suspect Feldman of being involved in document forgeries in October 1939, before realizing he was identical to Volodarsky. RCMP reported to MI5 that an individual named Feldman, who had received a counterfeit Canadian passport, facilitated the Brandes passport, and was living in New York City. MI5 investigated the names of people living at the address provided by RCMP. There is no indication that MI5 cleared its investigation with the FBI at the time.[xxxix] Once Volodarsky was in custody in Canada, the full story of document facilitation began to take shape.
Volodarsky’s other operational facilitation responsibility was to run a cover company called Round the World Trading Company. On Ovakimyan’s instructions, Volodarsky purchased shares in the company in February 1936 and he used the company to hide NKVD money transactions. Ovakimyan would give Volodarsky money, and Volodarsky deposited it in the company’s accounts and then wrote checks from the company to recipients all over the world.[xl] Volodarsky stated further that NKVD used Round the World Trading Company as cover for economic counterintelligence inquiries. The Soviet Union was often suspicious that American companies were overcharging for the machinery that Amtorg purchased. Volodarsky, using the cover of the Round the World Trading Company, contacted the same American companies with which Amtorg was doing business and asked for price quotations to allow Amtorg compare and determine whether Amtorg was being overcharged.[xli]
Volodarsky claimed that he quit the NKVD in April 1938 and hid from his superiors and the FBI. He moved his family to Neptune City, New Jersey, 60 miles south of New York City, where they were still living under cover identities when the U.S. Census was taken in April 1940.[xlii] On 30 March 1938, he dissolved the Round the World Trading Company and withdrew the company’s money.[xliii] He initially felt safe living in the United States until the war broke out in Europe and he began to fear that U.S. authorities would arrest him in connection with sabotage. He denied having any connection with sabotage, but he felt “jumpy” living in the United States knowing he had illegitimate papers that would be recognized as such if he were required to register as an alien.[xliv] His fear was probably based on the Alien Registration Act (known as the Smith Act), passed by the U.S. Congress in June 1940, which required all non-U.S. citizen adults to register with the U.S. government. Additionally, not knowing that his debriefers included FBI agents, he asked the RCMP not to pass information to the Americans because it might cause him tax problems. But these legal problems were minor compared to with his fear of the NKVD, which, he said, “would not hesitate to get rid of a person if they had any reason for doing so and knew where he was…It is well known that they got rid of many persons.”[xlv] He was afraid that he would be ordered back to Soviet Union and suspected that Soviet agents were searching for him. The FBI commented that it appeared that Volodarsky was more afraid that the NKVD would find him and “take him to account” than that U.S. authorities would find him and arrest him.[xlvi] Consequently, he decided in August 1940 to move to Canada.
On 18 November 1940 the RCMP took Volodarsky into custody based on an FBI referral.[xlvii] He began debriefings by repeating his cover story, giving information that the RCMP and FBI knew was false. The FBI escorted Rosenberg to Canada to give testimony about Volodarsky’s activities, and when Volodarsky was confronted with Rosenberg’s information and the results of U.S. and Canadian investigations, he gradually opened up to provide bona fide information.[xlviii] Eventually he provided significant information about Soviet intelligence operations in the United States, including information that led to the FBI arresting Ovakimyan in May 1941. Volodarsky remained interned in Canada for the remainder of the war, and the FBI continued to debrief him into the 1950s, using him as a source of information about people whom the FBI believed were associated with Soviet intelligence.[xlix]
The FBI referred to Volodarsky in a pamphlet titled The Shameful Years: Thirty Years of Soviet Espionage in the United States, prepared for the U.S. House of Representative, Committee of Un-American Activities in 1952. The pamphlet presented the story roughly as Volodarsky had told it in debriefings, but referring to him in one place as “an individual who must remain anonymous” and in another place using his name Feldman, “who has since disappeared.” Volodarsky was mentioned in the context of Ovakimian’s network, and the pamphlet publicly identified Brandes, Round the World Trading Company, Rosenberg, and other associated individuals.[l]
Volodarsky and his family settled and lived the rest of their lives in Canada. Unlike other defectors, he reverted to his original name, living in Canada as Joseph Wolodarsky. He died in 1990 and Elizaveta died in 1991.[li]
Notes
- [i] Photo from visa request, British Embassy Moscow, 19 August 1930, TNA, KV 2/2880.
- [ii] Blog post titled “Wolodarsky from Cherkassy,” by Vicky Rosenberg on Ukraine.com genealogy forum, http://www.ukraine.com/forums/genealogy/14651-wolodarsky-cherkassey.html.
- [iii] Visa application from British Consulate General Moscow, dated 19 August 1930, TNA, KV 2/2880, serial 1a.
- [iv] Blog post titled “Wolodarsky from Cherkassy,” by Vicky Rosenberg, op cit.
- [v] Boris Volodarksy, Stalin’s Agent, p. 125.
- [vi] For example, record of outward-bound passengers dated 27 November 1931, TNA, KV 2/2880, serial 12b. Also, Volodarsky’s immigration registration card, TNA KC 2/2880, serial 51a.
- [vii] FBI investigative summary, p. 7, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a.
- [viii] MI5 memo dated 15 December 1932, TNA, KV 2/2880, serial 72a.
- [ix] Letter from RCMP to MI5 transmitting FBI investigative summary, dated 3 April 1941, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a.
- [x] FBI investigative summary, p. 26-27, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a
- [xi] Intercepted letter from Russian Oil Products headquarters, dated 21 September 1930, TNA, KV 2/2880, serial 3x.
- [xii] Telegram from British Consulate General Moscow to MI5, dated 30 August 1930; response telegram dated the same day; TNA, KV 2/2880, serial 5b.
- [xiii] R.O.P Staff List dated 1 November 1931, TNA, KV 2/2880, serial 11b.
- [xiv] Immigration notices for Joseph Volkovich Volodarksy, TNA, KV 2/2880, serials 12a and 13a.
- [xv] Contact report written by Marcus Weinstein, dated 4 October 1932, TNA, KV 2/2880, serial 19a.
- [xvi] Contact report written by Marcus Weinstein, dated 12 October 1932, TNA, KV 2/2880, serial 21a.
- [xvii] Contact report written by Marcus Weinstein, dated 4 October 1932, TNA, KV 2/2880, serial 19a.
- [xviii] “Corrupt Gift Allegation,” Daily Telegraph, 24 November 1932.
- [xix] “Russian Fined £50 For Bribery,” Daily Express, 25 November 1932; “Oil Trade Secrets: Russian Fined £50 For Bribery,” The Times, 25 November 1932.
- [xx] Case Summary, Joseph Volkovich Volodarsky, dated 2 December 1932, TNA, KV 2/2880, serial 64A.
- [xxi] Vladimir was probably Vladimir Ruvimovich Fridman, the son of Ruvim Naumovich Fridman, a Russian revolutionary who led efforts to obtain oil for Soviet forces during the civil war as a member of the Union of Labor and Defense. In 1923 Ruvim became the chairman of Embaneft, a Soviet oil trust in Kazakhstan; see “Нефтяной Олигарх Феликс Дзержинский” (“Feliks Dzerzhinsky the Oil Oligarch”), Novaya Gazeta, 21 June 2004, http://2004.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2004/43n/n43n-s19.shtml.
- [xxii] MI5 memo dated 16 December 1932, TNA, KV 2/2880, serial 75a; Extract from MI5 report dated 21 December 1932, TNA, KV 2/2880, serial 76a.
- [xxiii] Boris Volodarsky, Stalin’s Agent, p. 125; John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2010), p. 382; David Levy, Stalin's Man in Canada: Fred Rose and Soviet Espionage (New York: Enigma Books, 2015).
- [xxiv] Krivitsky, I Was Stalin’s Agent, p. 253-254. The two Furmanovs have quite different positions within the OGPU: the Furmanov noted by Ginzberg managed counterintelligence operations against anti-Soviet émigré groups; the Furmanov that Volodarsky named was “in charge of the oil section”; FBI investigative summary, p. 19, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a.
- [xxv] Letter from RCMP to MI5 transmitting FBI investigative summary, dated 3 April 1941, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a.
- [xxvi] Letter from RCMP to MI5 transmitting FBI investigative summary, dated 3 April 1941, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a. This second reference to Furmanov may indicate that he was somehow personally related to or close to the Volodarskys. However, it may also be a reference to Ernest Yakovlevich Furman, chief of the INO 7th Department at the time, responsible for economic intelligence and counterintelligence for foreign establishments; see Aleksandr Kolpakidi and Klim Degtyarev, Внешняя разведка СССР (Foreign Intelligence of the USSR) (Moscow: Litres, 2015). The involvement of the 7th Department in funding Volodarsky’s travel would fit with the economic nature of his operations in the United States.
- [xxvii] Letter from RCMP to MI5 transmitting FBI investigative summary, dated 3 April 1941, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a. The shipping manifest listing Volodarsky’s entrance into the United States as Arvo Katainen is available in New York, New York Passenger and Crew Lists, 1909, 1925-1957, contained on FamilySearch.org.
- [xxviii] FBI investigative summary, p. 53, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a.
- [xxix] FBI, The Shameful Years: Thirty Years of Soviet Espionage in the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 16.
- [xxx] FBI investigative summary, p. 23, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a.
- [xxxi] Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America, p. 384, citing Volodarsky’s FBI interrogation.
- [xxxii] FBI interview of Thomas L. Black, memo dated, 7 July 1950, FBI Headquarters file Thomas L. Black, Espionage – R, 65-59191, serial 77; FBI NY memo dated 24 July 1950, FBI Headquarters file Thomas L. Black, Espionage – R, 65-59191, serial 87. See also Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America, pp. 382-383.
- [xxxiii] NARA, RG 60, Entry A1 126.
- [xxxiv] Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America, pp. 203-204.
- [xxxv] FBI investigative summary, multiple pages, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a.
- [xxxvi] RCMP response to MI5 enquiry about Willy Brandes, dated 24 January 1938, TNA, KV 2/1004, serial 6a.
- [xxxvii] Investigative summary of Mr. and Mrs. Willy Brandes @ Mr. and Mrs. Stevens, TNA, KV 2/1004, serial 7a; Newspaper clipping from the Daily Telegraph dated 5 January 1937, TNA, KV 2/1004, serial 1a.
- [xxxviii] Immigration record, Vermont, St. Albans Canadian Border Crossings, contained on FamilySearch.org
- [xxxix] RCMP telegram to MI5, dated 7 October 1939, TNA, KV 2/2881, minute 97.
- [xl] FBI investigative summary, pp. 16, 35, 36, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a
- [xli] FBI investigative summary, p. 19, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a.
- [xlii] 1940 U.S. Census, enumerated in April 1940.
- [xliii] Letter from U.S. Embassy to MI5, dated 21 Mat 1940, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 101a. See also Nigel West, Mortal Crimes: The Greatest Theft in History: Soviet Penetration of the Manhattan Project (New York: Enigma Books, 2004), p. 104.
- [xliv] FBI investigative summary, p. 70-71, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a.
- [xlv] FBI investigative summary, p. 17, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a.
- [xlvi] FBI investigative summary, p. 65, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a.
- [xlvii] FBI investigative summary, p. 6, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a.
- [xlviii] FBI investigative summary, p. 11, TNA, KV 2/2881, serial 115a.
- [xlix] See, for example, FBI New York memo dated 24 July 1950, Thomas L. Black, Espionage – R, FBI HQ file 59181, serial 87.
- [l] FBI, The Shameful Years: Thirty Years of Soviet Espionage in the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 14, 16.
- [li] Joseph and Elizabeth Wolodarsky’s gravestones are located in the Riverfield Cemetery, Howick, Quebec, near Montreal; see http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=141616845.