Biography
Several Soviet intelligence officer defectors have laid claim to the title “highest ranking.” But the individual who legitimately outranked all of others was Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov, who was working as Chief of the Far Eastern NKVD office when he walked across the border into Japanese-controlled Manchuria on 13 June 1938. Although he probably never knew it himself, he drew the attention of a number of countries’ intelligence services, and at least six countries received the information he revealed about Soviet military and state security capabilities, armaments, readiness, and morale. [i]
Lyushkov is the subject of two biographies, one in English and one in Japanese. The English version was written by an American historian, Alvin D. Coox, who specialized in Soviet-Japanese relations. Coox first published an article on Lyushkov in 1968, based on Japanese and American archival materials and interviews of former Japanese intelligence officers who had interacted with Lyushkov.[ii] Coox published an updated and expanded version of the article in 1998, adding more interviews, archival material, and material from the Japanese interrogation of the famous Soviet GRU illegal agent Richard Sorge, who was arrested in 1942.[iii]
Japanese historian Tatsukichi Nishino published a Japanese biography of Lyushkov in 1979. This biography similarly covered Lyushkov’s life, but also included the texts of Japanese magazine and newspaper articles Lyushkov published soon after his defection in which he explained his motive for defection and provided a brief memoir.[iv]
Lyushkov was different from other defectors of this period because his whole career was spent in internal security and political investigations, and he had little involvement with foreign operations. Consequently, unlike other intelligence officer defectors who worked in clandestine assignments, Lyushkov did not use multiple names. Coox claims that Lyushkov was the “first senior NKVD officer ever to defect from within the USSR.”[v] While this is not entirely correct—Fedor Pavlovich Drugov, one of the founders of the Soviet state security apparatus, defected eight years earlier—Lyushkov was more intimately involved with Stalin-era Soviet state security operations than any other defector.
Lyushkov was born in 1900 in Odessa, Ukraine, the youngest of five children. He attended school in Odessa and was drawn to communism by his older brother Sasha in 1917. He joined the Red Army initially as a private in 1917, but participated in covert activities against the Germans in 1918 in southern Ukraine. His early career followed a path similar to other Soviet intelligence officers, beginning as a Bolshevik activist and quickly rising through the political ranks. He participated in the formation of the Odessa soviet in 1918 and became a unit commissar in the Crimea Regiment in 1919. He attended a Bolshevik political training school in September 1919 and was assigned as a brigade political commissar upon graduation, joining an infantry unit during the civil war fighting against White and Polish forces in Ukraine and western Russia.[vi]
Lyushkov’s first state security position was a direct outgrowth of his political activism and training. Beginning in June 1920, he worked in the ChK Special Section (OO) of the 57th Cavalry Division operating in southern Ukraine, which monitored the political reliability of unit members. During this same time, Lyushkov attended the short-lived Odessa Humanities and Social Institute, which was formed in July 1920 as one of the first post-revolution institutes of higher learning in Ukraine. The institute operated until September 1921, when it was merged with the Odessa Institute of People’s Education.[vii] As was typical of the time, Lyushkov probably attended school part-time while working full-time. He served in a series of Ukrainian Republic GPU positions in the Odessa and Kamenets-Podolsk regions from 1921 to 1930, including service in the OGPU Border Guards in western Ukraine from 1923 to 1925.[viii]
In 1925 Lyushkov moved to the Ukrainian GPU headquarters, where he led the Information Department of the Accounting-Organizational Directorate for the next five years. His role during this period is documented in archives made available by the Russian historian Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, including documents from Soviet state security archives that cast light on OGPU activities in the late 1920s and 1930s. Yakovlev led the Russian President’s Commission on Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression in 1991, and the documents “are connected with the crimes of J. V. Stalin, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the VChK, OGPU, NKVD, KGB, and other punitive organizations against their own people, and their frightening, destructive role in the history of Russia and the countries of the former Socialist camp.”[ix]
Among these documents are several that provide insights into the issues that Lyushkov faced in the late 1920s in Ukraine, including mismanagement and corruption. In October 1929 Lyuskov reported about kolkhoz managers claiming unrealistically high grain production, and then demanding that peasants supply enough to meet the exaggerated amounts. The report included an instance when the local grain production committee arrested a peasant for holding a wedding and thereby distracting other peasants from their work.[x] Other reports discuss food shortages and the peasant uprisings in Ukraine.
Lyushkov claimed to Japanese interrogators that he took a foreign assignment in Germany in 1930. He boasted about drawing praise from Stalin himself for analyzing Junkers aircraft factories in Germany, using his proficiency in the German language. Little is known about this assignment besides Lyushkov’s brief mention, but if true, this would be the only foreign assignment of his career, and it appears to have been an analytical not an operational assignment, consistent with his work in the Ukrainian GPU Information Department.[xi]
In 1931, Lyushkov moved to the USSR OGPU in Moscow and continued to rise in ranks. Yakovlev’s archival database contains nearly 40 documents that show Lyushkov in a progression of responsibilities in the OGPU Secret Political Directorate from 1932 to 1936. Documents include OGPU reporting about the horrendous conditions across Russia resulting from collectivization, including severe food shortages that led to starvation, suicides, cannibalism, and child abandonment, including in the North Caucasus and the Far East, where he would later serve in senior NKVD positions. Some peasants resorted to eating grass and cattle feed, while others protested, sabotaged kolkhoz equipment, and threatened government officials. The documents also include reports of OGPU responses, including arrests and mass evictions to prevent armed insurrections and “kulak counterrevolution.”[xii] Lyushkov’s exposure to these events in the early 1930s clearly influenced his decision to defect in 1938. He noted during his interrogation in Japan the widespread anti-Stalin sentiments that resulted from these inhuman conditions. But his involvement in these events also led to some question why the “repentant purger” carried out the murderous orders of Stalin for so long before defecting.[xiii] He recognized this inconsistency, reportedly saying after he arrived in Japan, “Guilty as I am of collaborating in Stalin's foul terror, I shall risk everything, flee to the nearest country, seek asylum as others had done, and carry on the good fight against Stalin from the outside. The dictator's toadies will libel me and say I sold my soul but, one day, when the despot has been overthrown, I shall go home to a bright new Russia.”[xiv]
Lyushkov continued in the Secret Political Directorate until 1936. He was promoted to commissar of state security third rank, the equivalent to a major general, in 1935, and worked as deputy to Georgiy Andreyevich Molchanov, with whom he had worked since at least 1932. After his defection he told Japanese interrogators that he was the lead investigator on the case of Leonid Nikolayev, who assassinated Leningrad Party Chief Sergey Mironovich Kirov in 1934. Lyushkov claimed that Nikolayev was a lone assassin motivated by hatred for the Party, and that Stalin was not the instigator of Kirov’s assassination as many had speculated. As a senior official in the Secret Political Directorate he was also directly involved in purge investigations, including the “Leningrad Terrorist Center” investigation in early 1935, the investigation into a terrorist plot to assassinate Stalin in 1935, and the Trotsky-Zinoviev Terrorist Center investigation that led to the trial of the Sixteen in August 1936.[xv]
Leyba Lazarevich Feldbin (better known as Aleksandr Mikhailovich Orlov), who defected to the United States a month after Lyushkov, discussed these investigations in detail in his book The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes. He identified Lyushkov as the only NKVD officer involved in the investigations that led to the 1936 trial of the Sixteen who escaped execution. According to Feldbin, Molchanov, who was Lyushkov’s superior in the Secret Political Directorate, was executed along with other NKVD officers who knew the truth about the falsified testimony that purge trial witnesses were forced to give.[xvi]
Feldbin may have known Lyushkov personally, both having served as senior NKVD investigators; he at least knew Lyushkov’s name and the fact that he had defected at about the same time as Feldbin himself. Falsely evoking Lyushkov’s name, Feldbin wrote a letter to Leon Trotsky in December 1938 warning that the NKVD had penetrated Trotsky’s Paris organization, run by his son Lev Sedov. Feldbin described an individual named Mark who reported all of Sedov’s movements to the NKVD and who was involved in the theft of Trotsky’s archives that had disappeared from the Paris office of anti-Stalin émigré Boris Nikolayevskiy—Mark was later identified as Mark Zborowski, an NKVD agent who subsequently emigrated to the United States. Feldbin claimed to have received this information from Lyushkov, and he described Lyushkov accurately as Molchanov’s deputy who had been assigned as NKVD Chief in the Far East and later defected to Japan. Feldbin’s use of Lyushkov’s name was only a cover story to draw attention away from Feldbin himself; Feldbin claimed falsely in the letter to be Lyushkov’s uncle.[xvii] Nevertheless, Lyushkov likely did know Zborowski’s penetration of Trotsky’s Paris organization, which would have yielded information of value in the interrogation of purge trial defendants.
In August 1936 Lyushkov was assigned to be Chief of the NKVD in the Azov-Black Sea region, headquartered in Roston-na-Donu. Lyushkov’s involvement in purges did not end with his assignment to the field, but rather intensified as he gained complete control over the NKVD apparatus within his assigned region. Coox writes, “By 1936 [Lyushkov] was the ranking NKVD secret police chief for the whole Black Sea-Azov region, conducting wholesale Stalinist purgings under the direction of his old mentor, the pitiless Nikolai Yezhov.”[xviii] Afanasiy Mikhailovich Shorokhov (better known as Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov), a Soviet intelligence officer who defected in 1954, recounted a story told to him by a colleague about Lyushkov, whom Shorokhov described as an arrogant “toady” of Yezhov. When Lyushkov first arrived at Rostov-na-Donu he stormed into the office and excoriated the employees for being ineffective in arresting enemies of the people. He even supposedly pointed to several of the gathered employees and accused them of being enemies. The selected officers were arrested and executed.[xix]
In May 1937, Lyushkov submitted an interrogation report of Aleksandr Georgyevich Beloborodov, a former associate of Trotsky who was arrested in 1936 in Rostov-na-Donu. Beloborodov’s statement included claims that Trotsky planned to establish underground oppositionist cells in the Army and government organizations, with the involvement of Avgust Ivanovich Kork and Iona Emmanuilovich Yakir, both of whom were arrested with Mikhail Tukhachevskiy in June 1937 and executed. As with all such testimony, it is likely that the content was falsified to fit Stalin’s narrative, in this case against Tukhachevsky and his fellow senior military officers. A handwritten note written by Stalin on Lyushkov’s report read: “Isn’t it time to press this gentlemen [Beloborodov] and force him to tell of his dirty deeds? Where is he sitting, in a prison or a hotel?”[xx] Beloborodov was later transferred to Moscow and executed in February 1938.
As he had done in Ukraine, Lyushkov continued to report anti-government activities, such as sabotage of farm equipment.[xxi] He reported a statement dated June 1937 by M. M. Malinov who reported negative views that Iosif Mikhailovich Vareikis held about Stalin.[xxii] In 1937, Vareikis was the First Secretary of the Communist Party in the Far East, and Stalin singled him out for purging when Lyushkov arrived there for his next assignment.[xxiii]
After less than a year in Rostov-na-Donu, Stalin called Lyushkov to his office in July 1937 and presented him with a transfer to the Far East. Lyushkov recounted Stalin’s instructions: “War with Japan is inevitable; the Far East is undoubtedly a theater of war.” Stalin tasked Lyushkov to clean up the Soviet military and Communist Party apparatus in the Far East and root out Japanese spies and saboteurs, remnants of Tukhachevskiy’s supporters, and Trotskyites. Stalin told Lyushkov that conspirators planned to provoke a war with Japan, and then to turn Soviet troops back against the Soviet Union in cooperation with Japan. Stalin also claimed that Japan maintained an espionage and sabotage network in the Soviet Far East using Koreans and Chinese agents.[xxiv] These instructions set the course of Lyushkov’s brief tenure in the Far East.
Yezhov further instructed Lyushkov to establish a personal guard force around Vasiliy Konstantinovich Blyukher, military commander of the Far Eastern Front, ostensibly for his safety, but in reality to monitor him constantly. This is similar to a proposal from INO Chief Slutskiy to Feldbin/Orlov in Spain in August 1937 for the NKVD to send a security detail for him; Feldbin/Orlov rejected the proposal, suspecting that it was a trap.[xxv] Yezhov also instructed Lyushkov to replace Terentiy Dmitriyevich Deribas, the incumbent NKVD Chief in the Far East, and order him to Moscow for reassignment—NKVD officers knew such an order was a signal they were to be purged.[xxvi]
Lyushkov arrived in Khabarovsk in August 1937. Soon after his arrival, the Politburo passed a resolution titled, "On the Koreans," which instructed: "In order to stop the penetration of Japanese espionage in Far Eastern Region...evict all Korean population from border regions.... Start evictions immediately to be completed by January 1, 1938… NKVD implement measures against possible excesses and unrest on the part of Koreans in connection with eviction."[xxvii] This set off a massive NKVD-led campaign to resettle over 135,000 Korean residents from the Soviet Far East to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with Lyushkov at the helm. He similarly led the effort to evict 25,000 Chinese residents from the Soviet Far East to Xinjiang beginning in December 1937.[xxviii]
Lyushkov is never known to have expressed opposition to these “ethnic operations” or to the continuing purges. In fact, he was elected to the Supreme Soviet in December 1937,[xxix] and he was carrying a Supreme Soviet identification card when he surrendered to Japanese forces.[xxx] But in spring 1938, he received a dreaded message informing him of an impending transfer back to Moscow; he fully understood the implications.[xxxi]
Rather than return to what he assumed would be certain death, he walked across the Soviet-Manchurian border during the night of 13 June 1938 near the location where Russia, China, and North Korea meet. He was carrying a typewriter case filled with classified document that showed the sites of Soviet armed forces units, air bases, border posts, and military factories.[xxxii] He was initially held by a local border police unit, but the unit soon realized that their captive was more important than the typical border crosser. He was quickly transferred to the Hunchun branch of Japanese Army secret intelligence, and from there to Korea Army headquarters in Seoul. By 1 July he was in Tokyo.
A few weeks before he defected, he sent his wife Inna to Moscow with their ailing daughter, with instructions that she should escape westward to Poland before he escaped eastward to Japan. Little is known of his family life, but when he defected in 1938, Inna was 27 years old and they had one 11-year-old child. That calculates to Inna being 16 and Lyushkov 27 when their child was born. To signal her safe arrived in Poland, Inna was to send a telegram conveying an affectionate message.[xxxiii] He received such a telegram and walked across the border soon thereafter. The message, however, was apparently an NKVD provocation, as Inna was soon arrested and executed, along with Lyushkov’s parents and relatives.[xxxiv]
The first public revelations of Lyushkov’s defection appeared on 25 June in the Riga, Latvia, newspaper Сегодня (Today), identifying him as a Red Army division commissar named Ryshkov.[xxxv] Coox indicates that Kwantung Army Headquarters in Manchuria prematurely disseminated news of the defection before Tokyo had authorized it due to turf battles between the Kwantung Army and Tokyo.[xxxvi] The name Ryshkov comes from the Japanese transliteration of Lyushkov, which in Japanese is renderedリュシコフ (Ryushikofu), indicating that the source of the initial reporting was a Japanese individual who did not know Russian.
Other newspapers began to pick up the story on 2 July, when Lyushkov explained why he defected and set the general theme of his opposition to Stalin. He indicated that Stalin’s purge trials were more than just the product of Stalin’s pathological suspiciousness, but were a reaction to real dissention and anti-Stalin sentiments. Collectivization, Trotsky’s expulsion, and Old Bolshevik idealism formed the basis for anti-Stalin movements at the highest levels of Soviet leadership. His answer was to manufacture evidence against opponents, raise the specter of foreign threats, and create an environment of fear that permeated the entire Soviet society.[xxxvii]
The U.S. military attaché in Riga reported the news in a dispatch dated 7 July, initially mistaking Ryshkov and Lyushkov as two separate people who defected at different times. The military attaché, citing various newspapers, incorrectly reported Lyushkov’s defection as occurring on 30 June, although it described him as the “commander-in-chief of the OGPU Gendarmerie,” which was close to accurate.[xxxviii] The U.S. military attaché in Moscow rectified the mistaken reporting identifying him as a single person in a dispatch dated 1 August 1938.[xxxix]
The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters interrogated Lyushkov during the summer of 1938, receiving information about Lyushkov’s hatred for Stalin and his view that anti-regime factions were growing within the Soviet Far East Army. He also provided information about the dispositions and unit strengths of Soviet Forces in the Far East. Most importantly, Lyushkov gave the Japanese the Soviet military communication codes.
Lyushkov provided his Japanese interrogators with information about a growing opposition toward Stalin among the Soviet population. Not fully aware of Lyushkov’s background, the U.S. military attaché in Moscow who forwarded Lyushkov’s interrogation report to Washington raised the possibility that the information was Japanese propaganda intended to influence other world powers about the danger the Soviet Union posed to world peace.[xl] Hence, he suggested caution in accepting the information as completely accurate. Nevertheless, Lyushkov’s information about mass arrests and purges of military leadership was not disputed.
Lyushkov told of widespread discontent among peasants over collectivization, leading to the formation of illegal protest groups and active sabotage of military and farm equipment. Soldiers viewed collectivization similarly to peasants, seeing the damage it caused to their families’ livelihoods. Lyushkov predicted that this discontent would be particularly evident during war when it would have a detrimental impact on military discipline. He based his information his experiences in the NKVD Secret Political Directorate in Ukraine and Moscow, where he saw numerous reports of peasant opposition.
These sentiments were partially corroborated by a low-level defector, an NKVD border guard named Nikolay Ivanovich Ivanenko, who crossed the border from the Russian Far East to Manchuria in 1939. Ivanenko, a 21-year-old private, told a press conference in June 1939 that Russian peasants felt antagonistic toward Soviet power despite Soviet propaganda and the efforts of political officers, and that many others would follow him into defection if given the chance. He mirrored Lyushkov’s opinion that the attitude among the soldiers is the same as among the peasants, since the enlisted ranks were made up of peasants. Although his reporting agreed substantially with Lyushkov’s, Ivanenko told reporters that he had heard nothing about Lyushkov’s defection.[xli]
Opposition to Stalin’s policies was also evident among senior military leaders, resulting in hundreds of district, corps, division, and regimental commanders being arrested and executed, although these were often simply caught up in purges. Many of these had risen in the ranks under Mikhail Tukhachevskiy, which automatically placed them under suspicion when he was executed in June 1937. Lyushkov claimed that these military officers detested the institution of military commissars that limited their freedom to issue orders to their own troops. Others remained loyal to Trotsky, and yet others, particularly those from non-Russian ethnic groups, were disenchanted with communism altogether.[xlii]
Lyushkov himself never appears to have shown any sign of disloyalty except for his close association with disgraced NKVD chief Yagoda, who was arrested in March 1937. It took time for this association to catch up with Lyushkov, however, and he oversaw NKVD arrests of military leaders the Far Eastern Army, the Amur Flotilla, and the Pacific Fleet who were suspected of anti-Soviet activities, including contact with Yan Gamarnik, an associate of Tukhachevskiy who committed suicide in May 1937 before he could be arrested and executed. He also arrested Blyukher’s deputies; Blyukher himself was arrested in November 1938.
Lyushkov reported that Stalin replaced purged leaders with younger officers, attracting them with “the possibility of a rapid career and dazzling promotions.”[xliii] Soviet propaganda rallied these young people by demonizing Germany and Japan as enemies constantly intent on infiltrating Soviet forces with spies, whipping up nationalistic fervor among the soldiers and young military commanders.[xliv]
These new commanders began their careers sincerely following Stalin, but some came to recognize the ruinous nature of Stalin’s policies. Consequently, purges even began to reach down into their ranks. During Lyushkov’s tenure in the Far East, 1,200 senior officers and political workers and 3,000 mid- and lower-level commanders were arrested for being anti-Soviet elements. Lyushkov gave an example of Filipp Sergeyevich Oktyabrskiy, who took command of the Amur Flotilla in February 1938. When the People’s Commissar of Naval Forces, Petr Aleksandrovich Smirnov, ordered Oktyabrskiy to arrest and purge a large group of officers, Oktyabrskiy objected and complained that the order would leave no commanders under him. According to Lyushkov, Smirnov shrieked at him, “with you or without you we will do what is necessary.”[xlv] Ironically, Smirnov himself was arrested in June 1938 and later executed.
Lyushkov also provided information about the weaknesses of Soviet armed forces in the Far East. He claimed that 20% to 40% of Soviet units were unfit for combat. Supply units were incapable of delivering goods reliably to combat units, leading to arrests of nearly the entire supply corps. Trucks and tanks were badly maintained leaving them unusable, and even those that could be operated lacked fuel. Engineer troops were unsatisfactory. Personnel often lived in tents through the cold winters, and barracks construction moved slowly, with soldiers themselves fulfilling construction duties. Food supplies were inadequately stored and there were outbreaks of food poisoning.[xlvi]
Despite these weaknesses, Soviet propaganda maintained that Soviet leaders were considering a preemptive strike against Japan because Japan was preparing for war with the Soviet Union. Lyushkov described a planned campaign in which Soviet forces would attack in two prongs from Chitinskiy and Ussurisk, knocking out Japanese lines of communication with air attacks and submarines, while destabilizing the Japanese rear with partisan agitation.[xlvii]
Although Japanese interrogators were mostly interested in military intelligence, Lyushkov’s expertise was the NKVD. He told interrogators that NKVD intelligence activity in the Far East was heavily focused on uncovering anti-Soviet plots and identifying foreign spies. The NVKD’s primary mission was to monitor soldiers’ loyalty, and the NKVD recruited agents among postal and communications workers, chauffeurs, and women who associate with soldiers, and the NKVD arrested any Soviet citizen who entered a foreign consulate. The NKVD also monitored the Soviet citizens who were employed in Japanese concessions on Sakhalin, and they were often willing to become NKVD agents for small amounts of money.[xlviii]
For operations against Japan, the NKVD recruited Chinese and Koreans who could infiltrate Japanese military bases. Yezhov told Lyushkov that Japanese intelligence services were actively planning sabotage and diversionist actions against the Soviet Union, so the NKVD needed to develop similar actions in return. The NKVD ran training course for radio operators and saboteurs, particularly directed against Japan’s Bacteriological Institute.[xlix] Lyushkov explained that Russian strategic intelligence activity in Manchuria and Japan was run from the Soviet consulate general in Harbin and the embassy in Tokyo, which each housed both INO and Razvedupr rezidenturas. Soviet intelligence also maintained radio intercept installations at Komsomolsk, Svobodniy, Vladivostok, Kamchatka, and Sakhalin.[l]
The Japanese compiled Lyushkov’s information into an interrogation report, which they shared with a military attaché of an unnamed Baltic state with whom the Japanese government had an intelligence liaison relationship. The liaison partner was possibly Latvia, since a Riga-based newspaper was the first to break the story in June 1938. Probably unbeknownst to the Japanese, that military attaché passed the report to a British counterpart, who then passed an English translation to the U.S. military attaché in Moscow.
The Japanese probably did not intend for the document to make its way into British or American hands. When the British military attaché showed it to the American, he cautioned that it must be kept in complete secrecy for fear that the British military attaché could be cut off from one of his best sources. It is unclear how long each step in that chain took, but the document dated November 1938 reached the U.S. military attaché in Moscow in May 1939.[li] The attaché requested that the Military Intelligence Division in Washington protect the document and see that it be “disseminated as little as possible at least for the time being.”[lii] This request appears to have been honored, because there is no indication that either the FBI or MI5 ever received a copy of it. It is never referenced in relation to Ginzberg/Krivitsky, Graff/Barmin, Feldbin/Orlov, Rastvorov, or Shorokhov/Petrov, although it could have been relevant in those defectors’ debriefings.
The British and Americans were not the only governments to receive the report. Moscow was also anxious to learn what Lyushkov was revealing. The famous GRU illegal officer Richard Sorge learned of Lyushkov’s defection from a contact in the German military attaché office and forwarded copies of the preliminary Japanese interrogation results to Moscow.[liii] His contacts in the German embassy in Tokyo proved to be valuable sources of information about Lyushkov.
Although the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters succeeded in obtaining initial information from Lyushkov, it was not confident in its ability to interrogate Lyushkov to the fullest extent. So the Japanese government asked Germany to send a Soviet military specialist to Tokyo. Germany sent an interrogator in November 1938, who prepared a fuller report that was disseminated to the German and Japanese military headquarters in January 1939. When the German interrogation report was ready to transmit to Berlin, Sorge photographed it and sent it to Moscow.[liv]
Sorge’s reports about Lyushkov may have played a role in the defeat of the Kwantung Army in the Battles of Khalkhin-Gol (known as the Battles of Nomonhan in Japan) during the summer of 1939. When Sorge reported that Luyshkov had passed the Soviet communication codes, Soviet forces change the codes, preventing the Japanese from benefitting from them. The Soviets also got an insider’s view into Japanese assessments of Soviet military strengths and capabilities in the Far East that Sorge received through his German and Japanese contacts. Sorge’s reports allowed Soviet forces, led by the future World War II commander Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov, to deploy a larger and better equipped force to the Far East. Consequently, the Japanese did not face the ragged army that Lyushkov had described, resulting in a serious defeat for the Japanese in August 1939. At this same time as this campaign, which gave Stalin confidence that his eastern flank was secure against Japanese attack, Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov-Robbentrop Pact, in which Stalin and Hitler agreed to refrain from attacking each other in Europe.[lv]
However, Japan’s defeat cannot be blamed solely on Lyushkov’s bleak, and possibly misleading, assessments of Soviet forces’ readiness and capabilities in the Far East. Unbeknownst to Lyushkov, two weeks before he defected another Soviet officer named German Frantsevich Front,[lvi] an artillery major, defected along the Mongolian-Manchurian border. He provided Japanese Army intelligence with a large volume of more accurate details about the dislocations and types of Soviet armaments in the Far East, especially in Mongolia. This information was printed in Japanese Army intelligence bulletins and disseminated to Japanese military units along the Soviet-Manchurian border, including units around Khalkhin Gol. Front’s information also made its way back to the Soviets when Soviet forces overran Khalkhin Gol and captured a Japanese army headquarters, along with all of its documents.[lvii]
Despite his biased impressions of Soviet military forces in the Far East, Lyushkov redeemed himself by accurately predicting the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the USSR in 1941, and he warned against Japan’s overconfidence in Germany’s ability to quickly defeat the Soviet Union. Lyushkov continued to live in Japan throughout World War II, acting as a consultant for Japanese military intelligence. He visited Manchuria each summer during the war working with the Japan Special Agency, and the Japanese Army General Staff valued his information on Soviet methods during the war.[lviii]
In addition to providing strategic and military intelligence, the Japanese employed Lyushkov to plan an operation to assassinate Stalin, relying on his knowledge of NKVD procedures and his confessed hatred for Stalin. Not long after arriving in Japan, Lyushkov organized a group of Russian émigrés living in China into an assassination team, which was dispatched to Turkey and attempted to cross the Turkish-Soviet border into Georgia while Stalin was at his rest home in Sochi. The group was arrested immediately upon entering Soviet territory in January 1939.[lix] Later the same year, Lyushkov organized a second attempt to assassinate Stalin using a group of Russian émigrés to plant a bomb in Lenin’s Tomb timed to explode during May Day celebrations in 1939. That plot also failed. It turned out that Lyushkov’s knowledge of NKVD procedures did not include access to Stalin’s intense personal security apparatus. But the source of the failures was deeper that that: the NKVD had recruited an agent inside the Manchurian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an interpreter named Boris Bzhеmanskiy, who compromised both plots to the Soviets.[lx]
As he settled into life in Japan, Lyushkov became a public commentator on Soviet policies. In May 1939, he published an article in the Japanese magazine Kaizo explaining the results of the Eighteenth Party Congress, which occurred in March 1939.[lxi] He also published a critique of Stalin’s agricultural policy in July 1939, an exposition on Far East military theory in September 1939, and an analysis of Soviet policies in Europe in December 1939.[lxii]
His Japanese hosts made him welcome, offering him Japanese women to keep him company, one of which he took as a wife. He received Japanese citizenship and a Japanese name, Toshikazu Yamaguchi. Nevertheless, he spoke openly of wanting to immigrate to the United States. He drafted an autobiographical book and contacted a U.S. publisher, who gave him positive encouragement about the prospects of publishing it. He saved the money he made from Japanese articles so that he could eventually go to America. However, as the war progressed, his prospects of emigrating faded.[lxiii]
When the USSR moved to the offensive against Germany in 1943 and the Japanese General Staff began to realize that war with the Soviet Union was a real possibility, the Japanese needed Soviet expertise more urgently than ever. By July 1945, Lyushkov was moved to Manchuria to provide direct support to Japanese forces that faced a looming Soviet invasion. However, his information had become stale in the seven years since he left the Soviet Union; Soviet capabilities had change drastically, and his presence became more of a liability than a benefit. In August, when Soviet forces finally invaded, Lyushkov’s Japanese escorts decided he knew too much about Japanese intelligence tactics, and on 20 August 1945, a Japanese officer, Captain Yutaka Takeoka, recommended to Lyushkov that he commit suicide. Lyushkov declined and Takeoka shot him instead. His body was cremated and his final resting place was an unmarked grave at a temple for the unknown in Dairen, China.[lxiv]
After World War II the Soviet military counterintelligence organization SMERSH searched for Lyushkov but failed to find him, not realizing he was already dead. In November 1945, Soviet forces captured Takeoka and interrogated him and he informed them of Lyushkov’s fate, admitted having killed Lyushkov.[lxv] Takeoka served eleven years in Soviet prison camps before being repatriated to Japan in 1956. He first publicly discussed his role in the Lyushkov case in 1979 and Coox interviewed him in 1991, along with other Japanese officers who were involved in disposing of Lyushkov.[lxvi]
Some post-Soviet writers have created a story claiming that Lyushkov was not killed in 1945, but instead escaped to an American safehouse in China after the Japanese defeat and brought to the United States in October 1945. These rumors, supposedly based on unidentified declassified documents, indicate that Lyushkov served as a consultant for the CIA and the U.S. Department of State on matters involving the Far East and Soviet foreign policy, and that he lived in California until his death in 1968.[lxvii] There is no documentary support for these rumors, which are possibly based more on twenty-first century Russian antipathy toward the United States than in twentieth century reality.
Lyushkov is the subject of two biographies, one in English and one in Japanese. The English version was written by an American historian, Alvin D. Coox, who specialized in Soviet-Japanese relations. Coox first published an article on Lyushkov in 1968, based on Japanese and American archival materials and interviews of former Japanese intelligence officers who had interacted with Lyushkov.[ii] Coox published an updated and expanded version of the article in 1998, adding more interviews, archival material, and material from the Japanese interrogation of the famous Soviet GRU illegal agent Richard Sorge, who was arrested in 1942.[iii]
Japanese historian Tatsukichi Nishino published a Japanese biography of Lyushkov in 1979. This biography similarly covered Lyushkov’s life, but also included the texts of Japanese magazine and newspaper articles Lyushkov published soon after his defection in which he explained his motive for defection and provided a brief memoir.[iv]
Lyushkov was different from other defectors of this period because his whole career was spent in internal security and political investigations, and he had little involvement with foreign operations. Consequently, unlike other intelligence officer defectors who worked in clandestine assignments, Lyushkov did not use multiple names. Coox claims that Lyushkov was the “first senior NKVD officer ever to defect from within the USSR.”[v] While this is not entirely correct—Fedor Pavlovich Drugov, one of the founders of the Soviet state security apparatus, defected eight years earlier—Lyushkov was more intimately involved with Stalin-era Soviet state security operations than any other defector.
Lyushkov was born in 1900 in Odessa, Ukraine, the youngest of five children. He attended school in Odessa and was drawn to communism by his older brother Sasha in 1917. He joined the Red Army initially as a private in 1917, but participated in covert activities against the Germans in 1918 in southern Ukraine. His early career followed a path similar to other Soviet intelligence officers, beginning as a Bolshevik activist and quickly rising through the political ranks. He participated in the formation of the Odessa soviet in 1918 and became a unit commissar in the Crimea Regiment in 1919. He attended a Bolshevik political training school in September 1919 and was assigned as a brigade political commissar upon graduation, joining an infantry unit during the civil war fighting against White and Polish forces in Ukraine and western Russia.[vi]
Lyushkov’s first state security position was a direct outgrowth of his political activism and training. Beginning in June 1920, he worked in the ChK Special Section (OO) of the 57th Cavalry Division operating in southern Ukraine, which monitored the political reliability of unit members. During this same time, Lyushkov attended the short-lived Odessa Humanities and Social Institute, which was formed in July 1920 as one of the first post-revolution institutes of higher learning in Ukraine. The institute operated until September 1921, when it was merged with the Odessa Institute of People’s Education.[vii] As was typical of the time, Lyushkov probably attended school part-time while working full-time. He served in a series of Ukrainian Republic GPU positions in the Odessa and Kamenets-Podolsk regions from 1921 to 1930, including service in the OGPU Border Guards in western Ukraine from 1923 to 1925.[viii]
In 1925 Lyushkov moved to the Ukrainian GPU headquarters, where he led the Information Department of the Accounting-Organizational Directorate for the next five years. His role during this period is documented in archives made available by the Russian historian Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, including documents from Soviet state security archives that cast light on OGPU activities in the late 1920s and 1930s. Yakovlev led the Russian President’s Commission on Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression in 1991, and the documents “are connected with the crimes of J. V. Stalin, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the VChK, OGPU, NKVD, KGB, and other punitive organizations against their own people, and their frightening, destructive role in the history of Russia and the countries of the former Socialist camp.”[ix]
Among these documents are several that provide insights into the issues that Lyushkov faced in the late 1920s in Ukraine, including mismanagement and corruption. In October 1929 Lyuskov reported about kolkhoz managers claiming unrealistically high grain production, and then demanding that peasants supply enough to meet the exaggerated amounts. The report included an instance when the local grain production committee arrested a peasant for holding a wedding and thereby distracting other peasants from their work.[x] Other reports discuss food shortages and the peasant uprisings in Ukraine.
Lyushkov claimed to Japanese interrogators that he took a foreign assignment in Germany in 1930. He boasted about drawing praise from Stalin himself for analyzing Junkers aircraft factories in Germany, using his proficiency in the German language. Little is known about this assignment besides Lyushkov’s brief mention, but if true, this would be the only foreign assignment of his career, and it appears to have been an analytical not an operational assignment, consistent with his work in the Ukrainian GPU Information Department.[xi]
In 1931, Lyushkov moved to the USSR OGPU in Moscow and continued to rise in ranks. Yakovlev’s archival database contains nearly 40 documents that show Lyushkov in a progression of responsibilities in the OGPU Secret Political Directorate from 1932 to 1936. Documents include OGPU reporting about the horrendous conditions across Russia resulting from collectivization, including severe food shortages that led to starvation, suicides, cannibalism, and child abandonment, including in the North Caucasus and the Far East, where he would later serve in senior NKVD positions. Some peasants resorted to eating grass and cattle feed, while others protested, sabotaged kolkhoz equipment, and threatened government officials. The documents also include reports of OGPU responses, including arrests and mass evictions to prevent armed insurrections and “kulak counterrevolution.”[xii] Lyushkov’s exposure to these events in the early 1930s clearly influenced his decision to defect in 1938. He noted during his interrogation in Japan the widespread anti-Stalin sentiments that resulted from these inhuman conditions. But his involvement in these events also led to some question why the “repentant purger” carried out the murderous orders of Stalin for so long before defecting.[xiii] He recognized this inconsistency, reportedly saying after he arrived in Japan, “Guilty as I am of collaborating in Stalin's foul terror, I shall risk everything, flee to the nearest country, seek asylum as others had done, and carry on the good fight against Stalin from the outside. The dictator's toadies will libel me and say I sold my soul but, one day, when the despot has been overthrown, I shall go home to a bright new Russia.”[xiv]
Lyushkov continued in the Secret Political Directorate until 1936. He was promoted to commissar of state security third rank, the equivalent to a major general, in 1935, and worked as deputy to Georgiy Andreyevich Molchanov, with whom he had worked since at least 1932. After his defection he told Japanese interrogators that he was the lead investigator on the case of Leonid Nikolayev, who assassinated Leningrad Party Chief Sergey Mironovich Kirov in 1934. Lyushkov claimed that Nikolayev was a lone assassin motivated by hatred for the Party, and that Stalin was not the instigator of Kirov’s assassination as many had speculated. As a senior official in the Secret Political Directorate he was also directly involved in purge investigations, including the “Leningrad Terrorist Center” investigation in early 1935, the investigation into a terrorist plot to assassinate Stalin in 1935, and the Trotsky-Zinoviev Terrorist Center investigation that led to the trial of the Sixteen in August 1936.[xv]
Leyba Lazarevich Feldbin (better known as Aleksandr Mikhailovich Orlov), who defected to the United States a month after Lyushkov, discussed these investigations in detail in his book The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes. He identified Lyushkov as the only NKVD officer involved in the investigations that led to the 1936 trial of the Sixteen who escaped execution. According to Feldbin, Molchanov, who was Lyushkov’s superior in the Secret Political Directorate, was executed along with other NKVD officers who knew the truth about the falsified testimony that purge trial witnesses were forced to give.[xvi]
Feldbin may have known Lyushkov personally, both having served as senior NKVD investigators; he at least knew Lyushkov’s name and the fact that he had defected at about the same time as Feldbin himself. Falsely evoking Lyushkov’s name, Feldbin wrote a letter to Leon Trotsky in December 1938 warning that the NKVD had penetrated Trotsky’s Paris organization, run by his son Lev Sedov. Feldbin described an individual named Mark who reported all of Sedov’s movements to the NKVD and who was involved in the theft of Trotsky’s archives that had disappeared from the Paris office of anti-Stalin émigré Boris Nikolayevskiy—Mark was later identified as Mark Zborowski, an NKVD agent who subsequently emigrated to the United States. Feldbin claimed to have received this information from Lyushkov, and he described Lyushkov accurately as Molchanov’s deputy who had been assigned as NKVD Chief in the Far East and later defected to Japan. Feldbin’s use of Lyushkov’s name was only a cover story to draw attention away from Feldbin himself; Feldbin claimed falsely in the letter to be Lyushkov’s uncle.[xvii] Nevertheless, Lyushkov likely did know Zborowski’s penetration of Trotsky’s Paris organization, which would have yielded information of value in the interrogation of purge trial defendants.
In August 1936 Lyushkov was assigned to be Chief of the NKVD in the Azov-Black Sea region, headquartered in Roston-na-Donu. Lyushkov’s involvement in purges did not end with his assignment to the field, but rather intensified as he gained complete control over the NKVD apparatus within his assigned region. Coox writes, “By 1936 [Lyushkov] was the ranking NKVD secret police chief for the whole Black Sea-Azov region, conducting wholesale Stalinist purgings under the direction of his old mentor, the pitiless Nikolai Yezhov.”[xviii] Afanasiy Mikhailovich Shorokhov (better known as Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov), a Soviet intelligence officer who defected in 1954, recounted a story told to him by a colleague about Lyushkov, whom Shorokhov described as an arrogant “toady” of Yezhov. When Lyushkov first arrived at Rostov-na-Donu he stormed into the office and excoriated the employees for being ineffective in arresting enemies of the people. He even supposedly pointed to several of the gathered employees and accused them of being enemies. The selected officers were arrested and executed.[xix]
In May 1937, Lyushkov submitted an interrogation report of Aleksandr Georgyevich Beloborodov, a former associate of Trotsky who was arrested in 1936 in Rostov-na-Donu. Beloborodov’s statement included claims that Trotsky planned to establish underground oppositionist cells in the Army and government organizations, with the involvement of Avgust Ivanovich Kork and Iona Emmanuilovich Yakir, both of whom were arrested with Mikhail Tukhachevskiy in June 1937 and executed. As with all such testimony, it is likely that the content was falsified to fit Stalin’s narrative, in this case against Tukhachevsky and his fellow senior military officers. A handwritten note written by Stalin on Lyushkov’s report read: “Isn’t it time to press this gentlemen [Beloborodov] and force him to tell of his dirty deeds? Where is he sitting, in a prison or a hotel?”[xx] Beloborodov was later transferred to Moscow and executed in February 1938.
As he had done in Ukraine, Lyushkov continued to report anti-government activities, such as sabotage of farm equipment.[xxi] He reported a statement dated June 1937 by M. M. Malinov who reported negative views that Iosif Mikhailovich Vareikis held about Stalin.[xxii] In 1937, Vareikis was the First Secretary of the Communist Party in the Far East, and Stalin singled him out for purging when Lyushkov arrived there for his next assignment.[xxiii]
After less than a year in Rostov-na-Donu, Stalin called Lyushkov to his office in July 1937 and presented him with a transfer to the Far East. Lyushkov recounted Stalin’s instructions: “War with Japan is inevitable; the Far East is undoubtedly a theater of war.” Stalin tasked Lyushkov to clean up the Soviet military and Communist Party apparatus in the Far East and root out Japanese spies and saboteurs, remnants of Tukhachevskiy’s supporters, and Trotskyites. Stalin told Lyushkov that conspirators planned to provoke a war with Japan, and then to turn Soviet troops back against the Soviet Union in cooperation with Japan. Stalin also claimed that Japan maintained an espionage and sabotage network in the Soviet Far East using Koreans and Chinese agents.[xxiv] These instructions set the course of Lyushkov’s brief tenure in the Far East.
Yezhov further instructed Lyushkov to establish a personal guard force around Vasiliy Konstantinovich Blyukher, military commander of the Far Eastern Front, ostensibly for his safety, but in reality to monitor him constantly. This is similar to a proposal from INO Chief Slutskiy to Feldbin/Orlov in Spain in August 1937 for the NKVD to send a security detail for him; Feldbin/Orlov rejected the proposal, suspecting that it was a trap.[xxv] Yezhov also instructed Lyushkov to replace Terentiy Dmitriyevich Deribas, the incumbent NKVD Chief in the Far East, and order him to Moscow for reassignment—NKVD officers knew such an order was a signal they were to be purged.[xxvi]
Lyushkov arrived in Khabarovsk in August 1937. Soon after his arrival, the Politburo passed a resolution titled, "On the Koreans," which instructed: "In order to stop the penetration of Japanese espionage in Far Eastern Region...evict all Korean population from border regions.... Start evictions immediately to be completed by January 1, 1938… NKVD implement measures against possible excesses and unrest on the part of Koreans in connection with eviction."[xxvii] This set off a massive NKVD-led campaign to resettle over 135,000 Korean residents from the Soviet Far East to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with Lyushkov at the helm. He similarly led the effort to evict 25,000 Chinese residents from the Soviet Far East to Xinjiang beginning in December 1937.[xxviii]
Lyushkov is never known to have expressed opposition to these “ethnic operations” or to the continuing purges. In fact, he was elected to the Supreme Soviet in December 1937,[xxix] and he was carrying a Supreme Soviet identification card when he surrendered to Japanese forces.[xxx] But in spring 1938, he received a dreaded message informing him of an impending transfer back to Moscow; he fully understood the implications.[xxxi]
Rather than return to what he assumed would be certain death, he walked across the Soviet-Manchurian border during the night of 13 June 1938 near the location where Russia, China, and North Korea meet. He was carrying a typewriter case filled with classified document that showed the sites of Soviet armed forces units, air bases, border posts, and military factories.[xxxii] He was initially held by a local border police unit, but the unit soon realized that their captive was more important than the typical border crosser. He was quickly transferred to the Hunchun branch of Japanese Army secret intelligence, and from there to Korea Army headquarters in Seoul. By 1 July he was in Tokyo.
A few weeks before he defected, he sent his wife Inna to Moscow with their ailing daughter, with instructions that she should escape westward to Poland before he escaped eastward to Japan. Little is known of his family life, but when he defected in 1938, Inna was 27 years old and they had one 11-year-old child. That calculates to Inna being 16 and Lyushkov 27 when their child was born. To signal her safe arrived in Poland, Inna was to send a telegram conveying an affectionate message.[xxxiii] He received such a telegram and walked across the border soon thereafter. The message, however, was apparently an NKVD provocation, as Inna was soon arrested and executed, along with Lyushkov’s parents and relatives.[xxxiv]
The first public revelations of Lyushkov’s defection appeared on 25 June in the Riga, Latvia, newspaper Сегодня (Today), identifying him as a Red Army division commissar named Ryshkov.[xxxv] Coox indicates that Kwantung Army Headquarters in Manchuria prematurely disseminated news of the defection before Tokyo had authorized it due to turf battles between the Kwantung Army and Tokyo.[xxxvi] The name Ryshkov comes from the Japanese transliteration of Lyushkov, which in Japanese is renderedリュシコフ (Ryushikofu), indicating that the source of the initial reporting was a Japanese individual who did not know Russian.
Other newspapers began to pick up the story on 2 July, when Lyushkov explained why he defected and set the general theme of his opposition to Stalin. He indicated that Stalin’s purge trials were more than just the product of Stalin’s pathological suspiciousness, but were a reaction to real dissention and anti-Stalin sentiments. Collectivization, Trotsky’s expulsion, and Old Bolshevik idealism formed the basis for anti-Stalin movements at the highest levels of Soviet leadership. His answer was to manufacture evidence against opponents, raise the specter of foreign threats, and create an environment of fear that permeated the entire Soviet society.[xxxvii]
The U.S. military attaché in Riga reported the news in a dispatch dated 7 July, initially mistaking Ryshkov and Lyushkov as two separate people who defected at different times. The military attaché, citing various newspapers, incorrectly reported Lyushkov’s defection as occurring on 30 June, although it described him as the “commander-in-chief of the OGPU Gendarmerie,” which was close to accurate.[xxxviii] The U.S. military attaché in Moscow rectified the mistaken reporting identifying him as a single person in a dispatch dated 1 August 1938.[xxxix]
The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters interrogated Lyushkov during the summer of 1938, receiving information about Lyushkov’s hatred for Stalin and his view that anti-regime factions were growing within the Soviet Far East Army. He also provided information about the dispositions and unit strengths of Soviet Forces in the Far East. Most importantly, Lyushkov gave the Japanese the Soviet military communication codes.
Lyushkov provided his Japanese interrogators with information about a growing opposition toward Stalin among the Soviet population. Not fully aware of Lyushkov’s background, the U.S. military attaché in Moscow who forwarded Lyushkov’s interrogation report to Washington raised the possibility that the information was Japanese propaganda intended to influence other world powers about the danger the Soviet Union posed to world peace.[xl] Hence, he suggested caution in accepting the information as completely accurate. Nevertheless, Lyushkov’s information about mass arrests and purges of military leadership was not disputed.
Lyushkov told of widespread discontent among peasants over collectivization, leading to the formation of illegal protest groups and active sabotage of military and farm equipment. Soldiers viewed collectivization similarly to peasants, seeing the damage it caused to their families’ livelihoods. Lyushkov predicted that this discontent would be particularly evident during war when it would have a detrimental impact on military discipline. He based his information his experiences in the NKVD Secret Political Directorate in Ukraine and Moscow, where he saw numerous reports of peasant opposition.
These sentiments were partially corroborated by a low-level defector, an NKVD border guard named Nikolay Ivanovich Ivanenko, who crossed the border from the Russian Far East to Manchuria in 1939. Ivanenko, a 21-year-old private, told a press conference in June 1939 that Russian peasants felt antagonistic toward Soviet power despite Soviet propaganda and the efforts of political officers, and that many others would follow him into defection if given the chance. He mirrored Lyushkov’s opinion that the attitude among the soldiers is the same as among the peasants, since the enlisted ranks were made up of peasants. Although his reporting agreed substantially with Lyushkov’s, Ivanenko told reporters that he had heard nothing about Lyushkov’s defection.[xli]
Opposition to Stalin’s policies was also evident among senior military leaders, resulting in hundreds of district, corps, division, and regimental commanders being arrested and executed, although these were often simply caught up in purges. Many of these had risen in the ranks under Mikhail Tukhachevskiy, which automatically placed them under suspicion when he was executed in June 1937. Lyushkov claimed that these military officers detested the institution of military commissars that limited their freedom to issue orders to their own troops. Others remained loyal to Trotsky, and yet others, particularly those from non-Russian ethnic groups, were disenchanted with communism altogether.[xlii]
Lyushkov himself never appears to have shown any sign of disloyalty except for his close association with disgraced NKVD chief Yagoda, who was arrested in March 1937. It took time for this association to catch up with Lyushkov, however, and he oversaw NKVD arrests of military leaders the Far Eastern Army, the Amur Flotilla, and the Pacific Fleet who were suspected of anti-Soviet activities, including contact with Yan Gamarnik, an associate of Tukhachevskiy who committed suicide in May 1937 before he could be arrested and executed. He also arrested Blyukher’s deputies; Blyukher himself was arrested in November 1938.
Lyushkov reported that Stalin replaced purged leaders with younger officers, attracting them with “the possibility of a rapid career and dazzling promotions.”[xliii] Soviet propaganda rallied these young people by demonizing Germany and Japan as enemies constantly intent on infiltrating Soviet forces with spies, whipping up nationalistic fervor among the soldiers and young military commanders.[xliv]
These new commanders began their careers sincerely following Stalin, but some came to recognize the ruinous nature of Stalin’s policies. Consequently, purges even began to reach down into their ranks. During Lyushkov’s tenure in the Far East, 1,200 senior officers and political workers and 3,000 mid- and lower-level commanders were arrested for being anti-Soviet elements. Lyushkov gave an example of Filipp Sergeyevich Oktyabrskiy, who took command of the Amur Flotilla in February 1938. When the People’s Commissar of Naval Forces, Petr Aleksandrovich Smirnov, ordered Oktyabrskiy to arrest and purge a large group of officers, Oktyabrskiy objected and complained that the order would leave no commanders under him. According to Lyushkov, Smirnov shrieked at him, “with you or without you we will do what is necessary.”[xlv] Ironically, Smirnov himself was arrested in June 1938 and later executed.
Lyushkov also provided information about the weaknesses of Soviet armed forces in the Far East. He claimed that 20% to 40% of Soviet units were unfit for combat. Supply units were incapable of delivering goods reliably to combat units, leading to arrests of nearly the entire supply corps. Trucks and tanks were badly maintained leaving them unusable, and even those that could be operated lacked fuel. Engineer troops were unsatisfactory. Personnel often lived in tents through the cold winters, and barracks construction moved slowly, with soldiers themselves fulfilling construction duties. Food supplies were inadequately stored and there were outbreaks of food poisoning.[xlvi]
Despite these weaknesses, Soviet propaganda maintained that Soviet leaders were considering a preemptive strike against Japan because Japan was preparing for war with the Soviet Union. Lyushkov described a planned campaign in which Soviet forces would attack in two prongs from Chitinskiy and Ussurisk, knocking out Japanese lines of communication with air attacks and submarines, while destabilizing the Japanese rear with partisan agitation.[xlvii]
Although Japanese interrogators were mostly interested in military intelligence, Lyushkov’s expertise was the NKVD. He told interrogators that NKVD intelligence activity in the Far East was heavily focused on uncovering anti-Soviet plots and identifying foreign spies. The NVKD’s primary mission was to monitor soldiers’ loyalty, and the NKVD recruited agents among postal and communications workers, chauffeurs, and women who associate with soldiers, and the NKVD arrested any Soviet citizen who entered a foreign consulate. The NKVD also monitored the Soviet citizens who were employed in Japanese concessions on Sakhalin, and they were often willing to become NKVD agents for small amounts of money.[xlviii]
For operations against Japan, the NKVD recruited Chinese and Koreans who could infiltrate Japanese military bases. Yezhov told Lyushkov that Japanese intelligence services were actively planning sabotage and diversionist actions against the Soviet Union, so the NKVD needed to develop similar actions in return. The NKVD ran training course for radio operators and saboteurs, particularly directed against Japan’s Bacteriological Institute.[xlix] Lyushkov explained that Russian strategic intelligence activity in Manchuria and Japan was run from the Soviet consulate general in Harbin and the embassy in Tokyo, which each housed both INO and Razvedupr rezidenturas. Soviet intelligence also maintained radio intercept installations at Komsomolsk, Svobodniy, Vladivostok, Kamchatka, and Sakhalin.[l]
The Japanese compiled Lyushkov’s information into an interrogation report, which they shared with a military attaché of an unnamed Baltic state with whom the Japanese government had an intelligence liaison relationship. The liaison partner was possibly Latvia, since a Riga-based newspaper was the first to break the story in June 1938. Probably unbeknownst to the Japanese, that military attaché passed the report to a British counterpart, who then passed an English translation to the U.S. military attaché in Moscow.
The Japanese probably did not intend for the document to make its way into British or American hands. When the British military attaché showed it to the American, he cautioned that it must be kept in complete secrecy for fear that the British military attaché could be cut off from one of his best sources. It is unclear how long each step in that chain took, but the document dated November 1938 reached the U.S. military attaché in Moscow in May 1939.[li] The attaché requested that the Military Intelligence Division in Washington protect the document and see that it be “disseminated as little as possible at least for the time being.”[lii] This request appears to have been honored, because there is no indication that either the FBI or MI5 ever received a copy of it. It is never referenced in relation to Ginzberg/Krivitsky, Graff/Barmin, Feldbin/Orlov, Rastvorov, or Shorokhov/Petrov, although it could have been relevant in those defectors’ debriefings.
The British and Americans were not the only governments to receive the report. Moscow was also anxious to learn what Lyushkov was revealing. The famous GRU illegal officer Richard Sorge learned of Lyushkov’s defection from a contact in the German military attaché office and forwarded copies of the preliminary Japanese interrogation results to Moscow.[liii] His contacts in the German embassy in Tokyo proved to be valuable sources of information about Lyushkov.
Although the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters succeeded in obtaining initial information from Lyushkov, it was not confident in its ability to interrogate Lyushkov to the fullest extent. So the Japanese government asked Germany to send a Soviet military specialist to Tokyo. Germany sent an interrogator in November 1938, who prepared a fuller report that was disseminated to the German and Japanese military headquarters in January 1939. When the German interrogation report was ready to transmit to Berlin, Sorge photographed it and sent it to Moscow.[liv]
Sorge’s reports about Lyushkov may have played a role in the defeat of the Kwantung Army in the Battles of Khalkhin-Gol (known as the Battles of Nomonhan in Japan) during the summer of 1939. When Sorge reported that Luyshkov had passed the Soviet communication codes, Soviet forces change the codes, preventing the Japanese from benefitting from them. The Soviets also got an insider’s view into Japanese assessments of Soviet military strengths and capabilities in the Far East that Sorge received through his German and Japanese contacts. Sorge’s reports allowed Soviet forces, led by the future World War II commander Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov, to deploy a larger and better equipped force to the Far East. Consequently, the Japanese did not face the ragged army that Lyushkov had described, resulting in a serious defeat for the Japanese in August 1939. At this same time as this campaign, which gave Stalin confidence that his eastern flank was secure against Japanese attack, Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov-Robbentrop Pact, in which Stalin and Hitler agreed to refrain from attacking each other in Europe.[lv]
However, Japan’s defeat cannot be blamed solely on Lyushkov’s bleak, and possibly misleading, assessments of Soviet forces’ readiness and capabilities in the Far East. Unbeknownst to Lyushkov, two weeks before he defected another Soviet officer named German Frantsevich Front,[lvi] an artillery major, defected along the Mongolian-Manchurian border. He provided Japanese Army intelligence with a large volume of more accurate details about the dislocations and types of Soviet armaments in the Far East, especially in Mongolia. This information was printed in Japanese Army intelligence bulletins and disseminated to Japanese military units along the Soviet-Manchurian border, including units around Khalkhin Gol. Front’s information also made its way back to the Soviets when Soviet forces overran Khalkhin Gol and captured a Japanese army headquarters, along with all of its documents.[lvii]
Despite his biased impressions of Soviet military forces in the Far East, Lyushkov redeemed himself by accurately predicting the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the USSR in 1941, and he warned against Japan’s overconfidence in Germany’s ability to quickly defeat the Soviet Union. Lyushkov continued to live in Japan throughout World War II, acting as a consultant for Japanese military intelligence. He visited Manchuria each summer during the war working with the Japan Special Agency, and the Japanese Army General Staff valued his information on Soviet methods during the war.[lviii]
In addition to providing strategic and military intelligence, the Japanese employed Lyushkov to plan an operation to assassinate Stalin, relying on his knowledge of NKVD procedures and his confessed hatred for Stalin. Not long after arriving in Japan, Lyushkov organized a group of Russian émigrés living in China into an assassination team, which was dispatched to Turkey and attempted to cross the Turkish-Soviet border into Georgia while Stalin was at his rest home in Sochi. The group was arrested immediately upon entering Soviet territory in January 1939.[lix] Later the same year, Lyushkov organized a second attempt to assassinate Stalin using a group of Russian émigrés to plant a bomb in Lenin’s Tomb timed to explode during May Day celebrations in 1939. That plot also failed. It turned out that Lyushkov’s knowledge of NKVD procedures did not include access to Stalin’s intense personal security apparatus. But the source of the failures was deeper that that: the NKVD had recruited an agent inside the Manchurian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an interpreter named Boris Bzhеmanskiy, who compromised both plots to the Soviets.[lx]
As he settled into life in Japan, Lyushkov became a public commentator on Soviet policies. In May 1939, he published an article in the Japanese magazine Kaizo explaining the results of the Eighteenth Party Congress, which occurred in March 1939.[lxi] He also published a critique of Stalin’s agricultural policy in July 1939, an exposition on Far East military theory in September 1939, and an analysis of Soviet policies in Europe in December 1939.[lxii]
His Japanese hosts made him welcome, offering him Japanese women to keep him company, one of which he took as a wife. He received Japanese citizenship and a Japanese name, Toshikazu Yamaguchi. Nevertheless, he spoke openly of wanting to immigrate to the United States. He drafted an autobiographical book and contacted a U.S. publisher, who gave him positive encouragement about the prospects of publishing it. He saved the money he made from Japanese articles so that he could eventually go to America. However, as the war progressed, his prospects of emigrating faded.[lxiii]
When the USSR moved to the offensive against Germany in 1943 and the Japanese General Staff began to realize that war with the Soviet Union was a real possibility, the Japanese needed Soviet expertise more urgently than ever. By July 1945, Lyushkov was moved to Manchuria to provide direct support to Japanese forces that faced a looming Soviet invasion. However, his information had become stale in the seven years since he left the Soviet Union; Soviet capabilities had change drastically, and his presence became more of a liability than a benefit. In August, when Soviet forces finally invaded, Lyushkov’s Japanese escorts decided he knew too much about Japanese intelligence tactics, and on 20 August 1945, a Japanese officer, Captain Yutaka Takeoka, recommended to Lyushkov that he commit suicide. Lyushkov declined and Takeoka shot him instead. His body was cremated and his final resting place was an unmarked grave at a temple for the unknown in Dairen, China.[lxiv]
After World War II the Soviet military counterintelligence organization SMERSH searched for Lyushkov but failed to find him, not realizing he was already dead. In November 1945, Soviet forces captured Takeoka and interrogated him and he informed them of Lyushkov’s fate, admitted having killed Lyushkov.[lxv] Takeoka served eleven years in Soviet prison camps before being repatriated to Japan in 1956. He first publicly discussed his role in the Lyushkov case in 1979 and Coox interviewed him in 1991, along with other Japanese officers who were involved in disposing of Lyushkov.[lxvi]
Some post-Soviet writers have created a story claiming that Lyushkov was not killed in 1945, but instead escaped to an American safehouse in China after the Japanese defeat and brought to the United States in October 1945. These rumors, supposedly based on unidentified declassified documents, indicate that Lyushkov served as a consultant for the CIA and the U.S. Department of State on matters involving the Far East and Soviet foreign policy, and that he lived in California until his death in 1968.[lxvii] There is no documentary support for these rumors, which are possibly based more on twenty-first century Russian antipathy toward the United States than in twentieth century reality.
Notes
- [i] Photo from “Notes of General Lyushkov’s Defection From the Soviet Union,” Shashin Shuho, 20 July 1938.
- [ii] Coox, Alvin D., “L’Affaire Lyushkov: Anatomy of a Defector,” Soviet Studies, Vol. 19 (January 1968), pp. 405-420.
- [iii] Alvin D. Coox, “An Intelligence Case Study: The Lesser of Two Hells: NKVD General G. S. Lyushkov’s Defection to Japan, 1938-1945, Part I,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 11, no. 3 (1998), pp. 145-186; Coox, Alvin D., “An Intelligence Case Study: The Lesser of Two Hells: NKVD General G. S. Lyushkov’s Defection to Japan, 1938-1945, Part II,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 11, no. 4 (1998), pp. 72-110.
- [iv] Nishino, Tatsukichi, 謎の亡命者リュシコフ (Nazo no bōmeisha Ryushikofu; Mysterious Exile Lyushkov) (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1979).
- [v] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part I, p. 146.
- [vi] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part I, p. 148; Petrov and Skorkin, Who Led the NKVD 1934-1941, http://www.memo.ru/history/nkvd/kto/index.htm.
- [vii] Valeriy Valeryevich Levchenko, “Сергей Леонидович Рубинштейн:Грани Интеллектуальной Биографии Одесского Периода (1910-1920-е гг.)” (“Sergey Leonidovich Rubenshteyn: On the Edges of Intellectual Biography of the Odessa Period (1910-1920)”), Вісник Одеського Національного Університету(Odesa National University Herald), Vol. 17, No. 2(8) (2012), pp. 112-113.
- [viii] Petrov and Skorkin, Who Led the NKVD 1934-1941.
- [ix] “Международный фонд ‘Демократия’" (“International Foundation ‘Democracy’”), Aleksandr N. Yakovlev Foundation, http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond.
- [x] “Спецсообщение Информационного отдела ГПУ УССР о «ненормальных явлениях» в проведении хлебозаготовок по Зиновьевскому округу” (“Special Report of the Information Department of the USSR GPU on ‘Abnormal Events’ in the Conduct of Grain Production in the Zinovyevskiy Okrug,” dated 26 October 1929, Document Database, Aleksandr N. Yakovlev Foundation, http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/db-docs.
- [xi] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part I, p. 148. Coox draws from interviews with former Japanese intelligence officers and from post-defection Lyushkov’s notes.
- [xii] Document Database, Aleksandr N. Yakovlev Foundation, http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/db-docs.
- [xiii] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part I, p. 172.
- [xiv] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part I, p. 159-160.
- [xv] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part I, p. 149.
- [xvi] Alexander Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes (New York: Random House, 1953), p. 219. Lyushkov is identified as G. Lushkov.
- [xvii] The letter is in the Hoover Institution Archives, Trotsky Collection, Box 13, Folder 63, Orlov, Aleksandr 1938. Feldbin/Orlov also discussed this case in detail in his September 1955 testimony before the U.S. Senate, where he admitted using Lyushkov’s name as cover. See United States Congress. Senate. Judiciary Committee. Testimony of Alexander Orlov, 87th Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1955).
- [xviii] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part I, p. 149.
- [xix] Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, Empire of Fear (London: Andre Deutsch, 1956), pp. 74-75.
- [xx] “Спецсообщение Н.И. Ежова И.В. Сталину с приложением заявления А.Г. Белобородова” (“Special Report of N. I. Yezhov to J. V. Stalin with enclosed statement of A. G. Beloborodov”), dated 26 May 1937, Document Database, Aleksandr N. Yakovlev Foundation, http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/db-docs.
- [xxi] “Из Ростова-на-Дону — И.В. Сталину” (“From Rostov-na-Donu to J. V. Stalin”), dated 9 July 1937, Document Database, Aleksandr N. Yakovlev Foundation, http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/db-docs.
- [xxii] “Сообщение Г.С. Люшкова Н.И. Ежову о заявлении М.М. Малинова” (“Note of G. S. Lyushkov to H. I. Yezhov on a Statemtent of M. M. Malinov”), dated 27 June 1938, Document Database, Aleksandr N. Yakovlev Foundation, http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/db-docs.
- [xxiii] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part I, p. 157.
- [xxiv] Enclosure to U.S. military attaché in Moscow dispatch, “Interrogation of Liushkov G. S. November 1938,” dated 12 May 1939, p. 1, NARA, RG 165, Correspondence of the Military Intelligence Division Relating to General, Political, Economic, and Military Conditions in Russia and Soviet Union 1918-1941, MID number 2037-1997/11, Microform series M-1443, roll 17.
- [xxv] Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes, p. xi.
- [xxvi] “Interrogation of Liushkov G. S. November 1938,” p. 1.
- [xxvii] “Постановление политбюро ЦК ВКП(б) ‘о корейцах’" (“Resolution of the Politburo of the CC VCP (b) ‘On the Koreans’”), dated 21 August 1937, Document Database, Aleksandr N. Yakovlev Foundation, http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/db-docs.
- [xxviii] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part I, p. 155-156.
- [xxix] U.S. military attaché in Moscow, USSR, dispatch, “Comments on Statements of Fugitive Generals,” dated 1 August 1938, NARA, RG 165, Correspondence of the Military Intelligence Division Relating to General, Political, Economic, and Military Conditions in Russia and Soviet Union 1918-1941, MID number 2037-1997/9, Microform series M-1443, roll 17.
- [xxx] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part I, p. 147.
- [xxxi] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part I, p. 159.
- [xxxii] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part I, p. 146.
- [xxxiii] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part I, p. 159.
- [xxxiv] Ilya Kuksin, “Побег Столетия” (“Escape of the Century”), Вестник (Herald), No. 17, 17 August 1999.
- [xxxv] U.S. military attaché in Riga, Latvia, dispatch, “Desertion of High Officers from the Far East Army,” dated 7 July 1938, NARA, RG 165, Correspondence of the Military Intelligence Division Relating to General, Political, Economic, and Military Conditions in Russia and Soviet Union 1918-1941, MID number 2037-1997/8, Microform series M-1443, roll 17.
- [xxxvi] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part I, p. 165.
- [xxxvii] Nishino, Mysterious Exile Lyushkov, p, 97.
- [xxxviii] “Desertion of High Officers from the Far East Army,” 7 July 1938.
- [xxxix] U.S. military attaché in Moscow, dispatch, “Comments on Statements of Fugitive Generals,” dated 1 August 1938, NARA, RG 165, Correspondence of the Military Intelligence Division Relating to General, Political, Economic, and Military Conditions in Russia and Soviet Union 1918-1941, MID number 2037-1997/9, Microform series M-1443, roll 17.
- [xl] U.S. military attaché in Moscow dispatch, “Interrogation of Liushkov,” dated 12 May 1939, NARA, RG 165, Correspondence of the Military Intelligence Division Relating to General, Political, Economic, and Military Conditions in Russia and Soviet Union 1918-1941, MID number 2037-1997/11, Microform series M-1443, roll 17.
- [xli] “Разсказ Беглеца из СССР” (“Story of an Escapee from the USSR”), Vozrozhdenie, 9 June 1939, p. 2. Ivanenko is not included among the research subjects for this study because he was a low-level soldier, not an officer.
- [xlii] “Interrogation of Liushkov G. S. November 1938,” p. 4-5.
- [xliii] This is similar to how Lenin swept away the tsarist old guard at the beginning of the Soviet era, placing young idealists—often 18-20 year olds—as political commissars over military units to force communization. Lyushkov himself had been among those young people 20 years earlier.
- [xliv] “Interrogation of Liushkov G. S. November 1938,” p. 6.
- [xlv] “Interrogation of Liushkov G. S. November 1938,” p. 7.
- [xlvi] “Interrogation of Liushkov G. S. November 1938,” p. 8-9, 11.
- [xlvii] “Interrogation of Liushkov G. S. November 1938,” p. 19.
- [xlviii] “Interrogation of Liushkov G. S. November 1938,” p. 22-23.
- [xlix] “Interrogation of Liushkov G. S. November 1938,” p. 24-25.
- [l] “Interrogation of Liushkov G. S. November 1938,” p. 25; Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part II, p. 75.
- [li] U.S. military attaché in Moscow, dispatch, “Source of Information Contained in Moscow Report No. 1503-6310,” dated 12 May 1939, NARA, RG 165, Correspondence of the Military Intelligence Division Relating to General, Political, Economic, and Military Conditions in Russia and Soviet Union 1918-1941, MID number 2037-1997/11, Microform series M-1443, roll 17.
- [lii] “Source of Information Contained in Moscow Report No. 1503-6310.”
- [liii] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part II, pp. 72-75.
- [liv] Chalmers A. Johnson, An Instance of Treason: Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge Spy Ring (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 148-149.
- [lv] Coox, Alvin D., Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939. (Palo Alto Stanford University Press, 1985), p. 590.
- [lvi] Coox garbled this defector’s name, calling him Major Frontyarmar Frantzevich, probably based on a Japanese transliteration; Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part I, p. 178.
- [lvii] Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Gorbunov, Схватка с черным драконом. Тайная война на Дальнем Востоке (Battle with the Black Dragon: Secret War in the Far East) (Moscow: Veche, 2002), pp. 300-303.
- [lviii] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part II, p. 93.
- [lix] Yoshiaki Hiyama, “Японские планы покушения на Сталина” (“Japanese Plans to Assassinate Stalin”) Проблемы Дальнего Востока (Problems of the Far East), No. 5 (1990), 109-11.
- [lx] Iosif Telman, “Бегство чекиста” (“Flight of the Chekist”), Русский Базар (Russian Bazar), 2012, No. 34 (853), 23 August 2012, http://russian-bazaar.com/ru/content/98483.htm.
- [lxi] Nishino, Mysterious Exile Lyushkov, p, 103-124.
- [lxii] Nishino, Mysterious Exile Lyushkov, p, 125-208.
- [lxiii] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part II, pp. 93-94.
- [lxiv] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part II, pp. 99-102.
- [lxv] Vadim Birstein, Smersh: Stalin's Secret Weapon (London: Biteback Publishing, 2013), pp. 344-345.
- [lxvi] Coox, “The Lesser of Two Hells,” Part II, pp. 103-104.
- [lxvii] Andrey Lebedev, “Побег века: Чекист Генрих Люшков - самый высокопоставленный перебежчик в истории СССР” (“The Escape of the Century: The Chekist Genrikh Lyuskov, the Highest Ranking Defector in the History of the USSR”), Столетие (Century), 30 December 2013, http://www.stoletie.ru/territoriya_istorii/pobeg_veka_965.htm.